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The concept of ideology's theory-building potential has been 
under-exploited in studies of contemporary nationalism. This stu~y 
offers a novel approach to 'neo-nationalism' by defining it as an 
ideology, embedding it in a theory of discourse, and extending this 
framework to a methodology based on text analysis. Qualitative 
deconstruction of texts using the tools of literary theory is one of the 
research methods used, complemented by evidence from elite 
interviews and a survey of primary sources. In order to illustrate how 
neo-nationalism is discursively constructed, the core of the ideology is 
distinguished from its periphery. Furthermore, parties are characterised 
as ideologues in contemporary society and placed within the post-
modern framework of discourse theory. Case studies of the Scottish 
National Party and the Christlich-Soziale Union in Bavaria examine 
their interpretations of nationalist ideology through analysis of the 
rhetoric used in recent election campaigns. The parties are of particular 
interest because they attempt to reconcile core nationalist goals with 
contemporary political issues, such as that of integration within the 
European Union. The SNP is an example of a neo-nationalist party in 
that it pursues its core, immutable goal of prioritising the nation by 
promoting Scottish autonomy within a larger European framework. 
The CSU, on the other hand, is neo-nationalist in that its policies and 
rhetorical appeals revolve around a national nodal point articulated in 
terms of the Heimat. It has sought to defend Bavarian autonomy by 
profiling itself as the archetypal Bavarian party with an important role 
to play in both the German and European political arenas. The case 
studies demonstrate that a nationalist party's support for European 
integration may reinforce rather than undermine its core commitment 
to self-determination. Moreover, the ideological constructs developed 
by neo-nationalist parties can usefully be characterised in terms of 
discourse theory. Both the CSU and the SNP seek to 'de-contest' their 
interpretations of the nation and achieve conceptual hegemony by 
establishing their ideology as 'common sense'. Post-modem theory 
thus not only provides the epistemological grounding of the study, but 
also paves the way for a methodological approach designed to analyse 
neo-nationalism in its specificity. 
Introduction 
~~Politics is not merely - or even centrally - about power; it is also 
about meaning. " 1 
In recent decades, all manner of minority, sub-state, terrorist, 
democratic, irredentist and post-Communist nationalisms have been 
used as evidence of a phenomenon generically termed 'the rise of 
nationalism'. A few movements have grabbed the news headlines and 
others have arrested the attention of academics. However, the 
discipline of nationalism theory lacks a systematic investigation into 
nationalism's contemporary manifestations, and this study makes a 
contribution to remedying that lack. Nationalism is notorious for its 
multi-faceted nature and the difficulty of describing its central 
component - the nation. Theorists now mostly agree on the 
pointlessness of trying to identify an objective 'checklist' of criteria of 
., .. ,. nationhood. Instead, Benedict Anderson's characterisation of the 
nation as a subjectively 'imagined community' has gained almost 
universal acceptance. 2 A great deal of contemporary theorising thus 
centres on questions of identity and ethnicity. The present study, in 
contrast, proposes to analyse nationalism first and foremost as an 
ideology, with all the theoretical implications this entails. 
One important aspect of nationalist movements today is that 
they often do not equate the political expression of nationhood with 
independent statehood, thus moving beyond the nineteenth-century 
assumption that created the term 'nation-state'. Interpreting the 
principle of national self-determination to mean different degrees of 
autonomy can be seen as a pragmatic response to the development of 
multi-level govemance.3 Furthermore, and parallel to Alan Milward's 
thesis as to 'the European rescue of the nation-state', contemporary 
nationalist movements use the process of European integration to 
support their political projects. In his important book, Milward has 
shown the European Community to have been the "buttress[ ... ] of the 
1 R. Poole Nation and Identity p.ll3. 
2 Anderson contends that the nation is imagined as a limited, finite, sovereign 
community. B. Anderson Imagined Communities p.7. 
3 Cf. M. Mann 'Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, 
Developing, Not Dying' in G. Balakrishnan (ed.) Mapping the Nation. 
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nation-state's post-war construction".4 This study sets out to 
demonstrate that the European Union is also used by contemporary 
nationalists to undergird demands for greater autonomy from precisely 
those 'nation-states'. Although such movements have been 
acknowledged as representing a fundamentally different phenomenon 
to nineteenth-century nationalism, few scholars have set out to 
theorise them explicitly. 5 There is clearly a need for a specially 
adapted theoretical and empirical approach to guide the student of 
contemporary nationalism. This piece of research develops the 
conceptual tools required for such an endeavour, before using them to 
interpret specific cases ofneo-nationalist ideology. 
I Cases of Nee-Nationalism 
Within six months of each other, two very different party 
political broadcasts were shown on Bavarian and Scottish television 
~ 
respectively. The first opened with shots of beautiful young people 
picnicking and frolicking beside a lake. The typically attractive 
Bavarian countryside complemented the sun-kissed, colourful and 
carefree mood of the broadcast. This party evidently wanted to be 
associated with the good life. The second broadcast, on the other hand, 
had a down-to-earth feel. It offered images of politicians pressing the 
flesh under a characteristic Scottish drizzle, shots of Scotland's 
industrial landscape, and a portrait of a prominent party member 
fading into that of an old age pensioner. It conveyed the message that 
the party in question gave 'bread and butter' issues a high priority. The 
first broadcast, on the other hand, continued with shots of a child 
drawing a pretty picture of a bucolic scene, a combine harvester in a 
golden cornfield and a baker making typical Bavarian bread. This 
party wanted to show it was close to the ordinary people of Bavaria. 
The second broadcast, in contrast, included a sequence in which an 
office worker put down the telephone, picked up a framed photograph 
of prime minister Tony Blair, and dropped it into a wastepaper basket. 
4 A. Milward The European Rescue of the Nation-State p.3. 
5 Some prominent theorists of nationalisms' appraisals of neo-nationalism are 
summarised in D. _McCrone The Sociology of Nationalism Ch. 7. Eric Hobsbawm, 
however, describes Eastern European nationalism in the 1990s as a product of the 
same dynamics as those responsible for nationalism's nineteenth-century variants. E. 
Hobsbawm Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality Ch. 6. 
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This stark symbolism made it clear that the party opposed the sitting 
UK government and everything it stood for. The first broadcast, in 
turn, included images of a scintillating cityscape, a high-tech office 
and a rocket flying through space. This party wanted to show that it 
knew how to keep up with the times. Finally, the second broadcast Was 
interspersed with pictures of a crowd waving small paper saltires, of 
people singing and playing instruments in a traditional Scottish pub, 
and a shot of a Highland landscape. This party was identifying with 
typical Scottish symbols. 
The maker of the first broadcast, shown during the campaign 
for elections to the Bavarian parliament in September 1998, was the 
Bavarian Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU). The Scottish National Party 
(SNP) made the second broadcast, which was used in the run-up to the 
first Scottish parliament election in May 1999. The imagery used in 
these campaign materials tells us a lot about the parties in question by 
visually summarising central aspects of their ideologies. Evidently, the 
SNP and the CSU are similar in that they emphasise the importance of 
a given territory to their identity. However, the way in which they 
characterise this identity is quite different; the CSU's rendering is 
more vivid and aesthetically pleasing, while the SNP's imagery has a 
grittier edge. In turn, the SNP pushes Scotland's social problems to the 
fore, whereas the CSU delivers its policy messages in a less forceful 
manner. This may partly be due to the fact that the CSU is a long-term 
governing party in Bavaria and that the SNP, on the contrary, has only 
ever been in opposition. Another substantial difference is that the 
parties have quite distinct policy orientations. In its broadcast, the CSU 
emphasised business and individual prosperity, in line with its right-of-
centre political programme. The SNP, on the other hand, chose to 
highlight the plight of pensioners and the future of Scottish heavy 
industry, themes typical of its left-of-centre agenda. Not only do these 
broadcasts give us an idea of how each party imagines its respective 
nation, but they also offer a taste of the parties' blueprints for future 
action and the style in which they propose to implement their 
programmes. By stringing together a few minutes' worth of images, 
the parties have constructed a political discourse for us to interpret, 
something this study sets out to do in some detail. 
5 
Wh~n searching for an example or variant of contemporary 
nationalism, it is- not enough to rely on self-ascription by movements, 
parties or ethnic groups. Not only would this scupper any attempt at a 
theoretical categorisation of nationalisms, but it would also risk 
overlooking 'nationalisms by another name'. Indeed, these may be 
pursuing a nationalist project more tenaciously and more successfully 
than avowedly nationalist movements, whilst enjoying the advantage of 
avoiding the stigma often associated with the 'ism'. Nevertheless, one 
of the things we first encounter in a party is its name. The Scottish 
National Party provides us with a seemingly straightforward statement 
of its identity and core political goal; it evidently wishes to put the 
Scottish nation at the forefront of its political programme. Doubts 
immediately arise, however, as to how the party defines 'Scottish' and 
what it means by 'national', questions which will be addressed 
throughout the present study. A somewhat more opaque mission 
'"tit 
statement is contained in the name Christlich-Soziale Union, or 
Christian Social Union. The party apparently wishes to express its 
commitment to a Christian code of ethics. 6 Furthermore, the non-
confessional nature of this religious influence is hinted at by the 
inclusion of the term Union in its name, which suggests not only a 
bridging of cleavages but also an aspiration to be a party of the masses. 
The CSU does not, however, associate the word Sozial with socialist 
ideology, interpreting it instead to mean support for a social market 
economy, as institutionalised in the German model.7 Although these 
components are revelatory of the CSU's world-view, this study will 
focus on what one might consider to be the crucial, or nodal elements 
of the party's ideology. For present purposes, then, the CSU will be 
compared to the Scottish National Party in terms of its identity as a 
Bavarian national party standing only in Bavaria. 
This study will examine how the SNP and the CSU interpret 
nationalist ideology by analysing examples of their rhetoric. 
Nationalism will be characterised in terms of discourse at the 
theoretical level, and tackled conceptually as an ideology. At the 
6 T. Waigel 'Die g~istigen Grundlagen der Christlich-Sozialen Union' in B. Haneke 
& R. Hopfinger (eds.) Gechichte einer Volkspartei- 50 Jahre CSU p. 18. 
7 Ibid. p. 31. 
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empirical level, this will be translated into a concern with the way in 
which the chosen parties convey their ideological message through 
rhetoric. Analysis of texts will therefore be the principal research 
method used. The emphasis on parties derives from their role as 
ideologues in contemporary society; they are of interest here more: as 
sources of ideological thinking than as subjects of study in their own 
right. However, the wide definition of discourse which will be adopted 
requires that attention be paid to the unique context which inevitably 
influences party thinking. The flexibility of party strategy and its 
relationship to the core of party ideology will be another focal point of 
the study. A specific example of this is the SNP and CSU's attempt to 
reconcile their nationalist principles with support for further European 
integration. 
The existence of a tension between nationalist ideology and 
European integration is denied by the nationalists analysed in this 
study, and the question therefore arises as to where the seeming 
incompatibility originates. 8 The answer lies precisely in the 
anachronistic image of all nationalists as separatist and isolationist, 
obsessed with having their own state and achieving absolute 
sovereignty, complete with its connotations of autarchy. Such a vision 
sits uneasily with the process of 'ever closer' European integration, 
which requires member states to surrender sovereignty in certain areas 
in the name of European security and economic co-operation. One of 
the novelties of contemporary nationalism is its attempt to question 
this dichotomy and unite these two apparently divergent strand~ of 
thought. Using Michael Freeden's theory of core and peripheral 
ideological principles, it will be argued that a pro-European stance 
may reinforce rather than undermine a party's core commitment to 
national self-determination. 9 The parties' combination of two 
intuitively incompatible principles has turned a potential threat to their 
nationalist project into an opportunity to further it. 
8 According to one SNP member of the Scottish parliament; "The question is a 
nineteenth century question [resulting from] thinking very much in the Thatcherite 
imperial mode." George Reid, in an interview with the author. 
9 M. Freeden Ideology and Political Theory Ch. 2. 
7 
11 Theoreti~al Considerations 
Taking the distinction made by Tom Nairn between 'old' and 
'new' nationalisms as a point of departure, my research focuses on 
'new' or 'neo' nationalism. 10 My concern to move beyond totalising 
theories and acknowledge the specificity of every neo-nationalist 
movement led me to consider a post-modern approach. Given this 
rejection of universal explanatory models, I did not set out to find 
either specific or general causal mechanisms to explain contemporary 
nationalism. Instead, I opted to interpret the movements themselves, 
rather than the reasons for their emergence. The aim was therefore to 
supplement existing explanatory theories with an interpretative 
framework which could be applied to a range of contemporary 
nationalisms. I felt that the ideological nature of nationalism was 
under-resear~ed, and that the concept of ideology itself could be an 
important source of theoretical insights. The discipline of social 
psychology proved to be an unexpected source of inspiration in 
articulating this hunch. 
The work of Michael Billig, who has written on nationalism, 
ideology and rhetoric, was important in shaping my approach, as was a 
manuscript by Stephen Reicher and Nick Hopkins, which came to my 
attention at the beginning of my research and appeared in book form at 
the end of it. 11 From their work, I gleaned four important propositions. 
Firstly, that despite its myriad manifestations, the ubiquity of 
nationalism makes it an important contemporary phenomenon worthy 
of study. Secondly, that "national identity is as much implicated in 
'banal nationalism' as in 'hot nationalism'". 12 This led me to consider 
cases that are neither extreme nor violent, but are nevertheless 
10 T. Nairn The Break-up of Britain p. 32. The distinction is discussed on p. 28 of the 
present study. 
11 M. Billig Ideology and social psychology; extremism, moderation and 
contradiction, Arguing and Thinking; a rhetorical approach to social psychology, 
Ideology and Opinions: Studies in Rhetorical Psychology and Banal Nationalism. S. 
Reicher & N. Hopkins Identity, Mobilisation and Nation; A Psychology of Mass 
Action and Self and Nation. 
12 S. Reicher & N. Hopkins Self and Nation p. 101. Here the authors play on the term 
'banal nationalism' coined by Michael Billig. 
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expressions of nationalist ideology. The third proposition concerns the 
centrality of rhetoric to the study of nationalism, and its 
characterisation as the linguistic expression of ideology. 13 The 
resulting focus on the qualitative analysis of texts enabled me to 
analyse nationalisms in their specificity. It also tallies well with a post-
modem perspective, which allows for a crossover between political 
enquiry and literary theory in the deconstruction of texts. Finally, these 
authors use nationalism's ideological nature in order to access its 
meaning; 
There is a case for saying that nationalism is, above all, an ideology of 
the first person plural. The crucial question relating to national identity 
is how the national 'we' is constructed and what is meant by such 
construction. 14 
My approach to nationalism draws on work from three 
academic disciplines. The work of Billig, Reicher and Hopkins was the 
first important source, and led me to structure my research around the 
guiding principle that nationalism is an ideology expressed through 
rhetoric. These propositions were all reconcilable with the general 
post-modem approach to ideology as all-pervasive, which could 
incorporate the ubiquity of 'banal nationalism' .15 The theory of 
ideology elaborated by Michael Freeden was my second source of 
inspiration. By answering the question posed in his article 'Is 
Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?' In the affirmative, Freeden 
confirmed that nationalism continues to be a distinct, determinate 
category of ideology in contemporary politics. 16 His work also 
provides the basis for the distinction between core and peripheral 
ideological principles, which will be returned to time and again 
throughout this study. Freeden's understanding of ideology has been 
adopted here; 
[Ideology] effects a decontestation of the political concepts it employs 
by means of a combination of logical and cultural proximi ties among 
13 "We have replicated Billig's arguments about the importance of a rhetorical 
approach to all constructs of understanding." Ibid. p. 98. 
14 M. Billig Banal Nationalism p. 70. 
15 "The discourse of nationalism is the ultimate explanatory and legitimating 
framework in today's world." U. Ozkirimli Theories ofNationalism p. 229. 
16 M. Freeden Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? p. 765. 
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them, which prioritize certain concepts over others, and certain 
meanings of each concept over other meanings. The external 
manifestation of this thought practice is a unique conceptual 
configuration that competes over its legitimacy with other conceptual 
configurations.l7 
The notion of conceptual configurations points towards the empirical 
study of ideology as a construct, and recalls Billig's deconstruction of 
the meaning of nationalism. It also incorporates a sense of rival 
ideologies competing to decontest the meaning of core concepts, which 
has parallels with the dynamics theorised about in some strands of 
post-modem thought. 18 
The concept of ideology contains elements which can embed 
the slippery notion of national identity within the wider framework of 
discourse. Itself a notoriously vague term, the concept of discourse has 
been not only clarified, but also reconciled with ideology in the third 
major source ,.pf inspiration for this study, 'Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy' by Emesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. The theory of 
discourse elaborated in this book provided the conceptual toolbox 
required to approach neo-nationalism from a post-modem perspective. 
It also placed many ofFreeden and Billig's observations within a wider 
theoretical framework, such as Billig's discussion of the "syntax of 
hegemony"} 9 Furthermore, Aletta Norval has recently affirmed the 
fruitfulness of combining Freeden's work with that of Laclau and 
Mouffe.2° For the purposes of this study, a particularly useful similarity 
is the overlap between Freeden's understanding of a core ideological 
principle and Laclau and Mouffe's definition of a nodal point of 
discourse. To posit the nation as nodal to nationalist ideology not only 
17 M. Freeden Practising Ideology and Ideological Practices p. 307. 
18 W. Gallie was the first to use the phrase 'essentially contested concepts'. W. Gallie 
'Essentially Contested Concepts' in Black, M. (ed.) The Importance of Language. It 
is taken up by Michael Freeden in his book Ideology and Political Theory pp. 55-60. 
On the compatibility of Freeden 's work with post-modem thought see A. Norval The 
Things we do with Words: Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology. 
19 "Right from its earliest times, nationalism used a 'syntax of hegemony', by which 
the part claimed to represent the whole. One form of speaking might claim to be the 
language of the whole nation." M. Billig Banal Nationalism p. 88. 
20 "There is a remarkable coincidence between the morphological approach to 
decontestation an£1 contemporary attempts to develop a post-Marxian conception of 
ideology." A. Norval The Things we do with Words: Contemporary Approaches to 
the Analysis of Ideology p. 326. 
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provides an identificatory marker for case selection, but also situates 
the object of study within a rich discourse theoretical framework. In 
turn, the core principle of achieving national self-determination 
provides a reference point for the study of a nationalist movement's 
ideology and evolution. 
The aim of the empirical part of this study is to show that 
contemporary nationalist ideology combines a flexible, active political 
strategy with its principled justification. Not only does discourse 
theory incorporate a concept of ideology, but it also lends itself well to 
theorising both the adaptability and the diversity of contemporary 
nationalist parties. These will be characterised as ideologues 
attempting to mobilise support behind an alternative national construct 
to that of the existing 'nation-state'. In the sense that neo-nationalist 
parties form part of a constant struggle to establish their ideology as 
dominant, or hegemonic, 'common sense' becomes an exciting object 
of study. It marks the moment at which an ideology triumphantly 
becomes 'banal', to be generally accepted by a given society until 
successfully challenged by another world-view. To quote Michael 
Freeden once more; 
To analyse an ideology (as distinct from to participate in formulating 
one) is to categorise, elucidate and decode the ways in which 
collectivities in fact think about politics [ ... ] The temporal and spatial 
attributes of ideologies become evident when they are explored as 
conceptual configurations, in which general concepts, often courting 
universal appeal, and shared by preponderant membership of an 
ideological family, are fleshed out by adjacent and peripheral 
concepts. 21 
Using this approach, the present study sets out to develop a novel 
theoretical framework for studying contemporary nationalist ideology. 
Ill Chapter Overview 
Case studies of parties, which attempt to reconcile their core 
goal of national self-determination with peripheral principles 
supporting European integration, will be used to illustrate how neo-
21 M. Freeden Practising Ideology and Ideological Practices pp. 304 & 306. 
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nationalist ideologies are discursively constructed. The empirical 
analysis of the SNP and the CSU serves to illustrate the first overall 
contention being made; namely that the huge variation in 
contemporary forms of nationalism can best be understood in terms of 
ideology, characterised as a combination of core and peripheral 
principles. The second contention of this study is that, despite their 
apparent diversity, contemporary nationalist parties all share the core 
principle of self-determination, and can thereby be identified as 
nationalist. The third contention is that discourse theory offers a useful 
means of analysing nationalist ideology. Not only does this framework 
provide an epistemological grounding for the present study, but it also 
paves the way for a methodological approach adapted to the intricacy 
and detail of ideological rhetoric. It is hoped that this study will 
contribute to the theoretical literature by characterising contemporary 
nationalism as an ideology, embedding it in a theory of discourse, and 
extending this framework to a methodology based on text analysis. 
Chapters one and two offer a theoretical justification for using 
the concepts of ideology and discourse to analyse nationalism. In 
chapter one, it will be shown that the potential of ideology to 
illuminate and characterise nationalism has been under-exploited in the 
theoretical literature. A discussion of 'thick' and 'thin' ideologies and 
an examination of competing interpretations of the concept of ideology 
itself will contribute to filling this gap. As a prelude to the empirical 
case studies, parties will also be introduced into the theoretical 
framework. Chapter two seeks to resolve the ontological questions 
raised in chapter one by the definition of ideology as all-pervasive. As 
such, it widens the scope of the debate in order to place nationalist 
ideology in an epistemological context, namely that of discourse 
theory. The work of discourse theorists Ernes to Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe will be compared and contrasted to other approaches to 
discourse, before highlighting the relevance of their theory to a study 
concerned with nationalist ideology. Finally, rhetoric will be 
characterised as an expression of ideology, and thereby incorporated 
into the post-modem perspective. At this point, a conceptual 
framework incorporating nationalism, ideology and discourse will 
have been ci"eated, within which to embed the empirical data. 
12 
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Chapters three and four provide the methodological and 
contextual underpinnings of the study respectively. Chapter three sets 
about linking the theoretical framework to the chosen research 
methods of text analysis and interviews. The purpose of the research 
design is not to achieve statistical replicability, but to apply the theory 
of nationalist ideology in a way which can be replicated in other case 
studies. Consequently, the focus on rhetoric is translated into a 
qualitative approach to the empirical data and the exploration of 
nationalist ideology through the analysis of texts. The reasons for 
focusing the research design on political parties, the rationale behind 
choosing to conduct two case studies, and the decision to undertake a 
limited number of text analyses are discussed. Finally, an overview of 
the sources consulted during fieldwork leads into chapter four, which 
begins with a review of the literature concerning the SNP and the 
CSU. A discussion of the devolution and federalism debates in 
Scotland and Bavaria serves to relate each party's interpretation of 
self-determination to the political arena in which it is being advanced. 
The role of parties as ideologues throughout their history is then 
placed in the context of contemporary party political competition, in 
order to provide a basis for the analysis of changing party strategies. 
This contextual account is designed to situate the text analyses to 
follow within their respective political cultures. 
At this stage, the theoretical, methodological and contextual 
grounding for the empirical data is in place. Throughout the ~ase 
studies of the SNP and CSU in chapters five and six, the presentation 
of data is framed by the theoretical framework which has been 
developed. In order to draw out each party's ideological understanding 
of national identity and European integration, the discussion revolves 
around typical examples of party rhetoric. Furthermore, in keeping 
with discourse theory's concern with context, each section begins by 
describing the specific political environments in which these texts 
were employed. Both chapters end with a section examining each 
party's construction of the nation in more detail. Identifying salient 
themes in party ideology using this qualitative method allows us to 
retain the richness of the data. It also provides an empirical 
13 
springboard from which to make connections between the parties' core 
understanding of their nationalist projects and the supporting, albeit 
peripheral, role played by their European policies in furthering these 
projects. 
Chapters seven and eight compare the discursive constructions 
of SNP and CSU ideology. Chapter seven concentrates on the parties' 
European policy, using interview data to supplement the conclusions 
drawn from text analyses. Party policies on Europe are juxtaposed, 
before examining how these are reconciled with nationalist principles 
in party rhetoric. This leads to a discussion of the internal coherence of 
each party's nationalist ideology, and how European integration is 
constructed so as to underpin rather than undermine the parties' core 
goals. Chapter eight offers an explicit application of the study's 
discourse theoretical framework to the CSU and the SNP. It begins 
with a characterisation of the Heimat and the nation as nodal points of 
the parties' respective ideologies. It then investigates whether either of 
these nodal points has achieved conceptual hegemony in the 
corresponding political arena. Finally, each party's construction of 
national identity is analysed as an antagonistic practice using the 
notion of the 'Other'. The final chapter thus brings together theory and 
data from the chosen policy areas, in order to illustrate this study's 
central contention that contemporary nationalism can usefully be 
theorised using ideology and discourse. Suggestions as to how the 
theoretical framework might be applied to ·other cases of contemporary 
nationalism are made in the conclusion. Indeed, the CSU and SNP's 
unique brands of pro-European nationalism are two examples among 
many supporting the thesis that nationalism is best understood in terms 
of discourse in general and ideology in particular. This approach can 
successfully account for the great variety of contemporary European 
nationalisms. 
The diversity of contemporary nationalist movements can be 
traced to their differing definitions of the nation and understandings of 
how it should best be expressed politically. However, all nationalisms 
are based on the same fundamental principle of politicising a feeling of 
national belonging. In a world constructed in terms of 'nation-states', 
14 
contemporary nationalist parties attempt to mobilise voters behind 
their alternative ideological interpretation of the nation. Nee-
nationalists posit the existence of an 'imagined community', justified 
by means of 'invented tradition', and attempt to mobilise this identity 
in order to achieve national self-determination. 22 The case studies:· of 
the CSU and SNP develop the theoretical discussion by examining two 
interpretations of nationalist ideology, thereby illustrating that 
nationalism may be all-pervasive, but is not an analytically useless 
concept for all that. In turn, the discussion of nationalist strategy and 
rhetoric illustrates the attempts made by political parties to enclose the 
elements of people, party and nation in a vicious circle or, more 
neutrally expressed, in a rhetorical triangle. Thus, ideology and its 
agent, the political party, form the lynchpin between the theory of 
discourse and the analysis of specific nationalist discourses. The two 
levels of analysis complement one another in a way which is 
succinctly expressed by Michael Billig; 
The term 'nation' carries two interrelated meanings. There is the 
'nation' as the nation-state, and there is the 'nation' as the people 
living within the state. The linkage of the two meanings reflects the 
ideology of nationalism. 23 
22 "Whatever the historic or other continuities embedded in the modern concept of 
'France' and 'the French' - and which nobody would seek to deny- these very 
concepts themselves must include a constructed or invented component." E. 
Hobsbawm in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Tradition p.l3. 
23 M. Billig Banal Nationalism p.24. 
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1 Nee-Nationalist Ideology 
The overall aim of the following two chapters is to show that 
the concept of ideology and discourse theory together provide us with 
a useful framework for thinking about contemporary nationalism. 
Placing the data collected within concentric circles of nationalism, 
ideology and discourse theory sets up a clear theoretical framework for 
studying contemporary nationalisms. In the present chapter, a review 
of nationalism theory and different approaches to the concept of 
ideology will serve to delimit the scope and goals of the research. A 
critique of some of the leading theories of nationalism in the first 
section will serve to situate the analysis within this academic field. It 
should become clear that, contrary to this study, the classic debate 
between the modernist and primordialist schools of thought derives 
from a concern to explain nationalist phenomena causally and 
universally. Following on from this, a closer look at recent, 
empirically-based studies will highlight research being done into 
contemporary nationalism. The present study departs from the existing 
literature, however, in that it makes the ideological character of 
nationalism - implicit in all these authors' works - into a theoretical 
focal point. Despite the richness of the concept of ideology, its 
analytical potential has been under-exploited in the field of 
nationalism. Although scholars such as John Breuilly, Paul Brass and 
Kenneth Minogue have explored aspects of nationalism from this 
perspective, it has rarely been analysed using a theory of ideology as 
the point of departure. 1 One important exception is Michael Freed en's 
discussion of 'thick' and 'thin' ideologies in his article 'Is Nationalism 
a Distinct Ideology?' His approach will be adopted here in order to 
support the contention that nationalism is best analysed using the 
concept of ideology. 
The second section of this chapter will set out Freeden's theory 
and demonstrate its applicability to contemporary nationalist variants. 
1 In the introduction to his book, Nationalism and the State, John Breuilly states his 
goal as follows; "The central task is to relate nationalism to the objectives of 
obtaining and using state power[ ... ] Only then should we go on to consider the 
contributions of culture, ideology, class and much else." p. 2. 
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Indeed, the capacity of the theory to account for both the adaptability 
and the diversity of today's nationalist movements will be highlighted. 
Furthermore, Freeden makes a distinction between core and peripheral 
ideological principles, which allows us to identify nationalist 
movements by their 'ineliminable' components.2 His theory serves to 
identify and categorise contemporary nationalist movements and 
therefore forms an important part of the solution to the problem of how 
best to study contemporary nationalism. Any study of nationalist 
ideology also needs to identify ideologues. This leads us to the reasons 
why political parties can be characterised as agents of ideology. It will 
be shown that the adaptability of contemporary party policy chimes 
well with an analysis of ideology which distinguishes core and 
peripheral principles. 
The final section of the chapter looks at ideology in more 
detail, in order to uncover the variety of mindsets informing definitions 
of the concept To place ideology at the centre of an analysis of 
nationalism is not without pitfalls, as ideology is itself a highly 
contested concept. Defining ideology is an ideological activity, then, 
given that analysts' epistemological backgrounds will inevitably shape 
the way in which they approach the concept. An examination of the 
philosophical underpinnings of ideology's manifold definitions will 
reveal that the controversy surrounding it stems from incompatible 
world-views. It will be demonstrated that both Marxist and positivist 
approaches are unsatisfactory for the purposes of the present study, as 
they are more suited to universalising theories than to a differentiated 
understanding of contemporary nationalism. The conclusion to be 
drawn is that ideology, and nationalist ideology in particular, requires 
to be placed in an alternative epistemological context. Chapter two will 
go on to demonstrate how well discourse theory can fulfil this role. 
2 M. Freeden Ideology and Political Theory Ch. 2. 
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I Nationalism Theory 
One of the principal debates within nationalism theory divides 
primordialist and modernist scholars. It confronts the claim that nations 
are rooted in some ancient ethnie with the contention that nationalism 
is a product of the last two centuries of modernisation. 3 Another central 
debate juxtaposes ethnic and civic variants of nationalism, depicting 
them as irreconcilable opposites. In this case, a form of nationalism 
based on exclusive criteria of belonging such as language, religion or 
blood is contrasted with a nation defined according to state 
citizenship.4 These formulations, although having the merit of clarity, 
very much over-simplify possible approaches to explaining and 
classifying nationalisms. Consequently, the pairings should be seen as 
labels denoting end points of a spectrum rather than as strict 
dichotomies.5 For instance, in the celebrated debate entitled 'Do 
nations have navels?' which pitted the 'primordialist' Anthony Smith 
against the 'modernist' Ernest Gellner, each made considerable 
concessions to the other's position.6 Indeed, most scholars would not 
situate themselves at either pole of these discussions. In order to 
evaluate their relevance to the goals of the present study, a closer look 
at some explanatory theories of nationalism will be followed by an 
overview of the primordialist literature, studies of nationalism focusing 
on ideology and selected accounts of neo-nationalism, 
A variety of general theories attempt to account for the rise of 
nationalism, each emphasising different factors as crucial. 7 Michael 
3 For an example of such a debate, see C. Geertz et a/, reproduced in J. Hutchinson & 
A.D. Smith (eds.) Ethnicity pp. 40-56. The term ethnie is used by A. D. Smith to 
mean "a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical 
memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association 
with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among elites." Myths and 
Memories of the Nation p. 13. 
4 A third, philosophical debate looks at nationalism and self-determination in the 
abstract. Cf. M. Canovan Nationhood and Political Theory, D. Millar On Nationality 
and Y. Tamir Liberal Nationalism. 
s D. Brown attributes the idea of a spectrum to A.D. Smith Are there good and bad 
nationalisms? p. 300 (footnote 5). 
6 For a detailed account of the debate, see Gellner's posthumously published book 
Nationalism Ch. 15. 
1 These theories are discussed at greater length in J. Kellas The Politics of 
Nationalism and Ethnicity, J. Hutchinson Modem Nationalism and U. Ozkirimli 
Theories of Nationalism. 
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Mann, for instance, points to the importance of nationalism as a means 
of mobilising men to aliment the military machines of nineteenth-
century states.~ Benedict Anderson highlights the influence of what he 
calls 'print capitalism', the ever-more rapid and wide dissemination of 
the printed word, in fostering a sense of shared national identity among 
the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie. 9 Miroslav Hroch depicts 
intellectual elites as the force fuelling the growth of national 
consciousness. He divides the process of nationalist mobilisation into 
phases, in which first intellectuals, then the bourgeoisie and finally the 
masses throw their weight behind a political project. 10 The best known 
modernist theorist is Ernest Gellner, however, who characterised 
nationalism as a response to the dislocation brought on by the uneven 
development of industrialisation and urbanisation. 11 He claimed that, 
by being uprooted from their homes and thrown together in unfamiliar 
urban surroundings, people were forced to reassess and recreate a 
sense of belonging by identifying with national constructs. Gellner' s 
much-quoted• aphorism, "every man is a clerk", referred to a 
concomitant spread of education in the vernacular, which fostered 
participation in these newly- configured societies. 12 Counter-
nationalisms could be expected to develop, however, among those 
disappointed by the centre's promise of social mobility and equality. 13 
Eric Hobsbawm draws on both Hroch and Gellner in his historical 
account of nationalism since 1780. 14 Finally, John Breuilly privileges a 
political explanation, putting state structures and their need for 
legitimation at the forefront of his account of nationalist movements. 
He comes closest to the approach of the present study when he says; 
There is no valid explanatory theory of nationalism, only a number of 
ways of describing and comparing various forms nationalist politics 
have taken. 15 
8 M. Mann The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 
1760-1914. 
9 B. Anderson Imagined Communities. 
10 M. Hroch Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. 
11 E. Gellner Thought and Change, Nations and Nationalism, Encounters with 
Nationalism. 
12 E. Gellner Thought and Change p. 159. 
13 Ibid. Ch. 7. For an earlier, functionalist approach to nationalism seeK. Deutsch 
Nationalism and"Social Communication. 
14 E. Hobsbawm Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality 
15 J. Breuilly Nationalism and the State p.338. 
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Elie Kedourie is also a modernist, as he demonstrates in his 
book 'Nationalism', first published in 1960. Contrary to Gellner, 
however, Kedourie concentrates on the history of nationalism as an 
idea. The first five chapters of his book offer a detailed account of ·the 
philosophical roots and the development of nationalism, whilst the 
final two chapters discuss its ideological links with left and right, with 
liberalism, democracy and civil rights. Kedourie also discusses the 
social standing of nationalist ideologues such as Herder and Mazzini 
and throws light on the professional frustration, political inexperience 
and intellectual idealism motivating their writing. He argues that such 
men initially shaped nationalist politics, but that figures such as Hitler, 
Stalin and Lenin were responsible for distorting and debasing 
sophisticated intellectual debates. However, although he claims to be 
able to trace the nationalist phenomenon to a set of ideas, Kedourie 
nowhere describes the reception and active application of these ideas 
across Europe. This seriously weakens the plausibility of a theory that 
purports to be explanatory, but does not support the exegesis of 
nationalist ideology with an account of how it was propagated and the 
reasons for its success. 
Kedourie's derivation of fascist doctrine from Kant's thought 
is tendentious and highly normative. 16 The archetype of nationalism 
used throughout the argument is a chauvinistic, German and ethnic 
form, one which regards other nations as having lesser cultural 
content. Kedourie goes on to tar all nationalisms with the same brush, 
eventually trapping himself within his own, overly narrow definition. 17 
16 Kedourie argues that Fichte, Kant's disciple, adapted the categorical imperative to 
a theory of self-realisation through the collective, giving rise to the paradox that the 
individual will is all important but that individual freedom can only be realised by 
subjecting oneself to the state; "[I]ndividuals, as such, are phantoms; they gain reality 
in so far as they have a place in the whole. Consequently, the freedom of the 
individual, which is his self-realisation, lies in identifying himself with the whole." E. 
Kedourie Nationalism p. 38. 
17 Indeed, by the end of the book his defmition is far more narrow than that offered in 
the first chapter. On p.9 Kedouries states; "Nationalism [ ... ] pretends to supply a 
criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government 
exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right 
organization of a society of states." On p. 74 he makes the following claim; "A 
British or American nationalist would have to define the British or the American 
nation in terms of language, race or religion, to require that all those who conform to 
the definition should belong to the British or American state, that all those who do 
21 
By chapter six, his argument is less rigorous and more influenced by 
his evident distaste for nationalism. 18 The spurious distinction 
Kedourie mak~s between a Whig theory of nationality and 
nationalism, for instance, rests on the sweeping observation that the 
former 'worked' in the USA and Britain, whilst the latter led to 
Nazism. Arguably, Kedourie is suggesting thereby that it is not 
nationalist ideology itself but its implementation which is at fault; in 
other words, a relatively 'benign' application of nationalist principles 
should be called by another, less contentious name. Apart from 
anything else, this attempts to introduce an ontological distinction 
between chauvinism and patriotism, rather than recognise them as 
variants of nationalism. Although Kedourie approaches nationalism 
first and foremost as an ideology, the preceding critique has shown 
that his work is an unsuitable role model for the present study. 
Despite the sophistication of the theories outlined above, they 
are for the most part deterministic, as they purport . to find their 
favoured factors at the root of all nationalist movements. 19 Although 
the likes of Anderson and Gellner did divide manifestations of 
nationalism into geographical and historical zones, these categories 
describe very general processes and are of limited applicability to 
specific cases. 20 Liah Greenfeld, for one, accuses Gellner of ignoring 
the historical contingency of many nationalist phenomena. 21 She 
not, should cease so to belong, and to demand that all British and American citizens 
should merge their will in the will of the community." 
18 For instance, note Kedourie's argumentation between pages 107 and 109 of his 
book, which is based on an inductive method and a non-crucial, less than convincing 
case; "In any case national government and constitutional government do not 
necessarily go together [ ... ] This variant exhibits with particular clarity the fallacy of 
associating national independence with efficient, humane, and just government [ ... ] 
nationalism and liberalism are antagonistic principles." (my emphasis). 
19 For instance, Gellner asserts; "[A] homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable 
imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism." Nations and 
Nationalism p. 39. 
20 In Encounters with Nationalism, Gellner divided Europe into four historical time 
zones. He attempted to formulate a general model for the Atlantic sea coast zone, for 
instance, based on strong dynastic states. Anderson's work, on the other hand, is not 
Euro-centric and makes some far-reaching claims, including that 'print capitalism' 
developed in South American 'Creole' states to create the first version of 
nationalism. B Anderson Imagined Communities Ch. 4. 
21 L. Greenfeld Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. In her book, she charts the 
rise of English nationalism before the advent of industrialisation, on which Gellner 




herself recognises nationalism to be a political ideology and charts the 
changing meaning of its central concept, the nation, from medieval 
times onwards. 22 However, despite acknowledging the huge variation 
in nationalist movements according to situational constraints, 
Greenfeld also proposes a universal explanatory model of nationalism 
based on an identity crisis, or anomie, of the relevant social actors. 23 In 
contrast, the aim of the present study is not to explain 'the rise of 
nationalism' as a single phenomenon, but to examine contemporary 
nationalisms according to an interpretative theoretical framework. 
Neither does it seek to attribute objective characteristics to the nation, 
something easily done when all are deemed to emanate from the same 
source. Given that I set out to analyse nations only as a product of the 
political ideology of nationalism, what Peter Alter calls the 'simplest' 
definition of the nation will suffice for present purposes; "[T]he nation 
is a politically-mobilised people. "24 Linked to this definition is the 
point that neo-nationalisms go about mobilising people in a quite 
different environment to the predominantly nineteenth-century variants 
being discussed by Gellner and others of the modernist school. 25 This 
observation alone justifies the quest for an alternative approach to the 
study of contemporary nationalism. 
Along with John Armstrong, Walker Connor and Josep 
Llobera, Anthony Smith is one of the leading members of a school of 
thought which emphasises the 'primordial' elements in nationalist 
movements. 26 Smith asserts the existence of pre-modem ethnies and 
contends that modem states have been built around ethnic 
communities. According to him, the development of a nation from an 
ethnie is equivalent to the transition from a passive community to an 
active, organised and assertive one; 
teleological, ahistorical and apolitical in J. Hall & I. Jarvie (eds.) The Social · 
Philosophy of Emest Gellner. 
22 "The only foundation of nationalism as such, the only condition, that is, without 
which no nationalism is possible, is an idea; nationalism is a particular perspective or 
style of thought." L. Greenfeld Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity p. 4. 
23 Ibid. pp. 14-17. 
24 P. Alter Nationalismus p. 16 (my translation). 
25 This is recognised by Gellner and Anderson themselves, who give contemporary 
nationalism short shrift. For a summary, see D. McCrone The Sociology of 
Nationalism pp. 125-126. 
26 J. Armstrong Nations before Nationalism, W. Connor Ethnonationalism - The 
Quest for Understanding and J. Llobera The God of Modernity. 
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We are not talking here about actual descent, much less about race, but 
about the senses of ancestry and identity that people possess. 27 
Walker Connor's definition of the nation as "a group of people 
characterized by a myth of common descent" supports this view. 28 
Primordialists do not dispute that nationalists make selective readings 
of the past, but are keen to make the point that the selection must take 
place within strict limits set by pre-existing myths, symbols, customs 
and memories.29 Be that as it may, primordialist theorists offer little 
insight into how twenty-first century conditions impact on 
constructions of nationhood. They focus on the past as opposed to the 
present, and their approach is therefore of little relevance here. 
Like Elie Kedourie, Paul Brass and John Breuilly emphasise 
nationalism's ideological character. Although they share the 
primordialists' interest in recognising the specificity of nationalism, 
they do so by highlighting the importance of elites in shaping and 
propagating ideas. In his book 'Ethnicity and Nationalism', Paul Brass 
argues that elite competition, rather than ethnic identity per se, 
constitutes the basic dynamic of ethnic conflict. He goes on to state 
that this theory is compatible with notions of invented tradition and 
constructed social realities. 30 Indeed, Brass underlines the importance 
of the political and economic environment in shaping the expression of 
ethnic identity and its politicised form, nationalism. Similarly, John 
Breuilly points to the central role of state authorities in manipulating 
nationalism as a mobilising force. This supports his thesis that 
nationalism is used in order to create an ideological link between the 
cultural and the political, or society and the state (actual or desired.) 
According to Breuilly, nationalism is a product of "the need to make 
sense of complex social and political arrangements", a task nationalists 
undertake by adopting a simple political project which presents them 
as spokesmen for the nation.31 Breuilly also points to the adaptability 
27 A.D. Smith The Ethnic Origins ofNations p.150 (emphasis in original). For a 
definition of ethnie, see footnote 3. 
28 W. Connor Ethnonationalism- The Quest for Understanding p. 75. 
29 A. D. Smith The Ethnic Origins ofNations p. 154. 
30 P. Brass Ethnicity and Nationalism pp. 13 -14. 
31 J. Breuilly Nationalism and the State p. 343. 
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of nationalism as an important element in its appeal, and highlights the 
construction of stereotypes of the nation, its history and its enemies as 
crucial to the success of a nationalist party. 32 
Similarly to Brass and Breuilly, Kenneth Minogue's definition 
of the nation as "something to be found largely in the aspirations of 
nationalists" and his emphasis on "legend-making", demonstrate his 
understanding of nationalism as a political construct.33 Minogue's 
discussion of national symbols and "people who speak the same 
language" in a metaphorical sense, covers some of the same themes 
which Michael Billig would return to in his work on 'banal 
nationalism'.34 Further, Minogue examines the interplay of 
nationalism with other ideologies such as liberalism and Marxism, 
thereby preparing the ground for Michael Freeden's theory of thick 
and thin ideologies. Finally, Minogue identifies both the power of 
nationalism to inspire political action and the fact that it is an ideology 
largely empty of content. He concludes; 
Nationalism is a set of ideas, but as they travel from continent to 
continent, these ideas add up less to a theory than to a rhetoric, a form 
of self-expression by which a certain kind of folitical excitement can 
be communicated from an elite to the masses. 3 
The work of Breuilly, Brass and Minogue offers important insights 
into nationalist ideology, which are highly relevant to understanding 
the make-up of its contemporary variants. Not only does Breuilly's 
account emphasise nationalism's ideological character, but it also 
identifies the closely related themes of rhetoric and discursive 
constructs. Minogue, in turn, defines nationalism as a flexible ideology 
open to much variation. He discusses it in terms of rhetoric, just as the 
empirical part of this study sets out to do. The present piece of 
research aims to build on this literature by offering a theoretical 
framework for studying contemporary nationalism based on the 
concepts of ideology, discourse and rhetoric. 
32 Ibid. p. 344. 
33 K. Minogue Nationalism p. 31. Cf. p. 154; "The point we have had to emphasise 
about modem nationalism is that the politics come first, and the national culture is 
constructed later., 
34 Ibid. Ch. 5. M. Billig,s book Banal Nationalism is discussed further in chapter two. 
35 K. Minogue Nationalism p. 153. 
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Paul Brass's work is useful in suggesting an approach to the 
empirical study of nationalist movements. Brass claims that symbols 
and myths are selected and manipulated instrumentally according to 
their political usefulness, leading him to the following conclusion; 
The important goal for nationalist movements in this regard is 
exclusivity, the drive to become the sole political representative of the 
community. [Another] feature of the more effective nationalist 
movement is their ability to shape the identity of the groups they 
lead.36 
Such a reading chimes well with the emphasis of the present study on 
the techniques used by a nationalist party to construct a rhetorical 
elision between party and nation, to define the discursive boundaries 
of the nation, and to select the symbols which correspond most closely 
to its ideological interpretation of the nation. However, based on 
Brass's case study of Muslim nationalism in India, Francis Robinson 
takes issue with this stance, arguing that the influence of pre-existing 
Islamic ideas had a far greater limiting effect on elites and the form of 
political mobilisation they adopted than Brass allows for. Robinson is 
of the opinion that the influence of primordial factors on national 
movements should not be underestimated, as these shape not only "the 
range of legitimate actions for the elite [ ... ] but also form their own 
apprehensions of what was possible and of what they ought to be 
trying to achieve".37 He concludes that the primordial argument should 
be given greater consideration, and that the correct approach lies 
somewhere in between this and a constructivist theory.38 Although the 
present study will examine national myths employed by parties, it 
36 P. Brass Ethnicity and Nationalism p. 49. 
37 F. Robinson 'Islam and Nationalism' in 1. Hutchinson & A. D. Smith (eds.) 
Nationalism. 
38 In his critique of Brass, Robinson acknowledges that Brass does not dismiss the 
importance of primordial elements altogether. Ibid. p. 107. Indeed, both Breuilly and 
Brass also recognise that pre-existing factors do influence elites to a certain extent. 
For instance, Breuilly states; "[Elites] also begin with a fund of intellectual 
assumptions about what society is and how it is organised." Nationalism and the 
State p. 344. Cf. Liah Greenfeld's position; "The underlying ideas of nationality were 
shaped and modified in accordance with the situational constraints of the actors, and 
with the aspirations, frustrations and interests which these constraints generated [ ... ] 
Such reinterpretation implied incorporation ofpre-national modes of thought within 
the nascent national consciousness." Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity p. 15. 
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seeks to establish neither their antiquity nor their authenticity. Instead, 
it accepts Hobsbawm's view of traditions as invented, whatever the 
source and pedigree of the components used, and focuses . on the 
contemporary products of this ideological process. 39 
The preceding discussion has picked out some schools of 
thought in nationalism theory, all of which have helped to delimit the 
aims and scope of this research. To conclude, a view which proposes a 
synthesis of the primordialist and modernist positions emphasises 
cross-fertilisation over the confrontation of views within the discipline 
of nationalism theory. The deep-rooted nature of national loyalty and 
its strong mobilising potential have led Josep Llobera to entitle his 
book on nationalism 'The God of Modernity'. Given that Llobera 
distinguishes phases in national consciousness, the following quote 
demonstrates that the distance between the primordialist and modernist 
positions is not as great as might be expected,; 
Nationalism stricto sensu is a relatively recent phenomenon, but a 
rudimentary and restricted national identity existed already in the 
medieval period[ ... ] In modernity, the national sentiment is first of all 
a reaction against the cosmopolitan pretensions of the Enlightenment.40 
Moving beyond these periods in history, one could argue that a further 
stage has been reached in this process, heralded by the declining 
legitimacy of certain states.41 Although this could be rather glibly 
termed a 'post-modem' phase, to do so would be to make a sweeping 
generalisation of precisely the sort post-modem theory strives to 
distance itself from. Further, to describe this stage as a product of 
'globalisation' would be to employ a term as vague as 'modernity'. 
Approaching contemporary nationalist movements in this way is, at 
best, unhelpful. Concentrating on the dynamics of state and sub-state 
39 "It is clear that plenty of political institutions, ideological movements and groups-
not least in nationalism - were so unprecedented that even historic continuity had to 
be invented." E. Hobsbawm 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions' in E. Hobsbawm & 
T. Ranger ( eds.) The Invention of Tradition p. 7. 
40 J. Llobera The God of Modernity pp. 220-221. Llobera might prefer to be called an 
'ethno-symbolist' rather than a primordialist, the term A. D. Smith uses to describe 
his own position in Myths and Memories of the Nation. 
41 For a detailed account of the social, economic and political context of 
contemporary sub-state nationalism see M. Keating Nations against the State Chs. 2 
&3. 
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mobilisatiop, however, is a more concrete project. By focusing on 
some of the actors involved, the dynamics of nationalist dissent can be 
charted; 
Calls for national exclusivity are based on the configuration of 
contemporary politics and states which provides the template to which 
the rise of any specific nationalism is a response [ ... ] Due to 
differences in, for example, national histories, intellectual foundations 
and contemporary economic and political circumstances, a precise 
ideological content, outside of a loyalty to the nation, for nationalism 
per se is impossible to establish.42 
Thus, attention shifts from attempts to explain nineteenth-century 
nationalism universally, to analysis of specific contemporary 
nationalisms within their political contexts. 
Theories of Nee-Nationalism 
• 
The present study will focus on neo-nationalism at the sub-
state level. Tom Nairn was one of the first to introduce a distinction 
between traditional and contemporary nationalisms.43 He refers to old 
nationalism as the process of nineteenth-century European state-
building which took place in the context of industrial revolution and 
the breakdown of agrarian society. As we have seen, theorists have 
variously sought to explain this phenomenon as a device used by elites 
to promote solidarity among citizens, as a consequence of 
modernisation, or as a result of the development of print capitalism. 
These conditions no longer obtain in contemporary European society 
and new theories have been developed to explain today's nationalist 
movements. 
Tom Nairn's Marxian standpoint led him to link the varying 
responses of nationalist movements to the different stages of capitalist 
development of their respective nations. According to him, new 
nationalism is a product of relative deprivation in an already modem, 
industrialised environment. Without subscribing to the epistemological 
premises of this theory, Nairn's analysis is still an interesting starting 
42 M. K Flynn Ideology, Mobilization and the Nation pp. 18 & 30. 
43 T. Nairn The Break-up of Britain Ch. 3. 
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point for a study of the neo-nationalist phenomenon. His account of 
uneven development emphasises the relevance of 'material 
circumstances' to political mobilisation, whilst acknowledging the 
importance of symbols in cementing national solidarity. These are 
themes which are reflected here both in the concern to place case 
studies in context and in the emphasis on rhetorical features when 
analysing texts. From Nairn we can glean the proposition that each 
new manifestation of nationalism is sui generis - a product of unique 
national circumstances - whilst retaining the core principles of 
nationalist ideology at its heart. In the words of Liah Greenfeld; 
The idea which lies at the core of nationalism is the idea of the nation. 
[Nationalism is] a phenomenon whose nature[ ... ] is determined not by 
the character of its elements, but by a certain organizing principle 
which makes these elements into a unity and imparts to them a special 
significance. 44 
Consequently, it is essential to look at both the context of a nationalist 
movement and the manner in which its discourse is structured in order 
to understand how its ideology has evolved. Before going on to 
theorise the 'organising principle' of nationalism using the work of 
Michael Freeden, some alternative approaches to the study of 
contemporary minority nationalisms will be surveyed. 
In his book 'Nations against the State', Michael Keating 
discusses the cases of Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec; three territories 
which have not integrated completely into a state. He links political 
mobilisation there to the fact that state power has been undermined by 
a revolution in governance.45 His discussion of 'new nationalisms' 
depicts them as generally civic movements which incorporate a broad 
social base and are progressive in their discourse; that is, they accept 
both the concept of limited sovereignty and the existence of multiple 
identities. Contemporary minority nationalism is characterised as a 
mix of civic and ethnic markers, mobilised differently according to the 
44 L. Greenfeld Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity pp. 4 & 7. 
45 "[D]ependence has lessened as the states have lost their capacity for territorial 
management and the minority nations have become more self-assertive". M. Keating 
Nations against the State p. 268. However, Keating is not of the opinion that the state 
is generally in decline. Instead, he argues that it has been penetrated and destabilised 
by supra-state and sub-state factors. Ibid. p. 28. 
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changing ~onstellations of power at state and international levels.46 
According to Keating, for such minority movements to be successful, 
evidence of their competence in economic matters is also of utmost 
importance. Furthermore, he emphasises the role of nationalism in 
articulating a new political arena and thereby providing a focus for 
collective action. Given declining loyalty to the 'nation-state' 
construct, sub-state territories are re-invented as centres of social, 
economic and political activity, as well as an alternative locus of 
identity. An account of the way in which conflicts between the sub-
state group and its larger 'Other' are managed is therefore a central 
element of Keating's case studies. His characterisation of the factors 
influencing the programmes and strategies of contemporary 
nationalisms illustrates the effects of today's political environment on 
the dynamics of sub-state movements. The evidence presented 
supports the case for a fresh approach to contemporary nationalism. 
However, Keating recognises the ideological nature of nationalism but 
does not explore the ramifications of this observation.47 This study 
aims to complement Keating's account by elaborating on this aspect of 
neo-nationalism. 
Within the relatively limited literature incorporating case 
studies of contemporary nationalisms, the theoretical approach 
outlined in the introduction to Jenkins and Sofos' edited collection 
entitled 'Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe' most closely 
resembles the understanding of nationalism guiding the present 
study.48 In it, the editors focus on nationalism as a political, 
historically specific ideology and, like Keating, highlight the 
importance of social negotiation in shaping the strategies and interests 
of collectivities. The nation emerges from their account as a 
46 "It is not the existence of language and culture policies which determine whether a 
nationalism is ethnic or civic, but the uses made of language and culture, whether to 
build a civic nation or to practise ethnic exclusion." Ibid. p. 12. 
47 "The nation-state is first of all an ideological construction." Ibid. p. 28. 
48 Another interesting source of literature on contemporary nationalism is the 
discipline of political geography. See, for instance, B. Giordano Italian regionalism 
or 'Padanian' nationalism- the political project of the Lega Nord in Italian politics, 
G. MacLeod In wltat sense a region? Place hybridity, symbolic shape and 
institutional formation in (post-) modem Scotland and R. Levy Finding a place in the 
world economy. Party strategy and party vote; the regionalisation of SNP and Plaid 
Cymru support 1979-92. 
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conceptual tool manipulated by nationalist movements in order to 
legitimate their political project. David McCrone's characterisation of 
neo-nationalism, which generally tallies with Keating's, · also 
underlines its flexibility and context-dependency. For instance, he 
asserts that "different ideological elements are mixed and mobilised: 
right/left; ethnic/civic; past/future; local/global; corporatistlneo-liberal; 
separatistlautonomist".49 This portrayal suggests that neo-nationalism 
must constantly evolve and be ready to adapt the way in which it 
· articulates the link between the individual and the collective. 
In his book, Peter Lynch deals specifically with the relationship 
· between minority nationalisms and European integration. Echoing the 
. t~esis 1 developed. by Alan Milward, he relates a crisis in political 
. ·legitimacy: of: many, European 'nation-states' to their increased 
· participation · in international organisations such as the European 
Communities. 5° In turn, Lynch explores the effects of this on domestic 
constitutional reorganisation and the emergence of many minority 
nationalisms during the 1960s and 1970s, thus seeking to link the sub-
and supra-state dynamics constraining state power. 51 He then goes on 
to illustrate these links by means of case studies of Scottish, Welsh, 
Breton and Flemish. nationalist parties and their European policies. 
Interestingly, Lynch opts to discuss minority nationalisms in terms of 
their.goals, ideology and strategies, emphasising the heterogeneity of 
their approaches to European integration. Unfortunately, definitions of 
these terms are not offered, and they are not used to structure the c~se 
studies. Furthermore; Lynch does no more than state that a shared 
~·demand .for autonomy differentiates his chosen case studies from other 
political· traditions, and neglects to explore the common nationalist 
core of each party's ideology. The present study also sets out to look at 
the interplay between nationalists' European policies and their 
demands for autonomy. However, it does so by embedding its case 
studies in an explicit theoretical framework, which not only helps to 
structure the empirical analysis, but also ensures analytical 
replicability. A discussion of three further works on neo-nationalism 
49 D. McCrone The Sociology of Nationalism p. 129. 
so A. Milward The European Rescue of the Nation-State. For a discussion, see pp. 3-4 
of this study. 
st P. Lynch Minority Nationalism and European Integration Ch. 1. 
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will serve to demonstrate the originality of the theoretical approach 
adopted here. _ 
Saul Newman, in his book 'Ethnoregional Conflict in 
Democracies', categorises five 'ethnoregional' parties according to a 
fourfold typology of ideologies. For instance, he describes SNP policy 
as an example of a 'classless-inclusive ideology'. 52 Like Keating and 
Lynch, Newman emphasises the importance of "state regionalization 
policies in determining the path of ethnoregional conflict that emerges 
in their wake".53 Using statistical data, he seeks to chart the 
development of party strategies as a result of this dynamic, thereby 
relating ethnic identity to political strategy. However, his 
operationalisation of ethnic mobilisation as a factor in late twentieth 
century 'conflictual modernisation', recalls the universalising theories 
developed to explain nineteenth-century nationalisms.54 Consequently, 
although his eTaboration of an explicit typology and his emphasis on 
party ideology, party interaction and other contextual factors make for 
well-structured and insightful case studies, Newman's theoretical 
approach is not a suitable model for the present study. 
Montserrat Guibemau 's latest book complements her previous 
research into the philosophical underpinnings of nationalism by 
elaborating a theoretical approach to contemporary 'Nations without 
States'. 55 In it, Guibemau examines the relationship between sub-state 
mobilisation and the changing global political order by focusing on the 
conceptual triad of state, nation and nationalism, the role of 
intellectuals in promoting nationalism, and the means used by 
52 "A classless-inclusive ideology is one that does not attempt to mobilize individual 
socio-economic groups or organizations within the potential ethnoregional 
constituency through particularistic appeals. Instead it appeals simultaneously to all 
socio-economic groups and organizations[ ... ] and downplays the importance of 
socio-economic differences within the ethnoregion." S. Newman Ethnoregional 
Conflict in Democracies p. 10. 
53 Ibid. p.221. 
54 "The conflictual modernization approach focuses attention on a set of economic, 
social and political variables that weakened old political attachments and politicized 
new ethnic identities. In so doing, the conflictual modernisation approach not only 
can explain the origins of these conflicts but also their direction." Ibid. p. 8. 
55 These are defmed as "cultural communities sharing a common past, attached to a 
clearly demarcated territory, and wishing to decide upon their political future, which 
lack a state of their own." M. Guibernau Nations without States; political 
communities in a global age p. 1. Cf. Guibernau 's earlier book entitled Nationalisms. 
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nationalist movements to achieve their aims. 56 Although illuminating, 
her analysis could have been rendered more cohesive by using 
nationalism's ideological character - which is acknowledged as 
"crucial" but not explicitly elaborated upon - as a unifyipg theme. 57 
Underlining the competing, constructed nature of state and sub-state 
nationalist ideologies would have supported her analysis of the central 
role of intellectuals as ideologues dedicated to redefining nations as 
global actors. Further, to impute a "stable but dynamic core" to 
nationalist ideology rather than to a nation without a state, as if it were 
a monolithic bloc, might have been a more fruitful line of argument. 58 
The following observation could then have been used to inform and 
organise the book's somewhat disjointed structure; 
Intellectuals have the capacity to create ideologies which can 
contribute to legitimizing particular regimes or social structures, but 
they can also provide challenge and criticism to those regimes and 
• structures. 59 
All the authors reviewed agree that contemporary nationalisms must 
be approached differently to their nineteenth-century variants and that 
their strategic flexibility in the face of changing state, sub-state and 
supra-state relationships must be taken into account. Although this 
context has been well defined and discussed in the literature, 
Guibemau's work shows that the implications of nationalism's 
ideological character for theory-building have not been fully teased 
out. 
Finally, David Brown's . study entitled 'Contemporary 
Nationalism', represents a successful combination of unusual and 
illuminating case studies within an original and challenging theoretical 
56 These themes are discussed in chapters one, four and five respectively. Chapter 
two considers the role of the 'Other' in shaping a national movement's choice of an 
alternative option to the status quo, and chapter six analyses the flexibility of 
nationalist demands in the face of <;hanging political structures, including EU 
structures. In the final two chapters of the present study, these issues will be 
subsumed into an ideology-based analysis of contemporary sub-state nationalism. 
57 "The political ideologies to which nationalism is attached are crucial to 
understanding the significance and character of nationalism in each particular case." 
M. Guibemau Nations without States p. 7. 
58 /bid. p. 17. 
59 Ibid. p. 98. 
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framewor~. The author st.ates th~t the . purpose of his book is to · 
"unravel nationalism by. isolating' and examining its ideological 
components".60 --His aim is thus;very similar to that of the present 
study. Brown adopts. ·what. he .. ~ails a constructivi~t approach to 
nationalism, defining it as ,"ari. ideology offering a distorted perception 
of reality, containing s~.l.ective; · simplifications and elements of 
myth".61 He t~en goes o·~:l.~o,·,:,distinguish .. '. civic, ethnocultural and 
multicultural nationalisms; ,ar~i~g ·.that .t4·~ .iast haS recently emerged : 
from the 'unravelling'; ··~f;'_.the ': ·.ftr~t · .. ~~> :Howe~er, Brown also · 
highlights their inter~pe~etr~~io~.~·:,.His;atte~pL to 1.systematise the . 
: confrontation betweel?- th~~i~.M~~·.·~,~~d~.i~,.-~~~el~o~e addition to the··: 
· · literature,- not least bec~~-~:,~J~.e :)~~logical.!character. of nationalism 1 .. 
' 
1 
' • .' ·' ,· : .:· '
1
. 'i \ , • : t ~I 1 : ', . .' , • \( • • ,. 0 , .' , • . • 
guides Brown's thought. The approach is· original in that the focus of · 
·. case studies is ~ot {'lric~ted~~rilri~)i.~in ith'~·:~~6~~logical examination i :· .... · · 
. .· '··,··. ,. -;:.\"'' :_ ..... ·, J·t·~,-..-.~;1,\\~i;,l/ •'/1/{li~-~~~·-·,· · .. 0 •• ' •• 
of the causal impact or'p~t~v.ept~).but: ~ather)n 'the examination 'of the ... 
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· mythologisatioas of t~e past~~mbodied in the col)lpeting ideologies of . · .. · 
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' o • 'o' • ,,,,,,1:', I o o :.• : • •'o'., ,• , ' 
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nature of. ~ontemp~rary /~?X~~~~~~::·ldent,i~,es·.~·aspec.ts of nationalism·' .. 
which will be elaborated up.ori here.- In-depth analysis .of concepts and 
···.·:.,·:·· ... -.l'.'· ... ·.; .. :1 • .. • .... t 
themes crucial to nationalism .will be priyileged oyer. a chronological 
• • ,of '· f, .·.I . 
. account in the presentati~n·:~:f c'ase studies.-. -'·': .··.: _: 
, ' '. • , t ~ t': / ·,. • :I ' . ":",r' ''. ' ' I \ ', ~. I I .•. : ' . 
I,·,,' ,• :,,,' \• ', '' 
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... Contemporary, nationalis~ \ideology/per,.·~~. remains an under-.· 
t . • • I ' : • ' ~· ·. -~ :: ,'·' f •• : • I j l • . • : • ·: .'· • . '. • • 
· researched topic, as analysts often neglect the concept of ideology in 
o 1~,' I 0 ~ ·, 00 ~ 0 o I o 0 o ' o o 0 .' ', : 0 •, 
. their analyses of. multi-le\fel; gov.~mance i.an.d. 1 identity.' politics. This 1 
.; .·study contributes to remedy.iiig.~,thi.s,gap_ in.:th~'Iiterature. It sets out to I 
. . . ·. •. ! ·._':,'·:_ . . ·~~._;'.,:~'.:i ... _.·.: .. ·,:·_·f·:l.'t.' ~ . ... .· 
problematise nationalism .. ,in>te~s ·9f id~olo'gy; and to· demonstrate the· 
. usefulness of the con6epti.':ih'; ~~d6~st'andirig·,,neo-nationalism:· At the··. 
·same time, it draws on wo~k. b~--il(6·~~i·n~: ·~~(B~~~n i~·- o~der to .identify · 
the dynamics underlying I contemporary,' ria~ionalist movements and 
salient themes in their ideologies .. ~<;>·t onl~:d~.~s· th~ pragmatic element 
in the definition ofideology.ailow;·scope for ~alysing the dynamics of 
' .. • .. · ', ·,. ··.l'J· .· .• • ..• ··,; • .. 
nationalist party strategy;. but, a· .. study, .of.: the·: conceptual core of 
nationalism also provides· ~·fr~e~ork f~~ :id~~tifying and classifying 
.' I··.''·,·., ':,.."!:'·, .,:·:•:::).;·, . .' ', '·. 
------------~--------
60 D. Brown Contemporary Nationalis~ p: 1.52. 
61 Ibid. p. I. 
62 Ibid. p. 152. 
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possible case studies. The concept of ideology thus contains within it 
the means of structuring an investigation of neo-nationalism, given 
that it can incorporate both flexible and immutable principles. It can 
thereby introduce some heuristic order into the se~mingly endl~ss 
diversity of nationalist movements. Michael Freeden, who has written 
widely on ideology, will guide our first foray into the complexity of 
nationalist ideology. 
11 Nationalist Ideology 
How comprehensive must an ideology be to deserve the name? 
Must it offer a theory of history, an analysis of human nature and a set 
of beliefs regarding man's place in the universe before it can lay claim 
to the title? Very few writers offer so demanding a definition.63 John 
Plamenatz prefers to differentiate between 'comprehensive' and 
'partial' ideologies, or as Michael Freeden puts it, 'thick' and 'thin' 
ideologies.64 The basic principle of prioritising the nation remains 
central to contemporary nationalism. The nation is its very raison 
· · · · d'etre, even ifneo-nationalism's manifold variants have different ways 
of making the nation politically relevant and of formulating the 
ultimate goal of self-determination. But at what point do these 
variations become so opportunistic as no longer to correspond to a 
directing ideology? Michael Freeden's account of 'thick' and 'thin' 
ideologies is useful in tackling this question, as it makes a clear 
distinction between core and peripheral ideological concepts. This 
distinction is used in the present study both to identify suitable cases 
for analysis and to dissect their id~ologies, according to whether a 
principle is central or secondary to the movement in question. 
Michael Freeden defines a thick ideology as one "containing 
particular interpretations and configurations of all the major political 
concepts attached to a general plan of public policy that a specific 
society requires".65 A thick ideology, therefore, consists of a complete 
63 Pace Kenneth Minogue in 'On Identifying Ideology' in M. Cranston & P. Mair 
(eds.) Ideology and Politics 
64 Respectively, J. Plamenatz Ideology and M . Freeden Is Nationalism a Distinct 
Ideology? 
65 M. Freeden Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? p. 750. 
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set of prin~iples which can be applied to problem-solving in all policy 
areas, providing solutions which are recognisably in keeping with the 
world-view in -question. For instance, free market or welfarist 
approaches to . taxation are recognisable applications of liberal and 
socialist ideologies respectively. A thin-centred ideology, on the other 
hand, leaves some conceptual vacuums. It does not provide "chains of 
ideas [ ... ] stretching from the general to the practical, from the core to 
the periphery".66 According to Freeden, nationalism is an example of a 
thin-centred ideology, as it has few immutable or 'ineliminable' 
characteristics beyond the prioritisation of the nation. He cites 
feminism and green thought as other examples of thin ideologies, since 
they have no inherent principles which extend and apply their core 
commitment to women's rights and environmental protection 
respectively. These ideologies thus require peripheral policies - such as 
opposition to nuclear fuel, demands for limits to toxic emissions, or 
measures to palmote sexual equality - in order to translate core goals 
into a practical strategy. Similarly, nationalists must translate their 
core goal of self-determination in a way suited to their political 
environment. Self-determination, therefore, has no precise, immutable 
form within nationalist ideology, as it is interpreted using a different 
set of peripheral principles by every nationalist movement. Despite 
their shared commitment to national self-determination, different 
movements interpret this core goal in different ways. This proposition 
helps to account for the huge variation in the strategies nationalists 
pursue. What is more, they supplement the nationalist core with very 
diverse peripheral principles. The SNP, for instance, understands self-
determination as independence within Europe, whereas the CSU aims 
to preserve its autonomy within the German federal structure. 
Nonetheless, it will be shown that both parties are nationalist in that 
their policy programme is derived from the basic principle of 
prioritising the nation above all else. 
The core of a thin-centred ideology such as nationalism must 
be supplemented with elements from other ideologies. Conversely, 
thin-centred ideologies can be used to supplement an otherwise 'thick' 
ideology lacking in one fundamental area. Examples of this are 
66 Ibid. p. 750. 
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parties' selection of a national arena in which to pursue their particular 
political project, and the implicit acceptance by most sitting 
governments of the current boundaries of the nation-state. Despite 
being conservative, liberal or socialist first and foremost, governments 
thereby incorporate the central element of nationalism into their 'thick' 
ideologies.67 According to Freeden, then, core principles are the bare 
bones of a belief-system, which require to be fleshed out. Peripheral 
principles are a form of ideological padding, which is flexible in order 
to respond to changing social needs. These principles correspond to 
party strategy, which translates core ideological beliefs into a plan of 
action for making them a reality. Focusing on nationalist ideology will 
serve to illustrate this typology further. 
Freeden describes nationalism as a thin-centred ideology wit~ 
five core principles; first, the prioritisation of the nation as a key 
• defining framework for human beings; second, the positive 
valorisation of the nation; third, the desire to give a political and 
institutional form to the nation; fourth, the importance of space and 
time in determining social identity and fifth, a sense of belonging 
closely bound up with emotion.68 The first of these elements sums up 
the ideology's core commitment to national self-determination.69 
However, as Montserrat Guibemau rightly points out, nationalist 
ideology "does not indicate the direction to be taken or the methods 
which should be adopted to achieve [these goals]". 70 This makes it a 
thin-centred ideology in Freeden's terms, as it requires peripheral 
concepts to turn its abstract core into a political plan of action. Tha-t is, 
the core is interpreted differently depending on the circumstances; the 
SNP will evidently draw on different symbols of belonging than the 
CSU, which will have ways of defining Bavarian identity designed to 
appeal to its own national audience. Hence the 'chameleon-like' nature 
67 For a detailed discussion of these thick ideologies, see M. Freeden Ideology and 
Political Theory. The all-pervasiveness of the nation as an organising principle will 
be returned to in chapter two of this study. 
68 M. Freeden Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? pp.751-752. 
69 Anthony Smith proposes his own analysis of the 'core doctrine' of nationalism, 
highlighting basic propositions such as the division of the world into nations, the 
nation as the source of all political and social power, and the need to identify with the 
nation as a means to self-realisation. A. D. Smith National Identity p. 74. 
70 M. Guibernau Nationalisms p.63. 
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of nationalism, a flexible ideology par excellence, capable of being 
moulded to fit e-yery situation. 
Supplementing nationalism with elements of fascist ideology 
can turn the nation into an exclusionary, ethnically defined one, so 
much so that to purify it of foreign elements can be considered the 
only way of prioritising the nation. Anti-colonial nationalism has 
sometimes been combined with Communist principles, or has merely 
sought to create national solidarity on the basis of opposition to the 
colonial oppressor. The former offers an elaborated means of creating 
a united nation (a thick ideology, in other words) whereas the latter 
relies exclusively on the core principles of positive valorisation and an 
emotional sense of belonging. Without a complete and coherent world-
view, however, confusion and loss of direction are likely to occur if 
the short-term goal of independence is achieved. Finally, an inclusive 
form of nationalism is also possible, which makes its appeals on the 
basis of shared citizenship and supplements its wish for a politico-
institutional expression of the nation with a whole gamut of peripheral 
principles covering all major political issues. These examples show 
how the myriad variations of nationalist ideology can be incorporated 
into Freeden's account. By characterising nationalism as a 'thin' 
ideology, Freeden adds another dimension to the following view; 
Nationalism, political loyalty to a nation, is not an ideology itself, and 
only becomes one with elaboration by features that fill in the doctrinal 
spaces not necessarily articulated by a political nation's initial 
development. This accounts for the flexibility of nationalist ideologies 
in application and development, and the variations that can appear in 
reference to a single nation. 71 
In fact, the converse is being argued here. Nationalism is an ideology 
itself, but must be 'thickened' by peripheral concepts in order to be 
applicable to a specific context. The fact that all 'doctrinal spaces' are 
not filled does indeed account for the flexibility and the variations in 
nationalism, but does not demonstrate that nationalism is not an 
ideology. On the contrary, Freeden shows that nationalism is an 
ideology, albei! a thin one, which can incorporate the notion of 
71 M.K. Flynn Ideology, Mobilization and the Nation p. 14. 
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•, flexibility by supplementing its core principles with any number of 
peripheral concepts. 
Freeden's distinction between thick and thin ideologies goes 
beyond recognising the wide variation in contemporary nationalisms in 
order to place them within a theoretical framework which makes it 
possible to examine their similarities. Despite their apparent diversity, 
all contemporary nationalisms derive from the same core principle of 
prioritising the nation above all else. In turn, this preliminary 
conclusion provides a theoretical springboard from which to identify 
and categorise contemporary nationalisms. If the prioritisation of the 
nation can be identified as a core, guiding principle of a movement, 
then it is nationalist according to Freeden's typology. The first 
contention of this study has been demonstrated, namely that 
contemporary nationalist parties all share the same core principle of 
• national self-determination. It forms the basis for exploring the second 
contention; that ideology, and its sub-division into thick and thin 
principles, is the most fruitful conceptual approach to contemporary 
nationalism. Before going on to look at the concept of ideology itself, 
it is important to address the suitability of studying parties as 
ideologues. It will become clear that, far from betraying a lack of 
ideological principle, the adaptability and diversity of contemporary 
nationalist parties provides evidence to support Freed en's theory that 
nationalism is a combination of core and peripheral elements. 
Parties as ldeologues 
The leap from general ideological currents such as liberalism, 
socialism and nationalism to those of specific organisations with 
limited influence and support is a large one to make. However, as 
Michael Freeden remarks; 
Ideologies do not have to be grand narratives; they certainly do not 
have to be closed, doctrinaire and abstract systems. Ideologies are 
recurrent, action-oriented patterns of political argument.72 
7, 
~M. Freeden The Ideology of New Labour p. 45. 
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Given that ,!hey are "action-oriented", actors are central to any account 
of ideology, and political parties are one of the few entities to combine 
a thought-out -world-:vie~ ~ith '.·a strategy for implementing it. 
Although the beliefs and y~lues of all individuals contain ideological 
elements, very rarely can,these. b.e .. mapped a5 a complete, coherent 
ideology. In contrast, parties .combine the philosophy and practice of 
ideology in their politic~{:~~6ir~~::·an.~.~the str~tegies they adopt.. 
Far from signalling .a. ;de~Iid~ ,~{~id~~o·gy;'in ;the .political,arena; the· 
. • ~ . '. • . • . . . .. \ I . . . . . ; I . . . ! I ' 
adaptability of contemporary~. p~i~~ ~<?.'changing social and economic 
circumstances, not to ~~~~i6~ ~t4~i~ .. ~~~c~~ss. t~ r~spon~ to political 
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.. :· members. Parties offer,·:in~tead la) ~yst~matisation·· of: an, ideological~.·· 
trend such as nation~I'is.~.'·:· No; ~~tion~Ii~t ~·party .. actually.· represents 
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either an entire nation, or/ the,·.entir~ · complexity .. of. nationalism, 
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73 K. Mannheim Ideology and.Utopi~Ch'.s:'.The study of particular ideology would 
attempt to pick out the ideological frag~erit8 ·i~corporated into an individual's 
understanding of the world .. For a· social aiithropologist's view of particular 
nationalist ideology, see A. P .. Cohen Personal Nationalism: A Scottish View of some 
Rites, Rights and Wrongs. · .. · .. , . . . 
74 "One form of speaking might claim to be the language ofthe whole nation." M. 
Billig Banal Nationalism p. 88. · 
. . ;, ' ~ 
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some doubt, therefore, as to whether today's political parties continue 
to be agents of ideology. However, in a study of the ideology of New 
Labour, Michael Freeden writes; 
The age in which we live, far from being post-ideological, is one of 
ideological experimentation, of the resurrection of past principles 
combined with new attitudes.75 
According to this view, the adaptability of contemporary parties does 
not make them less ideological than those which stuck to their original 
principles, only to become obsolete. On the contrary, it is a sign of the 
ideological and strategic flexibility of parties that they have been able 
to adapt to the demands of an evolving society.76 Furthermore, 
focusing on parties serves to illustrate the dynamic element of an 
ideology, which must be pragmatic, down-to-earth and regularly 
revised in order to reflect the needs of contemporary society . 
Just as their mass party antecedents were born of the need to 
organise and explain a new system of universal suffrage, today's 
parties are still required to respond to the confusion and insecurity felt 
by many. In an attempt to fit an ideological framework to a globalising 
world, their ideologies have evolved in line with these changing 
demands. All voters are united in their desire for a better standard of 
living, and parties must respond to these wishes by promising to 
provide continued economic growth. At the same time, parties wishing 
to broaden their appeal beyond their traditional class or religious 
strongholds must successfully appeal to a wide spectrum of voters, 
without so diluting their message as to alienate their power base. 
Evidently, strategy and tactics play an increasing role in party politics. 
Changes in society have also prompted a change of tack when it comes 
to campaigning. As social mobility increases, education reaches more 
people and media exposure becomes ever more widespread, parties 
can no longer rely on traditional methods of appealing to specific 
75 M. Freeden The Ideology of New Labour p. 43. Cf. Andrew Vincent, who writes; 
"The new socialism [ ... ] still sees itself as part of a socialist tradition, and there is a 
continuity of values and formal themes; but these are expressed in a form which 
brings them into line with changing circumstances". A. Vincent New Ideologies for 
Old? p. 52. 
76 Peter Mair's work on party systems confirms this view. Cf. P. Mair Party System 





social classes or informing them only through their party newspaper 
and affiliated organisations. This illustrates the changed context which 
requires contemporary variants of nationalism to be distinguished from 
older forms. However, it does not follow from this observation that 
today's nationalists are less ideologically driven than in the past. On 
the contrary, parties are ideally suited to a study of contemporary 
variants of nationalism because of their dynamism, pragmatism and 
policy programmes; all defining elements of the concept of ideology. 
A final word is required on the empirical study of parties as 
vehicles of ideology. Putting his own theory into practice, Freeden's 
study of New Labour teases out the components in the party's 
manifesto and concludes that it displays conceptual flexibility within 
certain confines. He comments that; 
What distinguishes New Labour ideology, as indeed any ideology, are 
the distinctive -configurations it forms out of political concepts, the 
occasional new meanings it assigns to political words in common 
currency, and the innovative way in which it blends ideas both internal 
and external to its traditions.77 
These attributes also apply to contemporary nationalist ideologies, and 
will inform the empirical study of the CSU and SNP to follow. Each 
case will be examined in terms of the key principles which intertwine 
to form a unique ideological configuration. More specifically, the 
terms nation and Heimat will be analysed in depth, as the nature of the 
peripheral principles adopted is dependent on the meaning assigned to 
these core concepts. This will be illustrated using the peripheral 
principle of support for European integration, which is espoused by 
both parties. The parties thereby incorporate an external idea into their 
ideology in order to reinforce the core goal of that ideology. Party 
literature is a rich source of data in examining this process. However, 
any empirical study of nationalist ideology is best undertaken within 
an explicit theoretical framework. As a further step towards 
elaborating such a framework, the final section of the chapter sets out 
to examine the concept of ideology itself. This will lead us into the 
epistemological. debate underlying the definition of the concept. 
77 M. Freeden The Ideology of New Labour p. 45. 
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Ill The Concept of Ideology 
An ideology is a flexible, adaptable, but internally coherent 
belief system that offers a simple, interpretative explanation of society 
coupled with practical measures for maintaining or revolutionising the 
political status quo. Marxist ideology, for instance, offers an 
explanation of society in terms of class and advocates revolutionary 
activity as a means of realising its ideal of a classless society. Liberal 
ideology, on the other hand, structures its Weltanschauung around the 
individual, and defends free market exchange as the best means of 
bringing about individual freedom. Nationalist ideology, in turn, puts 
the good of the nation first, and has as its first principle the goal of 
prioritising the nation. Such a thumbnail sketch will already raise 
questions regarding the accuracy of the definitions just proffered arid 
the huge range of ideological interpretations existing even within these 
belief-systems. Indeed, the concept of ideology itself does not go 
uncontested. In some theories of society, such as Marxist and Critical 
theory, ideology is defined as erroneous beliefs which serve to 
perpetuate the dominance of a social class. Positivists, on the other 
hand, contrast ideology to the rationality and objectivity of science, 
rejecting any claim that individuals in general, far less social 
researchers, might be unconsciously subject to insidious ideological 
influence.78 Still others, who tend towards some form of relativism, 
doubt the possibility of verifiable truth and claim that the world-view of 
all, without exception, is ideological. In discussing these theories, I 
intend to highlight the different defi~itions of ideology from which 
each sets out. A survey of these views will enable me both to evaluate 
the usefulness of ideology to a study of contemporary nationalism and 
to elaborate my own definition of the concept. 
78 "Positivism privileges the study of things which really exist and can be observed. 
This approach posits that facts can exist independently of values and the possibility 
of eliminating all statements of a normative character from scientific explanation." R. 
Scruton A Dictionary of Political Thought p. 428. 
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Definitions of ideology are manifold, but can be broadly 
divided intb the categories of 'neutral' and 'negative'. 79 The neutral 
view tends to stiek closely to the semantic definition of ideology as the 
logic of an idea. The concept's pejorative connotations are said to 
originate from Napoleon's scorn of the French Enlightenment 
Ideologues, led by Destutt de Tracy, who was the first to use the word 
ideologie. Some of the best known proponents of the negative view of 
ideology are Karl Marx and Jiirgen Habermas. The Marxist definition 
was only ever made explicit by Friedrich Engels in a letter written in 
1893; 
Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker 
consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real motive 
forces are unknown to him: otherwise it simply would not be an 
ideological process [ ... ] He works with mere thought material, which 
he accepts without examination as the product of thought, and does not 
investigate further for a more remote source independent of thought. 80 .. 
This description raises many of the issues central to defining ideology, 
not least the question of false consciousness, the perception of 
ideology as a closed, self-sufficient Weltanschauung and the problem 
of identifying what is real. The following discussion will address each 
of these questions in turn. 
Engels portrays ideology as a logical, coherent belief system, 
but one based on false premises. The "remote source" he refers to 
points to the central Marxist tenet that material conditions are what 
determine thought. 81 This is linked to the proposition that bourgeois 
ideology oppresses the proletariat by perpetuating the illusion of fair 
exchange, and thus preserves its own interest in capital accumulation 
by the most insidious means of thought control. Critical theorists have 
gone further still in claiming that even science and technology - the 
79 The variation within these categories remains huge, however, as is 
exemplified by the range of views expressed by contributors to the book 
Ideology and Politics, edited by M. Cranston & P. Mair. 
8° Cited by L. Shapiro in 'The Concept of Ideology as evolved by Marx and 
adapted by Lenin' in M. Cranston & P. Mair (eds.) Ideology and Politics 
p.75. 
81 Engels was later to qualify this statement somewhat by asserting that although the 
economic environment was 'decisive' in men's lives, other political and ideological 
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flexibility !O ideology by failing to distinguish its immutable core from 
an adaptable, changing periphery. It has been shown above that 
-
Freeden's theol)T enables us to reconcile the defining principles of an 
ideology with the flexibility required to implement them. The CSU for 
instance, as a proponent of nationalist ideology, has always been 
concerned with preserving Bavarian autonomy vis-a-vis Germany and 
the European Union. However, the concrete policy expression of this 
goal has developed in line with the evolving discourse in each of these 
political arenas. If we remember that ideologies provide a justificatory 
basis for political action, it would simply not be expedient for political 
practitioners to stick rigidly to peripheral principles if these in no way 
furthered the attainment of their goals. For example, although the SNP 
has remained continually committed to independence for Scotland, it 
has interpreted this goal differently according to changing political 
discourse in Scotland and the UK. Without being as profound as a 
philosophy, idiOlogies do not rely primarily on faith as religions do. If 
an ideology can no longer explain, reassure and mobilise, it becomes 
anachronistic. 
Some analysts are reluctant to restrict the definition of ideology 
to the political sphere.84 However, given that the active element in 
ideology is undisputed, it is difficult to see hov; any ideological 
movement can be apolitical. Coups and revolutions, calls for anarchy, 
peaceful demonstrations and party political action within a democratic 
polity are all a reflection of attitudes to authority and the principles 
organising government and states, and therefore cannot fail to be 
political. Moreover, an ideology without activists would not be an 
ideology, but a philosophy or a dead letter. Ideology is therefore a 
particularly useful concept for analysing contemporary nationalist 
parties, given that it combines principle and practice in its definition. 
Not only does it subsume the study of nationalist party programmes, 
then, but it can also be used to examine a party's plan of action for 
achieving its goals. In addition, the concept of ideology serves to 
organise an investigation into contemporary variants of nationalism by 
84 Cf. K. Minogue 'On Identifying Ideology' in M. Cranston & P. Mair (eds.) 
Ideology and Politics p.76. 
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highlighting both the similarity of their core beliefs and the wide range 
of strategies they adopt. 
Nevertheless, there are as many conservative ideologies·. as 
there are revolutionary ones, and it is at this point that Karl 
Mannheim' s distinction between ideology and utopia becomes 
useful.85 Mannheim defines an ideology as a set of ideas which 
transcends the existing order but can be pursued within it. An utopia, 
on the other hand, would necessarily shatter the existing order if put 
into practice. This distinction provides a means of getting to grips with 
the sometimes value-laden classification of movements into 
ideological and non-ideological. One example is provided by 
Kolakowski; 
The social function of ideologies is to furnish an existing power 
system (or aspirations to power) a legitimacy which is based on the 
possession of absolute and all-encompassing truth. 86 
This definition incorporates the characteristic claim to truth of 
ideology, as well as introducing the distinction - equivalent to 
Mannheim's ideology/utopia dichotomy- between existing power and 
aspiration to power. However, the reluctance of a great many social 
scientists to include the political status quo and far less their own 
value-systems in their understanding of ideology, stems from the 
concept's persistent negative connotations. 
To Kolakowski, "typical examples of ideologies so conceived 
are [ ... ] communism (in all its variants), nazism, fascism, panarabism, 
zionism, various aggressive nationalist or racial activities, as well as 
imperial or imperialist ideas".87 With the partial exception of Zionism, 
all of these movements are widely regarded as either reprehensible or 
suspicious in some way. However, Kolakowski's next sentence reads; 
"conversely, the noun [ideology] seems less fitting when associated 
with adjectives like 'liberal', 'pacifist' and 'conservative"'. No further 
explanation is given as to why the term ideology might be "less 
85 K. Mannheim Ideology and Utopia p. 195. 
86 L. Kolakowski 'Why an Ideology is always Right' in M. Cranston & P. Mair (eds.) 
Ideology and Politics p.l24. 
87 Ibid. p.l24. 
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fitting" in the latter cases. Given that no objective criteria are offered 
to justify this classification, the juxtaposition of 'bad' ideologies with 
what appear t~- be examples of 'good' alternatives, illustrates the 
difficulty of achieving a value-neutral categorisation.88 Mannheim's 
typology has the merit of explicitly drawing attention to this fact by 
choosing to call the 'thought-style' justifying the political status quo 
an ideology. This proposition flows from the assertion that no theorist, 
Marxist or otherwise, can free themselves from ideology and discover 
absolute truth. As such, it tallies with a basic contention of post-
modem theory. In Mannheim's terms, a post-modem approach would 
be equivalent to a 'general' view of ideology, as opposed to a 'special' 
one that would posit the researcher as an ideology-free observer.89 
Thus, 'special' value-judgements mould Kolakowski's supposedly 
non-ideological definition in the same way as Robert Dahl's 
'objective' description of American politics could be said to hide 
presumptions and prejudices emanating from his personal belief-
system.90 The ;.ork of American pluralists provides an example of the 
positivistic approach to ideology. 
The admission that the political status quo IS ideologically 
shaped would rock the positivist perception of reality and objectivity 
on its very foundations. 91 This brings us to the 'end of ideology' 
debate led by Daniel Bell, Raymond Aron and Seymour Martin Lipset 
in the United States during the 1960s.92 The debate itself was premised 
on an extremely negative view of ideology, which was primarily 
associated with fascism and Soviet Communism. Hence, the 'end of 
ideology' debate was predicting the demise of totalitarian regimes, and 
as such was a direct antecedent to Francis Fukuyama's triumphant 
declaration that the 'end of history' had arrived when the Soviet 
88 Cf. P. Spencer & H. Wollman Good and Bad Nationalisms: A Critique of Dualism. 
89 K.Mannheim Ideology and Utopia Ch. 2. Although Mannheim's 'general' view of 
ideology will be the one adopted here, for the sake of simplicity, his conception of 
utopia will be incorporated into my definition of ideology. 
90 R. Dahl Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. 
91 This is highlighted by the following extract from the 'Interp.ational Encyclopaedia 
of the Social Sciences' published in 1968; "In so far as the social sciences have been 
genuinely intellectual pursuits, which have their own rules of judgement and 
observation and are open to criticism and revision, they are antipathetic to ideology." 
Cited in D. McLennan Ideology p.55. 
92 Cf. D. Bell The End of Ideology, R. Aron L 'Opium des Intellectuels and S. M. 
Lipset Political Man. 
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system did eventually collapse. 93 However, the reasoning involved is 
of relevance even if a wider definition of ideology is adopted. For one, 
the approach to ideology was most definitely a 'special' one, which 
rejected the very idea that American society could have an ideologiqal 
foundation. 94 In the understanding of many American social scientists, 
ideology was not applicable to mainstream, moderate politics. 
One example of positivist reasoning is Robert Dahl's pluralist 
account of American society, in which he adopted what has 
subsequently been called a 'one-dimensional view' of political 
power. 95 In his book 'Who Governs?' Dahl analysed cases of conflict 
in order to see which group got the upper hand in competition for 
power and influence over policy-making. However, he did not 
consider cases in which power might have been exercised by 
preventing the conflict from arising in the first place. Consequently, 
pluralism could be seen to be supporting the political status quo and 
perpetuating the dominant role of elites by portraying surface 
competition as necessary and healthy, whilst omitting to ask why large 
sections of society are not involved in political decision-making. In 
terms of nationalist ideology, the constant nation-building efforts of a 
state are indicators of the dominant ideology, one invariably in conflict 
with the aspirations of sub-state nationalist movements. 
Pluralists are reluctant to accept that their environment might 
be ideologically conditioned and hence less objectively real and 
describable. In the same way, Marxists and Habermasians cling to a 
belief in the correctness of their own interpretation of society. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum are those who float in the truth-vacuum 
of relativism. Mannheim' s conception of 'general' ideology which 
recognised that all thought, including that of the observer, was socially 
determined, moved away from the possibility of truth. In an attempt to 
respond to charges of relativism, Mannheim redefined his approach as 
93 F. Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man. 
94 R. Poole cites the academic Michael Walzer as making a similar assumption; 
"Michael Walzer powerfully celebrates the various different ways in which it is 
possible to be American. However, he downplays the extent to which these 
differences are contained within a normative public culture". R. Poole Nation and 
Identity p. 35. 
95 SeeS. Lukes Power; a Radical View. 
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'relationism'. He saw each social analyst as contributing partial 
insights to ·knowledge, which would one day be amalgamated into a 
comprehensive, -supra-partisan science. 96 However, I think one of 
Mannheim's own quotes serves to justify undertaking even a partial 
study for its own sake; 
The existing order gives birth to utopias which in turn break the bonds 
of the existing order, leaving it free to develop in the direction of the 
next order of existence. 97 
Not only does this image resemble the social dynamic described by 
discourse theory, but Mannheim's 'general' view of discourse theory 
is also compatible with a post-modem definition of ideology as all-
pervasive. This is therefore a fitting point at which to widen the 
discussion of ideology in order to look at the epistemological 
framework of this study. 
Conclusion 
The review of theories of nationalism and neo-nationalism has 
demonstrated the originality of studying nationalism first and foremost 
as an ideology. What is more, the fruitfulness of applying Freeden's 
theory of ideology to contemporary nationalism has been outlined and 
its compatibility with a study of political parties has been illustrated. 
Freed en's theory of thick and thin ideologies serves to organise the 
complexity and diversity of contemporary nationalisms, thereby 
providing a means of structuring their empirical study and the 
interpretation of the results. Consequently, the distinction between core 
and peripheral principles will permeate the case studies. In turn, 
nationalist ideology is defined as linking an internally coherent, if 
simplified, interpretation of the world to a political plan of action for 
making its ideals a reality. According to the view of nationalism 
adopted here, the nation can neither be defined objectively, nor can 
neo-nationalism be explained in terms of universal causality. Instead, 
each ideology is portrayed as competing with alternative world-views, 
with none being able to lay claim to truth outside of its own conceptual 
96 K. Mannheim Ideology and Utopia Ch. 5. 
97 Ibid. p.179. 
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framework. Neither can individuals leave behind their ideological 
baggage in a quest for objectivity. Indeed, a refusal to discuss the all-
pervasiveness of ideology makes any account of society incomplete. 
The preceding discussion has shown that all definitions of 
ideology are embedded within a meta-theoretical framework. This 
study aims to incorporate ideology into a wider epistemology based on 
discourse theory. Not only does ideology find a place within .the 
theory's conceptual armoury, but the work of Emesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe provides us with a way of characterising the dynamics 
of neo-nationalism.98 To pick a path which rejects both Marxism and 
. positivism is to choose a rocky road indeed, for to accept the all-
pervasiveness of ideology risks making the concept too general to 
.. · ... retain any·· analytical purchase. Restricting the focus of the study to 
parties as proponents of ideology represents an important step towards 
solving this problem. Moreover, it will be shown that discourse theory 
helps to avoid this pitfall by making a valuable heuristic contribution 
to a study concerned with the interplay between ideology's immutable 
core principles and the flexibility of the strategies used to pursue them. 
It will be argued that only a post-modem framework can successfully 
incorporate the ramifications of the chosen definition of ideology, 
whi.ch should be placed within the theoretical context of all-pervasive 
ideologies and constructed, competing discourses. Such an approach 
makes a substantial contribution to solving the problem of how best to 
study neo-nationalism, and complements the approach to ideology 
developed in this chapter. 
98 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
2 Discourse Theory 
Despite propounding very different philosophies, both Michel 
Foucault and Jiirgen Habermas have contributed to heightening 
awareness of the study of language in social enquiry. In particular, 
Foucault's book 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' and Habermas' 
theory of communicative action highlight the relationship between 
language and power. 1 Although these authors theorise the link in very 
different ways, discourse theory nevertheless develops and draws on 
both schools of thought. It is at once avowedly post-Marxist and 
infused with Foucault's theory of discourse formations. Contrary to 
Foucault's definition of discourse, however, Laclau and Mouffe's 
concept incorporates that of ideology.2 In turn, their attribution of a 
central role to words and their meanings as indicators of power 
relations informs this study's approach to neo-nationalism and its 
rhetorical expression. This chapter will begin discussing the value of 
using discourse theory to study contemporary nationalism by outlining 
the general debate surrounding the concept of discourse and its 
manifold meanings. The second section will discuss the work of 
Laclau and Mouffe, with particular reference to the influence of 
Gramsci on their theory of discourse. The relevance of discourse 
theory to a study of nationalist ideology will then be highlighted. It 
will be shown that the theory serves to embed a 'general' vision of 
ideology in a post-modem epistemology. At the same time, by 
developing the concepts of hegemony, articulation, antagonism and 
nodal points, it provides a useful way of thinking about the dynamics 
of nationalist movements. The section ends with a discussion of the 
applicability of these concepts to empirical study, leading into an 
examination of the post-modem approach to empirical research. More 
specifically, in the final part of the chapter, the concept of rhetoric will 
be introduced and its relationship to ideology and discourse clarified. 
Alvesson and Karreman's observation that discourse can be used to 
designate both 'social reality' and 'social text' has repercussions on the 
capacity of discourse theory to bridge the gap between theory and 
1 Cf. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge and J. Habermas The Theory of 
Communicative Action, Vols. 1 & 2. 
2 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Ch. 2. 
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method.3 It will be demonstrated that, within the ambit of post-
modernism~ rhetoric is the linguistic expression of ideology. Rhetoric 
thus serves as ~ conduit between the theoretical framework of this 
study and an application of its principles to an empirical analysis of 
contemporary nationalist ideology. 
I The Concept of Discourse 
Michel Foucault is an important figure in the development of 
post-modern thought in general and the concept of discourse in 
particular, as his rejection of totalising, positivistic theories spurred 
him to develop an alternative reading of history and politics based on 
'discursive formations' .4 One of Foucault's first works, 'The 
Archaeology of Knowledge', set out to describe such formations as 
the Renaissance, the Classical age and modernity. Within a discursive 
formation, social agents perpetuate power through the know ledge (and 
'truth') contaitfed in the predominant discourse.5 Thus, Foucault 
approaches truth as a social construct. Consequently, governmental 
knowledge is portrayed in his work as the power to define the identity 
of others through discourse, giving rise to the famous Foucauldian 
aphorism; 'knowledge is power' .6 Foucault's analysis of power and 
society breaks the Enlightenment mould, in that it foregoes analysis of 
'modern' concepts such as legitimacy and sovereignty in favour of a 
far more wide-ranging discussion of the 'micro' power relations 
permeating every sphere of society. This approach is summed up in his 
vow to 'cut off the king's head', by replacing the concept of sovereign 
power with that of 'capillary power' .7 Referred to as 'governmentality' 
in later work, this concept refers to the development of a philosophy of 
3 M. Alvesson & D. Karreman Varieties of discourse: On the study of organizations 
through discourse analysis p. 1126. 
4 "[W]hcnevcr, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, 
one can defme a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, 
transformations)[ ... ] we are dealing with a discursive formation." M. Foucault, cited 
in M. Barrett The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault p. 128 (emphasis in 
original). 
5 Foucault demonstrates how the layers of government within society- the family, the 
household, the province - and the multitude of micro-hierarchies within the macro-
hierarchy of the state are interlinked. M. Foucault 'Govemmentality' in G. Burchell 
et al (eds.) The Fotlcault Effect: Studies in Govemmentalitv. 
6 Cf. M. Barrett The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault p. 142. 
7 Ibid. p. 136. 
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governance based less on territorial administration and more on the 
management of every aspect of people's lives through successive 
'discursive formations' .8 
Foucault's definition of discourse is wide, and includes all the 
institutions, procedures and strategies which are involved in exercising 
governmental power. To him, discourse is an "open and doubtless 
indefinitely describable field of relationships" as opposed to "a general 
developmental stage of reason" or even "a slice of history".9 Clearly, 
he is arguing that all-pervasive discursive formations such as that of 
modernity can only be grasped by being broken down into smaller 
units. Foucault's work on the history of prisons and sexuality, for 
instance, set out to gauge the specific effects of the mentality of 
government by 'individualizing' discourses such as 'psychiatry,' 
'medicine' and 'biology.' By his own account, his book 'The Order of 
Things' is a study of the correlation between the discursive formations 
of natural history, economics, grammar and the theory of 
representation. 10 Foucault's penchant for detailed investigation of 
fragments is a useful way of pointing out previously neglected aspects 
of political power. However, he himself recognised that his approach 
involved "bracketing all the old forms of strained continuity". 11 
Foucault's account of discursive formations thus gives us a sense of 
successive levels of discourse, a hierarchy which will now be defined 
more clearly. 
The methodological and philosophical difficulties of linking 
macro and micro levels of discourse are exemplified by Foucault's 
juxtaposition of an archaeology of all-pervasive power with localised 
'genealogies of power'. 12 In their discussion of different varieties of 
discourse, Alvesson and Karreman suggest using a capital letter in 
order to differentiate the forms of discourse concerned with analysing 
8 Governmentality is defined as "on the one hand, the formation of a whole series of 
specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, the development of a whole 
complex of savoirs." M. Foucault 'Governmentality' in G. Burchell et a/ (eds.) The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality p.103. 
9 M. F oucault 'Politics and the Study of Discourse' in G. Burchell et a/ ( eds.) The 
Foucault Effect; Studies in Governmentality p.55. 
10 Ibid. p.54. 
11 Ibid. p.56. 
12 M. Barrett The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault p. 132. 
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localised contexts, from the concept of Discourse used in long-range 
theory-building. According to the authors, these labels respectively 
correspond to "the study of the social text (talk and written text in its 
social action contexts) and the study of social reality as discursively 
constructed and maintained". 13 Further, they suggest a hierarchy of 
discourses in order to remedy some of the confusion surrounding the 
term. Within the category of social text, micro-discourse - the detailed 
study of language use in a specific context - is distinguished from 
mesa-discourse, which goes beyond linguistic analysis in an attempt to 
find broader general patterns. The third and fourth levels, 
corresponding to the study of "social reality", are labelled Grand 
Discourse and Mega Discourse respectively. The former is defined as 
"an assembly of discourses, ordered and presented as an integrated 
frame", whereas the latter reflects a long-range interest in the macro-
system context. 14 Foucauldian discourse, for instance, is classified as 
an example of Mega Discourse, since "overall categories and standards 
• 
tend to be privileged in the treatment of empirical material". 15 
The preceding categorisation is useful for clarifying the level of 
analysis of the present study. The adoption of the Mannheimian 
concept of' general' ideology situates the field of enquiry firmly within 
the range of Mega Discourse. However, once this meta-theoretical 
proposition has been established, it can be used as a springboard for 
more localised research. That is, in order to demonstrate the usefulness 
of characterising nationalist ideology in terms of Laclau and Mouffe's 
discourse theory, it is necessary to descend to the level of Grand 
Discourse. Indeed, to reprise Alvesson and Karreman's definition, the 
empirical part of this study aims to deconstruct the "integrated frame" 
of specific instances of nee-nationalism. The notion of concentric 
levels of discourse thus serves to situate the empirical component of 
the research within its theoretical framework. Furthermore, it helps to 
define the analytical work that the study of texts is designed to do. 
13 M. Alvesson & p. Karreman Varieties of discourse: On the study of organizations 
through discourse analysis p. 1126. 
14 Ibid. p.1133. 
IS Ibid. p.1134. 
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It is important to emphasise that Alvesson and Karreman's 
hierarchy of discourse does not suggest the incompatibility of the 
linguistic concerns of conversation or discourse analysis with the study 
of 'Discourse' as a wide-ranging body of ideas, concepts and 
institutions. Indeed, the empirical analysis of texts may well be 
employed within each category as a research method. However, the 
scope of the findings will be more or less wide depending on which 
level of discourse is being studied. Laclau and Mouffe make their 
position clear in this respect; 
By discourse we do not mean a combination of speech and writing, but 
rather that speech and writing are themselves but internal components 
of discursive totalities. 16 
Hence, the conclusions drawn from the specific texts analysed in the 
present study will go beyond the immediate micro-context o( the 
election campaigns for which they were produced. The textual analysis 
will feed into a conceptual framework which aims to theorise the 
dynamics of nationalism as 'Grand Discourse'. As has been argued 
from the outset, ideology is a crucial element in this framework, and its 
successful incorporation into discourse theory contrasts with 
Foucault's neglect of the concept. 
Foucault uses the term 'discursive formations' to describe a 
mentality of government, but neglects either to designate any 
proponent of that mentality or to address the concept of ideology in his 
work. However, he does not thereby show that discourse can be 
analysed without a concept of ideology. Instead, he merely stops short 
of opening this theoretical can of woims. In an interview, Foucault 
explained his misgivings about the concept. First of all, he saw it as 
inevitably in opposition to some notion of truth, the existence of which 
he denied. He continued; 
The second drawback is that the concept of ideology refers, I think 
necessarily, to something .of the order of a subject. Third, ideology 
stands in a secondary position relative to something which functions as 
its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant. 17 
16 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Post-Marxism without apologies p. 4. 
17 M. Foucault 'Truth and Power' in P. Rabinow (ed.) The Foucault Reader p. 60. 
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However, as Charles Taylor points out, to talk of strategy without 
strategists is mo~e than unsatisfactory, it is inadmissible. 18 The present 
study transcends Foucault's misgivings by demonstrating that it is 
quite possible to place both ideology and ideologues within a 
discursive framework which excludes the possibility of truth. Laclau 
and Mouffe, in their book 'Hegemony and Socialist Strategy', develop 
Foucault's contribution to post-modern theory by incorporating the 
concept of ideology into their analysis. Ideology supplements 
Foucault's formless, diffuse conception of power by giving it an 
indispensable reason, direction and agent. 
11 Discourse Theory 
Laclau and Mouffe' s theory of discourse develops a general 
model of social dynamics that is applicable, as I will go on to show, to 
the study of cofttemporary nationalism. 19 If authority can be exercised 
by means of either coercion or consent, the more desirable long-term 
option is to manufacture consent by propagating and consolidating a 
form of 'Grand Discourse' legitimating the status quo. Power is always 
precarious and subject to challenge, however, a point underlined by 
discourse theorists' emphasis on the 'unfixity' of any dominant, or 
hegemonic discourse. Clearly, Laclau and Mouffe's concern with 
legitimacy marks a fundamental departure from Foucault's thought. 
According to them, power struggles reveal points of friction between 
rival political projects and ultimately, between antagonistic world-
views. Furthermore, challenges to the received wisdom of a given 
society are depicted as sources of identity crises, in which notions 
generally accepted to be 'common sense' are re-evaluated. One sign of 
this phenomenon is contested, or controversial concepts, as the 
different meanings attributed to them are often highly suggestive of the 
conflicting beliefs and values fuelling a debate. 
18 "Strategies without projects, this would be a good formula to describe Foucault's 
historiography." C.-Taylor Foucault on Freedom and Truth p.l68. 
19 For a detailed secondary account of Laclau and Mouffe's thought, see A. M. Smith 
Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary. 
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In a world of competing discourses, ideology is an expression 
of the contingency of meaning. Paradoxically, however, ideology's 
ultimate ambition is to achieve banality; 
Changing the terms of an argument is exceedingly difficult, since the 
dominant definition of the problem acquires, by repetition, and by the 
weight and credibilit6' of those who propose or subscribe it, the warrant 
of 'common sense' .2 
Ideology aspires to be accepted as universal and to see its rhetoric go 
unquestioned. Norman Fairclough goes so far as to say that "ideology 
is the key mechanism of rule by consent".21 A crucial conclusion he 
draws from this observation is that if "ideology is pervasively present 
in language, that fact ought to mean that the ideological nature of 
language should be one of the major themes of modem social 
science".22 The importance of the linguistic battlefield in the struggle 
for power cannot be over-emphasised; "Language itself is a stake in 
social struggle as well as a site of social struggle".23 Discourse theory 
applies the general principles of post-modem thought to political 
conflict and its linguistic expression. As such, it has great potential for 
a study of contemporary nationalism, which seeks to understand how 
nationalist parties articulate their ideologies. 
The confrontation between the premises of positivist and post-
modem research . during the twentieth century constitutes a 
paradigmatic shift of Copernican dimensions in its questioning of the 
attainability of truth. Discourse theory can thus be placed in the context 
of Thomas Kuhn's meta-theoretical proposition that science undergoes 
periodic change, during which the established understanding of reality 
is revolutionised. 24 The approach of the discourse theorists Ernes to 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe is resolutely post-modem, as it attempts to 
go beyond essentialist political theory and classical Marxism in 
20 S. Hall 'The Rediscovery of 'Ideology" in J. Rivkin & M. Ryan (eds.) Literary 
Theory: An Anthology p. 1062. 
21 N. Fairclough Language and Power p.34. 
22 Ibid. p. 3. 
23 Ibid. p. 88. 
24 T. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
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particular.25 Instead of positing the proletariat as the privileged social 
actor, they ascribe the potential to bring about social change to all 
groups, be it feminist or environmentalist lobbies, trade union activists 
or conventional political parties.26 The contrast to Foucault's actorless 
approach is evident. A shared post-structuralist tendency can be 
discerned, however, in the fact that discourse theory subordinates the 
attributes of the actor to the role it plays in constructing a discursive 
reality.27 Before examining this aspect ofLaclau and Mouffe's work in 
more detail, it is important to place their theory of hegemony in the 
context of its Marxist antecedents. 
In their book, Laclau and Mouffe trace the development of the 
concept of hegemony from the writings of Rosa Luxembourg, through 
Lenin, to Antonio Gramsci.28 Gramsci's thought moved beyond 
classical Marxism and its insistence on economic mechanisms by 
introducing the concept of a 'collective will' embodied in intellectual 
and moral leadership. 29 According to Gramsci, the ideological 
ascendancy of a class was maintained by combining material power 
with a set of moral, political and cultural values, a practice he defined 
as 'hegemony'. Joseph Femia highlights the contrast in Gramsci's 
thought between consent-based hegemony, which "condemns [the 
proletariat] to perceive reality through the conceptual spectacles of the 
ruling class", and domination, or supremacy based on coercion. 30 
However, Gramsci also distinguished 'superficial' consent to be 
governed from an 'embryonic' conception of the world belonging to 
the working class as a whole. 31 To Gramsci, revolution consisted in 
overcoming this 'contradictory consciousness' by constructing a 
25 Discourse theory denies the a priori link between economics and politics posited 
by historical materialism, and points instead to the contingency of discursive 
practices. E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy pp. 120-122 
26 Their work was considered to be an important step in the theorisation of the new 
social movements which began to make their mark in the 1980s. 
27 Indeed, in a reference to Foucault's work, the first chapter of Laclau and Mouffe's 
book is entitled "Hegemony; the Genealogy of a Concept". 
28 Gramsci's Prison Notebooks are fragmentary and often written in opaque 
language, so that his work is subject to many different and sometimes conflicting 
interpretations. The aim here is to do no more than outline the aspects of his thought 
relevant to discourse theory. 
29 Pace J. Hoffman, who argues in The Gramscian Challenge that Gramsci's 
concept of hegemony is not substantially different from that of Lenin. 
30 J. Fernia Gramsci's Political Thought p. 31. 
31 Ibid. p. 43. 
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counter-hegemony in a prolonged ideological struggle based on 
political education and cultural renewal. Gramsci contended that the 
superficial attachment of the proletariat to hegemonic institutions, 
beliefs and values was responsible for inducing the passivity of the 
masses and perpetuating the legitimacy of the status quo. 32 Thus, by 
introducing hegemony as a theoretical variable, Gramsci departed from 
the principle that proletarian revolution would be the necessary 
culmination of an inexorable historical process. 
According to Gramsci, then, the 'collective will' is not purely 
economically determined, but is also a result of historical forces and 
human consciousness. Furthermore, Gramsci conceptualised ideology 
as the 'organic cement' holding together a 'historical bloc' by means 
of basic principles. 33 This innovative reading of ideology defined it as 
a relational whole, a force capable of constituting identities such as 
'national-popular'. In fact, Gramsci saw ideology as a world-view 
which could be expressed implicitly in art, in law, in economics and all 
other aspects of the individual and collective life of a particular class. 34 
He thereby created a link between subjective consciousness and a 
Marxist reading of production relations; if ideology could help to 
maintain and achieve hegemony, it could also provide the means of 
making a class aware of fundamental social conflicts. 
Translated into the terminology of discourse theory, a historical 
bloc represents a relatively unified social and political space of related 
identities.35 As such, it delimits the legitimate exercise of hegemonic 
power. Laclau and Mouffe update Gramsci 's thought by equating such 
a bloc with a particular discursive formation. They criticise Gramsci 
for retaining the Marxist principle that every struggle is ultimately one 
between classes, and thereby failing to explore the full potential of the 
concept of hegemony. By characterising class as a cause, rather than a 
possible product of hegemonic articulations, Gramsci does not 
transcend the Marxist conception of the economy as necessarily 
outside the realm of ideology. Although he understands identities as 
32 W. Adamson Hegemony and Revolution p. 170. 
33 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p. 67. 
34 J. M. Piotte La Pensee Politigue de Gramsci p. 196. 
35 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p. 67. 
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being to some extent constructed, they nevertheless remain essentially 
class-based in his eyes. 36 However, Laclau and Mouffe see scope for; 
The expansion-and determination of the social logic implicit in the 
concept of 'hegemony' -in a direction which goes far beyond Gramsci 
- [to] provide us with an anchorage in which contemporary social 
struggles are thinkable in their specificity. 37 
That is, the possibility of a plurality of historical subjects must be built 
into the theory of hegemony. 
Laclau and Mouffe's repudiation of historical materialism in 
favour of a post-modern approach lays them open to the charge that 
their adaptation of the concept of hegemony is in fact incompatible 
with any form of Marxism.38 However, Laclau and Mouffe declare 
themselves to be 'post-Marxist without apologies', maintaining that 
their thought develops aspects of Marxism by drawing on advances in 
linguistics and ~sychoanalysis which nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century philosophers did not yet have at their disposal. 39 This has led 
them to move beyond Marxism's grounding in traditional metaphysics, 
its conception of the social agent, and its restriction of the field of 
social conflict to class antagonisms. According to them, Gramsci 's 
thought (which has itself been depicted as Marxist apostasy) provides 
the necessary theoretical hinge.40 By their own account, Laclau and 
Mouffe's discourse theory achieves a synthesis of post-Marxism and 
36 Roger Scruton interprets Gramsci's view of society as follows;" [A] powerful 
mechanism of consolidation exists within the social and political superstructure 
which helps to stabilize the ascendancy of a class at the limiting point of production 
compatible with its continuity". A Dictionary of Political Thought p.219. 
37 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p.3 (emphasis in the 
original). Adamson interprets Gramsci's own concept of hegemony as already going 
far along this road when he says; "[Gramsci] recognized that hegemonic rule[ ... ] is 
the 'normal' form of government, at least in industrial societies,· and therefore almost 
infinite in its variety". W. Adamson Hegemony and Revolution p.l73. 
38 Cf. N. Geras Post-Marxism? 
39 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Post-Marxism without apologies p. 92. 
40 Gramsci 's work has been interpreted as being an example of idealism, in the sense 
that the concept of hegemony makes the consciousness of a ruling class central to its 
exercise of power. Whether this 'voluntarist' aspect makes it incompatible with the 
materialism of Marxism has been the subject of much debate. Gramsci himself 
believed his thought was "materialism perfected by the work of idealist philosophy". 
1. Femia Gramsci's Political Thought p.ll3. 
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post-structuralism by "operating deconstructively within Marxist 
categories."41 
As we have seen, Laclau and Mouffe reject the v1ew that 
discourse can be explained in terms of universalist theory. Rather, they 
argue that all societies are constructed accor~ing to contingent . 
principles, which temporarily fix the identity of their constitutive 
elements; 
Society and social agents lack any essence, and their regularities 
merely consist of the relative and precarious forms of fixation which 
accompany the establishment of a certain order [ ... ] This radical 
unfixity makes it impossible to consider the political struggle as a 
game in which the identity of the opposing forces is constituted from 
the start. 42 
Political struggle, then, involves asserting one form of discourse over 
• another by "the construction of a new 'common sense' which changes 
the identity of the different groups".43 Building on Ferdinand de 
Saussure's understanding of language as a structure of interrelated 
signifiers, Laclau and Mouffe define discourse as the means used to 
organise a society as a structured totality, in order to give it stability 
and meaning. 44 
Discourse includes all social institutions, customs and practices 
as well as language, since meaning is fully relative to context.45 
Ideology can thus be characterised as one aspect of discourse; it is a 
network of interrelated concepts forming a subset of the world of 
discourse. Conversely, concepts can onlY. be understood in terms of the 
complete social context of which they form a part. What en1erges is a 
41 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p. 3. 
42 Ibid. pp. 98 and 170. 
43 Ibid. p. 183. 
44 Saussure's theory of linguistics was developed in lectures given in Geneva 
between 1906 and 1911. F. de Satissure Cours de Linguistigue Genera le 
45 Laclau has described discourse as a "meaningful totality which transcends the 
distinction between the linguistic and the extra-linguistic." E. Laclau 'Discourse' in 
R. Goodin & P. Pettit (eds.) A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy p. 
432. David Howarth, in turn, has termed institutions 'sedimented discourses.' 
'Discourse Theory' in F. Marsh & G. Stoker (eds.) Theory and Methods in Political 
Science p. 132. 
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discursive ordering of elements 1n an ideological interpretation of 
reality. 
"A discursive -structure [ ... ] is an articulatory practice which 
constitutes and organises social relations."46 
This definition of discourse flows indirectly from Saussure's 
proposition that language finds its meaning in its structure and not in 
its substance. That is, the rules governing the combination and 
opposition of words constitute meaning; for instance 'hot' can only be 
understood when linked to 'cold'. Laclau and Mouffe strongly 
emphasise that discourse is just such a system of differences, a 
proposition which highlights its vulnerability, contingency, historicity 
and openness to multiple identities. Although they follow Saussure's 
proposition that the relationship between a word - or signifier - and the 
concept it signifies is arbitrary, they do not believe that this 
relationship is fixed. In Laclau's view, to uphold the Saussurean claim 
as to the isomorphism of signifier and signified would be to render the 
two indistinguishable and thus deny the duality of the linguistic sign.47 
Structuralist theorists favoured a wider definition of discourse 
to that of Saussure, who saw it as the expression of the autonomous 
subject and thus unpredictable from one utterance to the next. Central 
to the structuralist critique of Saussurean linguistics was its 
proclamation of the 'death of the subject'. Discourse was redefined as 
a "viewpoint from which it was possible to redescribe the totality of 
social life" and uncover the "basic regularities which govern the 
production of meaning in social life".48 Since then, however, this 
notion of a closed, describable totality has in turn been subverted. One 
of the most radical critics of structuralism has been Jacques Derrida, 
whose subversion of essentialist truth claims allowed for the infinite 
'deconstruction' of 'authorless texts'. 49 His work can be placed within 
46 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p. 96. The authors define 
the term articulation as "any practice establishing a relation among elements such 
that their identity is modified as a result". Ibid. p. 105. The authors give 
Keynesianism and Thatcherism as examples of discursive structures. 
47 E. Laclau 'Discourse' in R. Goodin & P. Pettit (eds.) A Companion to 
Contemporary Political Philosophy p. 433. 
~ . 
Ibid. p. 433. 
49 See, for instance, J. Derrida Dissemination. 
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the French post-modern movement of the 1960s, which saw its most 
spectacular expression in the student uprisings of May 1968. Although 
not derived from linguistics, Foucault's thought can also be termed 
post-structuralist, in that it aims to denounce the power relations 
shaping social structures. 5° Finally, Laclau and Mouffe are post-
structuralist insofar as they see discourse not as a closed totality, but as 
a concentration of floating signifiers, which actors compete to mould 
into meaningful configurations. They share Derrida's view of the 
infinite possible constructions of subject positions. 51 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, political parties were 
instrumental in a hegemonic articulation, or the reconfiguration of "a 
series of political, ideological and economic elements" by participating 
in the redefinition of social relations which took place following the 
Second World War. 52 They evaluate the post-war situation as follows; 
• It was in the context of the reorganization which took place after the 
Second World War that a series of changes occurred at the level of 
social relations and a new hegemonic formation was consolidated. The 
latter articulated modifications at the level of the labour process, the 
form of state and the dominant modes of cultural diffusion which were 
to bring about a profound transformation in the existing forms of social 
intercourse. 53 
In Laclau and Mouffe's terminology, linguistic 'elements' become 
interdependent 'moments' once articulated within a discourse. 
Establishing new relationships between elements IS, therefore, 
equivalent to redefining the dominant form of discourse. The 
relationship between moments of discourse can be more or less 
coherent, logical, rigid or constant, much depending on the form of 
ideology used to perpetuate them. 54 The centrality of context to the 
meaning of signs comes to the fore, for out of context signifiers can 
50 R. Scruton A Dictionary of Political Thought p. 535. 
51 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p. 16. 
52 D. Howarth 'Discourse Theory' in F. Marsh & G. Stoker (eds.) Theory and 
Methods in Political Science p. 120. 
53 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p.160. 
54 One may assume, for instance, that a totalitarian ideology is far less flexible, or 
open, concerning its conceptual framework than an ideology promoting democratic 
renewal. Consequently, the former is more prone to hegemonic articulation than the 
latter, which has a greater capacity to absorb the discursive development brought 
about by social change. 
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only 'float' until rearticulated into a moment of new discourse. This 
structural renewal is particularly important to the construction of 
identity, not le~t national identity. In the same way as the meaning of 
'father' can only be understood relative to that of 'son' and 'daughter', 
a minority nationalist movement's definition of its cause can only be 
understood in the context of its problematic relationship to the current 
hegemonic 'nation-state'. In what follows, Laclau and Mouffe's 
armoury of abstract concepts will be applied to the study of 
nationalism, at both the theoretical and empirical levels. 
Discourse and Nee-Nationalism 
Laclau and Mouffe' s theory of discourse can be used to 
describe a whole range of social dynamics, without making 
universalising or causal claims. As such, it is applicable to various 
levels of social interaction and different social actors, including 
contemporary Ifcttionalist parties. In the context of nationalism theory, 
the assertion that the nation is itself a discursive construct flows from 
the post-modern understanding of reality as constructed, malleable and 
therefore contingent. The proposition that ideology is all-pervasive 
enables us to explore the extent to which nationalism itself is all-
pervasive and the consequences this has for sub-state nationalisms. 
After addressing these issues, the vocabulary of discourse theory will 
be applied to nationalisms propagating an alternative national construct 
to that embodied in the hegemonic discourse of 'nation-states'. 
Discourse theory characterises this conflict as antagonistic, and it will 
be shown that concepts such as these are useful in structuring an 
empirical study of nationalist parties. Both at the level of Mega 
Discourse and Grand Discourse, Laclau and Mouffe can make a 
substantial contribution to our understanding of contemporary 
nationalist ideology. 
To indicate one's nationality as Italian, Nigerian, Brazilian, 
Australian or Japanese is to evoke a national construct. That it should 
be well-established does not make it unproblematic or somehow 
exempt it from being studied in terms of nationalism. Every nationalist 
variant, from ._terrorist Basque nationalists, through democratic 
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independence movements to the United States of America, pursues the 
political goal of embodying its interpretation of the nation in territory 
and institutions. Michael Freeden has shown that the differences 
between these examples are a result of how the nation is defined and 
appealed to, but that the focal point of national mobilisation remains 
the same. 55 This recalls Liah Greenfeld' s statement that the nature of 
nationalism is determined by an organising principle which makes its 
constitutive elements, however these might vary, into a unity.56 A 
world of 'nation-states', then, is the expression of the all-pervasiveness 
of 'thin' nationalism. This point is central to the subsequent discussion, 
as the 'nation-state' is the hegemonic nationalist construct to which 
neo-nationalist parties propose an alternative. That the existence of a 
given 'nation-state' should constitute undisputed 'common sense' 
makes this task all the more difficult. The more entrenched the 
discourse of a given historical bloc, the harder it will be to impose an 
alternative hegemonic project. Discourse theory thus places the role of 
minority nationalist parties in perspective; their aim is to revolutionise 
social reality by articulating an alternative national construct. 
Every citizen of a 'nation-state' construct is subject at the very 
least to the 'banal nationalism' described and discussed by Michael 
Billig in his important book of the same name. Banal nationalism is 
expressed in the symbolic markers of belonging to a 'nation-state'; the 
limp flag (one being waved would be making an explicit statement), 
the emphasis of the media on 'home' news, singing the national 
anthem at football matches and the repeated use of the adjective 
'national' to describe affairs of state. The term is shorthand for 
expressing the idea of nationalism as 'Mega Discourse'; our everyday 
'social reality' is always discursively constructed around a concept of 
the nation which is taken for granted. To describe 'thin' nationalism as 
all-pervasive does not lead to the analytical redundancy of the concept, 
however. On the contrary, it permits a clearer and more dispassionate 
categorisation of its possible variants. 
55 M. Freeden Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? Freeden's work is discussed in 
more detail in chapter one, section two. 
56 "(The nature of nationalism] is determined not by the character of its elements, but 
by a certain organizing principle which makes these elements into a unity and 
imparts to them a special significance." L. Greenfeld Nationalism: Five Roads to 
Modernity p. 7. 
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[Nationalism] is the belief in the primacy of a particular nation, real or 
constructed [ ... ] This is meant to be an omnibus definition [It] should 
not be linked to the idea that nationalism is in any absolute sense 
linked to separatism. Very much to the contrary, the spirit of 
nationalism can dominate established states. 57 
Indeed, case studies of states can be particularly illuminating, as they 
embody successful nationalist mobilisation. In these cases, nationalist 
symbols, institutions and rhetoric have been identified with and 
internalised to such an extent that they constitute common sense, the 
ultimate goal of any movement pursuing a nationalist project. Minority 
nationalism challenges this common sense by arguing the need for an 
alternative national construct to the one in place. Discourse -theory 
comes into its own in characterising the dynamics of this 
confrontation. 
According to discourse theory, a democratic system is fuelled 
by competing attempts to hegemonise the principles organising a given 
society. However, the common sense understanding of the state is not 
necessarily revolutionised with every change of government. All 
political parties use ideology in an attempt to legitimate and 
consolidate their bids for power, but their political project is often less 
ambitious than a complete rearticulation of elements and their inter-
relationships into a new hegemonic common sense. As has been 
indicated, however, nationalist ideology. aims to rearticulate the 
meaning of a given political arena. It is therefore a hegemonic project 
through and through, one highly antagonistic to the existing 'nation-
state' construct. Minority nationalist parties seek to create a 
dichotomous antagonism between the prevailing 'nation-state' and the 
alternative discourse of the nation they propound. Theirs is a 
revolutionary project in that it sets out to rearticulate the parameters of 
national discourse rather than simply bring about internal change; 
A language has been jokingly defined as 'a dialect with an army and a 
navy', but this is a joke with a serious undercurrent. Modern armies 
and navies are a feature of the 'nation state' and so too is the linguistic 
57 J. Hall Nationalisms: Classified and Explained p. 2. 
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unification or 'standardization' of large politically defined territories 
which makes talk of 'English' or 'German' meaningful. 58 
In the same way, talk of 'Scottish' and 'Bavarian' is meaningful in the 
context of nationalist parties attempting to rearticulate the common 
sense understanding of the 'nation' .59 To quote Laclau and Mouffe; 
"political practice constructs the interests it represents".60 
In Laclau and Mouffe's terminology, 'antagonism' denotes the 
limit of a society, in other words the point of friction between 
discourses. The subversive nature of an antagonism means that it is 
often negative. Its presence brings the hegemonic order into question 
and therefore gives rise to an identity crisis.61 Given its opposition to 
objective totalities, discourse theory presupposes the impossibility of 
fixed identities. It therefore considers identity to be an illusion, for to 
posit the possibility of a closed, total identity would be to deny the 
• contingency of discourse. Instead, Laclau and Mouffe define the 
relationship between discursive moments in terms of difference. 
Furthermore, they argue that this lack of fullness must eventually 
become apparent in the form of an identity crisis, its temporary 
solution lying in the act of subversion that is the next hegemonic 
articulation. Nationalist parties can be thought of as promoters of such 
identity crises.62 Indeed, they aim to mobilise voters by encouraging 
them to identify with an alternative discourse. At the same time, they 
wish to conceal the fundamental impermanence of any discourse by 
claiming there is no alternative to their world-view and that the total 
resolution of discursive antagonisms is possible; 
58 N. Fairclough Language and Power p.21. 
59 In order to transcend the conceptual confusion inherent in the term 'nation-state', 
the adjective 'national' will be used to refer to the Scottish and Bavarian political 
. arenas rather than to the United Kingdom and German state constructs of which they 
form a part. The conventions adopted in the present study must not be confused with 
the terminology used by the parties themselves, in particular the CSU's defmition of 
the nation, discussed in chapter six, section three. 
60 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p.120. 
61 Ibid. Ch. 3. 
62 Gramsci's definition of intellectuals emphasises the role of parties and other social 
agents as transmitters of ideas and introduces a useful distinction between 
'traditional' and 'organic' intellectuals. However, his concept remains too infused 
with the imagery of class struggle and unilateral affiliation to be adopted in a study 
which highlights the multiplicity of identities and the infinite malleability of 
discourse. Cf. J-M Piotte La Pensee Politigue de Gramsci p.103. 
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The appar~nt emptying of the ideological content of discourses is, 
paradoxically, a fundamental ideological effect: Ideology works 
through disguising its nature. 63 
Any other approach would undermine a party's own claim to truth. To 
quote Pierre Bourdieu's succinct phrase, nationalist parties aim for the 
"recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of arbitrariness". 64 
It is tempting to describe the discourse dominating the forms of 
conduct and meaning in a given social order as hegemonic.65 Laclau 
and Mouffe, however, restrict their definition of hegemony to the 
dynamic of articulation itself and not to the period following a 
successful new articulation of concepts. 66 Instead, borrowing from 
Gramsci, they use the term 'historical bloc' to describe a relatively 
unified political space. 67 However, considering that a continuous 
dynamic, in the form of ideological maintenance work, is required to 
• 
perpetuate the status quo, it is proposed here to extend the use of the 
word hegemony to describe a period of relative stability in the 
discursive fixing of meanings. 68 This usage runs parallel to Waiter 
Adamson's claim that Gramsci's conception of hegemony can be 
divided into 'hegemony-maintenance' and 'hegemony-creation' .69 It 
also corresponds to common understanding of the term and thus makes 
for conceptual simplicity.70 Articulation will continue to designate a 
period of renewal in social identities. 
63 N. Fairclough Language and Power p. 93. 
64 Cited by N. Fairclough Language and Power p. 91. 
65 Cf. D. Howarth 'Discourse Theory' in F. Marsh & G. Stoker (eds.) Theory and 
Methods in Political Science. In Fairclough's terminology, a practice has become 
'naturalized' if it appears universal or common-sensical. N. Fairclough Language and 
Power p. 33 
66 Cf. E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy pp. 134-145. 
67 Ibid. p. 136. 
68 Laclau & Mouffe would fmd this usage problematic, as they posit the need for the 
hegemonic subject to be partially exterior to that which it articulates. This condition 
is no longer given once the articulation is generally accepted. Further, they stipulate 
the presence of "a vast area of floating elements and the possibility of their 
articulation to opposite camps" before a hegemonic practice can take place. Ibid. p. 
136. Why the reappropriation of previously articulated moments is excluded is 
unclear. Contested concepts have rarely been previously totally apolitical elements of 
discourse, but see the account of the concept of Heimat in chapter six, section three. 
69 W. Adamson Hegemony and Revolution p. 174. 
70 Such a defmition would enable us to term Margaret Thatcher's period in power as 
hegemonic, for instance. Cf. S. Hall The Hard Road to Renewal. In chapter two, his 
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Nationalist ideologies strive to gain acceptance as 'common 
sense' in their chosen territory by operating a successful articulation of 
concepts and thereby making their construction of the nation 
hegemonic. 
Ideologies are closely linked to power [ ... ] because they are a means of 
legitimizing existing social relations and differences of power, simply 
through the recurrence of ordinary, familiar ways of behaving which 
take these relations and power differences for granted.71 
In the context of conventional political parties jockeying for position, 
successfully pushing through one interpretation of a contested concept 
over another is therefore an important achievement. The generally 
accepted definitions of ideologically charged concepts such as justice, 
equality and freedom, for instance, form the discursive premises of 
political debate in a given society. Campaigners forced to argue for a 
new interpretation of terms in common use are in a far more difficult 
position than ideologues who may assume that their understanding of 
concepts equates with common sense. Those supporting a 'nation-
state' construct find themselves in the latter situation, having 
suc~essfully decontested the concept of the nation to their advantage. 
In Laclau and Mouffe's terminology, the nation corresponds to 
a 'nodal point' of nationalist ideology, defined as a privileged 
discursive point of partial fixation. 72 Not only does the nation specify 
the target constituency, but it is also crucial in bringing together -the 
strands, or moments, of nationalist ideolo.gy to form a coherent world-
view. As such, the nodal point of the nation corresponds to the core of 
nationalist ideology in Freeden's terms. Laclau and Mouffe recognise 
autonomy as a constructed political space resulting from hegemonic. 
articulation. The picture of nationalism elaborated using discourse 
theory tallies well with Freeden's depiction of nationalism as a thin 
ideology with an immutable core; 
analysis illustrates how Thatcher managed to rearticulate central concepts in the 
British political arena by redefining nodal points of discourse such as people, state 
and society. 
71 N. Fairclough Language and Power p.2 
72 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p. 112 
71 
Some unu.sual discursive formations may tend to be organized around 
a single and relatively stable nodal point - such as a nationalist 
discourse that has achieved an unusual degree of predominance and 
stability. 73 
In turn, the definition of the nation will inevitably have repercussions 
on the articulation of peripheral ideological principles. A racist 
definition, for instance, will give rise to principles designed to preserve 
national purity, whereas an articulation of the nation based on 
citizenship will generate principles encouraging democratic 
participation. 
The core principles of nationalism - the prioritisation of the 
nation, its positive valorisation, its institutional expression, its 
embodiment of territory and tradition and the emotional attachment it 
engenders - legitimate and perpetuate the current political division of 
the globe int<:Jt states.74 'Nation-building' describes the nationalist 
project of states which aim to hold on to their conceptual hegemony 
over the nodal point 'nation' .75 All states aspire to be nations in order 
to legitimate their hegemonic construct. 
Because in modernity national legitimation is the most prestigious 
form of relating people to the state, once the nationalist principle was 
unfurled, states had no alternative but to pursue policies of nation-
building. 76 
Sub-state challenges to the constitutional status quo use the same 
ideological principles, but adapt them to an alternative national 
construct. They attempt to break the common sense link embodied in 
the term 'nation-state' by bringing about what has been called a 'crisis 
of the hyphen' .77 This identity crisis is a sign of antagonistic 
73 A. M. Smith Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary p. 98. 
74 M. Freeden Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? pp. 751-752. 
75 "With the concepts of the nation and the state thus hopelessly confused, it is 
perhaps not too surprising that nationalism should come to rnean identification with 
the state rather than loyalty to the nation [ ... ] Contrary to the nomenclature, the 
'nation-building' school has in fact been dedicated to building viable states." W. 
Connor Ethnonationalism -The Quest for Understanding pp. 40-41 (emphasis in 
original). 
76 J. Llobera The God of Modernity p. 1 06. 
77 B. Anderson, cited by D. McCrone in The Sociology ofNationalism p. 173 
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discourses battling to rearticulate the contested concept of 'nation'. 
The struggle is between what competing ideologies would have as the 
'common sense' understanding of the nation. The prize is conceptual 
hegemony; 
The battle for nationhood is a battle for hegemony, by which a part 
claims to speak for the whole nation and to represent the national 
essence.78 
The problem arises as to how to apply the concept of hegemony 
to an empirical study. Clearly, the term is often used much more 
loosely than it has been defined here. For Gramsci, hegemony 
corresponded to the consensual aspect of authority, whereas it is now 
widely construed to include coercive power too. 79 Laclau and Mouffe, 
on the other hand, see hegemonic power as representing the dominant 
form of conduct and meaning within a given social order. Their 
conception of discursive hegemony thus remains at the abstract level of 
partially fixed meaning. In his book 'City Politics: Hegemonic Projects 
and Discourse', Maarten Hajer defines a hegemonic project "as a 
political project which constitutes a general political-strategic 
programme at a specific political institutional level". 80 This 
understanding of hegemony fits well with the present study's focus on 
the ideas and dynamics fuelling the ambitions of nationalist parties to 
define the dominant discourse in a given territory. Further, Hajer has 
proposed a means. of approaching the concept of hegemony 
empirically, based on the notions of discourse structuration and 
discourse institutionalisation. For these to obtain, a 'discursive space' 
must be dominated in two respects; 
Central actors are persuaded by, or forced to accept, the rhetorical 
power of a new discourse (condition of discourse structuration); and 
this is reflected in the institutional practices of that political domain; · 
that is, the actual policy process is conducted according to the ideas of 
a given discourse (condition of discourse institutionalisation). 81 
78 M. Billig Banal Nationalism p.27 
79 Cf. R. Cox Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method 
p. 170. 
80 M. Hajer City Politics: Hegemonic Projects and Discourse p. 32. 
81 M. Hajer 'Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalization of Practice: The Case of 
Acid Rain in Britain' in F. Fischer & J. Forester (eds.) The Argumentative Turn in 
Policy Analysis and Planning pp. 47-48. 
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Applied to ·a national 'discursive space', then, an analysis of discourse 
structuration would involve looking at the extent to which discursive 
moments permeate the rhetoric of central actors, political parties in this 
case. The condition of discourse institutionalisation, on the other hand, 
is more concerned with the way in which policies are implemented 
than with their content. Given that the present study focuses on the 
construction of nationalist ideology, the notion of discourse 
structuration is of more relevance here than that of discourse 
insti tuti onalisati on. 
Stuart Hall's article entitled 'The Rediscovery of 'Ideology", is 
a further illuminating example of the theory of hegemony in practice. 82 
It uses an explicit discourse theoretical approach to look at the 
ideological content of the immigration debate in the UK. In his article, 
Hall quotes the following line from Gramsci's prison notebooks; 
• 
"Every social stratum has its own 'common sense' and its own 'good 
sense', which are basically the most widespread conception of life and 
ofmen".83 Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe, Hall goes on to argue that, 
once detached from the reference to class, the notion of 'common 
sense' is equivalent to a hegemonic discourse, or a plausible 
interpretation of reality generally accepted to be the truth. 84 He chooses 
to look at the way this dominant discursive formation finds its 
expression in the realm of immigration policy, and in so doing 
highlights how certain actors are disadvantaged in the 'struggle over 
meaning'. The race debate, in which the dominant problematic is 
articulated in terms of controlling the numbers of immigrants to 
Britain, is used as a specific illustration. Hall points out that opponents 
of the prevailing view are forced to reproduce the terms of the 
argument when stating their case, as common sense is exceedingly 
difficult to challenge. His analysis is worth quoting at length, as it 
82 S. Hall 'The Rediscovery of 'Ideology" in J. Rivkin & M. Ryan (eds.) Literary 
Theory: An Anthology. 
83 Ibid. p. 1055. 
84 "Discourse, in s~ort had the effect of sustaining certain 'closures,' of establishing 
certain systems of equivalence between what could be assumed about the world and 
what could be said to be true. 'True' means credible, or at least capable of winning 
credibility as a statement of fact." Ibid. p. 1057. 
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describes the manifestation of conceptual hegemony and antagonistic 
practices at the empirical level. 
There was also the struggle over access to the very means of 
signification: the difference between those accredited witnesses and 
spokesmen [ ... ] whose statements carried the representativeness and 
authority which permitted them to establish the primary framework or 
terms of an argument; as contrasted to those [ ... ] whose 'definitions' 
were always more partial, fragmentary, and delegitimated; and who, 
when they did gain access, had to perform with the established terms of 
the problematic in play.85 
The parallel with minority nationalist movements struggling against 
the hegemonic discourse of a nation-state is clear. Hall's application of 
discourse theory to the themes of immigration and Thatcherism, among 
others, shows the fruitfulness of the theory in empirical studies. 86 
It has been shown that ideologies strive to make their 
interpretation of reality seem natural, taken-for-granted, common 
sense; 
The battle for hegemony, which accompanies the creation of states, is 
reflected in the power to define language, or in [ ... ] the power to 
'make meaning stick' .87 
Until now, however, there has been no discussion of how ideologues 
go about this task. In order to examine the ideologies of parties, a 
means of critically analysing the language they use is required. Billig 
gives us a first clue as to a possible approach in his observation that; 
"the flagging of what is nationalism [ .. .'] is ingrained into the very 
rhetoric of common sense". 88 Indeed, rhetoric constitutes the crucial 
conceptual link binding the theoretical and methodological approaches 
used in this study. Before the next chapter goes on to look at the · 
methodological considerations surrounding a rhetorical approach to the 
analysis of texts, the final section of this chapter proposes to place 
rhetoric within the theoretical framework of post-modernism. 
85 Ibid. p. 1061 (emphasis in original). 
86 Cf. S. Hall The Hard Road to Renewal. 
87 
M. Billig Banal Nationalism p. 32. 
88 Ibid. p. 49. 
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Ill Discourse and Rhetoric 
Discourse has been defined elsewhere as "sets of linguistic 
practices and rhetorical strategies embedded in a network of social 
relations" and as "the context of a prevailing set of political ideas". 89 
The first definition restricts the realm of discourse to language and 
communication, whereas the second adopts a wider view similar to 
Laclau and Mouffe's understanding of the concept as all-
encompassing. However, if one defines social discourse as "a network 
of social relations" or simply as "the context", the concept of ideology 
is still required to complete the picture by describing "sets of linguistic 
practices and rhetorical strategies" and "a prevailing set of political 
ideas." Discourse theorists consider ideas and their linguistic 
expression to be one aspect of the complex web of institutions, 
customs and practices, which together constitute a society. The 
question then arises as to how to design a piece of research adapted to 
the study of id~ology within a world of discourse. If an ideology is ... 
defined as a belief- system in the abstract it is, of course, structured 
conceptually and expressed linguistically. In order to understand neo-
nationalism, it must be unpacked, or deconstructed, to reveal its 
constitutive elements and internal tensions. In turn, discourse theory 
demands that a research design take account of context when 
interpreting the data collected. Further, a theory which rejects a view 
of ideologies as dogmatic or immutable requires research methods 
capable of rendering the subtleties of conceptual manipulation, the 
shifts and ambiguities in ideological meaning and their translation into 
rhetoric.90 This takes us into the realm of literary criticism. 
Post-structuralist theorists such as J acques Lac an and J acques 
Derrida have had a great deal of influence on the world of literary 
89 K. Litfin and P. Hall respectively, cited in M. Maier Three Images of Ideas in 
Political Science. Paper presented at European University Institute Workshop 'Norms 
and Interests in International Relations', November 20-21 st 1998. 
9° Catherine Belsey compares this new approach to text and discourse with the 
conventions of nineteenth-century readers; "If they did not recognise the silence with 
which the work fmally confronts its own ideological project, it was because they read 
from within the same ideological framework, shared the same repressions and took 
for granted the same silences". Critical Practice p. 137. 
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criticism.91 Their work sets out to highlight the ideological nature of 
texts and their place in a discursively constructed society. From their 
assertion that the subject is itself a discursive construct flows an 
interest in examining how the various subject-positions are produced 
that make multiple identities possible.92 Deconstructionist readings aim 
to point out the contradictions, omissions and incoherence within texts 
which all tend towards closure in the form of an ending, happy or 
otherwise. The very nature of deconstruction therefore precludes a 
systematic methodology for reading.93 Instead, possible meanings 
circulate between the reader, the text itself and the familiar discourse 
within which they are situated. 94 Thus, the techniques of literary 
cri tic ism are oriented towards a new goal. The aim is no longer to 
uncover the essence of a text, its mirroring of 'reality' or the intention 
of the author, but to examine instead how text production corresponds 
to the production of an identity, a subject, a discursive 'whole'; 
The work of ideology is to present the subject as fixed and 
unchangeable, an element in a given system of differences which is 
human nature and the world of human experience. 95 
The post-modem philosophical movement to which Derrida 
belongs is very much a political one. Derrida goes beyond the 
deconstruction of texts in his aim to subvert the very logic on which 
they are premised. According to Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, 'The 
Class of 1968 ', in which they also include writers such as Lyotard, 
Baudrillard, Kristeva and Foucault, shared the same motivation; 
[They were] less interested in knowing how systems worked than in 
finding out how they might be undone, so that the energies and 
91 For a critique, see N. Tredell 'Euphoria (Ltd.)- The Limitations of Post-
structuralism and Deconstruction' in P. Barry ( ed.) Issues in Contemporary Literary 
Theory. 
92 Lacan calls the infant an 'hommelette'; in other words a potential subject yet to be 
given a sense of identity and unity by learning a language and thus fmding a place 
within a social formation. C. Belsey Critical Practice Ch. 3. 
93 "Derrida always writes about particular texts, and the kind of writing which he 
practises and would like to inspire in others explores precisely the impossibility of 
comprehensive mastery, the impossibility of constructing a coherent and adequate 
theoretical system." J. Culler 'What is Deconstruction?' in P. Barry (ed.) Issues in 
Contemporary Literary Theory p. 83. 
94 C. Belsey Critical Practice Ch. 5. 
95 Ibid. p. 90. 
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potentials that they held in place might be liberated and used to 
construct an altogether different kind of society.96 
Terry Eagleton expands on this point by concluding his book on 
literary theory with a chapter entitled 'political criticism', in which he 
highlights the political nature of all literary criticism.97 
A similar observation is made in David Cooper's study of the 
relationship between rhetoric, literature and philosophy, which 
illustrates the blurring of interdisciplinary boundaries brought about by 
post-structuralism's emphasis on the ideological grounding of all texts; 
The critical deconstruction that leads to the discovery of the literary, 
rhetorical nature of the philosophical claim to truth [ ... ] cannot be 
refuted.98 
What Cooper calls the 'assimilationist thesis' is based on the argument 
that there is no ttruth to be found, only an ideological interpretation of 
the truth, and amounts to asserting that literary criticism can be applied 
to philosophy just as to any other text. According to this view, the 
persuasiveness of any text may be judged in terms of rhetoric rather 
than logic, since "it is impossible for philosophical writing to free itself 
from rhetoric". 99 A general category of the textual overtakes any rigid 
divisions between the literary and the non-literary, and strengthens the 
case for applying the techniques of literary criticism more widely. 
If scientific texts express ideologies, then the language used 
may be evaluated according to how well they persuade us of the 
apparent 'truth' or correctness of their ideological interpretations of 
reality. In other words, the rhetorical skill displayed becomes worthy 
of study. Conversely, the rhetoric used is indicative of the ideology 
underlying it. This is the major conclusion to be drawn from the 
96 J. Rivkin & M. Ryan 'The Class of 1968' in J. Rivkin & M. Ryan (eds.) Literary 
Theory: An Anthology p. 334. 
97 "From Percy Bysshe Shelley to Norman N. Holland, literary theory has been 
indissociably bound up with political beliefs and ideological values." T. Eagleton 
Literary Theory: An Introduction p. 194. 
98 Paul de Man, quoted in D. Cooper 'Rhetoric, Literature and Philosophy' in R. 
Roberts & J. Good The Recovery of Rhetoric p. 193. 
99 D. Cooper 'Rhetoric, Literature and Philosophy' in R. Roberts & J. Good The 
Recovery of Rhetoric p. 195. 
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assimilationist thesis for the purposes of this study. Indeed, it has 
informed the choice of the empirical methods employed. Techniques 
once used only in literary criticism will be applied here with the aim of 
uncovering the ideological message of texts. 
It can be assumed that the ways of thinking, which are created by and 
within ideology, are themselves inherently rhetorical. Similarly, the 
use of rhetoric will itself reflect the patternings of ideology. 100 
The linguistic manifestation of a political ideology is an archetypally 
rhetorical one in that it aims to convince and convert. In keeping with 
the premises of discourse theory and post-modernism more generally, 
the eminently rhetorical expression of nationalist ideology will be a 
focus of this study. 
To look at a text in terms of its rhetorical features is, according 
to Terry Eagleton "probably the oldest form of literary criticism in the 
world". 101 Although he does not make the case for a return to an 
Aristotelian form of critical analysis, the continued relevance of 
rhetoric to the study of discursive constructs, not least ideologies, is 
highlighted; 
[Rhetoric] saw speaking and writing not merely as textual objects, but 
as forms of activity inseparable from the wider social relations 
between writers and readers, orators and audience, and as largely 
unintelligible outside .the social purposes and conditions in which they 
were embedded. 102 
Language constitutes the raw material from which an ideology Is 
constructed, and rhetoric is the means used by ideologues to mould 
language into as pleasing, persuasive and effective a form as possible. 
As such, the study of rhetoric provides a means of accessing a text in 
its specificity, and therefore constitutes the hinge between the theory of 
discourse informing the present study and the methodology used to 
study individual nationalist ideologies. 
100 M. Billig Ideology and Opinions p. 3. 
101 T. Eagleton Literary Theory: An Introduction p. 205. 
102 Ibid. p. 206. 
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Conclusion 
Laclau -and Mouffe paint a picture of societies periodically 
reformed by a hegemonic rearticulation of the dominant discourse, the 
timing, content and protagonists of which are dependent on the 
particular social context and not on universal guiding principles. 
Consequently, no form of social organisation is ever complete or 'true' 
in a positivistic sense. Instead, notions of truth and values are deemed 
to be ideological constructs liable to be redefined. Although no social 
system is ever closed and safe from the possibility of hegemonic 
articulation, it may be a historical bloc; "a political space relatively 
unified through nodal points and tendentially relational identities". 103 
In empirical studies, such a system of discursive moments can be 
analysed using conventional political science concepts such as power, 
justice, liberty and equality, as long as these terms are also understood 
to be defined ideologically. Further, it has been shown that, although 
• all parties select a national arena in which to propagate their political 
programmes, neo-nationalists stand apart by making that choice into a 
core, immutable principle of their ideologies. Discourse theory is 
valuable in describing how their construction of the nation clashes 
with that of the existing 'nation-state' and how their ultimate goal is to 
achieve a hegemonic rearticulation of the national nodal point. 
Discourse theory's characterisation of ideology as all-pervasive also 
provides a springboard for the re-evaluation of text analysis. As the 
linguistic expression of ideology, rhetoric represents an ideal point of 
access to ideological constructs such as the nation, and will be used in 
analysing the case studies to follow. 
The theoretical framework for this study of contemporary 
nationalism is now complete. It has been shown that nationalism is 
best approached as an ideology within the epistemological framework 
of discourse, not least because discourse theory provides a means of 
structuring an investigation into the dynamics of nationalist 
movements. Furthermore, the vocabulary of discourse theory can be 
applied to an empirical study concerned with the construction of a 
nationalist ide~logy and its hegemonic project. The theory's derivation 
103 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p.136. 
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from linguistics highlights the importance of language in the study of 
ideology, and makes it eminently compatible with an empirical focus 
on texts and their rhetorical analysis. The task of the researcher begins 
to gain some definition. Without the monolithic social agent of 
structuralism or the ineluctable processes of historical materialism to 
guide research, each struggle for conceptual hegemony must be 
examined in its specificity. Moreover, the actorless nature of 
Foucauldian analysis can be avoided by identifying political parties as 
the principal proponents of nationalist ideology. Finally, privileging 
the study of ideology within the wider framework of discourse can be 
translated into a research design centred on texts, whose richness and 
detail offer illuminating insights into the strategies, rhetoric and 
ultimate aims of contemporary nationalist ideologies. Chapter three 
begins by describing how the theoretical framework of the study 
informed the methodological choices made . 
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3 Research Methodology and Design 
The present chapter sets out to do three things in order to show that; 
The choice of countries, the formulation of concepts, and the adoption 
of a method are not independent, successive decisions; they are 
inextricably linked. 1 
By translating the preceding theoretical discussion into a 
methodological approach to neo-nationalism, it aims to reinforce the 
link forged between discourse theory and the analysis of rhetoric. 
Given that the principal research method used will be text analysis, the 
relationship of this 'micro' level of discourse to the theoretical 
underpinnings of the study must be clarified. The first section of the 
chapter will begin with a definition of rhetoric and its relationship to 
texts. Drawing on the work of Norman Fairclough and Annette 
Hastings, the techniques used to analyse text will then be discussed in 
more detail. 2 The second aim of the chapter is to demonstrate that case 
studies lend themselves well to providing a 'thick' description of the 
case-specific factors influencing nationalist rhetoric. They thereby 
enable the reader to judge the implications of contextual idiosyncrasies 
for the theory. 3 Section two of the chapter, therefore, addresses the 
question of research design, which is structured around two cases in 
the present study. 
The difficulty of generalising from case study data, or of 
achieving a degree of external validity, has often been pointed to as a 
major weakness of the design. However, this charge rests on the 
mistaken belief that the replicability of conclusions must be equivalent 
to the assumption in statistical analysis that a random sample has 
universal generalisability. In testing a theory of nationalism, this is 
1 M. Dogan & D. Pelassy How to Compare Nations p. 138. 
2 N. Fairclough Language and Power and A. Hastings Connecting Linguistic 
Structures and Social Practices: a Discursive Approach to Social Policy Analysis. 
3 See J. Schofield 'Increasing the Generalisability of Qualitative Research' in M. 
Hammersley ( ed.) Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice. The term 'thick 
description' was coined by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz. C. Geertz The 
Interpretation pf Cultures Ch. 1. 
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neither a desirable nor a feasible goal. Instead, the aim here is to 
, 
achieve analytical as opposed to statistical replicability. Nonetheless, 
problems of comparison across cases do arise, and these will be 
addressed in the context of the debate on 'conceptual travelling'. The 
third aim of the chapter is to provide specific details of the empirical 
research undertaken. Consequently, section three will consist of an 
account of the sources available for consultation in both cases, 
including a survey of the primary data collected and an example of the 
content analysis that was carried out. This will lead into a discussion of 
the rationale behind the selection of four texts for in-depth analysis. 
The section will conclude with an overview of the interview techniques 
used and an appraisal of my research experience in Scotland and 
Bavaria. Throughout, the way in which both methods and methodology 
derive from the theor~tic~l ~amework of the ~tudy will be emphasised. 
Consequently, the empirical analysis will be geared towards applying 




The definition of rhetoric has changed over the centuries, in 
line with dominant philosophical paradigms.4 In the writing of 
Aristotle, its meaning, was closely bound to that of logic, and it 
remained an important philosopher's tool into medieval times. 
However, Descartes and his 'Discourse' marked a turning point in 
scientific method, and simultaneously heralded rhetoric's demotion 
from a systematic and scientific means of pursuing knowledge to the 
'art' of presenting arguments persuasively and eloquently. Stanley Fish 
points out that rhetoric came to be defined in terms of the binary 
oppositions so central to modem philosophy. He remarks that, in the 
same way as ideology, rhetoric has since been associated with what 
4 Thomas Kuhn 's ground-breaking work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
pointed out that modernism itself was nothing other than a rhetorical moment. "In 
short, the 'motor' by which science moves is not verification or falsification, but 
persuasion." S. Fish 'Rhetoric' in F. Lentricchia & T. McLaughlin (eds.) Literary 
Terms for Critical Study p. 211. 
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was perceived to be the negative element in patnngs such as 
"deep/surface, essential/peripheral [ ... ] realities/illusions, fact/opinion, 
neutral/partisan". 5 This illustrates the close link between ideology and 
its rhetorical expression. Explicit in the term post-modernism, ~d 
central to the work of Derrida and Foucault, is the desire to expose 
modernity as ideological and transcend the binary thinking 
characteristic of it.6 Indeed, Michael Billig refers to post-modernity's 
repudiation of the premises of scientific modernity as "the rhetorical 
turn".7 
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were something of a 
low point in the history of rhetoric, as it came to be discredited both as 
a tool of scientific enquiry and as a method in the realm of aesthetics. 
Interestingly, the contemporary meaning of rhetoric recalls our 
understanding of the Classical Sophist school of thought. Almost 
nihilistic in their approach, the Sophists prided themselves on being 
able to argue convincingly for or against anything, and were therefore 
held in contempt by Socrates and other seekers of truth. Word of the 
Sophists has come down to us principally through Plato's transcripts of 
Socratic dialogues such as the 'Gorgias', for the Sophists were orators 
and not writers. 8 Their capacity not only to propose different solutions 
to a problem but also to perceive a problem in different \vays, has 
distinct parallels with party competition in contemporary democracies. 
Eloquence is of primary importance to politicians intent on getting 
their ideological message across. This highlights the association of 
rhetoric with the oral tradition and therefore poses the problem of its 
suitability as a tool of textual analysis. A more precise definition of the 
concept's contemporary meaning will allay any such doubts. 
Jonathan Culler defines rhetorical analysis as "the study of the 
persuasive and expressive resources of language; the techniques of 
language and thought that can be used to construct effective 
5 Ibid. p. 205. 
6 "Deconstruction, that is to say, has grasped the point that the binary oppositions 
with which classical structuralism tends to work represent a way of seeing typical of 
ideologies." T. Eagleton Literary Theory: An Introduction p. 133. 
7 
M. Billig Ideology and Opinions p. 2. 
8 Plato Gorgias. 
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discourses".9 Stripped of the assumptions and pejorative connotations 
attributed to it by the modernist paradigm, rhetoric can be defined as 
an organisation-at and presentational technique which aims to arrange 
arguments informatively and persuasively. To this end, all manner of 
stylistic tricks are employed in order to convince, move and win over 
an audience. Although some of these may be concerned with oral 
delivery - emphasis, pace, tone and so on -just as many involve the 
syntax and structure of texts, which also play a central role in 
expressing a speaker's thought. 10 From pathos to polemic, the mood of 
a speech can be gleaned from a written transcript. As has been traced 
by Paul Corcoran in a historical survey, rhetoric has moved from oral 
delivery in Classical times, through dependence on a printed version in 
the early modem period, to a contemporary fragmentation in which 
speeches reach most people distilled into soundbites or accompanied 
by visual images. 11 Indeed, the skills of the orator must adapt to 
contemporary qppetites in order not to become obsolete. Consequently, 
the bulk of the analysis here will be devoted to rhetoric's role as an 
informative and persuasive expression of ideology, conveyed in the 
style, form and content of the language employed. 
Rhetoric is an art in that the attractiveness of a proposition 
matters more than its basic plausibility. But then again, the art of the 
rhetorician lies precisely in making his or her proposition appear 
eminently plausible. This dynamic illustrates the paradoxical nature of 
any ideological project, which aims to construct truth. Clearly, the 
choice of rhetoric as a focus of the analysis is closely bound up with a 
post-modem approach to the study of neo-nationalism. Both the 
ideologue and the researcher are concerned less with the pursuit of 
truth than with the way in which the desired effect is achieved. 12 In the 
world of ideology, manipulation trumps rigour, information finds itself 
on a par with insinuation, and both emotive and rational arguments are 
acceptable means to an end. Evidently, the conceptual tools of 
9 J. Culler Literary Theory; a very short introduction p. 70. 
1° Cf. E. Corbett Classical Rhetoric for the Modem Student. 
11 P. Corcoran Political Language and Rhetoric Ch. 3. 
12 "In the late twentieth century rhetoric has been revived as the study of the 
structuring powers-of discourse [ ... ] Common sense in whatever form it happens to 
take is always a rhetorical-partial, partisan, interested- construction." S. Fish 
'Rhetoric' in F. Lentricchia & T. McLaughlin (eds.) Literary Terms for Critical 
Study pp. 211-214. 
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positivist social scientists would be of little use in such a context. 
Consequently, the choice of text analysis as a research method is 
dictated by the characteristics attributed to rhetoric, which in turn are 
informed by the understanding of ideology elaborated in this study. 
Given that even the academic bastion of philosophy is being 
challenged by an 'assimilationist' thesis propounding the all-
pervasiveness of ideology, the case for using rhetoric to analyse the 
content, style and persuasiveness of political texts is not a particularly 
controversial one to make. 13 After all, the ideological character of these 
texts is is no way covert or disputed. The question arises, however, as 
to how to pinpoint the rhetorical features of a text. David Cooper 
discerns four of these; 
(i) [T]he deployment of tropes, like metaphor and metonymy; (ii) the 
deployment of persuasive techniques other than 'straight' logical 
argument; (iii) unity of style and content, and what I shall call (iv) the 
deferral of reference[ ... ] the strategy whereby an author's or speaker's 
reference to the real world is indirect, because refracted through an 
imaginary, or imaginatively presented one, which he sets up. 14 
The deployment of these rhetorical techniques serves to convince the 
reader of the correctness of an argument or the plausibility of a given 
world-view. Achieving such an effect will not depend on the rigour of 
a logical exposition or proof of its correspondence with reality, but on 
the skill of the rhetorician in making this appear to be the case. 
Rhetorical figures such as metaphor, personification and 
metonymy, the structure of the text, its ethos and point of view, can all 
provide illuminating insights into a party's ideology. Analysis of a 
text's style and content enables conclusions to be drawn about the 
make-up of the ideology being articulated and the system of 
differences it represents. In the specific context of nationalist ideology, 
the real world is indeed, to reprise Cooper, "refracted through an 
imaginary, or imaginatively presented one". This construct - called the 
13 Cf. D. Cooper 'Rhetoric, Literature and Philosophy' in R. Roberts & J. Good The 
Recovery of Rhetoric, discussed in chapter two, section three of this study. 
14 Ibid. p. 198. 
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nation - its form, content and the style in which it is expressed, is 
nothing other than the rhetorical manifestation of the ideology 
underlying it. Tcr quote Terry Eagleton; 
Ideology seeks to convert culture into nature, and the 'natural' sign is 
one of its weapons. Saluting a flag, or agreeing that Western 
democracy represents the true meaning of the word 'freedom', become 
the most obvious, spontaneous responses in the world. 15 
Ideology masquerades as the truth, and rhetoric is its disguise. 
Analysing the meaning of rhetoric lays bare the components of an 
ideology. 
Analysing Texts 
Text analysis is the most suitable research method for the 
present study, QS it can dissect concepts, trace arguments, evaluate 
standpoints and highlight nodal points in a way 'snapshot' survey data 
can do only superficially. Crucially, and contrary to the survey method, 
text analysis is intent on exploring the uniqueness of a single case 
rather than establishing relationships between many. Consequently, the 
choice of data should be governed by considerations of typicality and 
not statistical representativeness. 16 The exhaustive analysis of one text 
is therefore to be preferred to the summary treatment of several, as this 
approach is better adapted to elucidating the conceptual links and 
layers of meaning which together constitute an ideology. For instance, 
nationalists may attempt to mobilise voters for their cause by operating 
a rhetorical elision between people and party through the ambiguous 
use of the word 'we', the incidence of which can only be charted 
through close reading of primary texts. 17 Exploring ideology as a 
construct translates discourse theory's conception of discourse as a 
system of differences into a research design. Party propaganda is the 
most concrete and elaborate manifestation of party ideology, and as 
such deserves to play a privileged role in the present study. 
15 T. Eagleton Literary Theory: An Introduction p. 135. 
16 The notion of ty12_icality will be discussed in section three below. 
17 "This use of 'we' can be manipulative; it can claim a spurious solidarity, for 
instance when a politician uses it to convince people that she is 'one of them."' N. 
Fairclough Language and Power p. 15. 
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This study examines the discursive construction of the nation 
and its relationship to European integration in two examples of neo-: 
nationalist ideology, with the aim of understanding how core and 
peripheral ideological principles are combined in specific cases. In so 
doing, it focuses on "the detail of how language is used in particular 
settings or contexts"! 8 In an article entitled 'Connecting Linguistic 
Structures and Social Practices', Annette Hastings observes that few 
researchers have applied the work of Foucault or other theorists of 
discourse to policy analysis, in order "to reveal how social policy is 
implicated in constructing and sustaining a 'system of belief". 19 
Stepping into the breach, Hastings proposes that a 'problem' in social 
policy is defined through a process of selectivity and construction, an 
observation which can also be applied to political ideologies?0 Her 
approach amounts to analysing micro-discourse in order to gain 
insights into other levels of the discourse hierarchy. In her article, she 
deconstructs the representation of 'reality' in a Conservative 
government document on urban poverty. Hastings demonstrates how 
the text creates a rhetorical link between urban decline, poverty and a 
'culture of dependency' on the welfare state by analysing the language 
and structure of the opening three paragraphs of the document. The 
specific 'reading strategy' she employs is that of conventional literary 
criticism; attention is focused on the function of an introduction, 
narrative structure, grammar and word choice.21 Following Norman 
Fairclough, Hastings sets out to assess the role of these textual features 
"as 'cues' to the reader to assign a particular meaning to the excerpt".22 
Returning to the vocabulary of discourse theory, this analysis 
corresponds to identifying the moments of discourse which the text is 
using and manipulating. In a world constructed in terms of difference, 
18 A. Hastings Connecting Linguistic Structures and Social Practices: a Discursive 
Approach to Social Policy Analysis p. 192. 
19 Ibid. p.193. 
20 In his book, Chris Hart reproduces a list of rhetorical devices which was originally 
intended for students of economics, illustrating that analysis of rhetoric can be a 
method used across the social sciences; "Policy documents can be a major source of 
material, providing a subject for a thesis, as well as a technique of analysis. The 
tool box of rhetorical terms [ ... ] can be useful in identifying the argument authors and 
organizations propose as policy." C. Hart Doing a Literature Review p. 159. 
21 Cf. M. Hicks Literary Criticism; a practical guide for students. 
22 A. Hastings Connecting Linguistic Structures and Social Practices: a Discursive 
Approach to Social Policy Analysis p. 199. 
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any impression of cohesion must be treated as suspect. It is a sign of 
'ideological work', or the attempt to attribute a subject-position to the 
reader within an'llltimately illusory common sense. Hastings points out 
that readers are encouraged to adopt this "persuasive version of reality" 
as their own.23 Nowhere is this rhetorical goal more explicit than in 
neo-nationalist party propaganda. 
Given that the deconstructivist approach offers no concrete 
'reading strategy', and in · keeping with the features of rhetoric 
discussed above, the tools of literary criticism will also be adopted 
here.24 According to Fairclough, features to look out for in analysing 
rhetoric are the presen~e of. con teste~ concepts, the expressive values 
of words and the relationships established between them by means of 
listing or other classifi~·ation.; Lists, Jor instance, group words without 
making the relationship·. between. them explicit, whereas extensive 
discussion of a theme: signals the: possible presence of contested 
-~ . . 
concepts, the meaning.ofwhich cannot be takenfor granted.25 Elision, 
the use of the passive and; nominalization are favourite ways of 
introducing ambiguity. into .. a text, the use of the pronoun 'we' being 
one example which will be returned to. Positive and negative sentences 
are also often used to calculated effect, the SNP's emphasis on its 
positive message in order to mark itself off from its opponents being a 
case in point. Text deconstruction is used here to mean the dismantling 
of an ideology into its component parts in order to illustrate the way in 
which core and peripheral principles are reconciled. Unlike Derridean 
deconstruction, the aim is not to subvert, but instead to dissect the logic 
of an idea; an ideology .. 
Norman Fairclough's, method successfully bridges the gap 
between macro- and micro-levels of discourse. According to him, 
"language connects with the social through being the primary domain 
23 Ibid. p. 209. 
24 If we read examples of Derrida and Lacan 's work, it soon becomes clear that, 
despite the sometimes dense and often surprising nature of their critiques, they do not 
abandon analysis of a text's dominant themes, its syntax, use of metaphor and so on. 
Indeed, their critiques themselves often play with words in order to highlight 
unexpected or hitherto unarticulated associations. See, for instance J. Lacan Ecrits 
and J. Derrida Signeponge/Signsponge. 
25 N. Fairclough Language and Power Ch.5. 
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of ideology".26 Fairclough situates the text between a process of 
production and a process of interpretation, both of which are inevitably 
influenced by the social conditions of the respective actors.27 Those 
producing texts will attempt to target an ideal audience and ~ill 
incorporate allusions and references, or 'cues', designed to strike a 
chord with those sharing a given background. 28 In the case of political 
parties, appeals are based on the assumption of a shared political 
culture, or discourse. 29 Fairclough notes; 
The sense of coherence of a whole text is generated in a sort of 
chemical reaction which you get when you put together what's in the 
text and what's already 'in' the interpreter- that is, the common-sense 
assumptions and expectations of the interpreter. 30 
··This study focuses on how parties, as producers of text, imagine their 
target audience and what this reveals about their neo-nationalist 
ideology.31 More specifically, it will examine the way in which the 
nation is constructed and reconciled with the process of European 
integration in party rhetoric. 
11 Research Design 
The research design adopted is similar to that of the 'analytic 
narrative' used in some historical studies to elaborate on a theoretical 
model. 32 The aim is to illustrate a theory using a concrete example. 33 
26 Ibid. p.15. 
27 This is a reciprocal relationship, as the texts produced will in turn contribute to the 
evolution of the social context which gave rise to them. 
28 "Producers in mass communication thus have a rather effective means of 
manipulating audiences through attributing to their experience things which they 
want to get them to accept [ ... ] producers must assume that their interpreters or likely 
interpreters are equipped with particular interpretive procedures." N. Fairclough 
Language and Power p. 153. 
29 The term 'political culture' will be defined in section two below. Chapter four 
offers an account of elements of Scottish and Bavarian political culture relevant to 
this study of the SNP and the CSU. 
30 N. Fairclough Language and Power p.78. 
31 This approach is in keeping with the focus on Mannheim's definition of 'total' 
ideology, discussed in chapter one. Conversely, to highlight the process of text 
interpretation would involve a study of the reactions of individual readers, as 
influenced by their 'particular' ideologies. 
32 Cf. R. Bates et a! Analytic Narratives. 
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Consequently, the robustness of the inferences made is measurable in 
terms of ~alytical and not statistical replication; 
--
The issue should be couched in terms of the generalisability of cases to 
theoretical propositions rather than to populations or universes. 34 
Attempting to generalise statistically from case studies would defeat 
the purpose of the analysis. However, the theory's scope for 
incorporating case specificity makes it translatable to other cases. 
There is no attempt to present either the SNP or the CSU as typical 
cases of contemporary nationalist ideology. On the contrary, the 
empirical studies of party ideology and strategy will show that 
nationalist movements are heterogeneous, each being a product of 
specific circumstances. For this reason a restricted number of case 
studies is warranted, as it allows for a 'thick' description of some of 
the many factors influencing the unique expression of a particular neo-
nationalist idemogy. In turn, the diversity of neo-nationalism is 
accounted for theoretically by characterising ideology in terms of core 
and periphery and tracing party dynamics using discourse theory. 
The Parallel Demonstration of Theory 
A discussion of comparative history by Theda Skocpol and 
Margaret Somers can be transposed to political enquiry in order to 
place case study design within its methodological setting.35 The 
authors distinguish three forms of comparative history, namely macro-
causal analysis, the contrast of contexts and the parallel demonstration 
of theory. The present study does not fit into the first category, which 
is likened in the article to multivariate hypothesis testing and thus 
demands a quasi-experimental research design. It has only a superficial 
relationship to the second, which aims to make divergent trends stand 
out by comparing very different cases. The contrast of contexts 
33 "A case is an instance of a more general category [ ... ] A pr<?ject turns into a case 
study only when it becomes clear what the study is a case of." R. Hague et a/ 
Comparative Government and Politics p. 276. 
34 Mitchell, cited by D. Silverman in Interpreting Qualitative Data at p.l60. M. 
Dogan & D. Pelassf offer a succinct account of the two-case study, or what they call 
binary analysis, in How to Compare Nations Ch. 15. 




privileges the historical integrity of a case - or at least a thematic 
treatment- over explicit theorising. Such explicit theorising is a central 
component of the parallel demonstration of theory, however. In this 
last approach; 
The reason for juxtaposing case histories is to persuade the reader that 
a given, explicitly delineated hypothesis or theory can repeatedly 
demonstrate its fruitfulness - its ability convincingly to order the 
evidence - when applied to a series of convincing historical 
trajectories.36 
The aim of the comparison is to show that cases are sufficiently similar 
to fit the theoretical argument proposed. Consequently, data is 
confronted with theory throughout the case studies, as the design is 
ultimately geared to theory demonstration rather than, say, quasi-
anthropological description . 
The methodological aims informing the present research design 
closely resemble those of the parallel demonstration of theory, since 
the case studies of the SNP and the CSU are designed to illustrate the 
flexibility of neo-nationalism in terms of ideology and discourse 
theory. The theory of neo-nationalism elaborated here makes it 
possible to pursue the seemingly divergent goals of establishing the 
uniqueness of each case whilst making theoretical generalisations. This 
is because case specificity is incorporated into the interpretation of the 
dynamics of competing hegemonic projects, the adaptability of party 
policy, the interplay of core and peripheral ideological principles -and 
the importance accorded to context. The theory presented here does not 
attempt to identify the causal mechanisms responsible for 
contemporary nationalisms, but instead proposes a theoretical 
framework for observing these phenomena systematically. Adopting a 
clear theoretical standpoint ensures translatability, enabling the same 
approach to be used to understand other instances of neo-nationalism. 
Once the goal of explaining causality has been set aside, theory-
building takes on an interpretative character. Cases are chosen for their 
value in rendering the specific contemporary phenomenon; they are 
intended to illustrate hypotheses and hence test the theory. This 
36 Ibid. p. 176. 
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methodology is complemented by the openness of case study research 
design to diverse sources of data, allowing for the incorporation of 
both text and interview evidence into the present study. 
The analogy between the parallel demonstration of theory and 
the jurisprudence of a legal case is an illuminating one.37 A case's ratio 
decidendi - or guiding principle - may set a precedent. However, 
although the legal reasoning might be argued to apply to a subsequent 
case, the judge may eventually distinguish it on its facts. Case study 
research orients itself towards a detailed description of the case and its 
context, whilst still searching for significance beyond it. In other 
words, an explicit theoretical framework is used to establish what it is 
a 'case of. This framework is then applied to other cases by analogy, 
much as the ratio decidendi is applied to similar legal cases. Such an 
approach prioritises theory-building over data comparison in any 
statistical sense,. This explicitly accepts the fact that description and 
interpretation will always be theory-laden, a theoretical framework 
being crucial to any structured assessment. The logic of the research 
design is made more transparent by highlighting the methodological 
rationale behind data collection. 38 If a case can be interpreted in terms 
of a theory and the similarities or deviancies of other cases are better 
interpreted in terms of that theory than any other, then the goal of the 
research will have been achieved. 
Case Studies 
The choice of a left-wing and a right-wing party, a secessionist 
and a non-secessionist party, a fervently pro-European and a more 
circumspectly pro-European party is a conscious one. Considerable 
differences inevitably exist between the parties and their environments. 
For instance, the effects of the Second World War had a hugely 
different psychological impact on Scotland and Bavaria, Allied and 
Axis members respectively. The CSU was instrumental in shoring up 
Bavarian identity after the Punkt Null of 1945, whereas the SNP could 
37 R. Hague et al Cwnparative Government and Politics: An Introduction Ch.l6. 
38 "Sometimes the general perspective is clearly stated, and sometimes it is implicit. 
But it must be present for the monograph to become a real case study." M. Dogan & 
D. Pelassy How to Compare Nations p. 108. 
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build on an uninterrupted and strong civil society in Scotland. 
Consequently, there is no assumption of homogeneity across cases. On 
the contrary; the theory must account for such variation in order to 
increase its internal validity and its replicability to other c~es. 
Conversely, however, there is a degree of similarity between two 
parties which claim to represent territories enjoying some autonomy 
within concentric circles of state and EU governance. Most 
· importantly, the parties share a core goal of self-determination, which 
classes them as neo-nationalist for the purposes of this study. The SNP 
. was chosen· for ·its .'combination of a pro-European strategy with an 
. .'. unwavering·ideological ~commitment to independence. As one of the 
~ few· parties . · in ~ · co~temporary Europe interpreting national self-
. . determination in this way, its strong core principle will provide a clear 
. . 
' .. !, . '.·:;;.reference point 1.from'lwhich to analyse the peripheral policy of support 
for.,European;integration; The CSU, on the other hand, has only once 
... : ...... ·.:. ,..'before .. been;. c~aracterised as. a nationalist party.39 It will be 
I. , . . . ·• . . . 
· ... · · ... .'·, demonstrated,i how~ver;that the CSU's use of the concept of Heimat in 
· < its ideology is equivalent to the nodal point of the nation. To quote 
,.: · Dogan and Pelassy; · · · · 
The task of the comparativist, at this level, is to pinpoint real functional 
equivalences in order to control and master distortions raised by 
inevitable contextual differences.40 
· Not only do the CSU's core and peripheral principles accord with the 
theoretical framework proposed here, but its 'undercover nationali~m', 
. as it were,. allows. it· to pursue its goals unhindered by nationalism, s 
negative connotations; 
The chosen parties incorporate a European agenda into their 
ideologies and thereby supplement their core commitment to national 
self-determination with a peripheral, pro-European policy. The aim of 
the empirical study is to look at how these are reconciled in practice. 
To this end, a comparison of recent national and European elections in 
39 P. Noack Die CSU- ~ationalistisch oder was sonst? However, the term was used 
here polemically to refer to the CSU's demand for 'national' (read 'West German') 
resistance in the face of the SPD's plans for a rapprochement with East Germany and 
other Communist states during the early 1970s. 
40 M. Dogan & D. Pelassy How to Compare Nations p. 60. 
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Scotland and Bavaria was chosen as a way of pinpointing the party 
rhetoric which corresponded to the themes of national identity and 
European policy. It was thought that the campaign literature would 
crystallise party thinking in these areas. The analysis of each party's 
rhetoric was therefore based on this literature, with discourse theory 
providing the unifying theoretical framework. The national elections in 
question took place nine months apart and were naturally oriented 
towards domestic political debates. Although 'bread and butter' issues 
inevitably play a major role in any campaign, the first ever election to 
the Scottish parliament promised to define the way in which the four-
party-system of Scottish politics constituted a departure from the 
dynamics of UK elections. In turn, the fact that the Bavarian 
parliamentary election occurred only two weeks prior to the German 
federal election suggested that the two political arenas would be 
compared and contrasted in the campaign. As it was, the CSU's 
continued elect~ral dominance in Bavaria contrasted sharply with its 
sister party's fall from grace at the federal level. Given that the 1999 
European election campaigns took place simultaneously in Scotland 
and Bavaria, it was possible to evaluate the parties' differing responses 
to the current stage of European integration. However, it soon became 
apparent that, to a greater or lesser extent, domestic concerns were also 
fuelling the European campaigns. 
Personal bias being unavoidable, it is necessary at this point to 
set out the idiosyncratic reasons governing the selection of cases for 
this study. Like the thesis question itself, the choice of the SNP was 
motivated by my nationality, an interest in Scottish affairs and a desire 
to subject my own political leanings to critical scrutiny. The choice of 
the CSU resulted from a wish to move away from a comparison of 
Scottish nationalism with nationalist movements in Quebec, Catalonia 
and Italy, which had been undertaken before. 41 Having studied German 
and lived in Germany several times during my university career, I was 
in a position both to identify Bavaria as a possible case and to analyse 
German-language data. A lack of in-depth knowledge of Bavarian 
history and political culture before embarking on half a year of 
.. 
41 Cf. M. Keating Nations against the State, J. Newell The Scottish National Party 
and the Italian Lega Nord: A Lesson for their Rivals? and M. Urquhart Long or Short 
Game: The Italian Northern League and the Scottish National Party. 
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research in Munich enabled me to view party strategy and rhetoric with 
a fresh eye, and I was soon convinced that the CSU was a suitable case 
to be discussed in terms of nationalism. Further, my theoretical interest· 
in underlining the pervasive influence of 'banal' nationalism made me 
particularly keen to demonstrate nationalist characteristics in a party 
which did not recognise itself as such. However, the crystallisation of 
the theoretical framework for the study occurred after data collection 
was complete, thus reducing the risk that the case was simply moulded 
to fit the theory. 
My knowledge of the Scottish case was quite different. To 
quote Grant McCracken; 
Deep and long-lived familiarity with the culture under study has, 
potentially, the grave effect of dulling the investigator's powers of 
observation and analysis. But it also has the advantage of giving the 
investigator and extraordinarily intimate acquaintance with the object 
of study.42 
A deeper understanding of the historical background, the cultural 
assumptions underlying rhetorical 'cues' and the symbolism employed 
by the SNP contrasted sharply with the danger of missing linguistic 
subtleties and allusions made by the CSU. This imbalance was 
partially remedied by a period of immersion in Bavarian political 
culture and a rigorous questioning of new notions and concepts. 
Furthermore, conducting research in Bavaria prior to Scotland 
provided a comparative framework within which to organise and· re-
evaluate my experience of Scottish politics, thus manufacturing a 
degree of distance. Finally, I decided to complement my analysis with 
a suitably 'thick' description of the Scottish and Bavarian contexts 
within which the parties have evolved. Without claiming to eliminate 
them completely, this approach was intended to minimise the risks of 
over-selectivity and biased reporting. 
42 G. McCracken The Long Interview p. 32. 
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CompariQg Concepts 
Considerable time will be devoted in this study to exploring the 
CSU's rhetorical construction of the Bavarian Heimat and the SNP's 
understanding of Scottish 'Independence in Europe', as these are nodal 
points of the parties' respective ideologies. The question arises, 
however, as to whether these terms are comparable. Given the wide 
differences in political culture, language and history between the cases, 
is it legitimate to treat them both as examples of neo-nationalist 
ideology? Comparative politics always faces the problem of trying to 
apply conceptual tools across languages and cultures, when these may 
be defined differently according to the context. The opposite meanings 
attached to the words federalism and Foderalismus is one example 
which will be returned ' to, the myriad definitions of the nation is 
another.43 For this reason, a thorough understanding of the political 
discourse of a eountry is vital. The survey of primary and secondary 
literature undertaken here was necessary in order to do justice to the 
idiosyncrasies of specific cases and thereby improve the accuracy of 
comparisons with other nationalist ideologies. Comparative studies 
based on close textual analysis are relatively rare. However, once the 
problem of conceptual travelling has been addressed, an approach 
based on close reading enriches understanding of the many diverse 
ways in which concepts such as that of the nation can be constructed 
and manipulated. 44 
Giovanni Sartori was the first to highlight the problems of 
conceptual travelling, defined as applying a concept to a new case, and 
conceptual stretching, a term· Sartori used to refer to the inappropriate 
use of a concept.45 A study aspiring to any form of generalisability 
must develop a lexicon of generic concepts which are abstract enough 
to be of use across similar cases. However, the variety of contexts and 
meanings associated with specific concepts makes this a hazardous 
undertaking. In an example of conceptual travelling, Richard Rose 
makes a comparison between the British Conservative Party and the 
43 To quote Neil MacCormick; "The problem is that these words with common roots 
[have] different valbes and meanings in different cultures and contexts." Interview 
with the author. 
44 Cf. R. de Chillia et a/ The Discursive Construction of National Identities 
45 G. Sartori Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics 
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German CDU. The two parties are by no means identical, but are 
generally classed as equivalent due to their positions on the left/right 
scale of party politics.46 The recent proliferation of terms such as 
'regional nationalism' and 'territorial nationalism' also highlights the 
problems inherent in conceptual travelling. These attempt to delimit the 
range of study by means of clarificatory adjectives, but inevitably still 
run the risk of treating quite different phenomena as equivalent.47 
Finally, the slippery concept of political culture is a crucial contributor 
to the nature of political systems, and thus central to comparative 
studies. Dogan and Pelassy define it as "the set of political beliefs, 
feelings and values that prevail in a nation at a given time".48 The 
authors go on to quote Sidney Verba as saying; "political ideologies are 
affected by the cultural environment into which they are introduced".49 
National identity, for instance, is relevant to the present study as an 
aspect of political culture. It can be characterised as an inchoate sense 
of belonging which nationalists attempt to manipulate and mobilise. At 
the same time, however, it cannot be divorced from the elements of 
political culture influencing its articulation, such as the existence of 
multiple identities and their relationship to the history, party politics 
and constitutional legitimacy of a given political arena; 
Nationalism locates the source of individual identity within a 'people', 
which is seen as the bearer of soverei~nty, the central object of loyalty, 
and the basis of collective solidarity.5 
Given that discursive formations are a central concern of this 
study, the question of conceptual stretching is implicit in its research 
questions; 
To understand how the political discourse varies across countries is not 
merely a preliminary to a com}?arative project; it is itself an underused 
form of comparative research. 1 
46 R. Rose Comparing forms of comparative analysis 
47 Cf. M. Dogan & D. Pelassy How to Compare Nations Ch. 5. 
48 Ibid. p. 58. 
49 Ibid. p. 58 The opus classicus on political culture is G. Almond The Civic Culture, 
later updated by G. Almond and S. Verba (eds.) The Civic Culture Revisited. 
50 Liah Greenfeld Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity p. 160. 
51 R. Hague et a/ Comparative Government and Politics p. 274. 
99 
The most P!llpable evidence of the theoretical approach permeating the 
case studies is the way in which concepts are defined. Consequently, it 
-
is especially important to demonstrate that the concept of the nation is 
not being 'stretched' to fit the CSU's interpretation of the Bavarian 
Heimat. For this reason, a detailed analysis of the term Heimat will 
seek to show that it plays a 'functionally equivalent' role to the 
concept of nation as an ideological focal point of political 
mobilisation. In a comparative study, the detailed examination of 
discourse comes into its own in illustrating the equivalent roles played 
by concepts within ideologies. As such, attentiveness is shown to 
context without abandoning a broader comparison of ideological 
constructs across cases. 52 
The problems of conceptual travelling and stretching will be 
tackled head on in chapter four, in a discussion of the elements of 
Scottish and Bavarian political culture relevant to SNP and CSU 
ideology. The subsequent case studies will then focus on each party's 
construction of the nation and European integration as examples of 
core and peripheral ideological principles. Linking the research 
findings to the theoretical framework in this way creates a 'chain of 
evidence' from the presentation of data through interpretation to 
conclusions. 53 To quote Dogan and Pelassy once more; 
Because each function is conceived of as a part of a living complex, 
even the most empirically oriented research eventually nourishes the 
theoretical framework. 54 
This recalls the importance accorded by discourse theory to the social 
and political conditions of discourse. As a prelude to a discussion of 
these in chapter four, the final section of the present chapter will 
explain how the political culture informing party ideology was studied 
in practice. It will also detail the methods used to analyse the parties' 
ideologies, underlining their theoretical derivation. 
52 D. Collier & J. Mahon Conceptual stretching revisited: adapting categories in 
comparative analysis. 
53 R. Yin Case Study Research Ch. 6. 
54 M. Dogan & D. Pelassy How to Compare Nations p. 33. 
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', Ill Research Methods 
The research methods used to collect the empirical data were 
detailed qualitative analysis of specific texts, interviews, and a suryey 
of primary party literature, which was exhaustive for the election 
campaigns selected. Together, they provide a rounded view of the 
rhetorical manifestations of the parties' ideologies. The choice of 
methods was a response to Norman Fairclough's observation that the 
"analysis of ideology must be answerable to the detailed properties of 
texts". 55 In turn,' the close reading of specific texts is informed not only 
· ·by .literary theory; but also by insights into 'social repertoires', gained 
· from; conducting· interviews. Furthermore, the content analysis of 
, primary. lit~rature is another method of data collection in its own 
.,::·· ·.rightl56 .. :The·.fact;,that-:texfual\analysis •will inevitably be biased by the 
· ·. · · ~alyst's' experience can. be partially remedied by as thorough and 
·, . 
· .. • · . wi~e~ranging '.a· survey ._of texts as possible. In order to preserve the 
' ,·, I, • • ' ., 
.. · liilgtiistic subtletie·s of. primary texts written in German, their English 
: .. ·. translation has been accompanied by its original version throughout. 57 
The focus on the rhetoric used by parties is geared towards 
deconstructing their interpretation of the nation and European policy. 
To this end,: all' CSU and SNP campaign literature produced for the 
Scottish, Bavarian . and : European elections of 1988 and 1999 was 
gathered together. and analysed. It consisted not only of manifestos, 
speeches, press releases and party papers, but also of flyers, leaflets, 
posters and party political broadcasts. This rich resource provided- the 
basis for prelimi.nary hypotheses regarding each party's interpretation 
of· its core and peripheral principles ·and informed both the choice of 
texts for. detailed analysis and the issues explored in interviews. The 
survey of primary party literature was not limited to recent campaigns, 
but spanned a period of over thirty years. Minutes, discussion papers 
and proceedings from every CSU party conference since the early 
55 N. Fairclough 'Linguistic and lntertextual Analysis within Discourse 
Analysis' in A. Jaworski & N. Coupland (eds.) The Discourse Reader p. 204. 
Fairclough uses linguistic analysis in the wide sense to include grammar, 
structure and word choice. 
56 Cf. C. Hart Doing a Literature Review. 
57 The original versions of the two extended texts analysed in chapter six are to be 
found in Appendix 11. Quotes from secondary texts written in German have been 
translated. 
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1970s were checked for evidence of the party's interpretation of the 
Bavarian Heima_t and of its role as a Bavarian party. In addition, the 
minutes of special conferences and committee meetings on European 
policy were examined over the same period. 58 The lack of a complete 
SNP archive rendered a parallel study in Scotland impossible. 
However, this was partly remedied by questioning interviewees on the 
development of relevant policies and cross-referencing the results in 
order to control for incompatible accounts. 
All the documents served as historical artefacts as well as being 
examples of rhetoric which could be analysed for their ideological 
content. Having familiarised myself with the evolution of party 
rhetoric, I was in a position to pinpoint texts which were particularly 
relevant to my research questions. From the complete data set, four 
texts were chosen for their typicality. The main selection criterion was 
the text's repre~ntativeness of the themes, arguments and images used 
in the parties' most recent campaigns and in their rhetoric more 
generally. The selection process of the research design thus began with 
the choice of cases, continued with the identification of policy areas 
relevant to an exploration of core and peripheral ideological principles, 
and ended with the selection of texts from suitable election campaigns. 
The database drawn upon during the latter stages of this process will be 
described in some detail. For the purposes of illustrating the content 
analysis informing the choice of texts, the CSU's European policy will 
then be described, before discussing how interviews were used as a 
supplementary source of evidence. 
Survey of Primary Documents 
The extensive archive of the Hanns-Seidel trust, which is 
closely affiliated to the CSU, was my main source of documentation on 
the Bavarian party. The archive has complete sets of all conference and 
campaign materials delivered automatically from CSU headquarters, 
and several full-time members of staff catalogue the collection and 
assist those wishing to consult it. The SNP, on the other hand, has no 
58 These documents were consulted in the archive of the Hanns-Seidel Stiftung in 
Munich. 
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', official party archive. 
59 Neither is there any systematic logging of 
recent campaign materials as they are produced. Some pamphlets, 
leaflets and personal papers are stored in the National Library of 
Scotland in Edinburgh. However, they are largely unclassified and ~he 
collection is far from complete. Both parties have clear, easy-to-use 
and frequently updated web pages. That of the SNP includes an 
exhaustive record of press releases for the last five years and access to 
speeches, manifestos and some examples of campaign literature. 60 The 
CSU web page offers a complete set of policy statements as well as 
contributions to current political debates. Attending the SNP 
extraordinary conference on the party constitution held in Perth in May 
2000 provided me with the opportunity to make contacts. I was also 
able to compare the SNP's strategy for the 2001 General Election- as 
outlined in a speech by soon-to-be leader John Swinney - with their 
approach to the 1999 campaigns. In Bavaria, I attended the 1999 CSU 
• party conference in Nuremberg, which allowed me to familiarise 
myself with the party's leading politicians and their rhetoric at an early 
stage in my research, as well as make preliminary contacts with a view 
to conducting interviews. My period of research in Bavaria ended with 
a visit to the annual Ash Wednesday gathering of the CSU, which is 
renowned for the rousing rhetoric of the speeches delivered there. 
CSU Sources 
All of the literature produced by the CSU for both the 1998 
Bavarian and 1999 European elections was gathered and evaluated. 
This included the complete set of cinema and television broadcasts 
prepared for the campaigns and a series of pamphlets published by the 
CSU, detailing their policy in areas such as education, law and order, 
European policy and the economy. The campaign literature also ranged 
from manifestos and speeches to a brochure presenting the updated 
party logo, colours and advertising materials. These documents were 
compared to a selection of the materials produced for the 1998 German 
federal election. An evaluation of the development of CSU European 
59 Former SNP MEP Allan Macartney's extensive personal library became 
inaccessible after his death. 
60 During the period of data collection for this study the SNP website, www.snp.org, 
incorporated a useful search engine which has since been de-activated. The CSU's 
web address is www.csu.de. 
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policy fron; the early 1970s,. to .the present was also undertaken, using 
the written. records of party ·.confe~ences archived at the Hanns-Seidel 
Stiftung. These comprised all .. ofthe)~urope~ manifestos published by 
the party, as well as disc~ssion ··papers on themes as diverse as 
European identity and comni~n fof~i~. and. security policy. A set of 
thirty-five speeches written.: for CSU party leaders and government 
ministers between 1985 ~d.: l9.99. ·~~ con~ulted: Siegfried MUller, a 
senior speechwriter for .. csy_'p~l.i~i.ci·~~~·jn~l.uding Franz Josef StrauB. 
, ' ' , 0 ~ I ~ ' .' .' ' ~ 1 ' ' ' •' o • ; • ' I r. • ·. I ' .' 
himself, selected these as: of/possiqle. ,.interest, to me. Each speech 
naturally gave insight~ .i~t6·:p~;}h~t.~ric, .. b~t also included specific· · 
. . ,·\···::·.-~: -~·:· .·:'.'::~··)~: .. -.·.1:~;·.·.· . . ', . 
references to the Bavarian:)/f~imat?~d 'hasic'.party principles. Finally~ 
taking part in. a ·cour~e .:6[[~;~ iby';.M~ich i University on Bavaria's · · 
. . . •• :, •.•. : ',', ··~. ', .' ·/ If f '· • \ : ·< ·. ·:I : -~- . '· I· ..... : ' .. 0 . . . \ . . ; . 
post-war prime ministers·. gay~ i .tP~ .. : ~c~.ess ~to· specialist literature on 
.. •. ., .. :.' ... ii6i .. (f,'~;·::·.·.·~:·.t.::~·.'<·. ·i'>; ··. '. . . 
.. Bavanan and CSU htstocyt:/·.:,· ·, ......... ,·;.)·{ ::·:.1 •• .. ;.: ···i·'·· .. 
. . . . . . .· . : ... :: .@~::'.':/::·.·<~ ::,,::). ~· .\:·· >:. . :. . . . . 
· All of· lite weekly./;:·.'ooitiq·n~ \of,(· t~~/ . .CSU: party· paper, . the . 
. . ' ·: · .. ,· ... ,;J· : ... ~,1-· . -,f,'.'.~· .. :,) 't.'·· ,·':j{_.:.· .. ·:-~··-~t~·-· ·: ... ·, . . ,' 
Bayernkurier, · dating from\~ inie ~ '9~~ .. ~~::;J ul y/1999 were consulted.: As 
• 0 • 1
, , I ) \ I , 1 • •, ' ,.. 1 \ ~ '. 0 , I I \ '\ 11 1 , • o , 
' well as containing tr~scrlp~s.· of':'aii', majo~ :,sp~eches by' former party 
chairman Theo Waigel; ~·B·~v~~:prlm~,·~~is'ter Ed~und Stoiber and· 
his ministers, these provid~ .back~ound 'infdrmation to the European, 
., 0 o o 0 :1· I '.' J 
Bavarian and German election. camp~igos·w4ich took place during this· 
;,1_ ',• I 1) ·' ' ' o I 
period. A search of the. Hanns-Seid~l .. Sti/t~ng library for all materials 
of relevance to my topic ~i~lded ·~~veral.:co·mnl.entaries by prominent:. 
CSU politicians on Eur~~·e~·;poli~Y~~~ :!Furth.ermore, I could benefit· 
, ' • ~ \ .' : • •., ) ~ l . , ' ·.. . I. I '. ·. • '. ' • ' •. • • • ~, . ' ' • 
from free academic ·literatur~ ;produced; byr'.a .Bavarian government-
funded centre for politic.ali~dti.6~tioti~: .·the·:B~y~r'~~he Landesz~ntrale 
for politische Bildung.6~ s~·~~ch~~·id~t~i~ing:,,Edrnund Stoiber's recent. 
, . '·.; '•,'•} ''., ~',':f.''. •; . ,' ,'I I '. '· ,' '.' ', " .. " 
programmes for governrrient\and \statements by ilie current Bavarian 
minister for E~rop~ari ·. ~ffai~sf:~~~e ;·c~h~uited; .·as , ~as the Eur~pa­
Kurier, a newsletter detailin~ .th·~ a~tiviti~s: ~f CSU MEPs. In addition, 
• ,,
1 
·, , , 
0
, 0 / 0 f I ' • , 
CD-ROM searches were co~d:ucted oft~e dapy broad sheet newspaper, 
the Siiddeutsche Zeitung, and :.th~ weekly. ne:\vs. magazine, der Speigel, 
. : ..... ' ... :•\/ . . ,· 
, . ~ . ~ 
__________ ._ .. _· ! .. ·.·.\,·:,/ .~ ...... · '·· .. '.'; 
61 Cf. Staatliche Archive Bayems Die. bay~rl~~hen Mhtisterpdisidenten von 1945 his 
1993, K. Bosl Bayerische Geschichte and M.: Treml Politische Geschichte Bayerns. 
62 Cf. I. Friedrich Zur Sache; Europa, F: J.! StrauB Herausforderung und Antwort: Ein 
Programrn fiir Europa and T. Waigel (ed.) Unsere Zukunft heillt Europa. 
63 Cf. M. Treml Geschichte des Modemen Bayem, R.- Roth Freistaat Bayern: 
Politische Landeskunde and R. Roth ( ed.) Freistaat Bay em: Die politische 





for the years 1998 and 1999. These were an important source of 
information and comment on Bavarian politics and more specifically, 
on the Bavarian and European election campaigns. 
SNP Sources 
A search of the National Library of Scotland yielded some 
primary SNP literature. Other than SNP general election manifestos, a 
selection of party pamphlets and flyers dating to as far back as 1944 
were studied. These ranged from statements of principle and policy to 
early campaign leaflets. Strategy documents were tracked down for the 
1997 general election and the 1999 European election, as was an 
almost complete set of 'Scotland's Voice', the daily newspaper 
produced during the last week of campaigning for the Scottish 
parliament election. The quarterly research bulletins published by the 
party were consulted for the period from 1991 to 1995 and included 
some important discussions and statements of European policy. Access 
to promotional material produced by candidates for party office in the 
run-up to the 1999 party conference allowed me to take stock of 
questions of strategy and policy being debated within the party in the 
aftermath of the Scottish and European elections. Relevant 
publications by the Scottish Centre for Economic and Social Research, 
the Saltire Papers and the Business for Scotland group were 
consulted. 64 SNP press releases made during 1998 and 1999 were 
downloaded from the party website, as were speeches by party office-
holders to recent SNP party conferences. Finally, the 1997 and 1999 
CD-ROM editions of 'The Scotsman' newspaper were searched for 
articles concerning the general, European and Scottish election 
campaigns. 
The campaign materials collated for the 1999 SNP European 
election campaign included the manifesto, a campaign leaflet and 
flyers, target letters, a plan of campaign strategy and all party political 
broadcasts. Similarly, my database on the Scottish parliament election 
64 The Sal tire papers are an occasional series of discussion papers published by the 
SNP. The Scottish Centre for Economic and Social Research produces discussion 
papers on issues associated with self-government, and is associated with the SNP 
(former party leader Alex Salmond is an honorary vice-president.) The Business for 
Scotland group is run from SNP headquarters. 
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contained radio and television broadcasts, the SNP's manifesto and .. 
youth manifesto, a brochure detailing the 'Penny for Scotland' 
initiative, the campaign newspaper and an internal party document 
entitled 'The Scotland we seek; the SNP's vision of Scotland for the 
21st century'. A paper written by the SNP campaign manager Mike 
Russell after the election contained many reflections on the lessons to 
be learned from the campaign.65 Concerning SNP policy more 
generally, a policy document detailing the party's plans for the 
parliament and constitution of an independent Scotland was of 
particular interest.66 The book 'Scotland in Europe' by Paul Scott, 
written in an interview format, was an illuminating rehearsal of the 
arguments brought by Scottish nationalists to support the policy of 
'Independence in Europe'. Finally, ex-party leader Gordon Wilson 
provided a complete list of SNP conference resolutions on European 
matters since 1971, which allowed me to trace the development of SNP 
policy in this ~a. 
Content Analysis 
Within each policy area chosen to illustrate the core and 
periphery of party ideology, one text was selected according to how 
typical it was of the rhetoric used by the party. That is, the factors used 
to assess the value of the document for analysis were its 
representativeness of the themes and the style of party literature. In 
order to identify typical texts, therefore, a content analysis was 
undertaken of all the data gathered. Content analysis is an unobtrusive 
fact-finding method which can be made explicit to the reader, thus 
rendering the process replicable and its conclusions verifiable. 67 
Fairclough has illustrated the replicability of text analysis by re-
interpreting texts analysed by other authors. 68 The overview of themes 
emerging from the content analysis can be used to judge the 
'fittingness' of the texts chosen, or the degree to which they match the 
65 M. Russell Nothing more Difficult; a contribution to the debate on independence. 
66 Scottish National Party Citizens not Subjects. Cf. A. Macartney (ed.) Scotland's 
Government- The .. Transition to Independence. 
67 C. Marshall & G. Rossman Designing Qualitative Research pp. 85-86. 
68 N. Fairclough 'Linguistic and lntertextual Analysis within Discourse Analysis' in 
A. Jaworski & N. Coupland (eds.) The Discourse Reader. 
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rhetoric they are intended to represent. 69 The more the texts are 
common or ordinary in terms of CSU and SNP rhetoric, the more they 
can be said to be typical of that kind of rhetoric.70 Typicality, then, is 
informed by the content analysis of a full range of primary sources and 
the understanding of context it provides. As an illustration of the 
method's replicability, the following content analysis of the CSU's 
European policy can be compared with the piece of CSU European 
campaign literature reproduced in chapter six. This will enable the 
reader to judge whether the text selected was indeed typical. 
CSU European Policy 
Two recurrent themes across the CSU's conferences on the 
theme of Europe were the need to integrate western Germany into an 
international framework and the knock -on effect this would have on 
the federal competencies of the German Liinder.11 In 1987, following a 
conference of Liinder representatives held in Munich, the important 
new concept of subsidiarity was added to the debate. 72 The CSU's 
support for the principle of subsidiarity is often paired in its rhetoric 
with a demand that European Commission competencies should be 
delimited by treaty. Further, the need to preserve regional identity has 
been linked to the protection of Bavarian autonomy in the party's calls 
for the strict application of subsidiarity. This can be seen as a variation 
on Franz Josef StrauB's much-quoted appraisal of the European, 
69 The texts selected are specific instances of the parties' brand of neo-nationalis( 
rhetoric. This does not amount to asserting that the texts chosen are typical of neo-
nationalist ideology in general. · 
70 J. Schofield 'Increasing the Generalisability of Qualitative Research' in M. 
Hammersley (ed.) Social Research p. 210. 
71 From the 1950s onwards, the debate focused on the interpretation of Articles 23 
and 24 of the German Basic Law. The question of centralising tendencies under 
cover of vague clauses in the Basic Law became an ever-more important theme, not 
only in the question of redistribution of income between centre and periphery and 
between Lander (one of the CSU's most prominent current policies), but also in the 
power of the federal government to hand over Lander competences to Europe. For a 
commentary on this debate, and B~varia 's role in it, see Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier Die 
deutschen Uinder im Prozef3 der Europaischen Einigung Ch. C (sic.). Cf. R. Meier-
Walser & G. Hirscher (eds.) Krise und Reform des Foderalismus 
72 At that conference, the prime ministers of the West German Lander adopted a 
resolution outlining their vision of future European integration. For the text, see M. 
Treml Geschichte des Modemen Bayem p. 495. Franz Josef Strauf3 was particularly 
active in promoting the ten propositions it contained, and at the CSU party 
conference on 20th- 21 51 November 1987, Edmund Stoiber reported that they 
corresponded exactly to CSU party policy. 
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German and Bavarian tiers of government, reproduced in the CSU' s 
1994 European manifesto; "Bavaria is our Homeland, Germany is our 
Vaterland, Europe is our future". Another of the general principles 
guiding CSU policy today is that of Einheit in Vie/fait, or unity in 
diversity, which finds its expression in the concept of a 'Europe of the 
Regions' .73 Strains of exclusionary rhetoric can be detected in the 
CSU's evocation of a shared western and Christian culture.74 However, 
the juxtaposition of this notion of shared European values with a 
diversity of cultures, lifestyles and traditions is a potentially confusing 
one in CSU rhetoric. 
Peace, security, and the fight against socialism are recurring 
themes over fifty years of CSU European policy. 75 All recent speeches 
and policy documents on Europe continue to contain a reference to 
Europe as a guarantor of peace, an image which has long been salient 
in CSU rhetori~. Another favourite CSU theme of Biirgernahe, or 
closeness to the people, is juxtaposed with the centralism and high 
levels of bureaucracy which are allegedly characteristic of both 
socialist and European government. Franz Josef StrauB was not shy of 
highlighting his own contribution to European integration in his 
speeches, a legacy recognised by his successors. 76 Max Streibl, 
Bavarian prime minister from 1988 to 1993, looked further back in 
time for a legitimation of party policy, when he linked the party's duty 
to support European integration to well over one thousand years of 
Bavarian history.77 Bavarian and German interests also find a 
prominent place in CSU rhetoric. 78 The image of a party rooted in 
Bavaria is frequently used in order to convey the impression that only 
the CSU can be trusted to represent the Land in Europe. However, 
connotations of provincialism in CSU rhetoric are balanced by an 
73 The first of the party's principles regarding Europe reads; "Europe's future; unity 
in diversity". ["Europa's Zukunft; Einheit in Vielfalt."] 
Http:/www.csu.de/Europa/Leitsatze.htm, consulted on 1st March 2000. 
74This theme will be discussed in more detail in chapter seven. 
75 For instance, the title of the CSU's 1979 European Manifesto read; "A free future. 
No to Socialism". ["Zukunft in Freiheit. Nein zum Sozialismus."] 
76 Straul3 develops his vision of European politics and integration theory in his 
memoirs, Die Erinnerungen. 
77 Max Streibl, in a speech made to a party committee in Regensburg, on 1 th 
February 1989. 
78 Cf. the introduction to the CSU's 1994 European manifesto and I. Friedrich Zur 
Sache; Europa. 
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evocation of the party's role in Germany-wide politics. The CSU 
claims that Germany and Bavaria must be the driving force of future 
integration. Finally, the CSU's 1989 European Manifesto highlights 
the three central factors driving the party's pro-European staD:ce; 
tradition, conviction and political common sense. Not only are lofty 
visions of shared European goals and values to be found in CSU 
rhetoric, then, but also sober evaluations of what Bavaria has to gain 
from European co-operation. 
Interviews 
Case study research should properly be described as a design 
rather than a method, as it frames the process of data gathering rather 
'.than' dictating how it ·should be carried out.79 rhe full range of data 
. collection methods remain available to the researcher, thereby 
•. · facilitating data triangulation. As the control element in the research 
design, data triangulation serves to render the findings, interpretations 
and conclusions of the research as robust as possible. 80 By 
corroborating evidence from a variety of sources, the repeatability of 
an observation is verified. In the present study, interviews were used as 
a source of evidence in conjunction with a survey of primary sources 
and detailed text analysis, three methods being the optimum number 
for data triangulation. As well as complementing documentary analysis 
by providing ·further insights into party policy, interviews with party 
activists and politicians were used to control for correct interpretati?ns. 
Highly structured interview schedules would not have furthered· the 
· aims of the research. In the event, interviews were tape-recorded and 
·. loosely structured around a set of pre-prepared questions, allowing 
both interviewer and interviewee to explore areas of interest as they 
emerged. The interviews with politicians elicited spontaneous reactions 
and new insights, which opened up avenues for further research. In 
turn, the inconsistencies often contained in spoken comment could be 
accounted for by analysing written text. 
79 Cf. R. Stake 'Case Studies' in Denzin, N & Lincoln, Y. (eds.) Handbook of 
Qualitative Research and R. Stoecker Evaluating and Rethinking the Case Study. 
8° F. Bechhofer & L. Paterson Principles of Research Design in the Social Sciences p. 
57. 
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A total of twenty-six interviews were conducted with SNP and 
csu party, members, each lasting between half an hour and an hour. 
These included -parliamentarians, speechwriters, policy advisors and 
other party employees. The selection of potential interviewees was 
guided by an interest in hearing different interpretations of the official 
'party line'. Interviews with specialists clarified the development of 
specific party policies, strategies and slogans. The interview questions 
related to the general themes of European integration, . party self-
understanding and national identity, which were comparable across 
both cases. In addition, interviewees in Scotland were asked whether 
they felt the term 'nationalist' to be : a help or a hindrance to their 
cause. I also tested my interpretation. of the 'Penny for Scotland' 
campaign on some SNP strategists. Although this could be seen as a 
leading question, it 1. was, a concrete~ instance. of.: using. the control · 
' ' . 
function of interviews in the research design.· The question was always 
asked at the ~d of~· the· interview, thus minimising any possible 
·, :. 
influence· on · other. responses. The convention : used throughout the 
study has been not to reference interview data in footnotes. Where no 
source is given for a citation,. the reader is referred to appendix I, 
which lists the interviewees, relevant details regarding their 
occupation, and the date of the interview. 
In a discussion of the long interview, Grant McCracken points 
out that the aims of qualitative research are often misunderstood by 
judging it according to quantitative standards. 81 He goes on; "How 
many and what kinds of people hold these categories and assumptions 
is not, in fact, the. compelling issue. It is the categories and 
assumptions, not those· who hold them, that matter."82 Rather than 
attempt to cast case study research into a statistical mould, McCracken 
turns to the Humanities. for a set of standards more adapted to 
qualitative data. His argument thus underlines the usefulness of using 
the terminology of literary criticism in text analysis. According to him, 
"the language of this critical tradition is strange to positivist ears. The 
language asks how 'illuminating', 'encompassing', and 'elegant' an 
81 See, for instance, G. King, R. Keohane & S. Verba Designing Social Inquiry and 
D. Dion Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study. 




argument is".83 McCracken argues that theory should be judged in 
terms of its heuristic usefulness rather than its explanatory force. This 
can be applied to the overall aims of the present research which, in 
turn, informed the choice of research methods. To quote Skocpol ~nd 
Somers; 
No matter how many cases are discussed, the historical analyses 
themselves do not validate the theory. They can only illustrate and 
clarify it- and, potentially, refine it. 84 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the theoretical and methodological 
considerations of this piece of research are inextricably linked. Further, 
it has demonstrated the fruitfulness of using rhetoric as a means of 
accessing the ideological content of a text. To unpack a phrase is to 
uncover the full force of political rhetoric. The very fact that allusions 
remain implicit and subtleties escape a cursory reading constitutes its 
strength, for these underlying messages are nonetheless absorbed 
subconsciously until - through constant repetition - what was once a 
novel and perhaps dubious association appears logical, self-evident and 
unassailable. This process takes place in a world constructed through 
discourse. To quote Annette Hastings; 
If discourse analysis can identify what kind of knowledge is promoted 
and how it is promoted through language use, then it provides the 
opportunity for discourses to be both scrutinised and challenged. 85 ! 
The importance of theory to the empirical study is also evident in the 
research design, which focuses on two case studies in order to provide 
a suitably 'thick' description of each. The methods of data collection 
employed complement this aim. Surveys of primary sources, detailed 
text analysis and interview evidence ensure data triangulation, as 
conclusions can be compared and controlled. Analysis of texts is 
83 Ibid. p.50. 
84 T. Skocpol & M. Somers The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry 
p. 192. 
85 A. Hastings Connecting Linguistic Structures and Social Practices: a Discursive 
Approach to Social Policy Analysis p. 209. 
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placed within a wide-ranging overview of primary sources, thus 
increasing 'the validity of the conclusions drawn. This is supplemented 
both by the control function of interviews and their value as a source 
of evidence in their own right. The data collection methods adopted 
within the research design naturally reflect the concern with 
qualitative analysis which permeates the theory of discourse. 
As was highlighted in the discussion of conceptual travelling, 
an understanding of the political culture of a case is vital, as 
nationalist ideology will inevitably be embedded within it. 
Accordingly, chapter four discusses relevant aspects of the discursive 
background shared by each party with its target audience of voters. It 
aims to provide the references required to understand the allusions and 
'cues'· contained in the selected texts, and is thus as essential 
component of text analysis. Such an approach is best catered for by a 
research.: desigu based on case studies, which is geared towards 
analysing the parties within their unique contexts. In turn, the detailed 
text analyses included in chapters five and six efficiently present key 
aspects of discourse that were discovered through reading other 
primary sources and conducting interviews. Overall, the research 
design privileges the analytical replicability of the study. From the 
first, the aim has been to develop and test a theoretical framework for 
understanding neo- nationalism. This framework can be applied to any 
number of case studies designed to explore the concepts of discourse, 
ideology and rhetoric. 
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4 Putting the Parties into Context 
Scotland and Bavaria are two sub-state polities that now enjoy 
a substantial degree of political and administrative devolution wit~in 
the United Kingdom and Germany respectively. Scotland's five 
million inhabitants represent about one twelfth of the UK population. 
Not only is Scotland's political scene different to that of other parts of 
the UK, but it also retains a distinctive religion, education and legal 
system from its pre-Union existence as a sovereign state.1 With a 
population of around twelve million, Bavaria is the second largest of 
the sixteen German federal states in terms of population, and by far the 
largest in terms of area? As we shall go on to see, the presence of the 
CSU in the Bavarian political arena makes for a radically different 
political culture and party system to the rest of Germany. According to 
its erstwhile leader, Theo Waigel, the CSU is the most successful party 
• in Europe. Indeed, it enjoys the consistent support of over half of the 
electorate in Bavaria, having attracted over fifty percent of the vote in 
every Bavarian election since 1970. But for a three-year break in the 
1950s, the CSU has governed Bavaria continuously since 1946 and 
without coalition partners since 1966, having gained an absolute 
majority of seats in the Bavarian election of that year. The SNP's 
electoral fortunes have been less good and less consistent. A 
spectacular rise in support in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
culminated in the election of eleven members to the Westminster 
parliament on just over thirty percent of the Scottish vote in Novem~er 
1974. However, its support subsequently plummeted, and fhis 
percentage share of votes was only equalled again at the first election 
to the Scottish parliament in 1999. 
This chapter sets out to offer a flavour of the political discourse 
surrounding the SNP and the CSU. Overall, the aim is to provide the 
reader with the background necessary to understand better the 
principal themes covered in the following chapters. The focus will 
1 A union of crowns took place in 1603 when James VI of Scotland acceded to the 
English throne to become James I there. As a consequence, a measure of 
administrative centralisation in London had already taken place before the political 
union or 1707. 
~A. Kapplcr & A. Gn.:vcl (cds.) Facts about Germany. 
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therefore 9e on aspects of Bavarian and Scottish political culture used 
by the parties- to target their 'national' audiences. The sphere of 
relevant discou-rse is thus delimited by the core and peripheral 
principles being studied; namely the ideological construction of the 
nation and the parties' European policy. Factors influencing the 
parties' core commitment to their nation will be highlighted here, 
whereas chapter seven will discuss domestic political debates 
concerning the European Union. In the first section of this chapter, the 
academic literature pertaining to the SNP and the CSU will be 
surveyed. This will underline the originality of the case comparison, 
timeframe and theoretical framework of the present study. Section two 
will trace the historical development of self-determination in each 
nation. This will help us to place the ramifications of both parties' core 
commitment to national autonomy in context, as their policies can be 
related to the degree of sovereignty actually enjoyed by Scotland and 
Bavaria in rec~nt history. The texts to be studied in the following 
chapters illustrate the parties' attempts to identify with the nation. In 
order to evaluate the extent to which this strategy corresponds to the 
actual success of the parties, a survey of their electoral fortunes and 
their standing vis-a-vis the opposition will be offered in the section 
three. At the same time, this will give us an insight into the political 
dynamics influencing their policies, which will be returned to in the 
final chapter. 
I Literature Review 
A short review of the secondary literature on both parties will 
serve to situate the present study within the fields of CSU and SNP 
research. Various theories have been put forward in order to explain 
the SNP's cycles of success and decline from the 1960s onwards. 3 In 
turn, the history of the CSU and the conjunctural, organisational and 
demographic reasons for its electoral success have been exhaustively 
treated. 4 The present study does not propose to address these questions. 
'Cf. J. Brand The National Movement in Scotland, K. Wcbb The Growth of 
Nationalism in Scotland and M. Kauppi Scottish Nationalism; a conceptual approach . 
.t Cf. A. Mintzel Bcsondcrhcitcn der politischen Kultur Bayerns. facctten und 
Etappen einer politisch-kulturellen I fomogcnisicrung, /\. Mintzcl Rcgionale 
politische Traditionen und CSU-1-fl:gemonie in Baycrn and/\. Mintzcl Die 
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· s The Iiteratu{e ·in French is even more sparse and dated than that in English or 
German. Cf. J-P. Drieux Le Scottish National Party and F. Labie La Christliche [sic.] 
Soziale Union (C.S.U.) Bavaroise: Contribution a la Theorie Generale des Partis 
Politigues.·.·· . :: · '· · . ·.. .. . · · · · . 
~Articles pu~lishe.d in the 1980s include J. Agnew Models of Spatial Variation in 
· Political Expression: The Case of the Scottish National Party, S. Grasmuck The 
Ideology ofEthnoregionalism: The Case of Scotland and J. Lutz Community Context 
in the Spread of Voter Support for the Scottish National Party. 
! M.' Hechter. Internal Colonialism; the Celtic fringe in British national development 
1536-1966.'· ·.·': '::~ . 
8 "From the se~'entee~th century on, English military and political control in the 
peripheral regions was buttressed by a racist ideology which held that Norman 
Anglo-Saxon culture was inherently superior to Celtic culture." Ibid. p. 342. 
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Scottish na~ionalist phenomenon, which ends with an evaluation of the 
SNP.9 In the late 1960s, when he was writing, the SNP was just 
beginning to undergo its transformation from a single-issue movement 
to a fully-fledged party. Hanham emphasised the principled nature of 
the SNP, just as Richard Finlay did in a study of the party and its 
antecedents, published twenty-five years later. 10 By examining both 
the party's ideological core and its adaptable periphery, the present 
study also seeks to reconcile the pragmatism and adaptability of the 
SNP with the proposition that it was and remains a party of principle. 
Within the body of literature which sets out to explain the 
improvement in the SNP's electoral fortunes during the 1960s and 
1970s, we can cite the work of Keith Webb, Jack Brand and Mark 
Kauppi. 11 The authors identify this period as corresponding to the 
SNP's evolution from a single-issue movement to a party with a wide 
range of polici~, to the discovery of North Sea oil and the economic 
boost this gave to the independence cause, and to the party's first real 
taste of power in local government and at Westminster. Keith Webb 
develops the theory that the SNP's initial success was a result of 
protest voting, which the party then successfully exploited by offering 
an alternative political identity to the traditional left/right and class 
cleavages. 12 He points to the attractiveness of the SNP as a small party, 
which could be used to register voter dissatisfaction with the sitting 
government without causing a major political upset. The SNP's 
varying success at exploiting a given economic, political and social 
context emerges as a central dynamic in Webb's analysis. 
Similarly to Keith Webb, Mark Kauppi focuses on external 
economic problems and internal party organisation as factors crucial to 
9 H. 1. Hanham Scottish Nationalism. Christopher Harvie has also written a 
historical, if somewhat idiosyncratic account of Scottish nationalism; Scotland and 
Nationalism. Scottish Society and Politics 1707-1994. 
10 Richard Finlay writes that in 1942 the party "determined that principle, and not 
expediency, would be their guiding light, come what may". Independent and Free p. 
253. 
11 
Tom Nairn's theory of uneven development, which he develops in The Break-Up 
of Britain, has been discussed in the context of 'old' and 'new' nationalism in chapter 
one. 
12 K. Webb The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland. 
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the SNP's electoral success in the early 1970s. 13 Again, the SNP is 
portrayed as an actor rather than as a passive benefactor from a fall in 
support for other parties. Kauppi places somewhat too much emphasis. 
on the economic element in contemporary Scottish nationali~m, 
however. 14 By failing to acknowledge the contribution of SNP 
propaganda to its success, such as in its manipulation of an inchoate 
sense of Scottish identity, Kauppi fails to exploit the analytic potential 
of his own argument as to the importance of party strategy. Jack Brand 
characterises nationalist parties as actors who accept the conventions 
of political competition with a long-term view to changing the basic 
rules of the game. 15 He discusses a number of factors conducive to the 
formation of a nationalist movement, such as economic deprivation, 
belief in a cause, precipitating events and mobilisation around a leader. 
However, the role of parties as ideologues remains under-developed 
once more, and treatment of the economic factors driving party 
• dynamics is privileged throughout. 
Two books published in the 1990s update empirical analysis of 
the SNP without straying too far from the analytic framework of their 
predecessors. Roger Levy highlights the importance of vested interests 
to party strategy} 6 He pinpoints major factors responsible for the 
decline and then stagnation in SNP support during the 1980s, including 
a lack of voter loyalty and internal rivalries, as well as evident party 
inexperience in handling the devolution debate and exploiting 
'emotional-economic' issues such as North Sea oil. As such, his 
analysis still has resonance over ten years later, when the SNP states 
that the 'professionalisation' of the party is one of its highest 
priorities} 7 In his book entitled 'Strategies for Self-Government', 
J ames Mitchell uses an explicit theoretical framework in order to 
13 M. Kauppi Scottish Nationalism; a Conceptual Approach. 
14 "Modem nationalism is very much an economic movement [ ... ] although historical 
symbols are used they are not central to the appeal of the party." Ibid. p. 170. 
15 J. Brand The National Movement in Scotland. For his more recent work on the 
SNP, see J. Brand Defeat and Renewal. The Scottish National Party in the Eighties 
and J. Brand et a/ Social Constituency and Ideological Profile: Scottish Nationalism 
in the 1990s. 
16 R. Levy Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads. Cf. The more wide-ranging 
collection of essays edited by T. Gallagher Nationalism in the Nineties. 
17 Cf. M. Russell Nothing More Difficult; a contribution to the debate on 
independence. 
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understand, how the SNP set about becoming an effective political 
force. He ~ffers a contextual account of the SNP which emphasises 
that changing circumstances demand changing strategies. Mitchell then 
goes on to define the difference between political and cultural 
nationalism as one of strategy rather than ideological conviction. He 
thus applies the notion of 'invented' or 'remembered' tradition to a 
contemporary nationalist party by suggesting that cultural references 
are often manipulated. 18 The theoretical frameworks of Levy and 
Mitchell's books bear. a passing resemblance to that of the present 
study, insofar as they systematically conceptualise party policy and 
underline the pragmatism and adaptability of the SNP today. However, 
· I believe that their analyses can be elaborated · upon by a detailed 
examination of SNP. ideology, and ~ts rhetorical expression, a central 
aim of this piece of re~ear~h. · 
Moving-away :from , works written for an . academic audience, 
Andrew Marr provides a detailed account of certain episodes in SNP 
history which are also covered by Levy and Mitchell. 19 His book is 
particularly successful at rendering the mutual influence of SNP and 
Labour policies on the parties' responses to the constitutional question, 
and depicts the figures and issues involved in a lively, journalistic 
style. Two further books written by journalists were particularly useful 
for putting the data . analysis of recent· SNP party campaigns into 
context.20 Written to mark the first .Scottish parliament election, they 
were a welcome exception ·to the relative dearth of literature, let alone 
social science literature, dealing· with the SNP today.21 Murray 
Ritchie's book was invaluable for gathering insider information on the 
SNP's campaign. It includes ·candid ·comments from prominent party 
members as well as a day-by:-day account of events and the immediate 
political and media context of the ·campaign. Brian Taylor's book 
covers the period leading up to the election, from the Constitutional 
18 "A frequent distinction drawn by home rulers themselves is between cultural and 
political/economic nationalists. The distinction may have merit as a means of 
distinguishing between different strategies., J. Mitchell Strategies for Self-
Government p. 24. 
19 A. Marr The Battle for Scotland. 
20 M. Ritchie Scotland Reclaimed and B. Taylor The Scottish Parliament. 
21 A short article dealing with SNP European policy, based on interview evidence, is 
A. Ichijo 'Scotland and Europe: Three Visions of Contemporary Scottish 
Nationalism' inK. Brehony & N. Rassool (eds.) Nationalisms Old and New. 
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Convention, through the Scotland bill to the referendum. Although not 
specifically focusing on the SNP and written in an anecdotal style, 
these books complemented the survey of primary literature as sources 
of background information on the period dealt with in the pres~nt 
study. 
The CSU 
There are very few analyses of contemporary CSU policy.22 
However, in a bibliographical essay evaluating the literature dealing 
with the first thirty years of the party's history, Thomas Schlemmer 
makes some general remarks pertinent to the present study. 23 He 
points out, for instance, that little research exists into specific aspects 
of CSU policy. Education policy, one of the most important Liinder 
competences, is well documented, but other areas such as European 
policy, are not. Schlemmer also emphasises the need for historians of 
the CSU to adopt some of the conceptual tools of social science in their 
research. It is hoped that the present study will make some contribution 
to both these gaps in the academic literature. Thomas Schlemmer has 
written one of the most thorough examinations of the CSU' s early 
history.24 In an investigation of party policy and organisation 
immediately after the Second World War, he focuses on the party's 
difficult early years and the confrontation with its then arch-rival, the 
Bayernpartei. Despite the detail in which the party itself is examined, 
some reviewers miss an adequate portrayal of the context in which the 
party evolved, and thus doubt the book's contribution to explaining 
why the CSU soon recovered its electoral dominance. 25 
22 In this academic field, a great deal of importance is attached to basing research on 
the evaluation of original documentary sources. The thirty-year time lapse before 
certain CSU internal documents can be consulted may have influenced the fact that 
the bulk of studies of the party deal with the post-war period. 
23 T. Schlemmer Die aufsassige Schwester: Forschungen und Quellen zur Geschichte 
der Christlich-Sozialen Union 1945-1976 Other bibliographical essays are A. Mintzel 
Die CSU in Bayern als Forschungsobjekt and S. Irnmerfall & A. Mintzel Ergebnisse 
und Perspektiven der Forschung zur Parteienlandschaft in Bayern. 
24T. Schlemmer Aufbruch, Krise und Erneuerung. Die Christlich- Soziale Union 
1945-1955. Schlernmer collaborated with Alf Mintzel and Barbara Fait on a 
collection of party minutes and sources concerning the early history of the CSU. He 
now works for the Munchnerlnstitutfiir Zeitgeschichte, a state-funded research 
institute. 
25 G. Hirscher Der Standort der Union p. 131. 
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Ali'Mintzel 's series of books and articles is the first port of call 
for any student of the party. 26 As the only recognised academic expert 
on the party, his work deserves to be considered in some detail. 
Published in 1975, his first, ground-breaking study of the party sought 
to characterise its internal reorganisation in the 1950s as a 
transformation from a 'party of notables' into a 'modern-style mass 
party organisation'. 27 The study is a work of social science with an 
explicit theoretical framework and not a historical monograph like 
most other works dealing with the CSU. It is the only general and 
wide-ranging study of the party published to date and is regarded as 
something of a classic in the field. In it, Mintzel also addresses the 
integrative function of the CSU in Bavaria by studying external factors 
such as industrialisation, religion and traditional political cleavages. 28 
Less attention is paid to the role of party ideology, although other of 
his publications;eturn to this aspect in more detail.29 
Since the 1970s, Mintzel has continued to pen a number of 
essays on various aspects of the CSU. 30 One of his most recent 
contributions to the literature updates and synthesises the wide range of 
themes which guide his research; namely the party's dual role at Land 
und federal levels, debates surrounding the possible expansion of the 
party beyond Bavaria, its consistently good election results despite 
political scandal, the question of party leadership, CSU domestic and 
European policy, and the nature of the Bavarian opposition.31 Another 
26 A If Mintzel is a professor of social science at the University of Passau in Bavaria. 
27 My translation may not do justice to Mintzel's original terms of 
Honoratorienpartei and Massen- und Apparatpartei Modernen Typs, which were 
intended to replace terms such as Volkspartei, judged by the author to be too 
ideologically laden. A If Mintzel die CSU-Anatomie einer konservativen Partei pp. 
67-71. 
28 For instance, Mintzel was the first to chart the party's success at translating its 
inter-confessional stance into election victories. This piece of analysis is returned to 
in his contribution to B. Haneke & R. Hopfinger (eds.) Geschichte einer Volkspartei. 
29 A. Mintzel Geschichte der CSU: Ein Dberblick. 
3° For instance, A. Mintzel Besonderheiten der politischen Kultur Bayems. Facetten 
und Etappen einer politisch-kulturellen Homogenisierung, A. Mintzel Die 
Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayem and A. Mintzel CSU- Strategie gegen 
Gewichtsverlust. 
31 A. Mintzel CSU .• His discussion of the CSU's role in the debate as to whether 
crucifixes should continue to hang in Bavarian state schools may seem to be of 




cogent treatment of Bavarian political culture is to be found in Jiirgen 
Gebhardt's essay 'Bayern, Deutschlands eigenwilliger Freistaat' .32 In 
it, Gebhardt seeks· to analyse concepts such as Heimat as well as· 
Bavarian stereotypes and their historical origins. He also asks whetl].er 
a separate Bavarian political culture does in fact exist, and assesses the 
CSU's contribution to its creation. Although this is a political science 
work· of academic standard, like most publications of the Bavarian 
'' centre for political education, it is not in the least critical of the CSU.33 
The party's . role· in bringing about Bavarian prosperity is 
. acknowledged;·. but' .nothing·. is done to question the rosy view of 
Bavaria·n life and tradition it propagates. 
,·, j I, • 
Mintiel's: latest book-length study is entitled 'Die CSU -
: >:.:Hege~onie· .. in.I.Bayern:: .. ·Strategie und: Erfolg'. Mintzel defines the 
. '' cs.0~s lfegemonie as follows; 
... :. '.' 
· · ·. ~~: :. A\f6rm :of.•domina~~e .legitimated through democratic elections, which 
. (· has· strengthened: over the last thirty-three years of non-coalition 
government into a politico-cultural hegemony.34 
. . . 
It therefore Tefers first ·.and foremost to electoral dominance and not -
as in: the present. study·~ to conceptual hegemony within a discourse 
theory framework. The title of the book is misleading in that several 
chapters deal with other ·parties standing in Bavaria. Although this is 
to be welcomed 'as providing a more complete picture of the Bavarian 
political· arena, there is little attempt to offer a synthesis of the int~r­
party dynamiCs· of: Bavarian· politics. Oyerall, the book does not 
convey an .impression of·either unity or balance. This is certainly due 
to the fact that there is considerable reproduction of fragments of 
research. pub! ished ·elsewhere by Mintzel. Although the final section 
does update his work in the light of the 1998 Bavarian and German 
:l:! J. Gebhardt ,Bayern, Dcutschlands eigenwilliger Freistaat- Historisch-
gesellschaftliche Aspekte der politi.schen Kullur in Bayern' in R. Roth (ed.) Freistaat 
Bayern . 
.1.1 Indeed, this government department's role in consolidating the 'CSU-approved' 
image of Bavaria would constitute a subject of study in itself. Although a useful 
source or information, a lack of critical distance can often be discerned in the 
analyses and the conclusions contained in the work it publishes. Sec, for instance, 50 
Jahrc Baycrischc Verfassung and Kulturstaat Bayern, both edited and published by 
the Bayerisclze Lwzdeszentrale fiir politische Bildungsarbeit. 
'
14 
A. Mintzcl Die CSU- Hegemonie in Bayern p. 12 (my translation). 
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election results, his over-reliance on research into early party history 
only underlinesJhe fact that there are very few studies dealing in depth 
with the party to-day. 
Two English language introductions to Bavarian politics 
should be noted. The first is Peter James' book 'The Politics of 
Bavaria', which devotes chapters to Bavaria's economy, history, 
constitution and party system, as well as to the Franz Josef Straul3 
'phenomenon' :15 It also offers a detailed description of crucial events 
of recent decades, such as German reunification and the death of the 
party's long-time leader Franz Josef Strau13. As such, it is a useful 
descriptive handbook, which highlights why Bavaria is an exception to 
the rule in German politics. In a strong, theoretically structured 
explanation of the Bavarian party system today, Alf Mintzel provides 
an English-language summary of Bavaria's post-war social and 
economic deveropment. Some comparative material on other parties in 
Bavaria is also a welcome inclusion, and a series of maps illustrates 
the growth in CSU support.36 The map illustrating the election results 
of the 1974 Bavarian election is particularly striking, as Bavaria 
appears as an almost entirely black silhouette (black is the colour 
associated with the CSU):17 Mintzel concludes that "the conservative 
shaping of linguistic and figurative Bavarian state symbols" was 
facilitated by factors such as industrialisation, urbanisation and the 
development of the mass media, but was ultimately dependent on the 
political elite's interpretation of and middle-class reaction to these 
changes.Jx His article thereby identifies the phenomenon of CSU 
rhetoric which the present study sets out to analyse in detail. 
Nowhere does Alf Mintzel discuss CSU rhetoric or ideology in 
depth, preferring to concentrate instead on the influence of structural 
factors on the CSU's electoral success. Herbert Riehl-Heyse does look 
specifically at CSU rhetoric, however, in his book 'CSU -die Partei, 
die clas schone Bayern erfunclen hat'. Written by a journalist 
-'
5 Sec also P. James Parties and I:Jections in Bavaria: A Special Case and C. Cari-
Sime Bavaria, the CSU and the West German Party System. 
'
11 
A. Mintzcl Politi~al and Socio-economic Developments in the Postwar Era: The 
Case of Bavaria I <J45-I <Jk<J. 
nlhid.p.l()7. 
'S f/Jid. p. )75. 
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• 
sympathetic to the party, it IS an anecdotal, eclectic and 
impressionistic attempt at pinpointing some of the ideological reasons 
for the CSU' s enduring electoral success. The work is organised · 
around specific themes relating to the party's image and its rhetoryc. 
The subtext of several pieces of party literature is analysed, such as 
that of 'beautiful Bavaria', referred to in the title. Riehl-Heyse offers 
insightful pen-portraits of the subtle and not-so-subtle imagery 
accompanying important events such as the traditional Ash 
Wednesday rally. Given that the author is himself so steeped in the 
image of Bavaria that the CSU draws on and seeks to appropriate, his 
work is more of a good-natured celebration of the rhetorical symbiosis 
between party and Land than a critical evaluation. Although the 
present study also focuses on party rhetoric and symbolism, it does so 
within an explicit theoretical framework which serves to structure the 
analysis . 
Aside from Alf Mintzel' s work, two articles by Gerhard 
Hirscher represent the only recent research into contemporary CSU 
politics.39 The first illustrates that it is now becoming the received 
wisdom to classify the CSU as hegemonic in Mintzel 's sense of the 
term.40 Hirscher's study distinguishes three possible analytical 
approaches to the CSU; as a Bavarian party, as a government coalition 
partner and as a member of the Union of Christian democrats in 
Germany (with particular reference to its independent presence in the 
German parliament.) This typology is a useful starting point . for 
evaluating the way in which these spheres of CSU influence affect 
party policy, rhetoric and strategy. The present study, for instance, 
focuses on the CSU as a Bavarian party in order to examine its image 
and identity within Bavaria. In turn, references to its self-
understanding as a partner at the federal level will highlight the party's 
construction of its role in each political arena.41 Hirscher's second 
article is a reappraisal of the CSU's position in German politics after 
39 Hirscher is a member of the Akademiefiir Politik und Zeitgeschehen, a department 
of the Hanns-Seidel Stiftung, which is a trust closely affiliated to the CSU. 
40 G. Hirscher Die CSU als Koalitionspartner. 
41 The relationship of the CSU to its sister party, the CDU, is usually discussed within 
a body of literature focusing primarily on the latter. Recent publications include H. 
Poller Rechts oder Links? Niedergang und Emeuerung der CDU and T. Diirr & R. 
Soldt (eds.) Die CDU nach Kohl. 
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the 1998 elections, which saw· it poll unde~ fifty percent at the federal 
level but still suffer marked(y.les~ .than the' CDU in the Union 's overall 
defeat. 42 Hirscher sets out to. inve~tigate ~hether this heralds a change 
in the German party Iaiids~ai;ci~ The theoretical framework employed is 
• • • 0 • 
more unwieldy than iil~iriating, ,however;.and does not offer new 
insights into information a~~~yfafu~liar to a student of the csu. 
·. : . •. : / ( \ \,' /• '! :;, :~:· ... : \ ·~ ;, ~ .' ~ ... :'I):: .: : ' ; .... :~· ,:· ... ·', .: . ': ·, I . ' . . 
Finally, an .imposih~,;.~i~ht~~~dr~~page. tome published by 
• • ' o o ~ ( ' ' .' •; ',' ~· o ~ o ' ' ~~ ~' 'I!' . ' • ~ I ·; ' • I I . ' I ' • 
the Hanns-Seidel Stiftung.~o· mar~ the fi.ftietli'iumiversary of the CSU's 
.. creation must be single4 '6~t·_,~· th~.llio·~t..~id~-r~girig, relatively recent ( 
' .' ' • ·, ; \ ... ~ ~ ·~· >I : If i ! ~ ';: ',\ :-: :'•; ~:.' • ', :: .·\ ' ·, : : •' ''; . ~ ', ! ( ~' ~ '' ' 'o ' • 1 o • '. • . ' ' o ' ' ' ' 
'· study of the. party.<·Jt!,contains.duticles·,·oril the· CSU's: history by, 
; . . . ·.':!:,._,·,·-,../~~;.'·.';'/:~,'I_:-·:.-.~,; ... -.... ;'·. ·.:_:'~'i·':~·; .. ·. ' . . . 
:• academics, contrib~~i~_l1sJiy1~a~ruj~)p~p1_e·. mi.n.ister Edmund Stoi~er 
. . • • • I • • I • . : . l I ; ~ . I I I : . '1, \ • ·' ; · •• ~ . . ' . . ' : . •. . . ' \ ' • ·. . , 
, .. and ex-party I chairm_an)I_Thoo').'W~igel;~; irite~iews . with leading party ' ' 
. . _·, .,··:..·.i: .... '.'/~:.·~,~·:·:~:<:.i'~··· .. ,\';':.~· .. ::_,···J.~··:;·.:.\. ~~· ... '. · .. · . ' . , . 
. . .. figu~es of;t?.~,::,~~~/~~).~~;J:.~T~~~ti:?~-\~~~~~-.~~?:·?.~~~ .. ~.~~~u~ellts; including=.:.>·.· , ... · :: .. 





•:;:\} ~j~/1 1 •>'1)' /0) '•,',\:,';•, ,•}>·: 1 1 ,\0 .(:Ill'',,' 1 ( 1 
. invaluable · intr~ductoryj:':yolurrie/ · ..J~he; par,ty/, political contributions. 
• . .. : '"\"''·:\{ ,. ·. ·~,·.:'i' ... ';t;;:·r/.~$·~ · ··: ~·:,·,',,·;,.~;· ... 'i:.,:.,,,. · · .·. • . 
provide·: a' welcome~. PPP,Q.~ty/ ,to \~a1yse! some · pnmary. sources In 
• 0 I • t . ' • • • • I •. t '. 0 ' '. :. • .• ~.. I ( ' ~ . ' , • .. .. 1., ' I . . . J • • ' 
., order. to gain. faniili~t)r/with.('G$U.j rlietoiic.- .. Paity/history is well· , 
·. covered, and aspect~<~i)~6~te.ni~.ci~~ .. :.'~.oiib};>such:·,as foreign affairs,: . 
economic and so~ia{:p_oli·b~).and\t~~-i~.Q~~~ que~tion' are accorded 
I ·. 0'.'. ·I:·:, . ·.. ; :.·· 0 • ' 
articles of their own~·:As·~·i·s·,:tci :~~·~e~p~cted/.however,' the tone of the 
.' • I .•toll,' '·,,' • ,',·.'.,'•,,',: ''.•'.to•' ' 
articles is less than criti~ai.~:F~heimore~· historical surveys once again: 
. . . win the upper hand ovet<~~iys~s b;,·:s.6b'i.~(sci:entists. Nevertheless, the : , 
' . , ' 
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· ;:·. make this a useful resoirrc~..-.:Th~ present: study :sets out to update and 
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social science. framework!'!'~alysis _,·~f!'strategy and: rhetoric must, be .. 
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11 National Self-determination 
Scottish Devolution 
In his book, 'The Autonomy of Modem Scotland', Lindsay 
Paterson develops the controversial thesis that Scotland "has been at 
least as autonomous as other small European nations, for which the 
reality of politics has always been the negotiation of partial 
independence amid the rivalry of great powers".43 Paterson 
acknowledges that he is arguing against the premises of the dominant 
discourse; "Unionist and nationalist rhetoric in the present debate 
about Scotland's future share an assumption that Scotland has not been 
independent since 1707".44 Indeed, at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, Scotland had already experienced almost a century of 
incorporating union with its larger southern neighbour, England. In 
1707, after passing the Act of Union, Scotland's parliament was 
adjourned indefinitely, thus marking the beginning of its membership 
of the United Kingdom. Scotland's separate legal and education 
systems were preserved and there was no attempt to replace Scottish 
Presbyterianism with Anglicanism. The English had no intention of 
colonising Scotland economically or culturally; they had little interest 
in its relatively backward economy, and their attitude to their northern 
neighbour was generally one of indifference.45 However, sparked by 
the economic recession which came with the end of the Napoleonic 
wars, a sense of political injustice began to simmer in Scotland. The 
ratio of voters to inhabitants was much lower than in England and: the 
sharp rise in population caused by industrialisation led to calls for a 
further increase in the number of MPs, but Scotland was dependent on 
political will in London to bring about reform. 
Despite being a relative improvement, the rules linking suffrage 
to property ownership in the Reform Act of 1832 were such that few 
voters were added to the electoral roll, and Establishment control was 
43 L. Paterson The Autonomy of Modem Scotland p. 4. 
44 Ibid. p. 1. 
45 Indeed, Scottish culture flourished quite independently from England in the 
eighteenth century, with the Scottish Enlightenment producing such philosophers as 
David Hume, Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson. 
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actually consolidated. Mid-nineteenth century movements such as the 
National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights raised 
many of the same grievances that would be rehearsed by devolution 
campaigners well over a century later. These included the insufficient 
and ill-informed consideration given to Scottish bills at Westminster, 
the inadequacy of a standardised civil service oblivious to Scottish 
particularities, and a dearth of much needed funding for Scottish 
industries and universities. In response to pressure from landowners, 
MPs and the urban middle classes, the post of Scottish Secretary was 
created in 1885. The ministry's remit first included education, local 
government, roads and public health, but was gradually extended 
through the activism of certain incumbents and the incorporation of 
independent boards.46 However, administrative autonomy stopped 
short of political devolution.47 
After}~e Second World War, Scotland invested heavily in the 
new welfare state in more ways than one. It was important as a 
political project which united Scottish civil society and at the same 
time emphasised the continued worth of UK membership. 48 In a rare 
period of consensus in British politics, the focus on policy 
implementation corresponded to the role of the Scottish Office. 
Increases in its remit helped to define Scotland as a separate political 
unit within the UK, and it was allowed considerable leeway in adapting 
policy to Scottish needs.49 In the 1960s, for instance, regional policy 
went some way towards slowing the politically corrosive effect of 
46 These boards had been manifestations of Scottish civil society at the local 
government level, and oversaw increasing state involvement in many areas of social 
policy, including prisons, the police and development in the Highlands and Islands. 
A. Brown et a! Politics and Society in Scotland p. 12. 
47 For a detailed account of the extent of Scottish autonomy see L. Paterson The 
Autonomy of Modem Scotland and J. Kellas Modem Scotland Ch. 7. 
48 Scottish support for the principle of the welfare state can be traced to the 
paternalistic and Presbyterian ethic of nineteenth-century middle-class Liberals, the 
strong Liberal influence on the Conservative party in Scotland after 1912, and the 
strength of the Labour party in Scotland from the 1920s on. A. Brown et a! Politics 
and Society in Scotland p. 14. 
49 The Scottish Ofwce gradually took over responsibility for poor relief and education 
provision (traditionally the responsibility of local parishes) trade, (long the preserve 
of the Scottish burghs) and roads and bridges, which had originally been maintained 
by landowners. Ibid. p. 5. 
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Scotland's declining industrial base and rising unemployment.50 The 
Scottish Office's existence also helps justify the claim that Scotland 
has an independent civil society, a concept formulated by the Scottish 
sociologist Adam Ferguson in the eighteenth century to denote a 
network of social organisations. In turn, Scotland's status as a nation is 
accepted in UK political discourse, even if the nationalist project 
derived from this status is not.51 
Throughout the twentieth century, the Scottish economy 
suffered from the fact that it was one of the first to industrialise in the 
early nineteenth century, leading to its shipbuilding, steel, coal and 
textile industries becoming steadily less competitive as time went on. 
Like the rest of the world, Scotland was hit by the global recession of 
the 1930s, and even the discovery of North Sea oil in the early 1970s 
did not shield it from the two major economic shocks of that decade. 
• Diversification into areas such as tourism, services and electronics, 
coupled with increased inward investment, emphasised the Scottish 
economy's openness and reliance on exports, principally to Europe.52 
However, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Scottish voters 
became increasingly discontented with a political and - by extension -
constitutional system which was not delivering prosperity. The rise in 
SNP support around this time is often interpreted as a protest vote 
against the status quo.53 The economic situation was recognised to be 
too serious for yet another exercise in administrative tinkering. An 
elected assembly was proposed by the Labour government which c~me 
to office in 1974, and eventually called a Scottish referendum on: its 
devolution bill in 1979. 
'
11 The Highlands and Islands Development Board was created in 1965 and the 
Scottish Development Agency in 1975. 
'il Brown et a/ Politics and Society in Scotland p. 39. 
'i
2 In the 1990s, tourism was Scotland's largest industry in terms of employment and 
contributed £2.7 billion to the Scottish economy in 1997. Other high earners were 
expnrts of whisky. oil, gas and data processing equipment exports. Scouish 
Enterprise Network Tourism Action Plan. 
'i.
1 This is underlined by the fact that the decline in Conservative votes did not go to a 
single nther party. benefiting first the SNP and then Labour, with certain bye-election 
victories going to the Liberals. Cf. R. Levy Scollish Nationalism at the Crossroads p. 
25. 
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Al~hou.gh the devolution referendum of 1979 had resulted in a 
narrow 'yes' v_pte, the so-called 'Cunningham amendment' stipulated 
that over forty -percent of the electorate must declare itself in favour. 
Given that the actual outcome was 51.6% of votes cast 'for', 
corresponding to 32.9% of the electorate, the devolution project was 
abandoned.54 As an indirect result of this outcome, a general election 
was called for October 1979. Margaret Thatcher and her Conservative 
Party came to power and, following a cobbled-together campaign, the 
SNP saw the number of its MPs fall from eleven to two. Thatcher's 
brand of 'conviction politics' and her pledge to 'roll back the state' did 
not go down well north of the border, however. Scotland's higher 
proportion of state employees and public housing compared to England 
meant that the existing system was close to many a Scottish heart.55 
The widespread sense of affront was further enhanced by the 
consonance of welfarism with a popular Scottish myth of 
egalitarianism,~embodied in the idea of Jock Tamson's bairns and the 
lad o' pairts.56 The Scottish Office was used increasingly as a means of 
imposing Conservative policies for which the majority of Scots had not 
voted. Scottish voting patterns were quite different to those in England, 
so much so that between 1987 and 1997 the Conservatives governed 
Scotland with only about one seventh of Scottish seats. The loss of all 
Scottish Conservative seats at the 1997 general election brought an end 
to what was perceived as an unfairly imposed government, which the 
incoming Labour government's promise of a devolved parliament 
guaranteed could never happen again. 
:;.a The poor voter turnout in the I <J7<J referendum was variously attributed to poor 
weather, disillusionment both with the project and the Lahour government, and 
Scotland's had performance in the Football World Cup! A. Marr The Baltic for 
Scotland p. 15<J. 
'' McCrone and Bcchhofer's comparison of voting pallerns with the North of 
England (which has similar occupational and housing structures) suggests, however, 
that this is not enough to explain unique Scottish voting pallerns. They allude to, but 
do not pinpoint, some extra, peculiarly Scollish dimension. D. McCrone & F. 
Bechhofcr The Scotland-England Divide: Politics and Locality in Britain. 
~r. For a discussion of the roots of this myth, see D. McCronc Understanding Scotland 
Ch.4. A concrete ;xample is the widely canvassed view that Scollish peaceful 
opposition to the poll tax (as opposed to violent demonstrations in L..ondon) was 
based on its unfairness rather than on unwillingness to pay. D. McCronc Excessive 
~and Unreasonable: The Politics of the Poll Tax in Scotland. 
12H 
Building on the proposals of the Constitutional Convention, a 
Scotland bill was drafted by the new Labour government and passed 
through the Westminster parliament with remarkable alacrity.57 A 
74.3% 'yes' vote in the referendum of September 1997 paved the ~ay 
for a parliament with far more powers than its abortive predecessor of 
1979. Economic, defence and foreign policy (including European 
affairs), social security, consumer protection and immigration were 
some of the areas reserved to Westminster, with everything else being 
devolved to Edinburgh.58 The first Scottish parliament election was 
conducted using the single transferable vote system, and the formation 
of a Labour and Liberal coalition government definitively marked· 
Scottish politics off from the British political system of two-party 
competition: and, elections by plurality. 59 Scotland's voting system 
·1 · · · . :: · pro~ides for · a · combination of directly and proportionally elected 
' '·· .~.· 
't;, '. 
~embers of.the .Scottish parliament, resulting in a truer reflection of 
. . party. political support. in Scotland which nonetheless retains direct 
l. . ' 
· ·: · liilks between constituencies and their representatives. For instance, the 
Scottish Conservative vote is now translated into an equivalent 
proportion of seats, as is that of the SNP, whose fairly even spread of 
support across Scotland puts it a marked disadvantage in gaining first-
past-the-post seats. 
· .. The parliament joins a congeries of other distinctively Scottish 
institutions. The nation's · education, local government and legal 
systems, its .media, cultural institutions and the voluntary sector,. the 
.. Scottish Office and the Presbyterian Church of Scotland all contribute 
to. Scotland's unique political culture; 
. [T]he'rong-hel.d assumption about the correspondence of state, society 
and 1 nation, which removed Scotland as a conventional area for 
analysis and action, has been eroding. If we recover the idea that states 
57 The Scottish Constitutional Convention was formed in 1989 from most Scottish 
political parties (excepting the Conservatives and the SNP) as well as Churches, 
Trade Union and other representatives of Scottish civil society, with the aim of 
drawing up a blueprint for a Scottish parliament. For a detailed account of the 
Convention, see K. Wright The People say Yes. 
58 A full list of reserved powers is to be found in B. Taylor The Scottish Parliament p. 
139. This set-up was a marked improvement on the 1979 proposals, which had 
exhaustively listed the Scottish Assembly's areas of competence instead. 
59 Scotland continues to vote according to the first-past-the-post system in UK 
general elections. 
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are essentially political entities with no necessary correspondence with 
civil societies,. then Scotland's institutional autonomy within the 
British state takes on added relevance. 60 
It can be concluded that Scotland has a distinctive political culture, one 
which inevitably influences the SNP's interpretation of nationalist 
ideology. The degree of political autonomy currently enjoyed by 
Scotland within the UK ·constitutes a benchmark against which to 
evaluate the SNP's vision of 'Independence in Europe'. 
Bavaria and Federalism · 
Ignoring some ·peripheral :alterations; .Bavaria today is still the. 
amalgam of principalities,. dukedoms, towns and bishoprics brought 
together to form a kingdom',in :1806:61 :Awareness ofhistorical·regional; 
identities remains high in official circles·; CSU politicians are careful to 
ensure the prof)orti<;>nal; r_epresentation : of. politicians from the three . 
regio~s of Swabia; Franconia . and~ Altbayern within the Bavarian 
government. Regional' boundaries , are . also an important marker of. 
·identity for individual' Bavarians.· Following ·the Second World War, 
the German population· expelled from Czechoslovakia, which found 
refuge across the border, was declared by the Bavarian government to 
be the fourth Bavarian Stamm. The word Stamm is used by the CSU to 
mean a historical lineage; but· is . usually. translated into English as 
'tribe'. The need to mark the acceptance of. the exiles as 'honorary 
Bavarians' using this symbolism· illustrates to what· extent the 
traditional zones remain important components of the Land's identity. 
However, it has been pointed out· that these identities have been 
relegated to second, third· or even fourth levels of importance by the 
development of a Bavaria-wide national-identity, due in no small part 
to the CSU's homogenising ideology.62 The early nineteenth-century 
60 A. Brown et a! Politics and Society in Scotland p. 36. 
61 The Bavarian territory gained the former principality ofCoburg in 1920, lost its 
territory in the Rhineland in 1945 and recovered the district ofLindau in 1956. 
62 Alf Mintzel Die CSU - Anatomie einer Konservativen Partei 1945 - 72. Alf 
Mintzel is referring here to political identities, or the mobilisation of identity for 
electoral ends. However, CSU voters and politicians alike continue to identify 
themselves as Franwnians or Swabians (or even more locally) first and foremost. 
CSU rhetoric recognises this in its vague use of the term Heimat. In the Bayernkurier 
of 21 51 July 1990, the then prime minister Max Streibl expressed himself thus; "It 





nation-building efforts of Count Montgelas - the Bavarian Metternich -
and of Bavarian monarchs ably supported by civil servants, set an 
integrative process in motion which has been taken up and pursued by 
the CSU. This search for internal legitimacy is supplemented by a 
concern to preserve a degree of external sovereignty. But for the 
twelve years spent under Nazi dictatorship, the modern Bavarian state 
has always been a member of some form of federation. However, 
successive governments have continuously defended its autonomy 
against Prussian, Austro-Hungarian or European encroachment. Both 
as a kingdom and as a republic, Bavaria has consistently attempted to 
maximise its independence and promote a sense of Bavarian identity. 
Montgelas' 'revolution from above' introduced a unitary legal 
system and administration with little respect for tradition. 63 Loyalty to 
the Wittelsbach kings was also an important integrating factor within 
'·· • Bavaria. However poorly adapted they seemed at the time, Montgelas' 
reforms nonetheless laid the foundations of the modern Bavarian state. 
The king and his civil service would provide a skeleton ready to be 
fleshed out by a growing national consciousness. Although Bismarck 
paid lip service to Bavarian autonomy, the decision to play a part in the 
German Reich was by no means a foregone conclusion in Bavaria. 64 
Opposition from the 'Patriotic Party' had scuppered ratification of the 
union the first time and the final vote was only two votes over the 
required two-thirds majority.65 Although retaining control of areas 
such as education, culture and policing, Bavaria found itself very much 
dominated by Prussia. The combination of a weak king uninterestea in 
from the Sudetenland, they lovingly and faithfully preserve the ways of their region, 
their own lineage or even their own small district. But at the same time they all 
proudly declare themselves to be Bavarians together". ["Ob das Altbayern, Franken, 
Schwaben oder Sudetendeutsche sind, das macht keinen Unterschied, sie bewahren 
mit Liebe und Treue ihre eigene Stammesart, ihren eigenen Stamm oder sogar ihren 
eigenen kleinen Gau. Aber sie bekennen sich gleichzeitig und stolz miteinander als 
Bayern ".] 
63 King Ludwig I would later reorganise Montgelas' districts to correspond to 
historical regions and decentralise the administration to allow local communities 
more autonomy. 
64 Bavaria was granted certain symbolic rights and allowed to retain control of its 
post and rail services, beer and spirits tax, matters of domicile and the military 
(although only in peacetime). M. Treml Geschichte des Modernen Bayern Ch. 1. 
65 However, Wilhelm was proclaimed emperor of the new German Reich in the 
palace of Versailles even before ratification was finally pushed through the Bavarian 
parliament. 
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exercising Bavaria's remaining rights (let alone in fighting for greater 
autonomy), an alternative focus of loyalty in the emperor, growing 
Germany-wide Intercourse through trade and travel, urbanisation 
brought about by industrialisation, a single legal system and a central 
parliament, all helped to strengthen German identity within Bavaria. 
The last king of Bavaria would be toppled in a bloodless 
revolution in 1918. Against a background of military defeat, growing 
shortages, and the successful Bolshevik revolution in Russia, Bavaria 
was declared a republic in November 1918, a status it retains to this 
day. The next year was chaotic. A reactionary white terror followed the 
Communist red terror as the military sought to regain control. This 
unique period in Bavarian history could only confirm a great many 
Bavarians in their distrust of and distaste for socialism. The lack of 
clear government leadership at this time also meant a missed 
opportunity tq i.nfluence the content of the Weimar Constitution. By 
the time the Bayerische Volkspartei (BVP) managed to form a 
governing coalition of non-socialist parties in 1920, it was too late to 
prevent the loss of most of Bavaria's special rights and much of 
Germany's federal character.66 Throughout the Weimar republic the 
Bavarian government sought to revise the constitution and achieve a 
measure of financial federalism at least, but succeeded only in creating 
more friction with the administration in Berlin. As the only regionally 
based party in Germany, the BVP had difficulty finding allies in other 
Liinder to support its demands for greater policy autonomy and a more 
powerful Bundesrat. Then, as now, Bavaria was often a lonely 
defender of regional rights in Germany's federal system.67 
The generally anti-socialist atmosphere of the time was 
conducive to the development of right-wing groups such as Hitler's 
National Socialist Democratic and Workers Party.68 Although right-
66 Contrary to the CSU, the BVP did not manage to expand its support base far 
beyond southern Bavaria and the Catholic-conservative vote there. However, many 
BVP members joined the CSU after the war, ensuring personal continuity between 
the parties and strengthening the new party's conservative wing, grouped around 
Alois Hundhamrner. 
67 Cf. U. Miinch Freistaat in Bundesstaat 
68 The Bavarian government's attitude to Hitler remained ambivalent. Even after his 
attempted putsch in Munich in 1923, he was not severely punished and even 




wing parties gained little over six percent of the vote in the Bavarian 
election of 1928, they benefited from the spiralling inflation and 
unemployment triggered by the Wall Street Crash of 1929. Public 
discontent was compounded by unpopular austerity measures anQ a 
lack of identification with, and hence legitimacy for, the Weimar 
republic. With the Nazi take-over in 1933 came the Gleichschaltung, 
or forcing into line, of the German Liinder and the loss of any 
remaining Bavarian autonomy until the end of World War 11. 
Following the capitulation of the German Army in southern Germany 
on 41h May 1945, Bavaria came under the administration of an 
American military government which declared the existence of a 
Bavarian state on 191h September of the same year. Unlike many others 
of the newly configured German Liinder, Bavaria could look back on 
centuries of statehood, tradition and historical identity.69 This was 
deemed to be an advantage by politicians keen to re-establish 
democracy and a semblance of normality in a traumatised country. 
From the first, the CSU was intent on guaranteeing Bavarian autonomy 
within a German federal state. This policy, which has been shown to 
have roots in the Bavarian state tradition, continues to be a cornerstone 
of the party's ideology. 
Today, the 'Free State of Bavaria' has all the trappings of 
statehood, from a constitution and a constitutional court, through a 
government and a parliament, to a three-tier system of local 
government. 70 Yet it remains firmly embedded within the German 
(,•J The charismatic Franz Josef Strauf3, chairman of the CS U for over twenty-five 
years and Bavarian prime minister from 1978 until his death in 1988, often referred 
condescendingly to other German Liinder as 'Bindestriclz-Staaten ', or hyphenated 
(and hence artificial) regions. "[Bavaria] is one of the oldest states in Europe there is. 
Bavaria is not a hyphenated region that was created after the military defeat as an 
artificial product of the occupying powers". ["[Bayern] ist einer der alteslen Staalen 
Europas uberhaupl. Bayern ist nicht ein Bindestrichstaal, der nach der militarischen 
Niedcrlage als kunstliches Produkl der Besatzungspolitik geschaffen wurde".] Franz 
Josef Strauf3, in a speech to the CSU party conference in Munich on 22nd November 
I <JHS. 
711 The parliament has 204 members. Its senate, the only one of its kind in Germany, 
was abolished in 2000. Bavaria also has its own hymn and coat of arms. The 
Bavarian constitution provides for Bavarian referenda, as well as including a 
provision, unique in Germany, guaranteeing the right of individuals to contest a 
Bavarian law as unconstitutional. The proposal for Bavaria to have its own president 
in order to represent Bavarian sovereignty abroad was defeated by a single vote in 
I 946. F. I Wfer Die politische Ordnung in Bayern Ch. 4. 
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federal system, sending six government representatives to the 
Bundesrat, the §econd chamber of the federal government. Here, each 
state may only=vote as a block, and Liinder interests usually take 
precedence over party allegiances. 71 Bundesrat approval is required for 
about half of all federal laws, in particular those concerning Liinder 
competencies and constitutional questions. Otherwise, the Bundesrat 
may be overruled by a majority of the directly elected members of the 
German Bundestag. Voters in Bavarian elections each have two 
ballots; one vote goes to individual candidates, who are elected on a 
first-past-the-post basis, and the second vote goes to a party list. To 
this extent, the system is the same as that used in the first Scottish 
parliament election, and shares its advantage of combining 
proportionality with personalised mandates. 72 A five percent hurdle 
keeps small parties out of the Bavarian parliament. European elections, 
on the other hand, are based on a closed party list. It is important to 
point out that,. ttnlike in the UK, German parties receive state funding 
towards campaign costs, and the CSU is no exception.73 In a parallel to 
the situation in the UK, however, recent scandals have led to greater 
transparency regarding the amount and provenance of private 
donations. 
71 
I\. Kapplcr & A. Grevel (eds.) Facts about Germany p. 144. However, the fact that 
the majority party in the Bundcsrat may be different from that in the Bundcstag can 
cause problems for the federal government. During the 1970s, the role of the 
Bundesrat became much more party political, as the CDU/CSU majority there was 
accused of obstructing the governing SPD's legislative programme. M. Hancock et at 
Politics in Western Europe p. 250. 
72 In Scotland, a fixed number of seventy-three seats arc won by directly-elected 
candidates. The remaining fifty-six constituency members arc deducted from list 
totals. However, there arc fewer list members in the Scottish system than in that of 
Bavaria, making it 1ess proportional overall. /hid. pp. 2H2-2R3. 
71 
1\.11 parties who poll over 0.5% of the second-ballot vote at general and European 
dections and over I'~~ at regional elections receive a stale contribution per voter head 
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74 Cf. S: Ke~dfi~k & D.1 M~Crone Politics in a Cold Climate: The Conservative 
. Decl.ine m· Scbtland>:; · ·. · ·, · 
' ' 15 . ' ' . ' ·... ' 
. . Although the Consezyatives found themselves in the minority opposing the 
devolution· proposals, they riow participate fully in the Scottish parliament. 
76J'wo recently published works on Scottish politics since the creation of the Scottish 
parliament are P; Lync~· Scottish Government and Politics and L. Paterson et a! New 
Scotland, New Politics?.·: 
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1934, the I?art~ merged with the Scottish Party to form the Scottish 
National Party._ The creation of the SNP did not mean the end of 
divisions in the nationalist camp, however. This heterogeneity is 
underlined by the fact that the National Party of Scotland was itself the 
result of a merger between a movement advocating complete 
independence, to be achieved by electoral means, and a pressure group 
demanding further administrative devolution for Scotland. However, 
the stand-off between 'radicals' and 'moderates' continued to haunt 
the SNP. As such, the shared goal of Home Rule was less of a 
cohesive force and more a source of disputes. The aim of 'self-
government for Scotland' was considered too vague to be meaningful 
and the lack of any electoral success prompted members to look to 
other forms of political activism or join other parties. 77 
The year 1942 was a defining one for the SNP and its future 
ideology and • strategy. It saw a major split between the 
'fundamentalists', who favoured a policy of 'independence and 
nothing less', and those who preferred inter-party co-operation with 
the preliminary goal of home rule, or some form of devolution. This 
marked the SNP's official beginning as a party dedicated to gaining 
power by electoral means. When John MacCormick, who had 
dominated the SNP since its creation, left to set up a high-profile, but 
ultimately unsuccessful cross-party Convention for Home Rule, those 
nationalists remaining were free to develop a clear and lasting 
ideology. The party henceforth defined the nationalist principle of self-
determination as independence, or full national sovereignty. Shifts in 
SNP strategy have since been subordinate to and directed towards the 
core commitment to independence, which has remained fixed since 
1942.78 Ideological purity did not lead to much electoral success, 
however, and the rump of around two hundred SNP hard-liners lived 
in the political wilderness throughout the 1950s. The SNP was an 
inexperienced party without a coherent electoral strategy in an era 
when nationalism had been thoroughly discredited by war. 
Unsurprisingly, the pressing issue of reconstruction eclipsed its own. 
77 For an account of the Scottish national movement before the Second World War, 
see R. Finlay Independent and Free. 
78 The fundamental principles printed on today's membership card are the same as 
those of the 1949 SNP Constitution. 
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In 1967, popular dissatisfaction with the status quo, successfully 
channelled by the SNP into demands for constitutional change, led to 
Winnie Ewing winning the Hamilton bye-election. The shock-wave~ of 
the SNP victory made the dominant parties wish they could bury the 
issue of self-government once again. They could not ignore the 
television and media coverage given to the victorious candidate, 
however, which helped to bridge what the SNP's erstwhile leader 
Robert Mcintyre called the party's 'credibility gap' .79 Labour and the 
Conservatives felt compelled to devise their own alternative policies on 
the constitutional question in order to undermine the sudden 
attractiveness of the SNP. The Conservative leader Edward Heath even 
promised Scottish home rule in 'the Declaration of Perth' of 1968, but 
did not honour his pledge when he came to office. By then, the SNP's 
electoral success had waned, and its opponents no longer considered 
the party such a threat. 
The SNP's local election wtns had been a baptism of fire, 
forcing it to supplement its core ideological principles with a whole 
range of peripheral policies. The party was aware that it had to present 
an attractive political alternative in order to overcome existing class and 
religious loyalties. 80 In late 197 4, after a general election campaign 
which concentrated on making Scottish identity politically relevant, 
eleven SNP candidates were elected to Westminster. 81 The SNP was to 
be an important player at the United Kingdom level during the next five 
years, since the minority Labour government was dependent on small 
79 W. Ewing Scotland v. Whitehall; Winifred Ewing's Black Book p. 3. 
80 Until the 1960s, a traditional link between the Protestant working class and the 
Conservatives and between Labour and Roman Catholics persisted in Scotland. A 
religious cleavage can no longer be discerned in the Scottish party system, although 
the SNP's support for the revocation of the Act of Settlement and some SNP 
campaigning in 1999 can be seen as directed at the Catholic vote. For instance, 
Salmond addressed the Catholic Teachers Association Conference a week before the 
Scottish election. Cf. J. Bradley Ethnic and Religious identity in Modem Scotland. 
81 "'Scotland' was an ideological category in terms of which socio-political change 
could readily be interpreted[ ... ] Crucially, the SNP was a political party which could 
more easily capture the Scottish label, because it was a taken-for-granted reference 
very like the 'national' identity implicitly assumed by the Conservative party in 
England." A. Brown et a! Scottish Society and Politics p. 45. In an interview with the 
author, Gordon Wilson, a former leader of the SNP, commented; "The great change 
in the last forty years is the way Scottish identity has emerged as a primary source of 
appeal and loyalty". 
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parties to have legislation passed. Although independence is the one 
'• 
core principle uniting both groups under the same party banner, the 
internal tension -between gradualists and fundamentalists endures. As a 
result, the party was unsure how to respond to the devolution issue. A 
further complication was (and is) the fact that, according to opinion 
polls, SNP voters do not necessarily support the independence policy. 82 
During the 1970s, the swings in the SNP's policy on devolution 
from party conference to party conference had a negative impact on the 
electorate, suggesting indecision and lack of clarity. The party's initial 
pro-devolution stance did not achieve the desired effect of reassuring 
voters as to the risks , of the · radical : independence option, and also 
carried the danger of disaffe.cting the fundamentalist party faithful. 83 In 
order· to counter tills\ thn~at, p~rt)n policy, had moved towards . 
'Independence-nothing ·.less':· by 1977 .. T~e importance of retaining 
member loya)f¥. had; been·. recognised,' but· at . the . expense of a 
'• . ' .~··· 
contradictory policy\vhich supported ·the· Labour government until a 
vote of no confidence following the failed devolution referendum in 
1979, but rejected Labour's Scotland bill on devolution as not going 
far enough. Tellingly; each SNP branch .was left to decide whether to 
join the cross-party campaign for a 'yes' vote in the 1979 devolution 
referendum. Within the party, the unprecedented cohabitation of the 
SNP leadership with . a · large · parliamentary group led to much 
bickering. For the first. tirn,.e,. signs I of complacency led to a lack of 
. strategy for extending SNP. 's.upport; whilst other parties were infused 
with a new dynamism to woo voters back. The party retained only two 
of its eleven seats in_, 197?,- a .serious blow from which the party was 
only to recover in the ··1990s~ afte~ a decade of introspection and even 
more disappointing electio~'nbsults. 8~ ;. ,, .. 
82 M. Keating Nations against the· State p. 227. · 
83 Cf. R. Levy The Search for a Rational Strategy: The Scottish National Party and 
Devolution 1974-79. 
84 In 1979 the SNP won 17.3% of the Scottish vote. This fell to 11.7% in the general 
election of 1983, rising to 14.1% in 1987. Jim Sillars' win of the Go van seat for the 
SNP in a 1988 bye-election marked a turning point in party fortunes. In the 1992 
general election, the SNP won 21.5% of the vote, although this only corresponded to 





A decisive swing towards the gradualists took place with the 
election of Alex Salmond to the chairmanship of the party in 1990. 
Salmond was once a member of the ''79 group', which believed that 
the SNP should acknowledge its socialist tendencies in order to offer 
the working class a viable alternative to Labour. Ostracised by the 
'born-again fundamentalism' of the party in 1979, this approach would 
return to shape party strategy from the late 1980s onwards. 85 The 
party's characteristic pragmatism dictated that a compromise solution 
was required with regard to the devolution option. Salmond is quoted 
as saying in 1992; "I can well foresee circumstances in which the SNP 
would vote for something less than Scottish independence".86 In 
marked contrast to the indecision of the 1970s, Salmond led the party 
in a wholehearted endorsement of the 1997 devolution proposals, and 
often appeared on a podium with the Liberal and Labour leaders to 
support a 'yes' vote in the referendum . 
The establishment of the Scottish parliament has heralded a 
period of change within the SNP. The party as an organisation has 
expanded and moved to larger, more modem headquarters. Alex 
Salmond stepped down as leader, to be replaced by John Swinney in 
September 2000, and the party's thirty-five MSPs have been gathering 
experience as the principal party in the Scottish opposition. Despite the 
loss of one Westminster seat to the Conservatives in the 2001 general 
election, the SNP has ambitions to become Scotland's largest party in 
the Scottish elections of 2003.87 Even if pragmatism and flexibility is 
characteristic of its strategic thinking, keeping its ideological core 
intact has always been crucial to the very existence of the SNP. Only 
the unambiguous and oft-repeated long-term commitment to full 
independence can unite the gradualists and fundamentalists. The_se 
divisions have not been laid to rest with the advent of the Scottish 
parliament, as the party strives to balance its strong role in the 
devolved parliament with calls for full independence.88 
85 In 1982, Gordon Wilson admitted that "civil war has been raging since 1979". 
Cited in R. Levy Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads p. 105. 
86 A. Marr The Battle for Scotland p. 221. 
87 Unlike Westminster elections, the date of which is chosen by the governing party, 
Scottish parliament elections will take place every four years. 
88 That SNP support for devolution contains an inherent ambiguity was evident in the 
criticism of its Scottish election campaign which came from both within and without 
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The csu-
The Christlich"'"Sozia/e Union, one of the first political parties to 
be authorised under the American occupation in January 1946, 
immediately set about promoting a sense of internal Bavarian unity and 
solidarity. In a prelude to a discussion of the CSU's interpretation of 
Heimat in chapter six, the following section will examine the aspects 
of Bavarian political culture appealed to by the party. As its name 
suggests, the CSU' s founding members had envisaged a party which 
would bridge the religious divide between the predominantly Catholic 
south and the Lutheran Protestant north of Bavaria, thus overcoming 
the political fragmentation which had dogged the Weimar Republic. 
This religious rapprochement simultaneously addressed the question of 
strong regional identities within Bavaria; principally Franconian, 
Swabian and A/tbayerisch, or 'old Bavarian' .89 The CSU did not take 
part in the amalgamation of Land-based Christian Democratic parties 
into a federation in 1949. This was partly due to many of its members' 
strong belief in federalism and their reluctance for the party to be seen 
as a sub-group of the CDU. To this day, the CSU stands only in 
Bavaria and continues to present the preservation and propagation of 
its Bavarian identity as a central component of its ideology. Attempts 
to form a German-wide party or another sister party in the East-
German Liinder have been laid to rest, as any expansion would lead to 
a dilution of the CSU's Bavarian identity. 
The CSU dominates institutional discourse by virtue of its 
absolute majority in the Bavarian parliament and being constantly in 
government. Privileged access to the media, control of state 
bureaucracy and the ability to set the agenda in Bavarian politics are 
some of the advantages this affords. Revealingly, the party's short 
the party; "Salmond was immediately defensive when asked why the party had 
chosen to put its pledge to hold a referendum on independence at the bottom of the 
[manifesto pledge] card". Scotland on Sunday, 11 1h April 1999. Gordon Wilson 
observed; "There were some strategic errors in the last campaign that are now I think 
recognised.; the fact that we were going to argue purely on devolution and on the 
existing powers [ .. J". 
89 For an appraisal of the effect of religious and regional affiliation on the voting 
preferences of Bavarians today, seeP. James The Politics of Bavaria Ch. 8. The 
chapter draws on a study of the 1990 Bavarian election conducted by 
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen for the Hanns-Seidel Stiftung. 
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period in· opposition - from 1954 to 1957 - forced it to rethink a 
hitherto too heavy reliance on governmental structures. Despite 
remaining the largest party in parliament, four of its opponents formed 
a coalition to keep the CSU from power. The 1950s correspond to Jhe 
only time in the party's history in which it suffered a major drop in 
support; This . was . brought on by the electoral success of the 
Bayernpartei; which fought for the same conservative vote as the CSU 
·using more far more isolationist rhetoric.90 As a result of its brief spell 
in opposition,· ~he CSU reorganised completely (according to existing 
Bavari~ , a~inistrative regions; which has both a pragmatic and 
symbolic logic)·, arid ; is·. now established in over ninety percent of 
Bavarian·. municipalities. The party's subsequent consolidation of its 
electoral'success ha8 been attributed to this all-pervading presence.91 
. ':· . ', . .·... . ' 
: . .... ,.; Th<?.:SPD~in\Bavari~ 1.seems'uriable·to compete with the CSU on this 
. , front;. being'· repre~ented · in only about sixty percent of Bavarian 
· f·.'~\.:: municipaliti~s ... Over and above the tangible benefits of representation 
... -:. . ·. :· ·. and ;.influenc~ ~t :ev~ry level of Bavarian society, the CSU attempts to 
·. achieve conceptual/ hegemony in Bavaria by striving to have its 
· ideology equated with 'common sense.' This task is made considerably 
easier by the Bavarian government's past success at making Bavaria a 
generally attractive place to live, work and invest. 
The· .. fact· that ·predominantly a gran an Bavaria only began to 
industrialise after the· Second World War meant that it could avoid 
much of:' the·; social dislocation suffered in Scotland. Successive 
Bavarian, governments . have actively promoted and funded a 
programme· of, modernisation. Indeed, the integration of over 1.6 
million, ethnic German refugees, principally those exiled from the 
Czech Sudetenland in 1945, was facilitated both by land reform and by 
their contribution to structural change in the Bavarian economy as 
90 M. Treml Geschichte des Modemen Bayem Ch. 3. 
91 Cf. Alf Mintzel Die CSU - Hegemonie in Bayem. Strategie und Erfolg. The CSU 
also exploits this fact in its rhetoric; "The founding of the CSU was a movement 
supported by many groups ·from all parts of Bavaria. This corresponded to the 
diversity of our Land and contributed to the fact that the CSU was soon firmly rooted 
in all parts of Bavaria". ["Die Griindung der CSU war eine Bewegung, die von vielen 
Gruppierungen aus alien Teilen Bayems getragen wurde. Das entsprach der Vielfalt 
unseres Landes und trug mit dazu bei, dal3 die CSU bald in alien Landesteilen fest 
verwurzelt war".] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber celebrating fifty years of the 
CSU in Regensburg on 11th October 1995. 
141 
workers and consumers. The fact that the Land was poor in raw 
materials, transport links and capital led to very high energy costs. 92 
One response to- this was the construction of several nuclear reactors 
from the 1950s onwards. This represented one of the first investments 
in the high-technology industries for which Bavaria would become 
renowned.93 The Land participated fully in Germany's post-war 
'economic miracle'; Bavarian industry was circa seventy-four percent 
more productive in 1954 than before the war.94 The resumption of 
trade to Eastern Europe in the 1990s was a welcome boost to the 
Bavarian economy, with many German companies locating in Bavaria 
in order to take advantage of its border with the Czech republic. From 
being a somewhat peripheral player in W estem European trade, 
Bavaria now finds itself near to the geographical centre of Europe once 
more, with all the new business opportunities this affords.95 
Bavari~ \s post-war development from a backward agricultural 
economy to one of the richest Liinder in Germany is inextricably 
linked to CSU policy and is extremely important to the party's image. 
Indeed, Bavaria is the only Land to have become a contributor to the 
system of financial redistribution between the German Liinder after 
having been a recipient.96 In addition, without the need for coalition 
partners, the CSU is free to implement its ideological action plan for 
the future. This is embodied in the 'big ideas' that the government has 
developed and promoted, particularly since the fall of the Iron Curtain. 
One of these is prime minister Edmund Stoiber's 'High-Tech 
Offensive', which plans to make Bavaria a centre for biological 
92 In an interesting spin, the rhetoric of both Franz Josef Strauf3 and Edmund Stoiber 
has forefronted the importance of Bavaria's 'Rohstoff Geist', or intellectual raw 
material. 
93 However, the Bavarian government has also invested in agriculture and the zones 
of traditional heavy industry, such as Nuremberg. This, in turn, is linked to a regional 
policy within Bavaria, designed to develop areas outside the high-tech capital, 
Munich. 
94 M. Treml Geschichte des Modem en Bay em p. 427. 
95 Bavaria is now a centre of car manufacture, aeronautical and genetical 
engineering, electro-technology and optics. More than one in two employees works 
in the service sector, compared to under seven percent in agriculture. In addition, 
Bavaria's beautifutalpine scenery, its ski resorts and rich cultural heritage have led to 
the development of a large tourist industry. 
96 For a statistical table showing the development of Bavaria's receipts and 
contributions, see M. Treml Geschichte des Modernen Bayern p. 493. 
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technology.97 Finally, the importance of personal image in Bavarian 
politics cannot be over-emphasised. Indeed, analysts identify the dearth 
of charismatic SPD leaders in Bavaria as one of the reasons for its lack 
of success there.98 Franz Josef StrauB, on the other hand, was a larger-
than-life figure who moulded the CSU to his own image in over twenty 
years as party chairman and ten as Bavarian prime minister. Often 
regarded as dangerous and reactionary outside Bavaria, he was loved 
and respected within his native Land.99 
Following in Franz Josef StrauB's footsteps, Edmund Stoiber 
has carved out a niche in Bavarian politics independently of his party. 
A series of surveys published in the German daily, the Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung, in the run-up to the 1998 Bavarian election, showed his 
popularity to be higher than that of his party as a whole. 100 The party 
has had its share of scandal, however, notably with the so-called 
(" ·~ · 'Ami go' scandal which led to the resignation of then prime minister 
Max Streibl in 1993. Stoiber himself was implicated in the 'LWS' 
scandal in late 1999, but both he and his party seem to have emerged 
unscathed. 101 In German politics, the CSU has managed to avoid the 
pitfalls of close association with the CDU, successfully dissociating 
itself from the anonymous donations scandal which rocked its coalition 
partner in early 2000. At the federal level, the CSU cultivates its image 
both as a united party firmly rooted in Bavaria and as a Volkspartei, in 
other words a mass party appealing to all sections of the electorate. Not 
afraid to criticise CDU policies or emphasise Bavarian autonomy~ the 
97 Gambling on the development of certain ind~stries in this way is not without risks, 
something admitted by Stoiber himself (Cf. his inaugural speech to parliament in 
1998.) AlfMintzel opines that the launch of this project contributed to the party's 
win in the 1998 Bavarian election, and that it will do a lot to perpetuate a sense of 
Bavarian identity in the longer term. A. Mintzel CSU. 
98 A. Mintzel Die CSU-Hegemonie in Bayem Ch. 5. 
99 The influential news magazine, der Speigel, famously conducted a campaign 
against Franz Josef Straul3 during the late 1960s. He was generally vilified in the 
German media and by the opposition, most vehemently during his unsuccessful bid 
to become German chancellor in 1980. 
10° For instance, survey results put CSU support at 46% and support for Stoiber at 
61%, making him by far the most popular Bavarian politician. Die Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung, 25th May 1998. 
101 The first scandal involved accusations of corruption at the highest level, whereas 
the second concerned the use of taxpayers' money for dubious building projects. 
However, in the European elections of 1994 and 1999, which were the next electoral 
polls after the Amigo and LWS scandals respectively, the party's share of the vote 
increased compared to the previous election. 
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·.' 
CSU' s pre9ilection for a ~lear, ,uncompromising stance on everything 
from immi~ation to Europe~ ~o1i6~ h~ helped it to position itself to 
the right of its ~artner on th~ Genp.an.politicalspectrum. 102 
•.. . .. , ' \ . . . .. . . . ' . ~ . . 
. ,;; ~,\;.·;.· .~··.' .. ·:.~·)1~~/:::i·:l·'' .. '' ' .. 
The CSU's official: role: as i.~sister,. party' (Schwesterpartei) to 
' I o : '• •, ' : • •,1' ' : .' : .': • ., ~ ' ·~ • . ' I : ' ' ·, • 
the CDU remains a central .. compoiierit :in its self-understanding. The · 
I '.'',') .• :.·J:':.'t t ; .'.'t,·.'. : ' ' · .... , 
relationship was described. hy,~~r~'.rJosef,.StrauB as a loyal but critical 
partnership. 103 .Co-operatibri·/ .. b·~~~e~·;··. th~!/ .. ~arties . is ·. b~ed. ~n . the 
. • .. ~.·:.~ 1,, ~, 'J.·:·,l .. ~~-\\'•·,:) ·.} :·I ·~ : •.' _.'I : . , , • 
Understanding that neither I Will: Stand\ against the Other, although the 
. . ,'I _·; :_:·:,·.··:~ ·.::_· .. ~·.·._.~~-.-.. ·~·~:-~·'. · ....••. • • . _: . 
CSU has in the past ~considered :breaking ;its links :with the CDU in 
• • • ( I • ·,_ I • ' " ~ t. I '· ·, .... :' ,·;. • I : ~ \ . ~. ' . • , ·, ,· ·, • • . • • ' • 
. o~der to stand across ... G,e~~XJ.~.T.~~:·\·~~~p: 5w#.··~.~fici~lly. ~aken ~n -1976 ·, 
• , .' • •. • ... , 
1 
.... •' ~ '1 • • I ~ _r ' ·.'•' ~·-,"· ' ' 0 • ·, . , I ' 1 , 1 ', ' · . ' I , , 
.. under the tutelage ·of<}:i'ranz~·Josef(StrauB,\ only.: to be reversed after .. 
o r I , !~./·:' ~: \'.,';.::-_.;>:•::,\,'t;'•,';··;··.~,\ ;·_. 'Y (~'',·,• ,· ' ~ • • \'' 
: .. fierce opposition ~om: 1 ,.:s·~~io~,Y/c){( thei·:··party. 104 :An :important: 
. . • '·. '.(;:, ·'·.·.· .. ··,l .. f~;~}-~:l_.~: .. ~:.~:.'.·.'},'/:.!·> ;;~· :':':_!··~·;: ... · ,'. . . . . ' . 
consideratiori mqtiya~ii).g·~e;,ppos~tio#.tW.~Jhe :f~ar:,of diluting the party's 1 ·: · 
• · •• ~ ... • t : :,': \ ; • ·,' \ (·~ t,.:_,.-, ::~ ... ~;:·\\;_~;' Y{.' ( :'( ~ ..... \ ..': :·:/ :-.~'}:.'.\;\~/ \ ·\ .. ' .' t '(·.I : · .. : ··. .· .'. . . . . . • . : 
Bavarian ·identity,:ari~.\.~~-~r~by;. .. ~d~~j~ngla.lcentral :element in Its· 
, 'I, 1, ',I .f,,-. •.' ;;::'•:~~·.'','.,il.~<·.~<:~.'.''•'•',\!•'[\'·~•,~',<,·1,,'','; •<'·. ,·;:I •I' \I , •', ' 
. I .'·: appe~l. ~~t~·!.·.~ ~· ~h~,f';f.~~~~~.J),~~J,;·fff·f~~}~Y:~~i~~·: _csl!; rhetoric uses . · 
concepts such as :,'rep_t;Ib_l~G:~/~dr.soyer~ign~/:'to :canvas~ .support for·. 
' o o ' o o l ;:'? ::~·.!_.'://,~," ,' l'.',':.t',' :•;' /~:·=·~·.~. ·:,\'._'. ,:',;f o ' -.: I • ' ' I . 
· ··. continued Bavarian ~·auto~oniy/, in )·areas.·:.:such 1 as 1 education,. health, 
. . ,,_.:~ .. ·.,.·/·'.\ ·(·.'i:;\:·.'.~;.'i~':(·.·.~·~:·(_.·:·~.:.:·. ....... . . 
policing and industry/:Jlle'.:GSU.'·~iljqy$··~:giea~ deal o( influence at the· 
. ·'· •, ·.••· ·_t:•,, ·1 .... • "·.· ,., .•.• , .. ·. . . 
federal level, both in g~y~·~~n~:·:~4.·l~ri.;~pp·o-~itiori. 105 In periods of · · 
. . . ; I ' ' . . ~ . . . I • .. : . I . • • I ' • J • • ' • • • • • • 
opposition, for instance~· the.party~~ ... ~rivi~bte'res~lts in Bavaria give it a 
102 . . . . . '.' ;.' ' ;' .. :: .:,.(\;,) ;;,, \\ ..... ' :' : • • ' ' • . • . . . 
. .The CSU is also opposed to abortio~ although ~ts competence to legislate in this 
. · .. area lias been struck down by the oefniafi':~ollstitlltioll~l court.~:'That.means that there 
.. ·.;will continue to be clinics spedficailyfot.~b'Ortto~~'m B~varia. Now, as then, we . . 
I I , , . I .. • .: 0 t /, i •, ' 1 ' , I ' I •1 , .. > • • ' .' ~ I : ( f ' . 0 , I 
· ~ believe this to be wrong." ['tDas heillt,' daB es ·au·ch'.in Bayem weiterhin reine . 
.. : Abtreibungskliniken geben.wird.;Da1~·halt~ri ~ii.iuichwie·~or fiir falsch."] Edmund 
· Stoiber, in a speech to the Bavarian· parliamb'rit oq ·i9th b~t~ber 1998. The party also· .. · 
•, . . . , " , . .. '• ' , . , I .. ' 
. fought for crucifixes to continue hangmg m' Bavarian· schools, a theme which in turn 
.,-·was linked to Bavarian iden~ty.~n·~·m,llni~~~#o~ i'ssu~~b{theCSU.·A. Mintz.el CSU · .. 
'. . t6 '. ". ···~.;:'··.':'l//t:·~·-,\'':'•':·.·:· ';'~::'/,' •;'.'.'·;·.·. ':· .··,,;' .. · ' . 
potn I ·•······.:().'I,,,.,:,,L .. ·~~·<·,"• ... ,... ... . . . 
103 "Both in opposition at:td ~-when·~p~rti~ip~~g ·~in· ·goverrum!nt the CSU has always · · 
worked together with the CSlJ.'c~i~c~l.iy;~ut' i~§ally:'>['~Iri z~iten del-' Opposition wie ': 
in Zeiten der Regierungsbeteiliglliig.:h~~.4~~ .CSU ;iminer .. in kritischer Loyalitiit mit 
der CDU zusammengearbeitet".] :Franz .Josef.Str~m6, in a speech to the CSU party 
conference in Munich on 22nd Novembe~ l985.'·: ... ·< · . .-. , · 
104 The Kreuther Beschlufl, as it wa~dmoMt~ ~~s· ~o~ented on by Theo Waigel as 
..... ,· . . ·:.'J·.· ... ·. . ·• 
follows; "That would have led to terrible oonfliCt between the CDU and the CSU [ ... ] 
The gains from the split would have been' smalh!r' than the losses caused by 
competition". ["Das hatte dazU·g~fiihrt,~&acsu ~d CDV sich furchtbar bekampft 
batten [ ... ] Der Trennungsgewi.lln 'wiife kleiiler· gdwes.en' als der Konkurrenzverlust".] 
105 The CSU did expand in 199o~··,whe~·a~rrrum re.~nlfic.ation changed the CDU-CSU 
relationship by redllcing the CSU's perce~ta'g~ o(the .. ove~all German vote, thus 
making the CDU the far stronger p~rtiler in.the German parliament. However, the 
DSU, created by the CSU to fight ·election~: m· the new Liinder and help redress the 
balance, was not a success.· · · · · · · :1 • · · . ' • .. 




strong support base from which to influence CDU and federal politics 
generally. Despite the overall defeat of the CDU/CSU coalition 
government in the federal election of 1998, the CSU still garnered 
4 7.1% of the Bavarian vote at this election and was further boosted. by 
a 52.1% win in the Bavarian election two weeks previously. Given 
Bavaria's large population and the scale of its support there, t~~ CSU ,,. 
regularly emerges as the third largest party in Germany as a/ whole. 
\. 
Further, it forms a separate parliamentary group in Berlin, which 
allows it to maintain its policy independence and distance itself from 
CDU positions if strategy demands. 
The main opposition party in Bavaria is the SPD, whose level 
of support hovers at around thirty percent of the vote. As already 
mentioned, it has failed to field charismatic candidates on a par with 
CSU politicians, and suffers from its image of being over-centralised at 
I· ·• the German level. It remains strong in the large cities of Munich and 
Nuremberg, and is generally somewhat better represented in northern 
Bavaria. However, one of the CSU's success stories has been its 
largely successful attempt to woo the predominantly Protestant, 
federally-minded region of Franconia in the decades following the 
second World War. Support for green parties in Bavaria is somewhat 
lower than in the rest of Germany, and is currently running at just over 
five percent. 106 The German liberals, the FDP, so long crucial to 
government coalition-building at the federal level, are relatively 
insignificant in Bavaria, and the party has recently polled under_ the 
five percent hurdle governing parliamentary eligibility. The remnants 
of the Bayernpartei, a serious challenger to CSU power in the 1950s, 
typically attract about one percent the vote with its policy of Bavarian 
independence. Bavaria also has a home-grown far-right party, t~e 
Republikaner, formed when its volatile founder split from the CSU in 
the 1980s. Together with other far-right groups such as the NPD and 
DVU, the Republikaner contest elections across Germany, but 
typically fail to clear the five percent hurdle. However, a freak vote at 
the 1989 European election put their support in Bavaria at almost 
fifteen percent. As will be discussed in the following chapter, the CSU 
106 In the Bavarian elections of 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998, the Greens won 7 ,5%, 6,4 
%, 6,1% and 5,7% ofthe vote respectively. 
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went on t~ rec.over and better its level of support at the next two 
European electi<_?ns, making the Republikaner's success short-lived. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered more closely how the ideologies of 
the SNP and the CSU fit into their political environments. One of the 
most important characteristics of contemporary nationalists is their 
flexibility and adaptability to social and political change, and an 
understanding of the context in which they evolve is therefore vital. 
An analysis of the neo-nationalist rhetoric of each party complements 
the findings of academic research regarding party organisation, 
strategy and election campaigning. The Scottish devolution debate and 
Bavaria's history of federalism have contributed to shaping the parties' 
interpretation of self-determination. By highlighting the events 
influencing the!development of each party's commitment to national 
autonomy, the preceding discussion has prepared the ground for a 
detailed examination of their ideologies. Although Scotland and 
Bavaria are only semi-states, they nevertheless provide the boundaries 
of a national discourse. This is perpetuated not only by the SNP and 
the CSU, but by all parties who address the Scottish and Bavarian 
electorates as distinct entities. 107 However, only nationalist parties 
make the nation into the nodal concept on which all other principles of 
their ideology are based. The SNP and CSU's construction of the 
nation and their role within it will provide the focus of discussion in 
the empirical studies to follow. This will be supplemented by an 
examination of their European policy, in order to investigate how each 
party goes about reconciling core and peripheral ideological principles. 
Nationalist ideology's central task is to politicise national identity in 
order to achieve a degree of political emancipation from a larger 
polity, erroneously termed a 'nation-state'. The rhetoric used by the 
SNP to pursue this goal will be the subject of the next chapter. 
107 "[T]he existence of competing nationalist paradigms is the rule, rather than the 
exception [ ... ] groups of all sorts are likely to compete for the control of the 
nationalist space". J. Llobera The God of Modernity p. 199. 
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.. 
5 SNP Ideology 
"The crucial question relating to national identity is how the national 
'we' is constructed and what is meant by such construction." 1 
.. 
The ultimate aim of the Scottish National Party is 
'Independence in Europe', a vision which juxtaposes the core 
nationalist goal of self-determination with a pro-European stance. But 
how does the SNP reconcile its interpretation of self-determination 
with a peripheral policy which has the potential to limit national 
autonomy? In other words, how can a quest for national sovereignty 
be compatible with the European integration process? As a first step 
towards understanding how the party goes about solving this potential 
tension· in its position, the present chapter will focus on the SNP's 
construction of the national "nodal point". Analyses of texts will be 
used to show how the pursuit of an ideological goal is tackled in neo-
nationalist rhetoric. In order to place these texts in context, a short 
overview of the SNP's 1999 Scottish and European election campaigns 
will precede each transcript and its treatment. Similarly to the aspects 
of Scottish political culture discussed in chapter four, this will provide 
insights into the organisation and strategy underlying the rhetorical 
'cues' used by the party in its attempts to mobilise support for 
independence. The first section of the chapter analyses a party political 
broadcast devised for the 1999 Scottish election campaign. It traces the 
rhetorical articulation of themes dominating SNP discourse; namely 
the Scottish nation and the SNP's construction of its own role as _the 
only truly Scottish party. In the second section, a text taken from the 
SNP's European election campaign literature is used to highlight the 
relationship of European policy to the party's core principles. That the 
SNP should also emphasise its commitn1ent to prioritising the nation in 
its rhetoric on Europe illustrates the secondary importance of the EU in 
party ideology. 
In order to render conclusions more robust, the methods of text 
analysis and a survey of primary sources are combined throughout the 
chapter, and are supplemented with interview evidence. The final 
section of the chapter elaborates on the conclusions drawn from the 
1 
M ichacl Billig Banal Nationalism p. 70. 
147 
texts in a J:)iscussion of the party's 'Independence in Europe' policy. 
Both the genesi_~ of the slogan and the strategic thinking behind it are 
revealing of the relative importance of its component parts to SNP 
ideology. The section contributes to our understanding of how the SNP 
reconciles its core nationalist ideology with support for further . 
European integration. It should become cle.ar that the party attempts to 
embody a certain image of Scottishness, by creating a rhetorical 
equivalence between 'itself as ·a :S~ottish party, the Scottish people and 
the Scottish nation .. · Although: the European. element is important to 
.·party strategy, it is principa~ly used: to. undergird the party's Scottish· 
focus and further its cor~ .i~e~logical goal. 
1 . SNP Rhetoric and .National~st Ideology 
' ,' I . / . : ' : :~: : ~· , I '. : i , ' I 
'., 
The SNP's Scottish El~ction Campaign, 1999; 
: ~ • j • 
The first Scottish parliament election, in which the SNP won 
. thirty-five seats, took. place on. t.~e. 6th of· May 1999. Campaigning 
· difficulties undoubtedly .contributed t~ an election result which, though 
putting the SNP at the forefront of parliamentary politics for the first 
time, did not live up to :the· expectations of a party which had been 
leading Labour in Scott~sh. ~pinio.n .polls during the summer of 1998.Z 
Until th~ organisational cha11ges ~set ·in motion by the election, the SNP 
' . '• .. ' . 
was. not particularly profe~·sional: 'and, organised ·in its approach to 
. , ' ' ~ . ' ' 
campaigning. In marked ·contrast to the on~ hundred or more additional 
. staff now ~orking··. for: .the; party/ at': the· Scottish parliament, SNP 
' '' 
headquarters continues ,to :fl1n.ctio'n/yvith 1a nucleus of. nine permanent. 
I. employees? Although alclec(by,si~ \to ten extra staff, the group was not 
' I ,• , ) 
very efficient· in its. orga'riisation: ofi the: Scottish election campaign.4 
:! Brian Taylor cites an internal source as saying that Salmond 's Kosovo statement 
could have lost the party three or four seats. In it, Salmond called the NATO 
bombing of Serbia an 'unpardonable folly~. The Scottish Parliament p. 173. Mike 
Russcll commented that, though the party had expected to do a little better, it had not 
expected to win and had concentrated instead on cementing the credibility of the 
party. ' 
:1 1t is difficult to give an accurate estimate of numbers at the parliament, given that 
some arc on short-term contracts and others arc part-time personal assistants to 
MSPs . 
.~ For a candid appraisal of the 1999 SNP election campaign by its general manager, 
sec M. Russcll Nothing more difficult; a contribution to the debate on independence. 
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This was recognised by John Swinney, long one of the main party 
strategists and now leader of the SNP, when he insisted on the need to 
'professionalise' the party in the run-up to the general election of 
2001.5 During the 1999 campaigns, the party's approach \Yas 
somewhat ad hoc. For instance, focus groups were conducted by party 
members with expertise rather than by an outside body. As a result, 
and in contrast to the Labour party's use of professional pollsters, the 
reporting of results was often informal or even anecdotal and never 
written up.6 The production of campaign literature and of party 
political broadcasts also took place in-house, the main reason for this 
being a financial one. Despite the 1999 Scottish election campaign 
being the most expensive in the party's history, it could not match the 
expenditure of the Labour party. This was identified as a major source 
of problems in the campaign. 7 
As regards organisation and human and financial resources, the 
SNP's election campaigning was far outdone by that of New Labour, 
which could mobilise experienced, professional staff from other parts 
of the UK.8 The SNP relied on only a small core of campaigners at 
head office to co-ordinate the Scottish election effort. Committed 
activists provided their services for free and a lot was expected of 
them. For instance, local volunteers carried out the distribution of the 
short-lived party paper, 'Scotland's Yoice'. 9 Mike Russell, the SNP 
campaign manager, identified the major problem not as a lack of staff 
but as lack of efficient task allocation and organisation in general. 
Communication between headquarters and local branches was founo to 
be wanting. One instance was that activists were not briefed on how to 
) In a speech made to an extraordinary SNP conference in Perth in May 2000, 
Swinncy introduced the party's 'new look' and its action plan for the 2001 general 
election. On the party's previous attempts to use more professional campaigning 
methods, sec P. Lynch Profcssionalisation, New Technology and Change in a Small 
Party: The Case of the Scottish National Party. 
(,Source; Peter Murrell. 
7 Commenting on the Scottish parliament election, Kcvin Pringle said; "I think the 
basic problem was a resource issue in the fact that we were out-rcsourced, 
particularly by the Labour party". Cf. M. Russell Nothing more difficult; a 
contribution to the debate on independence p. 16. 
x Labour also did not hesitate to make use of civil servants from the Scottish Office, a 
practice roundly condemned by Murray Ritchie. Scotland Reclaimed p. 83. 
'I This title is itself an example of the rhetorical technique which will be described 
and illustrated in the text analysis below. 
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deal with Alex Salmond's infamous statement on NATO intervention 
in Kosovo. Consequently, doorstep canvassing declined dramatically, 
as activists were unsure how to respond to voters' questions and 
criticisms. 10 The SNP has no party paper, if one discounts the four 
page 'Scotland's Voice' published. in the week before the Scottish 
election. The perceived ~ostility to the SNP of papers such as the 
'Daily Record' and 'The Scotsman'. was judged to be serious enough 
by the party for it to· launch its' own: SNP-friendly alternative. 11 
However, Labour considered 'The Herald', another Scottish daily 
broadsheet, to be particular~ y pro-Nationalist during the campaign, and 
. ·: denied it any revenue .. from Labour· advertisements as a result. The 
'Scots Independent.'. mont~ly newspaper, although openly supporting 
the SNP and independence, is not an officially affiliated party organ. 
' ' ~ ; I 
The ·fact that :the war in· Kosovo. was .'raging in the spring of 
1999 stole~ lot .. of pre~~: .. attentio~ fr.om the· issues being debated during 
. ..... . . ' 
the' campaign, 'such·. a~·::' tuition: fees';. the p~uli~ment's tax powers, and 
private fin.ancing of ·scho91 and hospital buildings. A speech made by 
the SNP's most. famous·. supporter,. the: actor Sean Connery, was 
upstaged for newsworthin~ss by the murder of a popular television 
presenter on the same day. Further, it was felt among the press that the 
SNP leader Alex Salmond was not his usual; energetic self. Rumours 
of internal differences amongst the leadership were also the subject of 
intense media scrutiny:. Used· to being· a relatively minor player in 
general elections, the SNP.· had: never before experienced so much 
attention from press and opposition. alike. They were taken aback by 
the Labour party's · unremitting ·negative ·campaigning - known 
colloquially as 'Nat-bashing' - which was designed to 'engender fear' 
of the SNP in the electorate. 1 ~ For.instance, .Labour was keen to portray 
independence as equivalent to divorce from the rest of the UK, with all 
the negative connotations this image entails. 13 In general, the SNP's 
10 Source; Peter Murrell 
11 Scottish press coverage of the election campaign is analysed in M. Ritchie 
Scotland reclaimed. 
12 The formulation of the strategic aim to 'engender fear' comes from a leaked 
Labour document, written by one of its chief strategists, Douglas Alexander. 
Published in The O~server newspaper in early 1999, it was seized upon by the SNP 
as indicative of negative Labour tactics. 
1




performance at press conferences was less than polished, and its delay 
in publishing budget proposals was an easy target for Labour. Finally, 
the SNP seemed ill at ease arguing for devolution instead of its core 
goal of independence, fostering the impression in some promin~nt 
members that the party was not articulating its message clearly 
enough. 14 In order to assess this claim, an examination of party 
ideology will be undertaken. This can best be tackled by looking to 
primary sources for typical examples of the rhetoric used by the SNP. 
What follows is a transcript of an SNP party political broadcast used 
during the Scottish election campaign. 
"An ideology of the first person plural"15 
1 If life is our most precious resource then we must take ~he 
greatest care and have the deepest love for its nurture. Life 
thrives where there is protection, it grows where there is 
nourishment. These young lives should be allowed to express 
5 themselves freely, to develop and grow with dignity, able to 
fulfil the hope and the promise that is in each one of our 
children. Their future is created by us. 
So how do we create a legacy for ourselves and for our children 
10 that we 're proud of? 
We took the first step by overwhelmingly voting for our own 
parliament in Edinburgh. That is why this election is a defining 
moment in our history, because for the first time in three 
hundred years we are taking control of our lives. You know~- if 
15 we want something enough we can all make it happen. If the 
focus for the dreams of people is for a better world, then let's 
shape that world in our image, not in someone else's. 
You know- our future is ours, it's there for the taking, it's there 
for creating. We can be who we're meant to be in this world. 
14 Gordon Wilson, former leader ~fthe party and a self-confessed fundamentalist, 
compared the SNP strategy unfavourably to that of Labour; "They used divorce, 
repeated it, kept it simple, and had a very substantial impact whereas we were caught 
on the flanks because nobody was propounding the opposite case for independence". 
15 "If nationalism is an ideology of the first person plural, which tells 'us' who 'we' 
are, then it is also an ideology of the third person. There can be no 'us' without a 
'them'. M. Billig Banal Nationalism p.78. 
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20 We can make our choice. We can take our place in the list of 
nations who have taken us forward in our evolution. We 
deserve io make decisions, rightly or wrongly, for ourselves. 
For too long other people have decided the course of our lives. 
We can create for ourselves a new model of democracy in 
25 Scotland, more open, less confrontational. We can create a 
vibrant future for ourselves, we can be dynamic, in a 
government that is ours. For we are shaping a new image of 
ourselves, we are growing as a nation and we have so much to 
offer. 
30 So let's bring an honesty and freshness to political life, not 
have a parliament that is controlled by any party that is in turn 
controlled by Westminster. Let's not leave the real power in 
Westminster, we must bring our democracy home. That is why 
we voted for the existence of this parliament, so that we in 
35 Scotla~~ can actually have a say on vital issues that affect our 
lives. 
We can choose to refuse a penny cut in income tax because, 
while hundreds of thousands of people in Scotland live below 
the poverty line, we cannot afford to take it. We don't want that 
40 penny, we want a Scots penny, where we give it back to 
ourselves, to each other. 
That penny means life to all of us, in health and education and 
housing and social services. We choose to care. We choose to 
shape our country's future with our hearts. as well as our heads, 
45 for we accept that compassion is a vital part of life. "What goes 
around comes around" is as true of nations as it is of people. 
We can choose to rid our country of the nuclear missiles that sit 
on our waters and our soil. Why do we need the capability to 
wipe out the entire planet? 
50 It's ridiculous. 
Scrap them and release billions of pounds into building a 
society based on hope and love, not fear and greed and violence 
and poverty. But instead, choose to build our country, make her 
stronger, creating social justice for all of us. Building a quality 
55 of life each of us can share, where we can be rightly confident 
of our future. 
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Scotland is still the seventh richest country in the world. 
So please don't sit on the fence in the creation of a new 
Scotland. 
60 Be decisive, make your choice, it's a moment of ~elf 
determination, think about it, and follow your heart, for with a 
little bit of love and a penny we can create a new Scotland for 
ourselves and our children. 
Vote SNP. 
The text above is a transcript of the voiceover - delivered by a 
male speaker with a pronounced Scottish accent - accompanying the 
SNP's party political broadcast of 20th April 1999.16 A first reading 
reveals that it uses highly emotive language throughout, thus belying 
claims that SNP appeals are predominantly economic and rational. 17 
The subject of the film heightens the sentimentality of the text. A 
succession of clips of schoolchildren playing, painting and dancing is 
shown. The film is shot in black and white and the overall effect is 
aesthetically attractive and sophisticated, in contrast to the rough, 
jarring images used by the Labour party for a campaign broadcast on 
the theme of divorce. 18 Although the children are endearing, the fact 
that their voices are not heard makes them come across as symbols 
rather than as individuals. The effect is underlined by the voiceover, 
which invites the viewer to see them as "life [ ... ] our most precious 
resource" (line 1) in need of nurture, love, care and protection (lines 2-
3). An expression of concern for the children's future creates .. the 
rhetorical link between the moralisipg introduction and the party 
political message permeating the rest of the broadcast. 
Although the import of the introduction is very general, it is 
directed at a specific audience, which is first addressed using the word 
"our" in line 1. In keeping with the optimistic, forward-looking tone of 
16The text, together with some images from the broadcast, can be found at the 
following web address; http://www.snp.org.uk!PPB/pb990421/. 
17 John Swinney commented; "There is absolutely no evidence of us being shy in 
using the emotional dimension to our message". This contradicts Jack Brand's, 
admittedly dated, analysis The National Movement in Scotland p. 23. 
18 Broadcast on April 12th, 1999. Cf. M. Ritchie Scotland Reclaimed, p. 94. 
153 
the text, the children can be seen as personifications of the "vibrant 
future" (li~'e 26}, "the dreams of people [ ... ] for a better world" (line 
16) and the "honesty and freshness" (line 30) evoked during the 
broadcast. In turn, presenting these as characteristics of a future 
Scotland and the children as "our children" (line 7) specifies the 
national context. I use the word "future" advisedly, as "independence" 
is never used in the text. This has ·much to do with the thrust of the 
SNP Scottish election campaign, which played down the independence 
message in order to concentrate on specific policies and the party's 
commitment to making. the parl.iament work. As will become clear 
from the instances in. which t~e··firstperson ph.iral.is used, the pronouns 
we, us and our are intended. 'to designate the Scottish electorate and by 
. . . 
extension, the Scottish nation.·.This is formulated explicitly in line 11; 
· "we·. took· the · first.:~: ~tep > .. by.>ov~~hehningly.:.· ,voting for; our own 
' ', .' I r ' 
parliament in Edinburgh/' However; by not specifying who 'we' refers 
to in line 1, th~,partyassu111es.that then~tional context is clear. It plays 
on the fact that this is ·a ·bro~dcast pertaining to. a Scottish election by a 
party standing solely in · .. Scotland; using· rhetoric to create the 
impression of a 'natUra!'' co.rrespondence between people, party and 
nation. 
By linking an ideal r vision of Scotland · to innocent, fragile 
children; the narrator .seeks i to·:· forge ··.an emotional bond with his 
audience in order. to -.carry,· it' with him. through the piece of political 
rhetoric that follows; Th~ future 'of a child one h~ watched at play is 
easier to identify with and .feel.:responsible ·for, than the future of an 
· abstract nation, after. all.'. Qonsequently;: the moral responsibility to 
ensure the freedom;; development.::·aitd 1· dignity. (line: 5) of one's 
. . . . . . 
offspring is linked 'to a collecti:ve political project. In turn, the national 
arena in which it is. to be ·.implemented· is used· as a rhetorical hinge 
between these two ideas (li~es S-11 ). Setting the scene in this way 
effectively prepares the audience to transpose the concepts of love, 
care and nurture (line :2) from· the realm ·of the family to the political 
arena. 19 In turn, a parallel with the nation as an alternative- political-
19 Later on in the text, this transposition is· ~a de expli~it in the evocation of the 
Scots' allegedly coJnpassionate and collectivist nature; "'What goes around comes 
around' is as true of nations as it is of people." (lines 45-46). Cf. also; "This party is 
Scotland's family, Scotland's last community. and Scotland's best hope". From a 
speech by Winnie Ewing to SNP conference on 25th September 1998. 
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family is being suggested. This is supported by the evocation of 
common values, communal solidarity, and a political project all can 
invest in (lines 24 & 45). The party's understanding of the Scottish 
nation is conveyed by means of these symbolic markers, avoiding the 
explicit use of the laden term 'nation'. Instead, liberal use of the first 
person plural forms the linguistic thread linking these elements to a 
collective. Moreover, the pronoun we explicitly includes the viewer in 
a way 'nation' does not, making the appeal more direct and personal. 
The word our appears twenty-seven times in the text, variously 
linking the collective to a common future project (when used in 
conjunction with the words lives, selves, future, image, evolution), to a 
common political system (parliament, government, democracy choice), 
and to a common territory (country, water, soil). A shared past is 
evoked only once, in the phrase "that is why this election is a defining 
moment in our history" (lines 12-13). Otherwise, the rhetoric used to 
convey the party's understanding of the Scottish nation strongly 
supports the view that the SNP sets out to include all Scottish residents 
in its political project. Few will feel left out by an invitation to share in 
future prosperity (line 40), the evocation of solidarity born of 
compassion (line 45), and an expression of distaste for nuclear 
weapons (line 47). 20 The important point here is that SNP rhetoric does 
not limit its possible electoral constituency on ethnic or racial grounds. 
Its criterion for belonging to the Scottish nation is based on residence, 
its appeals are aspirational and solidarity in the present is emphasised 
without recourse to historical myths.21 
The use of the first person plural throughout the text provides 
the key to the SNP's perception of its role in representing Scottish 
identity. When the identity of we is specified again in line 34 as "we in 
Scotland", the SNP is implicitly included as a 'body'. Indeed, in the 
immediate context of the broadcast, the "we" consists of the SNP -
personified by the narrator- and his audience; 
20 Indeed, this last element may have been included in the text purely to achieve just 
such a rallying effect, as this long-standing SNP policy played next to no role in the 
rest of the campaign. 
21 The SNP's requirements for citizenship in an independent Scotland are as follows; 
"The right of Scottish citizenship will belong to all those resident in Scotland on the 
date of Independence and to those who were born in Scotland but are resident 
elsewhere". SNP Citizens not Subjects p. 4. 
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'We' typically are not merely the speaker and the hearers: 'We' may 
be the patty, the nation, all reasonable people and various other 
b
. . 22 
corn tnattons. ~ 
Voter and party are portrayed as being able to achieve together a 
"vibrant future [ ... ] in a government that is ours" (lines 26-27). 
Further, phrases such as ''we want a Scots penny" (line 40) attempt to 
elide the distinction between Scots and the SNP in order to convey the 
impression that party and people are united in having the same values. 
and desires. Indeed, in the phrase "a Scots penny", the SNP' s agency 
disappears completely in the formation : of a direct rhetorical bond 
between people and policy. Finally; the ·'feel~good' factor contained in 
the text makes it very difficult not ·to identify with pledges formulated · . 
in terms of love, comp~sion and quality of life. 23 
. . . . 
.• • .~·· • ....... ·\1 
Blurring the d'is~inctio~ between' party and people is an attempt · 
to harness the _p~~er.~finspi,ring rhetoric to the SNP's political project. 
Indeed, the phrase; "~e are .shaping a :n~w· .. iinage of ourselves" (lines 
.· .. 
27-28), perhaps unwittingly provides the key to deciphering the entire 
text. The broadcast . is~ an exercise; in , the: manipulation of Scottish 
identity according to the SNP's world-view, an important element of 
which is the ambiguous use of the. word we. In the broadcast, the 
process of political · mobilisation . is. rendered rhetorically by 
encouraging the audience to identify in turn with youth, Scotland and 
finally the SNP. By politicising an inchoate Scottish identity in terms 
of nationalist ideology; the party is ·shaping an "image of ·ourselves" · 
which corresponds to the Scottish people and 'their' party, the SNP. 
To quote Michael Billig; 
The imagining of 'our' community involves imagining either implicitly 
or explicitly, 'them', from whom 'we' are distinct.24 
22 M. Billig Banal Nationalism p. 106. 
23 One cannot help but wonder, however, whether the SNP is sensitive to another 
Scottish stereotype in its rhetoric; that Scots are slow to emote. It may be the case 
that this broadcast mspired ridicule and not confidence in some voters. Neil 
MacCormick commented; "In metaphysical Scotland you get a much better hearing 
for an argument than for an emote. An element in the culture". 
24 M. Billig Banal Nationalism p.66. 
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As if to strengthen the viewer's resolve to vote for change, 
nationalism's necessary 'Other' is indeed referred to and contrasted 
directly with the positive picture painted of a future Scotland,. The text 
also grapples with who 'they' are, albeit using indirect language. The 
status quo is described as one in which the "real power" (line 32) lies 
in Westminster and others have long controlled the lives of Scots (lines 
13-14). Although Westminster is mentioned as a shorthand for the 
British parliament, the reference to three hundred years of outside 
control identifies the 1707 Treaty of Union with England as the source 
of Scotland's woes. By implication, then, the linguistic net capturing 
the 'Other' must be thrown wider. The phrases "someone else's" (line 
17) and "other people" (line 23) are examples of personification which 
are intended to connote everything associated with the British political 
system; the non-Scottish element of the electorate, the Westminster 
parliament, the government, British parties and British politicians. 
Consequently, the terms must needs include English voters and their 
representatives who, more numerous and consequently more influential 
than the Scots, "have decided the course of our lives" (line 23). For 
this reason, the rhetoric continues, the party does not simply want to 
bring down the government or reform parliament, it wants to be done 
with the 'Other' altogether. It wants to "bring our democracy home" 
(line 33) and "choose to shape our country's future" (line 43-44) by 
dissolving the union with England. 
At this point in the text, the rhetorical separation of 'us' from 
'them' is complete. The task is now to pad out the meaning of ~we' 
according to SNP ideology. The development of the argument has 
reached a stage at which "a party [ ... ] controlled by Westminster" 
(lines 31-32) is automatically deemed to put voters from England 
before those in Scotland.25 In turn, the rhetoric equates British parties 
with Westminster control, leading to the conclusion that the Scottish 
parliament can only fulfil its purpose if it is led by the only non-British 
party, the SNP. In a rather daring analogy, this is described as 
"bring[ing] our democracy home" (line 33). Contrary to what one 
might expect, this was allegedly not achieved by the 'yes' vote in the 
25 Although this is a superficially appealing argument, it is by no means logically 
watertight. However, the modification of Labour party strategy since the beginning 
ofTony Blair's leadership might give it at least the ring of truth. 
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referendum. Instead, it is asserted that Scottish parliamentary 
democracy' will not be truly 'home-grown' without an independent 
Scottish goverrlment and, by extension, an SNP government. The 
elision of the SNP with "we in Scotland" (lines 34-35) is bolder still, 
suggesting that any other party in government will not really speak for 
Scots, or even that Scotland will not truly feel like 'home'. This 
corresponds to the final stage in mobilising a national identity for party 
political ends. Using the first person plural, the rhetorical equation of 
people and nation is supplemented by an elision of people and party. 
Tellingly for its final broadcast before the Scottish Parliament 
election, the party chose to use rhetoric designed to inspire and 
encourage rather than to justify and explain. It is proof that, although 
modem campaigning favours debate of specific economic and social 
issues, the party does not under-estimate the electoral potential of 
somewhat vague, sentimental appeals to 'higher values.' In the .... 
broadcast, the party programme is discussed in terms of moral 
principles such as freedom of expression, human dignity, honesty, 
compassion, quality of life and social justice. This suggests that the 
SNP intends to stand not only for an election manifesto but also for 
values that voters can recognise as their own, providing further 
evidence of the rhetorical rapprochement being operated between 
people and party. Further, by introducing the nation into the equation, 
the party seeks to create the conceptual triad central to any neo-
nationalist party strategy. In fact, the entire text of the broadcast is 
geared towards mobilising Scottish identity politically by linking it to 
the SNP and its neo-nationalist ideology.26 
The SNP' s interpretation of independence as a process Is 
conveyed in the tripartite structure of the text, each stage describing a 
step towards independence. "The first step" (line 11) is described 
explicitly as the 'Yes' vote in the referendum, and then interpreted as a 
sign that "we are taking control of our lives" (line 14). This inference 
is by no means beyond debate, as it mixes the personal and political 
spheres in its personification of the Scottish electorate as an entity 
26 Neil MacCormick commented; "Parties have to latch on to some aspect of people's 
perceived identity and work from that". 
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which acts as one, shares the same values and aspires to the same 
goals. This rhetorical technique serves to set up the second stage of the 
process, namely voter confidence-building. A selection of phrases 
follow which are intended to inspire and uplift, each introduced by '~we 
can". · Repetition is used to drive home the point; the phrase is 
employed no less than eleven times between lines 19 and 62. Rather 
· like a . chant' or a flag, it is used as shorthand for membership of a 
group,' but might not be very meaningful in itself?7 Nonetheless, the 
themes of creation and choice return repeatedly; the nationalist project 
is beirig presented in terms of building the future, not preserving the 
I ' 
past:,· .. : 
.. In order .to convey its political message, the text capitalises on 
· ,,,the:positivity~~gen~rat~d;by .. the themes of love and growth by linking 
. . . ',.',: ·,·· . •(, .. :.·. . 
, opti~istic.·.~ords :such as new,' .vibrant, and dynamic with democracy, 
fut~re: and. g()V~rnment'. (lines 24-27). The beautiful, heart-warming 
· .. itn;~ge~ ·used ill:·the ·b~oad~ast encourage the viewer to feel optimistic 
about~· the .·future, and this effect is heightened by the vocabulary 
:·employed.~ The text is· peppered with positively connoted nouns, such 
as dignity; hope and promise (lines 5-6), which are grouped together or 
juxtaposed with negative terms for maximum impact. A succession of 
verbs convey, asense of growth and dynamism to the text; nurture[ ... ] 
thrives'[ .... ] develop.[: .. ] fulfil [ ... ] grow [ ... ] create" (lines 2-9). 
. . \ . 
. · Furt~~r, phrases ~uch ·~s ."defining moment [ ... ] better world [ ... ] new 
· · modet f .. ] vibrant future[ ... ] new image [and] vital issues" (lines 12-
35) give a sense of the invigorating change for the better that a vote for 
independence.· ~ould • allegedly represent. Powerful, rousing rhetorical 
s~bols ·such\. as. life;. country, hearts and future are also employed 
· · . througho~t' · the,: text.;· They inject a sense of solemnity and 
port.entousness irito the forthcoming vote, suggesting that this election 
can be life-changing and above all, life-enhancing. 28 
The third, concluding stage of the argument is introduced with 
the call "So let's" (lirie 30). This section of the text corresponds to the 
27 Indeed, the phrases are cliched and sometimes nonsensical, i.e.; "We can take our 
place in the list of nations who have taken us forward in our evolution" (lines 20-21). 
Michael Billig discusses the notion of flagging the nation in Banal Nationalism Ch.l. 
28 The words life or lives appear eight times in the text. The effect is further 
underlined by the use of superlatives such as deepest and greatest (line 2). 
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'action plan' aspect of SNP ideology, and consists of three elements. 
"Democracy" must be brought "home" by voting for a party not 
beholden to Westminster (lines 32-35), the choice to care should be 
made by voting for a "Scots Penny" (line 40), and a society based on 
hope and love can begin to be built by voting to scrap nuclear weapons 
(line 51). Thus, spiritual values are appealed to once again before 
being translated into a concrete measure, namely a vote for the SNP. 
The party's political programme is being set out, and in this case it is 
emotive rhetoric that lubricates the ideological mechanism (lines 42-
45).29 The phrase "our hearts as well as our heads" (line 44) is self-
legitimating. It attempts to bring together the economic and emotive 
approaches to political debate which are usually deemed mutually 
exclusive. Indeed, like a reassuring footnote, in case the viewer has 
been left a little anxious by so much rousing rhetoric, the phrase 
"Scotland is still the seventh richest country in the world" (line 57) is 
inserted to flagJhe SNP's favourite economic argument.30 
The combination of emotional and economic rhetoric Is 
highlighted in the following quote by Alex Salmond, which he 
repeated often during the campaign; "We are a rich country but not yet 
a rich society". The phrase 'economic-emotional' was first used in 
1971, in an SNP report on the party campaign regarding North Sea oil 
revenues. 31 It encapsulates the SNP's approach to mobilising votes; a 
combination of emotive symbolism and economic arguments designed 
to foster voter identification with basic principles of nationalist 
ideology. Inevitably, 'economic-emotional' rhetoric is linked to a sense 
of Scottishness in SNP rhetoric. Winnie Ewing recounts her dialogue 
with a Conservative MP, using Scottish dialect in her response to 
suggest that she is speaking as a Scot rather than as an individual; 
[The Conservative said] 'I am Scottish Nationalist in my heart but not 
in my head'. I [Winnie Ewing] retorted, 'The heart's aye the pairt that 
makes us richt or wrang' .32 
29 See also lines 61-62 of the text; "think about it, and follow your heart, for with a 
little bit of love and a penny [ ... ]" 
3° From a speech to an SNP Special Conference on 13th March 1999. When speaking 
to the business cmumunity on 20th April 1999, Salmond even asserted; "Over a 
hundred years ago, Scotland was the richest country in the world". 
31 Cited in R. Levy Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads p. 40. 
32 From an address to SNP Conference on 25th September 1998. 
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Another prime example of this strategy was the 'Penny for Scotland' 
initiative. It represented a major theme of the 1999 Scottish election 
campaign, and was indicative of the close link between emotional and 
rational appeals in SNP rhetoric. 
'A Penny for Scotland' 
As the relevant segment of the text illustrates, the 'Penny for 
Scotland' campaign presented an economic measure in the language of 
social conscience and Scottish solidarity (lines 37-45). The SNP's 
pledge to reverse the penny reduction in income tax contained in 
Gordon Brown's 1999 budget and spend it on public services, was an 
attempt to turn what other parties called a tax rise into a positive 
contribution to Scotland's sense of community. At the same time, the 
party sought to vilify the Labour measure as being out of touch with 
Scotland's needs and wants. By asserting that Scots were more 
• interested in adequate public services than tax cuts, the SNP claimed to 
speak for a virtuous, caring nation. It thereby attempted to reinforce a 
sense of Scottish distinctiveness from the rest of the United Kingdom. 
In this way, the issue was subtly shifted away from a belief in private 
or public ownership, in state or private education and in high or low 
taxation, to be redefined as a question of national character and 
vision.33 This is an example of eminently rational economic arguments 
being linked to an inchoate sense of Scottish belonging in order to 
mobilise voters behind the nationalist project. 
As a fusion of the emotional and the rational, the 'Penny for 
Scotland' campaign sums up the neo-nationalist strategy adopted by 
the SNP in order to further its core ideological goal of prioritising the 
nation. It also sheds light on the party's construction of Scottish 
identity, which amounts to telling voters that they have a natural, 
33 Addressing a fringe meeting of the Scottish Trade Union Congress on 19th April 
1999, A lex Salmond said; "It is now completely clear on which side of the fence 
New Labour sit( ... ] It is the SNP who stand on the other side of that fence, the side 
on which are gathered the people of Scotland - young and old, employed and 
unemployed, sick and healthy, included and excluded. It is the SNP who are fighting 
for a penny to invest in our collective future - it is the SNP who dare to care. I believe 
that Scotland will dare to care too". 
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national predisposition towards supporting 'caring' policies.34 The 
flattering assertion that ''we accept that compassion is a vital part of 
life" (line 43) is_designed to be as attractive and inclusive as possible. 
Further, the claim that Scots are inherently compassionate can be 
supported using either invented tradition or opinion poll evidence. 35 
After all, the aim is to make a maximum of voters believe and invest in 
this myth by translating a feeling of belonging into a vote for the party. 
Instinctively, anyone would want to belong to a group displaying such 
a commendable quality as compassion. In the text, the nation is also 
constructed by drawing the parallel between caring for one's own 
children and caring for other members of the nation. The SNP is 
thereby defining an 'imagined community' for voters to identify with. 
This process of political mobilisation uses the nation as an identifier 
where others might use the proletariat, the environment, or Christian 
democratic values. The image of Scotland constructed by the SNP is 
the public face of a strategy which has the achievement of national 
self-determinati~n as its core ideological goal. 
The simple slogan 'Scotland's party', employed during the 
SNP's 1999 campaign, encapsulates nationalist party thinking.36 Not 
only is the party depicted as representing the nation, but the nation is 
also deemed to possess the party. The simple phrase presents the two 
as closely intertwined, if not inextricably linked. If the party belongs to 
the nation, this suggests that it must have the nation's best interests at 
heart. From there it is but a short step to asserting that party and nation 
are symbiotic, or even one and the same. The characterisation of the 
SNP as the only national party attempts to mobilise Scottish identity 
for the party's own ideological ends. It can no longer be assumed, 
34 Although interviewees defended this myth, opinions differed as to the effectiveness 
of the campaign. Gordon Wilson criticised it for being introduced too hastily, whilst 
other accused it of targeting the conscience of the middle class rather than attempting 
to win over the working class. 
35 For an instance of the latter argument, note the response of George Reid when 
asked whether he personally believed the Scots to have a compassionate streak. He 
replied "Yes, I think so. My own constituency has a very, very full database. We've 
got over 60,000 entries and they go back over seven elections". 
36 John Swinney remarked; "A lot of what has dominated my thinking in the last 
number of years in trying to redirect party strategy, certainly since the 1992 election, 
was about trying to-get the party focused on how we had a mainstream Scotland 
agenda, a mainstream Scotland profile". 
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however, that individuals will readily mobilise behind a nationalist 
project 1n contemporary politics, especially 1n peacetime. 
Consequently, the SNP has developed strategies in order to make the 
national identifier more attractive, adapting it to concrete domestic 
issues. Policies addressing everyday concerns such as health and 
education, for instance the 'Penny for Scotland' initiative, attempt to 
translate bread and butter issues into a matter of self-determination 
(line 60). Whether they happen to use emotional or rational rhetoric, 
however, such policies are all directed towards a core ideological goal; 
the channelling of an inchoate sense of national identity into a vote for 
independence. At the same time, they illustrate the adaptability of the 
SNP's neo-nationalist ideology to the demands of contemporary 
politics. A prime example of this is the party's European policy, which 
has been developed to complement and facilitate the party's nationalist 
project. 
11 SNP Rhetoric and European Integration 
The SNP's European Election Campaign, 1999 
The European election took place in the UK on June the lOth, 
1999, barely a month after the Scottish parliament election. 37 Two 
candidates were elected from the SNP list. 38 A third candidate only 
narrowly missed being elected, a new system of proportional 
representation having been favourable to the relatively even spread of 
the SNP's vote across Scotland.39 The SNP allocated little money to 
the European election. This was influenced by the fact that it came in 
the immediate aftermath of the party's most costly campaign ever and 
that it was deemed to be by far the less significant.40 SNP accounts 
37 For an account of the election in the UK as a whole, see A. Teasdale The Politics 
of the 1999 European Elections. 
38 Winnie Ewing was the SNP's only MEP from 1974 until 1994, when she was 
joined by Allan McCartney. 
39 This system made all of Scotland a single constituency, ensuring a perfectly 
proportional division of the Scottish vote. The two incumbent SNP MEPs are Neil 
MacCormick and Ian Hudghton. 
40 Gordon Wilson, who was a candidate in the campaign, commented wryly; "I don't 
feel there was any SNP campaign at all [ ... ] All the staff had gone to the new 
parliament. Headquarters had virtually become a sort of ghost town." 
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state that £496,594 was spent on the Scottish parliament election 
campaign .and £90,409 on the European election campaign. However, 
the SNP made great play of being the only party to publish a European 
manifesto, and accused its political opponents of not taking the EU and 
the election seriously enough. The party's European campaign slogan 
of 'Stand up for Scotland' picked up the theme of boosting self-
confidence, which was an important component of its rhetoric 
preceding the Scottish election.41 Although not mentioning the 
European context specifically, the accompanying 'Independence in 
Europe' slogan fulfilled this role. Given the abstract nature of the 
European Union to most of the Scottish electorate and the fact that 
domestic issues often predominate at European elections, this approach 
was to be expected. Although target letters pinpointed farmers, 
fishermen, small businesses and young voters as those most likely to 
show an inten~~t in European elections, the content referred primarily 
to domestic matters. The letter to first time voters (the SNP enjoys high 
support among young people) attacked tuition fees in higher education 
and Labour's minimum wage proposals. The overall strategy, as with 
the CSU's European campaign, was to mobilise the party's core 
support and identify specific interest groups. Election fatigue of both 
campaigners and voters in the aftermath of the Scottish parliament 
election informed this approach, coupled with the fact that SNP 
supporters are more likely and Labour voters less likely to turn out for 
elections. 42 
The SNP campaign was the brainchild of one man, Peter 
Murrell, who also took the step, unusual in the SNP at the time, of 
drafting an explicit strategy document.43 The main aim was to repeat 
one clear slogan in order to avoid the mixed messages of the Scottish 
41 The modified slogan 'We stand for Scotland' was used in the 2001 general election 
campaign. 
42Kevin Pringle remarked; "In such an election you can aspire to really challenge 
Labour for the totf"spot because SNP people are more inclined to turn out to vote in a 
European election and because of the nature of the SNP 'Scotland in Europe' theme". 
43 P. Murrell SNP 1999 European Election Strategy Document. 
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election campatgn. There was relatively little consultation with 
colleagues, underlining the fact that the European election was a 
second order affair. Peter Murrell drafted the campaign radio 
. broadcasts himself, for instance, a matter which required extensive 
. consultation in the planning of the CSU's European election campaign. 
The. approaches of both the CSU and the SNP to the European 
campaign were otherwise fairly similar. Target letters and leaflets were 
produced and an (artificial, given the voting system) allocation of each 
'. candidate. to 'a region was opted for. This allowed the prospective 
. ·, MEPs .i in both ·.Bavaria and Scotland to focus their campaigning by 
_::· pre~enting.·· .. themselves~ as local candidates. However, the SNP's 
approach to the European election broadcasts was typically ad hoc and 
pragmatic. Surprised· that more of them had been allocated to the party 
. · ·.than 1. expected;·.: a \.low .. budget, .. 'talking heads' style· was opted for, 
. ::·::''ln~olving ~d lib. contribiltions by the candidate Neil MacCormick. The 
· . · .. · broadcasts .. contaiD:ed 1• a sizeable amount of factual information, 
~·:. · :_· .. ·de~igned:· to·, ·address1 the·;public's. generally poor knowledge of 
I I ' ' ," ' ' 'l ' 
European . institutions;· and finished with an inspiring appeal to vote 
. · SNP~ Interviews conducted with members of the public, soliciting their 
que.stions on aspects ofthe ~U, were interspersed with responses from 
sitting .and prospective MEPs. The arguments and the style of rhetoric 
used ·.can .be observed at first hand in the introduction to the SNP's 
1999 European ~anifesto. 
1 Scotland goes to the polls again. on June 1Oth to elect its eight 
. :, ·!·.members of the European Parliament. 
.· ... · ··:'<.:<The :eyes ;.of the world have been on Scotland in recent weeks, 
:I·. witnessing the start of our new era of democracy. The SNP -
5 and Scotland- made massive strides forward in the Scottish 
Parliament elections. At the European Parliament elections on 
June lOth Scottish voters will have another opportunity to make 
. their voices heard in the international community. 
It is time to stand up for Scotland. 
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10 By voting SNP in these European elections you will help elect 
Euro-MPs who will put Scotland's interests first. The SNP's 
record jn Europe speaks for itself. 
Winnie Ewing has shown what can be achieved when 
politicians make Scotland their top priority. For the last twenty-
IS five years Winnie has brought the needs of her Highland and 
Islands constituency to international attention and has 
championed Scottish interests in Europe. 
Scotland's Party, the SNP, is part of the mainstream European 
social democratic tradition. We believe that an enterprising and 
20 dynamic economy goes hand-in-hand with high quality public 
servtces. 
The SNP knows it is possible to transform Scotland. We can 
reverse the trend of job losses, public service cuts, and the 
privatisation of essential services. 
25 New Labour has let Scotland down by adopting old Tory 
polici~ and neglecting the pressing needs of our communities. 
But things don't have to be this way. 
The SNP has a positive vision of the future. Now that the 
Scottish Parliament is up and running, there is a greater need 
30 than ever to seize the opportunities opening up for Scotland in 
Europe. The SNP looks forward to the day when the people of 
Scotland will be ready to move forward to Independence and 
full membership of the European Union. 
Voting SNP will send a strong signal that Scotland is preparing 
35 to rejoin the nations of Europe as a full member of the 
European Union. 
As an independent member state, Scotland would enjoy a new 
first-class status in Europe. We would have more influence, a 
stronger voice, and greater access to the benefits. Voting SNP 
40 moves Scotland another step closer to Independence - and you 
can be sure that SNP Euro-MPs will put your interests first in 
Europe. 
Stand up for yourself on June 1Oth. Stand up for Scotland. 
Vote SNP. 
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This introduction to the SNP's European manifesto is signed by 
its then leader, Alex Salmond. Despite the European context, only two 
paragraphs of the text are devoted specifically to EU matters. Instead, 
the preamble refers back to the recent Scottish parliament election, 
describing it as a momentous, world-class event (lines 3-4). What is 
more, the opportunity to equate Scotland with the SNP is not lost; it is 
asserted that "The SNP- and Scotland- made massive strides forward" 
(lines 4-5). Party and nation are depicted as moving forward together, 
suggesting a close link between the two, as well as providing an 
example of the party's predilection for evoking dynamism and 
progress in its rhetoric. In turn, the national focus is underlined by the 
paragraph linking SNP activity in Europe, which allegedly "speaks for 
itself' (line 12), with Scotland's interests as a whole. Although few 
readers will be aware of what was actually achieved, the paragraph is 
primarily intended to make a nationalist point. The evocation of the EU 
arena in the text is exclusively in terms of Scotland and its interests. 
Although voters are enjoined to vote, the appeals made centre on 
Scotland and not on the European parliament (lines 10-11, 41-42). 44 In 
turn, the reference to the importance of public services is designed to 
underline the party's social democratic credentials and not to laud, say, 
the Treaty on European Union's social chapter (line 20). If the party 
describes itself as "mainstream European" (line 18), this is in a bid to 
increase its credibility at home. There is no reference either to the 
guiding principles of European integration or to specific EU 
regulations. Evidently, political mobilisation, even in the context of a 
European election, takes place through the medium of the natiop. At 
the European level, individual ill:terests are a vanishing point, 
providing the party with an unparalleled opportunity to emphasise the 
nation as an alternative focus of voter identification.45 Indeed, the word 
"Scotland" is used no less than sixteen times in the text. 
44 Kevin Pringle stated; "The information that we had put together suggested that the 
kind of campaign that was most likely to motivate people to turn out to vote in a 
European election where people are less inclined to vote is something that actually 
stressed the Scottish aspect if you like, ahead of the European aspect. You know, 
Scotland's interests have to be very strongly represented in Europe". 
45 This is underlined by Mike Russell's view that "people think about Scotland at a 
national, state level when thinking about Europe, and identify us as being the people 
who think that way too". 
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The party's desire to ''transform Scotland" (line 22) leads it to 
employ some characteristically aspirational rhetoric in outlining its 
"positive vision of the future" (line 28). A dynamic is created using the 
phrases ''up and running( ... ] seize (. ~ .] opening up [ ... ] looks forward 
( ... ] move forward" (lines .29-32); This image is then contrasted to 
Labour's "old Tory policies'~ (lines 25-26) and its neglect of Scottish 
needs. The comparatives more,. stronger and greater (lines 38-39) 
highlight the disadvantages ·. of the · status quo. By implication, 
Scotland's current position must be second class, since an independent 
"Scotland would enjoy a new first cla8s status in Europe" (lines 37-38). 
· · However, the "positive · visio.n',' '(line; 28) makes ·no reference ·to the 
higher ideals of European ~ntegration, such as peace and solidarity, but 
instead to "the opportunities opening up for Scotland in Europe" (lines 
30-31 ).· According to· .the .:SNP; .therefore,· ,European integration is to be · 
welcomed, not as a . worthy' end:. in ·Itself, but.·· insofar as it improves 
Scottish prospects· for•. 'economic security and· prosperity as an 
·independent 'nalion. ·-The· text·makes 'it' quite clear where the SNP's 
priorities lie. This· neo~nationalist t party's policy on· Europe is 
peripheral, pragmatic and ;.subordinate to its· core ideological goal. The 
content of the text illustrates how Europe does little more than provide 
a backdrop to the political· dramas being played out on the domestic 
stage. In the SNP' s pursuit'· . of national : self-determination, the 
· European dimension is simply instrumental. · 
· The text encourages· the individual ·to identify fully with the 
nation and vote to ·"put ~c~tland ~.s interests· first'.' (line 11) by electing 
SNP MEPs.· The rhetoric· ofthe argument is quite simple and by now 
familiar; voters are·urged'to;"make .their; voices heard( ... ] to stand up· 
for Scotland. By voting_S~- [~.:~]'!' (lines. -7-1 O); Individuals are thereby. 
called upon to translate ·a· fe~ling ·of: belonging to Scotland into a vote 
for the SNP. The party's ·rhetorical reliance on the force of national 
identification evidently assumes that the individual is still capable of 
prioritising the nation above ·all· else. The text culminates in a strong 
appeal to people's sense of self-worth with the call to "Stand up for 
yourself on June lOth. Stand up f~r yourself' (line 43) written in bold 
type. The repetition, in· these juxtaposed phrases suggests the .. 
interchangeability of the . words "yourself' and "Scotland", and the 
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voter's interest is thereby assumed to coincide with that of Scotland. In 
this rhetorical link, the self and Scotland are thus posited as symbiotic. 
The third element in the argument is added with the words "Vote SNP" 
(line 44). In another example of the creation of a correspondence 
between people, party and land, "yourself' is presented as the 
equivalent of "Scotland", and the logical consequence of this as being 
to vote for the SNP. 
The campaign strategy document supports the view that the 
slogan has deliberately been left open to a number of interpretations.46 
For instance, a phrase brought to mind by the slogan 'Stand up for 
Scotland' is 'to take a stand'. This connotation sounds a more 
confrontational note and reinforces the images of action against threat 
or danger conjured up by the slogan. It is expressed in visual form by 
the manifesto's cover photograph of all the candidates standing 
together, looking up at the camera. The uplifted faces have an 
aspirational quality, and the tight group suggests a closely-knit team 
selected to represent a united Scottish nation. One has call to stand up 
for oneself when one is being browbeaten, undermined or even 
aggressed. The slogan thus begs the question; against what or whom 
should one stand up for oneself? By prudently neglecting to answer, 
the party sets about mobilising the nation against the 'Other' without 
giving it a name, thus harnessing the force of this tactic without 
explicitly making any enemies. In turn, the vagueness here can be used 
to advantage, as voters are free to interpret the 'Other' as being their 
most disliked European or British bogeyman. 
The party's central slogan can also be interpreted as 'to stand 
up for Scotland's interests', thereby underlining the fact that SNP 
support for the EU is pragmatic, and that Scotland's interests come 
first. The malevolent 'Other' might conceivably be a rampant EU 
46 "The thematic strength of 'Stand up for Scotland' is that it can be used as a direct 
appeal to the committed SNP supporter in target letters but remains flexible enough 
to allow campaign literature and events to develop a limited number of key sub-
themes, namely 
• Stand up for Scotland- that's our promise. 
• Stand up for Scotland - Labour don't 
• Stand up for Scotland - other small nations stand up for themselves 
• Stand up for Scotland- it's time we made the grade in Europe." 
P. Murrell SNP 1999 European Election Strategy Document. 
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bureaucracy, or a disadvantageous common agricultural policy. 
However, _no reservations are emitted about the European integration 
project in gen~ral or any aspect of it in particular. Conversely, the 
SNP' s portrayal of the EU as a land of opportunity is not developed in 
any way. The EU is represented monolithically and positively, if 
superficially, as a component in the party's blueprint for future 
independence. Consequently, the SNP emerges as resolutely pro-
European. We must look elsewhere for the malevolent 'Other'. Given 
the domestic focus of European elections in the United Kingdom and 
the greater prominence of demands for independence than support for 
European integration in the text, the 'Other' can quite easily be equated 
with the British state. Examples of harsh treatment of Scotland by 
British governments will spring more readily to the mind of a potential 
voter than instances of European Commission unfairness. This 
interpretation is fully supported by the content of the text, which lists 
the negative domestic trends the SNP pledges to reverse (lines 22-24). 
If the party aillfS to inspire, it must do so using appeals that will strike a 
chord with voters, a near impossibility in the distant, abstract world of 
European politics. Although the focus on domestic politics might seem 
out of place in the introduction to the party's European manifesto, it is 
an illustration of the peripheral role played by European issues in the 
SNP's neo-nationalist ideology. 
There have been few, if any, detailed critiques from the media 
or the opposition of the SNP's vision of its future as an independent 
EU member state. Demurring voices have made themselves heard 
within the party, however. When the adoption of the 'Independence in 
Europe' policy was first considered in the early 1980s, forceful 
expressions of dissent came from then SNP office holders Steven 
Maxwell, Isobel Lindsay and Jim Fairlie,. Their arguments have since 
been definitively sidelined, a fact which (a somewhat embittered) 
Isobel Lindsay feels did and does not bode well for the quality of 
European debate within and outside the party.47 Although 
47 Isobel Lindsay observed; "I think the thing that was more disturbing in the late 
eighties was that there had to be no scepticism and by that I don't just mean the 
question of supporting membership or not supporting membership but there was a 
mood I think amosg some that you hadn't to raise criticisms or qualifications and that 
the storyline had to be; this is overwhelmingly good for Scotland[ ... ] and I think that 
was rather unhealthy". 
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acknowledging the strategic attractiveness of the policy, which was 
welcomed by the media as a sign of the party modernising itself, 
Lindsay commented that more cautious party members were fobbed 
off with unrealistic promises. 48 The points made by what is now 
considered a quasi-defunct anti-European strand in the SNP 
nevertheless highlight some of the problems inherent in the party's 
stance. That opposition parties should have failed to pick up on these 
arguments is largely due to the unsophisticated nature of the European 
debate in Scotland and the UK. in general. Criticisms of the SNP's 
ideological construction of the EU will be considered in the first part of 
the next section, before going on to look at the specific strategic 
benefits of the 'Independence in Europe' policy in furthering the 
party's core goal. 
Ill 'Independence in Europe' 
In an article published in 1991, Isobel Lindsay identified four 
forms of nationalist ideology; 
The first is a romantic, sometimes semi-mystical concept of 
nationhood [ ... ] The second is a small state nationalism as part of the 
process of decentralising state structures [ ... ] The third is nationalism 
as "Left" politics [ ... ] The fourth is nationalism as modernisation, as a 
response to uneven development. 49 
In her view, only ·the third and fourth forms of nationalism are 
potentially compatible with European integration. However,. her 
argument is based on two assumptions which are increasingly 
untenable today. Firstly, to describe European integration as 
"inherently federalist" is to ignore the strong intergovemmentalist 
dynamic in EU decision-making. Secondly, the inclusion of the 
subsidiarity principle in the Treaty of Maastricht goes some way 
towards countering the argument that "bringing control closer to 
48 Isobel Lindsay remarked; "The only argument to those who felt they were losing 
out in the EU context was, we will have a strong voice and we will be able to change 
things from the inside, in truth always a very questionable position". 
49 I. Lindsay 'The SNP and the lure of Europe' in T. Gallagher (ed.) Nationalism in 
the Nineties p.85. 
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people" is necessarily incompatible with "growing bureaucratic 
central ism". 50 
Particularly relevant to the core of SNP ideology is Lindsay's 
discussion of the economic rationale of integration, the restrictions this 
would impose on an independent Scottish government, the minor role 
an independent Scotland would play in Europe, and "the theme of EC 
as escape". 51 Lindsay is right to ask whether it may be counter-
productive for the SNP to bypass references to England in its rhetoric 
when the electorate is more psychologically receptive to comparisons 
with such an important neighbour. 52 She also pinpoints a strategic 
problem that is particularly pertinent now a Scottish parliament exists; 
For the anxious, a domestic legislature offers substantial change but 
greater reassurance, while for those psychologically or politically 
attracted to radical change, the addition of the EC factor at this stage 
may make little difference. 53 
• 
The article addresses seminal strategic and ideological questions which 
the SNP has still to answer, yet such a critique of the SNP's policy on 
Europe is notable for its rarity. 
A decade ago, Isobel Lindsay had already pointed out some of 
the less well-developed elements in the SNP's position and articulated 
a series of arguments to undermine it, but the party's European policy 
still remains largely unchanged. The fact that some interviewees, 
including John Swinney, gave very vague answers to questions on 
specific aspects of EU policy testifies to a lack of new or precise 
thinking in this area. The smoothness with which the SNP asserts the 
compatibility of independence and integration belies the philosophical 
50 Ibid. p.86. 
51 Ibid. p.89. Some aspects ofLindsay's argument are now obsolete. For instance, 
Lindsay devotes considerable time to refuting the fanciful proposition, apparently 
floated during the 1989 European election campaign, that a majority of votes in a 
European election would constitute a mandate for the SNP to negotiate independent 
member state status with supportive allies in Europe, and ignore any possible input or 
objections from the rest of the UK. 
52 "You cannot both build it up as a threat, as the source of Scotland's disadvantaged 
position, and then expect it to be psychologically plausible to argue that attention 
should be shifted from the Westminster relationship because of the greater 
importance of the European dimension." Ibid. p.91. 
53 Ibid. p. 90. 
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and tactical problems inherent in its position. Its attempts to make the 
link between the two appear self-evident is, of course, a basic 
rhetorical device. The 'Independence in Europe' policy is designed to 
neutralise the unsettling notion of independence by placing it within 
the larger framework of the EU. However, the concept of Europe· is 
undoubtedly secondary to that of independence in SNP ideology, even 
in the context of the European election campaign. Rather like a 
security blanket, the EU lies at the ready, waiting to put a damper on 
too many firebrand accusations from the opposition of isolationism and 
parochialism. 54 
'Independence in Europe' combines the SNP's core ideological 
goal with a peripheral concept. The adoption of the policy in 1988 is 
testament to the anachronistic nature of the party's previous stance, 
which had led the party to oppose UK entry in the 197 5 referendum on 
EEC membership. The SNP had argued that Westminster should not · 
decide for or against Scottish membership without consulting the 
Scottish people separately. A pamphlet published in 1969 bore the title 
'No Voice, No Entry' and the SNP slogan for the 1975 referendum 
was 'No-on anyone else's terms'. However, such a stance was easily 
misconstrued as opposition to the EEC itself and the message was 
eventually judged too complex and apparently contradictory to be 
conveyed effectively. 55 
Although SNP policy towards EC membership had been 
reversed as early as 1983, the official launch in 1988 was an important 
step. The thinking of the policy's chief architect, Jim Sillars, points to 
its strategic underpinning. 56 During the early 1980s, influential 
members of the party set about reinterpreting the SNP's core goal of 
54 Gordon Wilson used the image of a safety-net to describe the European dimension. 
John Swinney's image of the umbrella is also a good rendering of the policy's role as 
a protective covering; "The European context provides an umbrella within which the 
transition to independence can be envisaged". 
55 Gordon Wilson maintains that the policy "was consistent with today's line to a 
degree, except that underlying that was a less favourable attitude of a lot of the party 
[to EEC membership]". Isobel Lindsay pointed out that it was "a more difficult 
position, a less simplistic position" than Independence in Europe. 
56 "Despite having faced the difficulties that the 'separatist' tag created between 1974 
and 1979, the SNP has done little work on more closely defming what independence 
means in practical terms. It is time for some fundamental thinking on the concept of 
independence." J. Sillars Scotland: The Case for Optimism p. 182. 
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independence to respond to a new European political context and 
thereby achieve strategic ·.advantage vis-a-vis the opposition. 57 
'Independence _in Europe' had the advantage of providing economic 
safeguards and reassurance to Scots wary of 'going it alone' .58 It also 
had the potential to reinforce a sense of Scottish distinctiveness from 
the rest of the UK. For instance, the SNP has explicitly "condemn[ ed] 
the 'Little Englander' attitude of the .British govemment".59 Crucially, 
the party was able. to. use 'Independence in Europe' to counter 
accusations of separatism.60 ·. T~e connotations of isolationism 
associated with independence;, much exploited by Labour, severely 
undermined the . SNP.' s 1 confid~nce-building. efforts by evoking ·a 
regressive, introspective· natio~alism.61 . The change of policy was a 
sign of the party's development·; from · a ·crusading movement to an 
I . 
adaptable party sensitive to elect()ral :strategy.·~2 Finally, the consistent 
intellectual support for E~opean .rilembeishiJ? from the ~espected SNP 
member, constitutional lawyer arid ;n~w ·MEP Neil MacCormick should 
also ·.be mentfbned:6~. In\ ·the :·,final:. analysiS,'. however, pragmatism 
57 Isobel Lindsay remarked; "I do think it was Jim [Sillars] and his conversion of 
Alex [Salmond] and the others, the other younger element on his grouping at the 
time, who made a decision to try. to direct the party into an extremely euro-
enthusiastic party". . .. 
58 "The doubts held by our group of potential in~ependence voters, who go along part 
of the way but hesitate about the final irrevocable steps, are not without validity." J. 
· Sillars Scotland: The Case for Ootimlsmp. 182. · · 
'· 
59 SNP European policy statement,·Aprill996. This underlines the party's eagerness. 
to distance itself from Margaret Thatcher's euro-sceptic stance. Angus Robertson 
· ·' ·commented; "there isn't the same level ofhostility to Brussels [in Scotland] as there 
· has been traditionally with policy:-makmg in ~ndon'~ .' · . 
60 Bruce Crawford observed; ~~The. only .problem. we have is we get painted as being 
an organisation which.is about division and.separatism,·which is not about an 
inclusive process of joining". : , . 
61 The Labour party continues to liken. the SNP's plans to break-up and divorce; 
"[Dewar's] relentless attacks on 'divorce' have secured a record level of hostility to 
independence, with 48% of Scots saying they would vote against it and only 39% 
supporting the idea". Scotland on Sunday, 2nd May 1999. According to Isobel 
Lindsay, the isolationist argument will always be used "whether there's substance in 
it or not because it's seen as an effective emotive argument". 
62 George Reid remarked; "The SNP in the 1970s was Poujadiste and populist and a 
movement rather than a party. So I think what Salmond has done is give the party a 
coherence it never had before". . 
63 Cf. N. MacConflick Democracy, Subsidiaritv and Citizenship in the European 
Commonwealth, Sovereignty: Myth and Reality, and What Place for Nationalism in 
the Modem World? 
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motivated this neo-nationalist interpretation of self-determination from 
the first. 64 
The policy shift was typically neo-nationalist in recognising 
that global pressures have made complete sovereignty anachronistic, 
and that such an interpretation of independence was neither feasible 
nor desirable. Instead, the best way for the party to present a more 
moderate image was for it to couch its indubitably radical goal in 
European terms. 65 However, references in party rhetoric to other EU 
member states as 'normal' nations indicate that a 'nation-state' is still 
considered the idea1.66 A traditional nationalist flavour thus persists in 
the idea that nation and state should coincide, and the SNP is one of 
the only parties in Europe to make such a radical constitutional 
demand. 67 Yet it nonetheless remains an archetypally neo-nationalist 
party in that it updates the nationalist principle of self-determination to 
fit in with the role of contemporary 'nation-states'. The national 
sovereignty aspired to is not absolute and autarchic, but voluntarily 
limited by treaty, allegedly in the national interest.68 The SNP 
interprets self-determination using a European construct, which is at 
once subordinate to and supportive of its core ideological goal. 
The 'Independence tn Europe' policy has served as a 
springboard for the party's strategy of underlining the benefits of 
independence, building-up voter confidence and emphasising party 
credibility. A transition to independence operated within the European 
64 George Reid expressed this with candour; "If you look at Scots exports, we live on 
a pretty barren stump of rock. If we don't sell our goods we're not going to survive 
and where's the biggest market? The biggest market is in Europe". 
65 Alasdair Morgan made the following observation;" There's a limit to how many 
radical changes you can get people to vote for at the one time". 
66 "Far from being unusual, sovereign independence is the normal status for small 
countries, and the most successful of those are the ones which can combine confident 
individuality with co-operative participation in larger structures". Address by Alex 
Salmond to the London School of Economics on 25th February 1999. "Scotland will, 
in short, become a normal nation, playing a normal part in the world". SNP Citizens. 
not Subjects p. 6. 
67 Cf. P. Lynch Minority Nationalism and European Integration. 
68 The most sustained discussion of sovereignty is to be found in the work of Neil 
MacCormick. He commented; "The last chapter of my recent book is called 'New 
Unions for Old' and that's how I see it and I mean independence in that sense." Cf. 
N. MacCormick Questioning sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European 
Commonwealth. 
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Union framework can no longer be portrayed by opponents as such a 
leap in the dark. The party also contrasts its policy to the 
Conservatives' reluctance to open up to European developments. In 
turn, this approach is linked in party rhetoric to the myth that Scots are 
inherently more pro-European than the English, and that the Scots' 
historical experience of international co-operation will stand them in 
good stead during the process of European integration. 69 In its 
ideological interpretation of Scots identity, the SNP portrays a dual 
allegiance to Scotland and Europe as unproblematic (although the 
same cannot be said for a dual British and Scottish identity). 70 
A pro-European Scottish identity is sometimes explicitly 
contrasted to a peculiarly English nostalgia for 'splendid isolation'. 
However, the party now generally avoids references to England in 
favour of comparisons with other small European countries.71 This is 
partly to avoid accusations of anti-Englishness, and partly to transcend • 
the UK context in order to show how 'normal' nations prosper within 
the EU. The party's eagerness to promote the benefits which EU 
membership could bring to Scotland has also contributed to the party's 
pro-European stance, most recently expressed in strong support for 
Scottish participation in Economic and Monetary Union and, less 
vocally, for eastward enlargement of the EU.72 Whether such positions 
are truly in the interests of the Scottish economy and regional 
eligibility for EU structural funding is, quite literally, debatable. 
However, there has been no sign of any informed discussion of these 
issues within the party or the Scottish media. The party's unqualifiedly 
positive stance on the question of monetary union, a debate on which is 
just beginning to burgeon in the UK, illustrates that a more fully 
developed position is not deemed necessary. Given that European 
integration in the United Kingdom is still discussed in terms of support 
for or scepticism towards the project as a whole, it is sufficient for the 
69 This national myth will be discussed at greater length in chapter seven. 
70 On the construction of British and Scottish identity for the purposes of political 
mobilisation, seeS. Reicher & N. Hopkins Self and Nation Ch. 3. 
71 Angus Robertson commented; "It's not our place to compare the Scots as being 
better or worse than the English. What we are trying to do is increasingly to draw 
comparisons with elsewhere in Europe". 
72 George Reid expressed surprise at how overwhelmingly supportive the SNP 
National Council had been of Salmond's pro-euro policy, as debated and passed in 
June 2000. 
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SNP to utter an all-encompassing 'pro' as its contribution to the 
debate. To quote Isobel Lindsay once more; 
You cannot start to question this or to have a reasonably intelligent 
debate because it would suggest some criticism of the whole European 
project. 
Conclusion 
In the eyes of its own spokespeople, the SNP has undergone the 
transition from movement to party in the last thirty years. That is, it has 
progressed from being a group constituted around a single issue to an 
electoral machine ready to implement a full raft of policies if elected to 
govern. Despite the fact that the thrust of its core ideological goal 
remains unchanged, this has led to modifications in the way it presents 
its demand for independence. To portray independence as an absolute 
• good is now considered anachronistic by the party. Simply to cry 
'freedom' will rally few followers in Scotland's contemporary political 
arena. This language belongs to cases of unbearable oppression, to 
uprisings and revolutions, and such connotations are unhelpful to the 
party's moderate image. In contrast, 'Independence in Europe' is a 
reassuring policy, designed as a response to the "collective caution" of 
the Scottish electorate.73 However, although the SNP has incorporated 
the European dimension into its flagship policy, it plays but a 
subordinate role in the independence message. The EU is little more 
than an expedient symbol used to counter the SNP's separatist and 
isolationist image.74 As such, it represents a peripheral componeu"t of 
the party's neo-nationalist ideology, directed at achieving the core goal 
of independence. The 'Independence in Europe' policy as a whole is 
testament to the flexibility of a thin ideology which can surround its 
conceptual core with any number of thickening principles. 
Another case in point is the party's 'Penny for Scotland' 
campaign, which recast the _question of public spending in terms of 
Scottish national identity. It illustrates the party's attempt to suggest 
73 J. Sillars Scotland: The Case for Optimism p. 182. 
74 As Isobel Lindsay put it;" a response requiring no analysis only image". I. Lindsay 
'The SNP and the lure of Europe' in T. Gallagher (ed.) Nationalism in the Nineties 
p.89. 
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the existence of a symbiotic bond between the Scottish people and 
'Scotland's party'. Using this rhetorical construct, the party sets about 
politicising a feeling of national belonging. This is an important 
technique in neo-nationalist party strategy. It aims to establish the 
party's ideological construction of the nation as common sense within 
the territory in question, with a view to achieving conceptual 
hegemony.75 This chapter has examined the SNP's interpretation of the 
Scottish nation through the rhetoric used in selected campaigns. It has 
gauged the compatibility of this construct with the party's pro-
European stance, and found that both aspects are designed to further 
the party's core goal of self-determination. The following chapter will 
approach the CSU in the same way, evaluating the Bavarian party's 
neo-nationalist ideology through its rhetoric. It will become clear that 
the CSU propounds a world-view which revolves around the 
immutable core principle of prioritising the Bavarian nation . 
• 
75 Chapter eight will discuss neo-nationalism in terms of discourse theory. 
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6 . CSU Ideology 
"The process of defining is itself an element of political debate. What 
nation, nation-state, nationalism and the national question might and 
should mean is a political struggle over concepts and as such a central 
subject of [ .. } investigation. "1 · 
The CSU prides itself on having been a supporter of European 
integration since the party's creation in 1945, and has more recently 
characterised:. itself as , a primary player in the development of the 
concepts ·of subsidiarity and a. 'Europe of the Regions'. At the same 
·time, it has always cliainpioned Bavarian interests, often asserting that 
... '. it is the only P~~ capable of representing Bavaria competently both in 
I ,, I 
·:: Euro~e an~ at home. Implicit in this statement is the assumption that 
: ·.the.: party~~~\ ~~.p~cul~arlx/ Bavarian identity which gives it a special 
:.:. authodty to. speak. for. the ·nation. This chapter uses text analysis to· 
'• I '• \ . ' 
· .~ examine :ho'o/ the :~SU. goes about reconciling its pursuit of Bavarian 
. . 
. autonomy/. :with:· support :·.for · further European integration. These 
pdD:ciples will be charactedsed as respectively central and peripheral to 
· ·:::the party's ideology. In order to put the party's rhetodc in context, each 
· text: will be prefaced with a short discussion of the campaigns for 
which they .were written; In the first section, the analysis will build on 
the.: features of nationali~t rhetodc identified in the previous chapter. 
Similarly to the SNP's ·case, it will be shown that a correspondence 
between pariy,~ people • and nation is constructed rhetodcally in the . . .. ,. ' . 
context' of: both· national ; and European campaigning. This will be 
.. · highlighted using an extract from a speech made by the Bavarian prime 
... minister,· Edmund ·~ Stoiber, in the weeks preceding the Bavarian 
pcrr,li~ent elect.ion of 13th September 1998. 
·Using a text from the CSU's 1999 European election campaign 
as another typical example of party rhetoric, the second section will 
discuss how the party has integrated a pro-European agenda into its 
resolutely Bavaria-odented political programme. The final section of 
the chapter will examine the difficulties surrounding the use of the 
German term Nation in party rhetodc. The CSU' s response to this has 
been to stru~ture its ideology around the concept of Heimat, a term far 
1 F. Roth Die Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs p.l8. 
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less historically laden than Nation. It will be demonstrated that, by 
making Bavaria a focal point of political mobilisation, the party 
pursues a nee-nationalist strategy within the overarching structure of 
German federalism. Far from being a handicap; the choice of the 
alternative term Heimat to describe the Bavarian nation has proved to 
be a particularly effective means of pursuing the party's core 
ideological goal of national autonomy. 
I CSU Rhetoric and Nationalist Ideology 
The CSU's Bavarian Election Campaign, 1998 
The CSU won 52.9% of the vote in the Bavarian parliament 
election, held two weeks before the governing CDU, CSU and FDP 
coalition lost the German federal election. The Bavarian election result 
suggests that ~ome of those voters who wanted a change at the federal 
level still trusted the CSU to manage Bavarian affairs. Furthermore, the 
party polled 47 .7°/o in the federal election, illustrating that even when 
the Christian-Democrats did badly in Germany as a whole, CSU 
support proved to be more resistant.2 All the same, this was the CSU's 
worst result in a federal election since 1949. The fact that it polled well 
over 50°/o in the Bavarian parliament election was most reassuring for 
the party, however, as its Bavarian power base is what enables the CSU 
to exert influence at the German and European levels. The party's 
strategy in order to attract undecided voters was to emphasise its 
conservative identity using campaign themes such as law and order and 
calls for a tough immigration policy. This is indicative of the fact that 
the CSU has always seen more of a threat in its support 'fraying at the 
edges' than in direct confrontation with the SPD. In the run-up to the 
Bavarian election, the presence of the Republikaner and other small 
parties contributed to CSU opinion poll ratings of between forty-six 
and forty-eight percent in Bavaria, and prime minister Edmund Stoiber 
seemed genuinely nervous that the party would not achieve the much 
sought after fifty percent share of the vote. 
2 G. Hirscher quotes Edmund Stoiber as saying; "If Helmut Kohl wants to win the 
general election, then Bavaria needs to achieve an absolute majority for the CSU. 
Southern Germany must provide the majorities". Die CSU nach den Wahlen 1998 
p.433. 
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The CSU' s campaign was run from its headquarters in Munich. 
The party's fifty-five employees are organised into departments, each 
with its own remit. The press office alone consists of three employees 
and is complemented by a public relations department.3 In addition, 
the CSU has enjoyed the continuous back-up of Bavarian government 
structures and civil servants (for whom career moves between 
government posts and positions within the party are not uncommon) 
over the last fifty years. Like other German parties, the CSU also has 
its own affiliated trust, which devotes itself to political research and 
education, among other activities. The Hanns-Seidel Stiftung organises 
conferences and exhibitions and holds highly subsidised seminars in 
political education for members of the public. It also maintains its own 
academic research department, library and scholarly publication, and 
employs four highly-qualified, full-time archivists to administer the 
• large CSU archive. The Bayernkurier is the party newspaper, published 
weekly and printing details of party events, speeches and policy as well 
as providing very partisan commentary of current affairs in Germany 
and abroad. Bavarian newspapers such as the Miinchner Merkur have a 
rather conservative editorial stance, despite Munich being one of the 
few places in Bavaria with a socialist mayor. A major daily broadsheet, 
the Siiddeutsche Zeitung, which is edited in Munich but read all over 
Germany, has a more liberal editorial stance and is not overly 
sympathetic to the CSU.4 Indeed, in a clever caricature published in 
late 1998, it lampooned many of the symbols employed in CSU 
rhetoric.5 
The CSU had a professional approach to the Bavarian election 
campaign, which had a budget of eighteen million German marks.6 The 
3 SNP press relations were until recently largely co-ordinated by one man, Kevin 
Pringle, with Angus Robertson responsible for foreign press relations at election 
time. Since the Scottish Parliament election, the number of press officers has risen to 
three. 
4 The paper published an article on the eve of the Bavarian election listing reasons 
not to vote CSU. 'Es gibt Griinde, in Bayem nicht CSU zu wahlen'. Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung, 12th September 1998. 
5 Among the symbols identified were Alpine dairy maids, rural churches and brass 
bands, but also microchip factories, nuclear reactors and space travel. 'Das 
Streiflicht', Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 20th December 1998. 
6 This sum, roughly equivalent to six million pounds sterling, excludes district and 
local branch expenditure. Source; Josef Lindner. 
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size of the party machine makes forward planning indispensable and 
flexibility difficult, especially as outside agencies are often contracted. 
For instance, the graphics for the campaign were conceived by an 
advertising agency working to a detailed brief, and the party produced 
a brochure of campaign materials which were sent to local branches 
well in advance. 7 A great deal of attention was paid to the target 
audience and the imagery used in ~e campaign. One example was the 
care taken not to include alpine scenery in the illustrations of Bavaria's 
countryside, in order not to alienate Franconian voters. 8 In addition, 
different portraits of Edmund Stoiber were used on billboards in rural 
and urban constituencies. :. According to Markus Schiek, creative 
director of the campaign, the · overall · aim was to soften Stoiber' s 
somewhat ascetic image in or~er t~. app~al to. the urban and youth vote, 
whilst still: conveying'. an~ impression' of:' moral rectitude and 
trustworthiness in the more conservative; rural constituencies. In rural 
areas he was depicted in a.formal pose,· sitting behind a desk, wearing a 
suit and prominently 'displaying his wedding ring. In the cities he was 
pictured in a relaxed group setting, wearing an open-necked shirt and 
carrying his jacket over his shoulder. This last poster was illustrative of 
the party's attempt to foster a sense of approachability, in order to 
create the impression that the CSU is concerned with the everyday 
problems of all Bavarians. The image was consciously reinforced by 
the prime minister's bus tours o~the Land during the campaign and the 
creation of opportunities for .him to be· approached by members of the 
public. Analysis of an address by Edmund Stoiber, published in the 
week before the Bavarian :election, will shed light on how the party 
went about articulating its ideological.message during the campaign. 
7 The presentation of the party's logo, colours, and typeface in this pamphlet was 
itself a rhetorical tour de force; "Green expresses the love for our land and the CSU's 
attachment to the H eimat". ["Griin zeigt die Lie be zu unserem Land und die 
Heimatverbundenheit der CSU"] p. 13. "A clear, legible and simple typeface, which 
immediately makes our basic position clear; modem, forward-looking and self-
confident". ["Eine klare, gut lesbare und schnorkellose Schrift, die auf den ersten 
Blick unsere politische Grundhaltung deutlich macht; modem, zukunftsorientiert und 
selbstbewuBt".] p. 14. 
8 Source; Markus Schiek. 
182 
'For Bavaria, with Hearts and Minds' 
1 For Love of Bavaria and its People 
For Bavaria, with hearts and minds. That is not only the slogan 
with which we are fighting the Bavarian election for the trust of 
citizens and for a clear majority. This slogan also describes the 
5 spirit in which the CSU and the Bavarian government work for 
Bavaria: It is love for Bavaria, for its great history, its rich 
culture, its scenic beauty, its lively variety of tradition and 
progress. We work for this unique Land with innermost 
conviction, for its people from the regions of Altbayern, 
10 Franconia and Swabia, which have also become the Heimat of 
those exiled. Because this land's unmistakeable 
originality/autonomy [Eigenstiindigkeit] is close to our hearts, 
we are doing everything to preserve the legacy of our diverse 
traditions, the beauty of nature and the human face of the 
15 [Bavarian] republic. 
However, we also know that Bavaria today, in a world in which 
national borders are losing their meaning, must take on 
challenges and competitors. Therefore we continue to be 
committed to a future that 'speaks Bavarian'. 
20 We are fighting with all our might so that Bavaria, with its 
historically developed cultural identity, remains on course.for 
success and asserts its po,sition in Germany and in an 
integrating Europe. We represent Bavarian interests against 
political opponents like the SPD, which sees Bavaria more as 
25 subordinate to the federation than as an independent state. It. can 
offer no alternative for the sole reason that, from its 
competencies to its ability to push measures through, it lacks all 
capacity to be an advocate for Bavaria at national and 
international level. 
30 Bavaria must remain tn good and reliable hands. Our 
commitment in Bavaria and our success will at the same time 
be a signal in federal debates as to the future course to be taken 
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in Germany. The organiser of an insubstantial political show 
does not earn trust, those with achievements to show earn trust! 
35 Bavariallas successfully taken up the challenges of our time. In 
a cross-Germany comparison, Bavaria has for years had the best 
labour market situation. Bavaria has an excellent infrastructure 
at its disposal, a highly-qualified workforce, economic growth, 
an exemplary welfare state and a high standard of living. These 
40 successes are first and foremost to the credit of the hard work 
and determination of our citizens. But they are also the fruit of 
future-oriented, consistent government policies, which paved 
the way for the change from an agrarian land to the most 
modem of industrial states, with medium-sized business at its 
45 heart. We have created economic and social progress and also 
ensured the preservation of historical, regional identity and the 
character of rural agriculture, which must remain the soul of 
our Land[ ... ] 
Theref~e, in the years that lie before us, there is no 
50 alternative to our policies - "For Bavaria, with hearts and 
minds". 
Edmund Stoiber's address, published on the front page of the 
party paper, the Bayernkurier, shortly before the Bavarian election, is a 
typical example of CSU rhetoric.9 The title itself constructs a 
correspondence between party and Land; it invites the reader to draw 
the conclusion that anyone who wants the best for Bavaria should vote 
CSU (line 1 ). Although this is not yet explicit in the title, there is 
nonetheless a clear attempt to create a link between emotions such as 
love and fraternity and a vote for the party. In this way, an a priori 
neutral attachment to Bavaria becomes politically charged. A 
perception that the party is so rooted in Bavaria as to have become 
synonymous with it is also being played upon here. 10 Given the 
territorial focus of mobilisation and the party's aim to prioritise the 
autonomy of this community, its rhetoric can be characterised as the 
politicisation of national identity for nationalist ends. 
9 Bayemkurier, 2gth August 1998. The German original of this text is reproduced in 
Appendix 11. 
1° Cf. H. Riehl-Heyse CSU- Die Partei, die das schone Bayem geschaffen hat. 
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Stoiber begins his address with the general slogan used in the 
Bavarian election campaign; "For Bavaria. With hearts and minds" 
(line 2). The juxtaposition of the irrational and the rational in the 
campaign slogan is a direct transposition of a neo-nationalist strategy 
into party rhetoric. It will become clear that, in a way similar to the 
SNP's 'emotional-economic' approach, the CSU targets both voters' 
hearts and minds with a mix of concrete policies and emotive appeals. 
The structure of Stoiber' s address provides further evidence of this 
two-pronged strategy. His speeches almost invariably begin with a 
declaration of allegiance to the Bavarian Heimat, expressed through an 
evocation of its beauty, its traditions, its history and culture (lines 6-8). 
Setting the scene in this way provides a rhetorical springboard from 
which to elaborate a vision of future development. This particular 
speech begins with a heart-warming sketch of all that is worth loving 
about Bavaria. The introduction is bursting at the seams with 'feel-
good' rhetoric and positive adjectives such as great, rich, lively, unique 
and diverse (lines 6-13). It is allegedly because Bavaria is close to the 
CSU's heart that it does everything in its power to protect the Land's 
traditions and natural beauty (lines 13-14). The party is thereby 
portrayed as having a natural affinity with Bavaria which, implicitly, 
other parties do not. This is articulated explicitly later on in the text 
with reference to the SPD (lines 23-25) and again in the conclusion 
(lines 49-50). 
In an example of personification, the human attributes of heart, 
mind and spirit are ascribed to the CSU and the Bavarian government 
(lines 2,5). They are also described as feeling motivated by an 
"innermost conviction" (lines 8-9). This rhetoric is designed to elevate 
these 'bodies' to a higher plane than other parties, which merely jostle 
for power. They fight for trust (line 3), conjuring up images of 
crusaders engaged in a moral battle between right and wrong. Their 
work is also presented as a labour of love (line 6), and as such is 
equated rhetorically to a vocation. Furthermore, an organisation which 
is moved by an inner conviction to work for a cause has connotations 
of a charity engaged in good works rather than a calculating, 
strategically thinking political party. All of these images contribute to 
the forging of a rhetorical link between the party and the Land, one that 
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nses above petty politics and has an enduring, symbiotic quality. 
Should voters accept that the relationship between party and Land is as 
close and loving as Stoiber claims, another possible effect of the 
rhetoric is that the list of positive Bavarian attributes (lines 6-8) might 
come to be associated with the CSU in their minds. 
As befits a Bavarian election address, the Land remains the 
focal point when the scope of the text is widened to Germany and 
Europe. In this context, the party watchword is that future progress 
must 'speak Bavarian' (line 19). 11 Paradoxically, Stoiber's 
metaphorical response to globalisation and international competition is 
to evoke a traditional dialect. The phrase 'Lap top und Lederhose' 
expresses the juxtaposition of past and future in an even more succinct 
form. 12 New connotations are evidently being played upon here; a 
crossover is being operated from the image of Bavaria as a Land rich in 
tradition and culture to Bavaria as a model of innovation and 
• 
dynamism. This is underlined in lines 20 to 23. An identity rooted in 
history is combined with contemporary success (lines 21-22), 
suggesting that these alleged Bavarian characteristics are not only 
compatible but also mutually dependent. Further, the concepts of 
tradition and progress recall an extremely well-known and oft-quoted 
phrase coined by Franz Josef Strauss; "To be Conservative means to 
march at the head of progress". 13 The presence of the CSU in 'the 
Bavarian equation' is strongly emphasised. The party is portrayed as 
fighting with all its might (line 20) for Bavarian interests and the 
preservation ofBavarian identity (line 21). 
The theme of the CSU's protective mission is extended to the 
issue of Bavarian autonomy. The party is depicted as being engaged in 
a struggle at a national and international level against the 
homogenising or centralising tendencies of federal Germany and the 
European Union respectively (lines 22-23). The SPD, as a Germany-
11 This phrase is a reprise of an article entitled 'Der Fortschritt spricht bayerisch', 
published in the magazine GEO in 1986. 
12 The phrase was originally coined by former German president Roman Herzog and 
is often quoted witb approval by those close to the CSU. 
13 ["[StrauB] konnte zurecht sagen: Konservativ sein heiBt an der Spitze des 
Fortschritts marschieren".] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber on the 1 01h anniversary 
ofFranz JosefStrauB's death, 3rd October 1998. 
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wide party, is neatly equated with the evils of German centralism and 
roundly condemned as incapable of representing Bavaria (lines 24-25). 
At this stage, the syntax conveys a greater sense of dynamism than the 
more reflective evocation of Bavaria in the introduction. The use of 
descriptive adjectives makes way for a higher concentration of verbs. 
At the same time, the mood is somewhat aggressive, underlined by the 
use of words such as fighting, might, asserts, represent, opponents, 
advocate (lines 20-28). These successive moments of the argument 
represent the rhetorical translation of the themes of tradition and 
progress. 
The CSU is presented as a champion of Bavarian sovereignty 
against opponents who place Bavaria in a subordinate position (line 
25). In order to heighten the rhetorical effect, the contrast with a party 
which can be trusted to prioritise Bavarian interests is underlined; 
"Bavaria must remain in good and reliable hands" (line 30). This 
sentence signals a move away from the portrayal of Bavaria as the 
underdog, forced to defend its position against outside encroachment, 
to an assertion of its role as the trend-setter in German affairs (lines 32-
33). A list of its enviable record in various policy areas is designed to 
establish the Land's good credentials. It also recalls the rhetorical 
technique of emphasising Bavaria's positive attributes which was used 
earlier in the text, supplementing the evocation of traditional aspects 
with progressive ones. 
Throughout the text, traditional and modern aspects of 
Bavarian identity have been reconciled in CSU rhetoric. Furthermore, 
the CSU has been characterised as a uniquely capable and thus 
indispensable protector of this composite identity. The party . has 
defined the nation according to its ideological principles, before 
proceeding to connect this construct with the electorate's inchoate 
sense of national identity. Political mobilisation along national lines is 
then linked to a vote for the party, characterised as the ideal 
representative of the national constituency. In the course of the text, a 
subtle elision of party and people takes place. Those responsible for 
Bavaria's economic and social achievements are identified first of all 
as its citizens, but in the second place as the Bavarian government 
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{lines 40-42). The word 'we' introducing the next sentence is thus 
ambiguous; it is unclear whether the CSU or the Bavarian population is 
the subject (line 45). This creates the illusion that all are working 
together towards the same goals. By this stage in the argument, the 
CSU's ideological principles of tradition and progress are shaping its 
description of the Bavarian status quo (lines 45-46). What is more, the 
text emphasises the role of the CS U in bringing about this state of 
affairs. (line' 42). Present-day Bavarian 'reality' is depicted as a 
· successful. fusion of . economic and social progress and historical, 
regional· identity. The'. CSU is thus presented as both mother and 
midwife of Bavarian prosperity. 
I' •, ' 
: ·. Thro'ughouUthe.text, party policies are portrayed as part of 
Ba~arian ~·andby exten.sion CSU - tradition. Voters are to be left in no 
doub·t that the CSU was responsible for making this vision of Bavaria a 
•.. r~ality. 1 I Later on ir(the· tex't, Stoiber ·affirms that past CSU politicians 
made their· future vision for. Bavaria a reality "worth living". 2 Not 
. ; ··content to hammer home the CSU's allegedly central role in moulding 
:····Bavaria in its image, Stoiber's address ends by projecting the party's 
' .ideological characterisation of Bavaria into the future (lines 49-50). To 
maintain that ~here is no alternative to the CSU's political ideology is a 
· daring assertion. However, the symbiosis of party, Land, people and 
prospefity.ha·s been e'mphasised continuously throughout the text, and 
this·. statement,'. simply. summarises the argument. It restates that the 
CSU. is the only, truly Bavarian party, that it has contributed to ~the 
· character of, Bavaria and should continue to do so in the future. An 
. image ·of Bavaria ·has been constructed which gives the impression that 
· .' ::li; the par.ty/ is·, an: indispensable part of its make-up. Further, national 
identity: has I been. politiCally· mobilised by creating a correspondence 
· . between Jove for the Heimat and a vote for the CSU. The politicisation 
1 The same id.ea was formulated much more directly by Stoiber when he said that 
Bavaria's continuous positive development since the end of the war was thanks to the 
CSU. ["Bayern konnte seit Kriegsende eine kontinuierliche Entwicklung nehmen-
. und dank der CSU war cs einc kontinuierliche Aufwartsentwicklung."J From a 
speech by Edmund Stoiber on the 10111 anniversary of Franz Josef Strauf3 's death, 3rJ 
October 1998. 
2 ['.'All dies wurdc erreicht, weil fiihrcnde Pcrsonlichkeitcn in CSU und 
Staatsregicrung [ .. ; ] einen kuhnen Zukunftscntwurf fUr den Freistaal m it 
Bcharrlichkcit und Augenmaf3 lcbcnswerte wirklichkeit wcrden licf3cn."] Edmund 
Stoibcr it1 the Bayernkurier. 29th August 1998. 
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of national identity is a crucial element of nee-nationalist ideology. It 
is the rhetorical expression of the CSU's core commitment to Bavarian 
autonomy. The following section will examine how the party has 
incorporated the peripheral question of European integration into its 
ideology, beginning with an overview of its 1999 European election 
campaign. 
11 CSU Rhetoric and European Integration 
The CSU's European Election Campaign, 1999 
In the European election on June 13th 1999, the CSU polled 
sixty-four percent of the Bavarian vote - its best ever result- and sent 
ten MEPs to Brussels. 3 This was two more than in 1994, and helped to 
reassert the party's hegemony m Bavaria after the Christian 
Democrats' disappointing loss of the German federal election to a 
coalition of the SPD and the Greens in 1998. As Bavarian prime 
minister and CSU party chairman, Edmund Stoiber is the figurehead of 
his party and an instantly recognisable politician in the Land. 
Consequently, the 1999 European election campaign focused on him, 
although he was not standing for election. Despite his strong views on 
the single currency, the campaign managed to profile the CSU leader 
as a committed supporter of integration. There was a conscious attempt 
to personalise the campaign in an effort to render European politics 
less abstract and remote. Consequently, each party candidate was 
allocated to a region within Bavaria. The party's strong Bavaria-
specific identity allowed it to include a sub-Bavarian dimension 
without risking too much confusion over the term 'region' .4 Stoiber 
represented the Bavarian level which, it was emphasised, could only 
properly be represented in Europe by the CSU.5 
' For an account of the election in Germany as a whole, sec L. Helms Turning 
Indifference into a Minor Landslide: The 1999 European Elections in Germany. 
·' Although the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the federal German Liinder is one of 
the highest in Europe, the influence they wield in EU organs such as the Committee 
of the Regions is simply on a par with other regional administrative units. However, 
Bavaria is acutely aware and defensive of its status as a Freistaat, or republic, and 
would regard the seven Bezirke, or districts within Bavaria, as regions proper. 
" According to the research body Forschungsgruppe Wahlen , which conducts 
research into German elections, this assertion resonates with the Bavarian electorate. 
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In line with the tendency, as prevalent in Germany as in the 
UK, to see European elections as a barometer of government 
popularity, the campaign also incorporated critiques of some of the 
German government's domestic measures. Other campaign themes 
stressed the need to increase European accountability and pare down 
Euro-bureaucracy, to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy in the light of the Kosovo conflict, and to reduce German 
payments to EU coffers. The question of European monetary union had 
been a source of friction within the CSU for quite some time, with 
differences of opinion amongst the leadership tarnishing its image as a 
united party.6 The strategic reason for Stoiber's cautious stance is 
made clear by his somewhat over-dramatic words; "If the Euro-project 
doesn't work, then the CSU will slip under fifty percent. And that is 
the beginning of the end of the CSU".7 Another campaign theme 
underlined the importance accorded by the CSU to Bavarian 
autonomy; the party demanded that the European Commission's 
competences be defined by treaty. The CSU continues to be concerned 
that the Liinder have been deprived of certain areas of authority in the 
creeping process of centralisation within the German federation. The 
party fears that the same could occur at the EU level and this informs 
its position on the regulation of the Commission's authority. 
The CSU's budget for its European campaign was far higher than that 
of the SNP, although each lasted for about a month overall. The 
Bavarian party spent over six million German marks (approximately 
two million pounds sterling), excluding expenditure at the party's 
district and branch levels. Its campaign culminated in a small-scale 
party conference, which was designed to attract as much of the media's 
In the context of the 1994 European election, they found that the CSU was well 
anchored in all social groups and considered by them to be the archetype of a 
Bavarian state party. !"Die hayerische Staatspartei schlechthin".J Cited in G. 
Hirscher Die CSU nach den Wahlen 199R p. 425 
''Chapter seven discusses the stance taken by Stoiher in the debate surrounding the 
euro. 
7 Cited by G. Hirscher Die CSU nach den Wahlen 1998 p.430. 
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attention as possible. Unusually, no CSU European party manifesto 
was published, only a series of European policy principles in April 
1999. Prior to the beginning of the campaign, endless meetings were 
held in which the connotations of each frame and image of the 
European election broadcasts were discussed.21 Filming was entrusted 
to a professional company and four days of shooting were required. In 
addition to the public channel slots, broadcast time was booked on all 
private television channels (with the film being shown up to twenty-
five times on some), and ran in almost all Bavarian cinemas. The radio 
broadcasts were played fifty times on all of forty-three Bavarian radio 
stations. The party identified women, pensioners, farmers and the 
fourth Bavarian Stamm of expellees as those most likely to vote. These 
groups were targeted through advertising in a total of forty-five papers, 
many of them with specialised readerships.22 A direct mailing signed 
by Edmund Stoiber to over three million Bavarian households 
complemented this. Such an approach emphasises that CSU 
campaigning was on a much larger scale than the SNP's effort. 
Although the CSU was also interested in mobilising loyal voters, its 
potential pool of support is much more extensive than that of the 
Scottish party. Nonetheless, analysis of a text produced for the 
campaign will reveal certain similarities to the SNP's rhetoric on 
Europe. The text, written by the candidate heading the party list, sets 
out the guiding principles of CSU European policy. 
'The Champion of Bavarian Interests' 
The CSU's Ten Points for Europe 
For the 13th of June the motto is; the CSU is the force that 
moves. 
We are the champion of Bavarian interests 
5 We stand for a credible European policy, which successfully 
presents Bavarian interests to their best advantage. Bavaria 
needs a strong and experienced representative in Europe. In the 
21 Source; Julia Hartmann. 
22 For instance, the Sudetendeutsche Zeitung, the Deutsch-Russische Zeitung and the 
Slesische Nachrichten are all targeted at a readership of expellees, who might be 
expected to be particularly interested in the issue of EU enlargement. 
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future just as in the past we will be the guardians of Bavaria's 
interests and citizens in Europe. 
10 We stand for a Europe of Nations and Regions 
We need a Europe in which Bavaria and Germany can fulfil 
their roles. The regions and nations provide their citizens with 
identity and solidarity. They are also indispensable in the future 
as the carriers of European integration. 
15 We are fighting for a clean Europe 
After the resignation of the entire EU commission we will pay 
strict attention to ensure that only the most qualified public 
figures are appointed under the new commission president, 
Prodi. We support "quality not quotas". That also includes 
purging and 
20 restructuring the EU commission. Citizens have the right to see 
their taxes used correctly. 
We are lhe most competent party in European questions 
No other party of Bavaria has acquired competence in the field 
of European policy to a degree comparable with that of the 
25 CSU. Surveys show that a large majority of citizens trust the 
CSU the most to solve difficult European problems. 
We want to give agriculture a fair chance 
Farmers' revenue must be assured. We should preserve the 
agrarian structure of the family farming businesses typical of 
30 Bavaria, which produce high quality food and cultivate our 
unique cultural landscape [Kulturlandschaft]. 
We are showing the red card to the red-green coalition's 
'chaos politics' in Boon 
Chancellor Schroder came up with the motto: "Not all different, 
35 but a lot better". We now know that the federal government 
does everything worse. Instead of tackling necessary reforms it 
is bringing back the old, and it sells out on German interests in 
40 Europe. This team facing relegation deserves only one thing on 
the 13th of June; the red card. 
Eastern enlargement requires far-sightedness and 
perceptiveness 
Eastern enlargement is in Bavaria, Germany and Europe's 
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45 political and economic interests. In order to avoid problems in 
agriculture and in the jobs market, especially in the border 
so: 
. I 
·regions of Bavaria, a transitional period is required. 
Western Christian values must remain the leading culture 
[Leitkultur] 
We are opposed to the illusion of a multicultural society. Due to 
insufficient integration and homogeneity, it endangers stability 
and internal · peace within Europe. Western Christian culture 
must remain the guiding culture in Europe. 
·we guarantee unified, coherent policies 
ss·;... , , The success of our modem policies in Bavaria and at the federal 
· · )evelshow that ·We are right. Our conception of politics, which 
• '•' I 
consi~ts of expertise, closeness to the citizen and the linking of 
. traditio~: with; modernity, is a general model not only for 
Bavaria,\ but for all of Europe . 
::·. 60 {·:· .: .· The Europ.ean parliament must become a counterweight in 
Europe;· 
I · • · Giv'en ·the : majority of socialists in the member state 
· . governments, we need the European parliament, which has 
·.I : :. • ',. become··: a· eo-legislator with equal rights, to be a Christian 
democrat; citizens' 
65. c·ounter-pole. That's only possible with a strong CSU. 
I,' 
· ·.· ,· ·', This summary of CSU policy on the EU, published in the week 
. · pre~eding the: European election, exemplifies the party's Bavaria-, . 
centred iapproach to 'questions of European integration. 23 The very first ... 
·. point,\ makes· this· clear, with its, pledge to make European policy 
su~oi~inate ·.to, Bavarian interests (lines 5-6). The word choice -
.>' .. credible; successfully, strong and experienced (lines 5-7) - sums up the 
. •' . 
CSU~s: self-image: The party presents itself as a champion and 
guardian (line 4, line 8), reinforcing the image it seeks to create of 
itself as a trustworthy and competent Bavarian emissary to Europe. 
This theme conti.nues with a more wide-ranging, but still resolutely 
self-centred appraisal of the European project in point two (line 1 0). 
National and regional rights are presented as potentially in conflict 
23 Bayernkurier, 5'h June 1999. The German original of this text is reproduced in 
Appendix 11. 
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with integration (lines 10-11 ). The solidarity referred to here is not 
European, but instead anchors the party unequivocally within the 
Bavarian and German contexts which are at the centre of its vision of 
the EU (lines 12-13). It seems that the protection of identity must guide 
and limit further integration above other economic or political 
considerations (lines 13-14). Readers are left in no doubt that the 
party's loyalty lies with them as Bavarians as opposed to with Europe. 
The text constructs a rhetorical binary of 'citizens versus Europe', 
somewhat surprising perhaps for an avowedly pro-European party. 
As the third point illustrates, the CSU wishes to be seen as the 
party which can still voter anxieties regarding obscure European 
machinations (line 15). There is no hesitation to show the EU in a bad 
light by mentioning the Commission scandal so early in the text. The 
party does not identify with EU institutions but instead shows wariness 
of them (lines 16-17), thus replicating a common voter attitude towards 
the EU in geneNll. This links up with the theme of the reliable and 
experienced champion of Bavarian interests which returns in point 
four. It is supplemented with the party's by now familiar assertion that 
there is no serious alternative to it in the political arena, whether it be 
that of Bavaria or the EU (lines 23-26). Point six backs up this claim 
with topical examples of alleged 'chaos politics' on the part of the 
German federal government. This alludes to the CSU's influential role 
in a third political arena (lines 32-33). 
References to Gerhard Schroder, the federal government and 
topical political debates in Germany are not strictly relevant to the 
European context. However, the election is explicitly being presented 
here as an opinion poll on the German government's performance. The 
rhetoric used is populist and simplistic; the government's policies are 
simply characterised as chaotic (line 33), everything they do is 
portrayed as bad (line 36), and voters are urged to act in terms of 
football metaphors (lines 40-41 ). In general, however, the text does 
engage with a range of European issues, from the guiding principles for 
future integration, through reform of the Commission, to the question 
of eastern enlargement. It is also admitted that "difficult European 
problems" remain to be solved (line 26). Thus, the text is not a polemic 
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for or against the process of European integration as such. It is taken as 
read that the EU is a worthwhile project, and a pragmatic approach is 
favoured. The text's treatment of specific aspects of European policy 
does something to tackle the abstract nature of many EU issues to 
voters and to bolster the party's claim to have expertise in European 
matters. 
Continuing to illustrate that the CSU does not shy away from 
contemporary European issues, point five tackles the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) (lines 27-31). The relatively prominent 
position given to the issue of agriculture is motivated by primarily 
domestic and not European considerations, however. Indeed, it is 
intended to reassure farmers, an important Bavarian interest group and 
a traditional source of CSU support, that European integration will not 
endanger their livelihoods. The treatment of the theme of agriculture, 
then, is more symbolic than informative; the party's proposals for 
reform of the CAP are not even alluded to. Instead, the text emphasises 
the importance of the sector as representative of Bavaria's cultural 
landscape (line 31 ). The farming community is a small but vocal 
minority in Bavarian politics and also the archetype of Bavarian 
Catholic conservatism. Consequently, rural life is a marker of 
traditional Bavarian identity and a potent symbol for neo-nationalists 
to exploit strategically. This is vividly portrayed in the concept of 
Kulturlandschaft, which also often accompanies evocations of the 
Heimat in party rhetoric. This term conjures up images of the Land's 
uniqueness and the breadth of its culture, embodied in the beauty of.. the 
Bavarian countryside. Point seven, which addresses eastern 
enlargement, has a similar domestic focus (lines 42-4 7). These points 
illustrate the instrumentality of the CSU's pro-European stance to its 
neo-nationalist ideology. Prime minister Stoiber's rapid image 
transformation from EMU-sceptic to a committed supporter of 
European integration for the purposes of the election campaign is 
another case in point. 24 
Points eight and nine seek to apply the party's ideological 
interpretation of Bavarian and German society to Europe in general, 
24 See chapter seven for a fuller discussion of this point. 
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prompting the rather implausible assertion that European society is not 
multicultural. In fact, point eight introduces another domestic issue 
disguised as a -European question. The references to homogeneity, 
stability and internal peace should accordingly be understood in terms 
of the German immigration debate, which will be discussed further in 
section three below. The CSU considers that to accept Germany's 
multicultural nature would endanger social peace, and sets its 
requirements for the naturalisation of immigrants accordingly. In order 
that the German 'leading culture' remain undiluted, it holds the view 
that the acceptance of German constitutional principles, a grasp of the 
German language and active participation in German society should be 
preconditions for the acquisition of citizenship. Despite inherent 
difficulties, the text introduces the concept of 'leading culture' into the 
European arena (line 48). This immediately raises the question as to 
how a shared western, Christian culture can be reconciled with the 
party's defence of European diversity, emphasised in point two of the 
text. Returning •to the original German case, only the idea of shared 
constitutional principles can plausibly be transposed to the European 
arena.25 The EU's requirement that its member states be democratic 
springs to mind as an example. The concept of Leitkultur is used here 
to assert that a certain degree of European homogeneity must be 
preserved. To be sure, the terms 'western' and 'Christian' are at least 
as exclusive as inclusive; Muslim, Arab and other non-European 
cultures are explicitly excluded. 
The CSU asserts the existence of a set of fundamental 
principles and values, however exclusive, which transcend the 
individuality of member states. This amounts to an expression of party 
support for a form of integration which goes beyond economic co-
operation. In turn, the European project must be formulated in terms 
that are compatible with the nationalist core of CSU ideology. This is 
made explicit in point nine of the text, in which the CSU confidently 
states that its Weltanschauung, the 'correctness' of which has been 
vouched for by Bavarian voters, should be applied generally at the 
European level (lines 55-59). Coupled to the pragmatic principles of 
25 Interviewees also· cited the rule of law and respect for human rights as components 
in the CSU's concept of western Christian culture, but the import of these principles 
is far from fixed. 
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expertise and closeness to the citizen IS the party's trademark 
combination of tradition and modernity (line 58). Its ideology is 
deemed to be worthy of export if only to save the EU from left-wing 
control, completing the CSU's transformation from a protector of the 
ordinary citizen to a beacon of conservative values in Europe (lines 62-
65). A confrontational tone can thus once again be detected in the 
portrayal of the European Union as a den of socialists (due to the 
currently high proportion of member states with left-of-centre 
governments.) 
Franz Josef StrauB's oft-repeated interpretation of integration as 
the guarantor of European freedom and peace remains a basic principle 
of CSU policy today. 26 StrauB was at pains to contrast this vision with 
Eastern European socialism. The title of the 1979 European manifesto, 
for instance, read; "A free future, no to socialism".27 Although this 
aspect has been toned down somewhat since the end of the Cold War, 
point ten shows how the underlying confrontation between a socialist 
and conservative Weltanschauung was adapted and revived in the 1999 
election campaign. The vote itself is presented in the text as a choice 
between a socialist and a Christian democratic vision of Europe (lines 
64-65).28 In general, the favourite CSU theme of Biirgernahe, or 
closeness to the people, was juxtaposed to the centralism and high 
levels of bureaucracy allegedly characteristic of socialist government. 29 
This is mentioned in point nine of the text (line 57), and constituted an 
important theme in the European campaign as a whole. European 
parliamentary candidate Alexander Radwan summed up the tone o£ the 
26 "Europe's essence is freedom, Europe's task is peace!" ["Europas Wesen ist die 
Freiheit, Europas Aufgabe ist der Friede!"] From a speech by Franz Josef Strauf3 to a 
CSU European congress, 19th May 1984. . 
27 ["Zukunft in Freiheit, Nein zum Sozialismus."] References to "collectivist false 
doctrine, totalitarian ideologies and false doctrines of salvation" ["kollektivistische 
Irrlehren [ ... ] totalWire Ideologien [und] falsche Heilslehren"] crop up frequently in 
the body of the manifesto. CSU European Manifesto, 1979. 
28 A brochure published by CSU MEPs in February 1999 described a vote for the 
CSU in the European election as a decision against a left-wing Europe. 
["Richtungsentschied gegen linkes Europa".] 
29 In his European election campaign leaflet, the CSU candidate Bernd Posselt 
declared himself to be in favour of a free and Christian Europe and against the 
predominance of socialism; ["Fi.ir ein freies und christliches Europa, gegen ein 
sozialistisches Obergewicht".] 
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rhetoric in his election leaflet; "I am for a Europe of citizens, not for a 
Europe of bureaucrats". 30 
--
1A strong Bavaria for Europe' 
The party's overall slogan for the European elections was 
'Bayern stark for Europa ' translated as 'A strong Bavaria for Europe'. 
In a similar way to points nine and ten of the text, it exudes self-
confidence in its affirmation that Bavaria's strength can be put to good 
use in furthering the European project. The juxtaposition of Bavaria 
with the attribute of strength is one which permeates much of CSU 
rhetoric. This is underlined by the subtitle to the CSU logo which was 
to be found on all European campaign materials and in line 2 of the 
text; 'CSU- die Kraft, die bewegt', translated as 'CSU - the force that 
moves'. Although the verb - which has the same range of meaning in 
both English and German - refers primarily to the ability to get things 
done, the altetmitive sense of something that is emotionally moving 
should not be neglected. Indeed, the slogan succinctly renders the 
'emotional-economic' character of CSU rhetoric. As 'the force that 
moves', the CSU pledges to continue working for the Land, reinforcing 
the idea of progress which is prominent in its rhetoric. 
The European campaign slogan "A strong Bavaria for Europe" 
uses the word for to convey a spiritual appeal. Indeed, for can be 
interpreted to mean 'for the European cause', thereby suggesting that 
Bavaria's strength has a purpose. In turn, this can be linked to the 
party's understanding of the European project as a means of achieving 
peace in Europe. The slogan presents Bavaria as a protector of the EU 
and its ideals in a way which may be out of proportion to the Land's 
actual influence, but serves the rhetorical purpose of making the voter 
feel at once secure and empowered in European affairs. A measure of 
self-importance flows from the self-confidence permeating the party's 
rhetoric. In keeping with this, the European project is presented as an 
inspiring higher goal in which all can share. The slogan also plays on 
the idiomatic German phrase 'sich fur etwas stark machen ', which 
means to promote something enthusiastically. In an attempt to 
overcome apatny towards European matters, voters - addressed as a 
30 ("lch bin ftir ein Europa der BUrger und nicht der Btirokraten".] 
198 
. . 
nation- are urged to invest in the European cause. The link to the 
forward-looking phrase 'sich stark machen' imbues the slogan with a 
constructive dynamism which complements the positive portrayal of 
Bavaria as strong. Finally, the European campaign slogan is nationalist 
in that it assumes the reader will identify with Bavaria and feel spoken 
to directly as a member of the nation. Bavaria, portrayed as a strong, 
united· entity,· is: used as shorthand for the electorate and for its 
participation in the national mobilisation/or Europe. 
If the dual themes of tradition and progress attempt to situate 
· . the, CSU's ·strategy· iri: time, then its ideological interpretations of 
Bav.aria and ·Europe can be seen as the spatial counterpart. The core 
principle .of CSU, ideology focuses on Bavarian self-determination, 
· V{hereas :the:EU,I emerges ;as .a peripheral principle gravitating around 
·. the: · prioritisation i of/ Bavarian interests. Both are portrayed as 
: . complementary. aspects of csu ideology rather than as irreconcilable 
. . 
opposites.· StrauB's rendering of the relationship was that; "Politics for 
. · Bavaria does not me·an the same as politics in Bavaria".31 Despite a 
.. generally positive,attitude towards the EU, CSU rhetoric becomes 
defensive when .the preservation of Bavarian culture and autonomy is 
at stake. .·What· is more, the party is not afraid to criticise certain 
aspects of the integration process. This illustrates to what extent the 
. party's strategy vis-a-vis Europe is ultimately subordinate to its core 
ideological i goal· of preserving Bavarian Eigenstaatlichkeit, literally 
translated into English as ·'sovereignty'. Sharing sovereignty in certain 
areas is found to be expedient by the party, but it actively demands-the 
. retention, of many/ of its existing . competencies. The CSU articulates 
· this igoal iin terms ·of the Bavarian Heimat. However, it remains to be 
· seen to whafextent:·the party's understanding of the term Heimat can 
be equated· to··, a. nationalist· interpretation of the nation. In order to 
answer this question, the next section will examine the history of the 
concept and its usage in CSU rhetoric. 
31 ["Politikfor Bayem ist nicht gleichbedeutend mit Politik in Bayem."] Franz Josef 
StrauB, quoted by Edmund Stoiber in a speech commemorating the 1 01h anniversary 
of StrauB 's death on 3rd October 1998. 
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Ill The Bavarian Heimat 
By rhetorically relating the CSU to the Land of Bavaria, the 
party is attempting to make the ideological linkage of a politically 
neutral Bavarian identity and a vote for the party appear common 
sense. For instance, a great deal of CSU rhetoric hinges on an appeal to 
love for the Bavarian Heimat. 32 Further, the economic strength of the 
Land is underlined, and linked to fifty years of CSU government. This 
consolidates the illusion that these aspects of Bavarian society and the 
CSU's place within it form a logical, durable whole as opposed to an 
ideologically shaped, temporary formation open to question and 
change. Further, it will be shown that the prioritisation and 
politicisation of the Heimat much resembles the strategy employed by 
nationalist ideologues. The concept is symbolic of the party's 
ideological vision of Bavaria, and can thus be construed as shorthand 
for its core goal of preserving Bavarian autonomy. In turn, this core is 
combined with 'a range of peripheral principles with which it might at 
first seem incompatible, such as support for European integration.33 
Another apparent contradiction is the coupling of traditional and 
modernising elements in the CSU's ideology by means of references 
both to love for Bavarian traditions and an innovative economic 
programme. This combination of conservatism and progress is 
undoubtedly facilitated by the concept of Heimat which, as Alon 
Confino has demonstrated in his historical survey of the term's 
meaning, at once "glorified the past and celebrated modernity".34 
Confino goes on to point out that by the turn of the twentieth century, 
the Heimat was portrayed visually as an idealised combination of 
cityscape and landscape, thus emphasising "the coexistence of local 
and national identities and the reciprocity between tradition and 
modemity". 35 The preceding text analyses can be cited as evidence that 
the CSU interprets the concept of the Heimat in the san1c way. 
32 Cf. C. Sutherland Nation, Heimat, Vaterland; The Reinvention of Concepts by the 
Bavarian CSU Party. 
33 "At first sight, one might think that Europeanisation and regionalisation were 
opposing, even conp-adictory developments." E. Huber in T. Waigel (ed.) Unsere 
Zukunft heil3t Europa p. 100. 
34 A. Confino Nation as a Local Metaphor p. 121. 
35 Ibid. p. 122. 
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In his book entitled 'Nation as a Local Metaphor', Confino 
identifies the need for a study tracing the process of 'imagining' a 
nation. 36 Based on an exegesis of printed texts and images produced in 
Germany between 1871 and 1914, his own study achieves this aim by 
charting how the definition of the term Heimat was gradually widened 
to mean not only the locality, but also the nation. From being a 
mediating concept between local life and the abstract nation, Confino 
demonstrates that the Heimat came to symbolise Germany as a whole, 
until the conception of deutsche Heimat became corrupted by Nazi 
ideology. However, Celia Applegate points out that the concept was 
"pulled out of the rubble of the Nazi Reich as a victim, not a 
perpetrator" and came to embody once more the local patriotism which 
had been discouraged by Nazism. 37 Both authors are of the view that 
the Heimat, as a symbolic haven of peace and thus the antithesis of 
war, was an apolitical focus of solidarity.38 As such, it became a 
vehicle for "speaking the unspeakable" horror of the Third Reich in 
order to transcend it. 39 The following section aims to build on these 
studies by illustrating the way in which the CSU then appropriated the 
concept of Heimat for its own political ends. The party's articulation of 
the term sets out to equate the Heimat with a national construct in 
much the same way as Confino shows to have been the case before the 
First World War. However, in the CSU's case, the national construct in 
question is more localised than Germany as a whole. Indeed, it will be 
shown that the CSU has interpreted the Heimat to correspond to 
Bavaria and politicised the concept in order to further its core goal of 
Bavarian autonomy. To quote Alo~ Confino once more; "What makes 
the Heimat idea so interesting is that it reveals the profundity of the 
national idea". 40 
The CSU has attempted to present the twelve years of Nazi rule 
as a tragic hiatus in Bavarian state tradition and continue a process of 
36 Cf. B. Anderson Imagined Communities. 
37 C. A pp legate Heimat; A Nation of Provincials p. 228. 
38 "The Heimat idea was not connected to one political party [ ... ] it was open to 
appropriations by various political movements. Its political message was implicit and 
ambiguous". A. Confino Nation as a Local Metaphor p. 187. 
39 C. A pp legate Heimat; A Nation of Provincials p. 228. 
40 A. Confino Nation as a Local Metaphor p. 214. 
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nation-building which began with ·the creation of the Bavarian 
Monarchy in 1806.41 The party derives its vision of Bavaria from a 
historical myth ~f statehood, territorial continuity and a democratic 
state of law which also recognises internal diversity. Particularly 
important to it is the preservation of Bavaria's long-standing, though 
limited, legislative sovereignty and administrative autonomy.42 The 
CSU chooses to express . this politically not in demands for full 
independence, but by making its : presence · felt within the federal 
republic of Germany. Indeed, in government the party follows a 
Bavarian historical trend · iri 'its spirited defence of the rights of the 
German Liinder. Without ever· demanding independence, the CSU has 
sought to preserve the· maximup1 .degree· of 'State sovereignty possible. 
In this sense it can be considered a contemporary nationalist party, for 
. '' 
to describe only moveJJ:lents ;demanding 'a ·sovereign state as nationalist ' 
is anachronisti~. 43 The history/O~!the CSU is closely intertwined with 
post-war Bavari;;t. lndeed,1 .iri iCSU rhetoric, .the party itself is used to . ·' . ' . . ' . 
symbolise'a sense ofBavarian belonging.-Jt·even imputes recognition 
of its Bavarian character and achievements to voters for other parties.44 
A comparison with·. the· ~ntegrative·, function of i~entifying with a 
monarch would not be exaggerated.• The late Franz Josef Strauf3, long-
time leader of the csu and probably the man who most influenced the 
party's direction and image, ,was mourned in a spectacular ceremony to 
41 "The period of Nazi rule did: ·not fully sever. our people from its history and its 
traditions". ["Die NS-Zeit [ ... ] hat unse·r Yolk [: .. ] nichtvollig von seiner Geschichte 
: und seinen Traditionen getrennt".] From a ~peech by Franz Josef StrauB celebrating 
forty years ofthe CSU in Munich on 19'h September 1985 . 
. 
42 "Bavarian sovereignty is· the political ·protector of the Bavarian way of life [ ... ] 
Bavaria, the oldest German state and one of the oldest states in Europe, should never · 
be allowed to sink to the level of a' m~re administrative province". ["Den politischen 
Schutz und Schirm ftir. dies~s bayerische Le ben bildet · die bayerische 
Eigenstaatlichkeit [ ... ] Bayem,. der alteste deutsche Staat und einer der altesten 
Staaten Europas darf niemals zu einer bloBen Verwaltungsprovinz absinken".] From 
a speech by Max Streibl in Munich on 61h July ·1990. 
43 Many neo-nationalist movements, in Catalonia and Wales for instance, campaign 
for a degree of autonomy more suited to current regionalising and globalising 
tendencies. 
44 In the run-up to the 1999 European election; Stoiber reported the results of a 
survey in which it was asked which party protects Bavaria's cultural traditions and 
autonomy in an int~rating Europe.· Allegedly, more than 80% replied that it was the 
CSU, including 77% of SPD voters. The question is indeed highly suggestive of the 
answer; as a conservative party the CSU is generally associated with the preservation 
of tradition and Bavarian autonomy. 
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rival that of King Ludwig II of Bavaria in its display of pomp and 
public grief.45 
The CSU asserts the existence of a Bavarian 'imagined 
community', and uses historical myths to back up this claim in its 
rhetoric. The Bavarian constitution refers to one thousand years of 
history, but this has since been overtaken by more impressive party 
estimates; CSU politicians now talk of one thousand five hundred or 
even two thousand years of historical continuity.46 However, this 
alludes to what is known as Altbayern, or old Bavaria. Ruled by the 
Wittelsbach princes since the twelfth century, it is historically less 
fragmented than the regions of Franconia to the north and Swabia to 
the west, which also belong to the modem Bavarian state. In this way, 
certain elements of history are selectively 'forgotten' and others 
'remembered' with an ideological goal in mind. As the scholar of 
nationalism Emest Gellner concluded, the answer to his playful 
question "Do nations have navels?" was in fact immaterial, since the 
characteristics of a nation necessarily depend on the modem 
reinterpretation of history.47 In this way, the CSU politically mobilises 
some aspects of Bavarian history over others, such as Bavaria's 
experience of soviet rule! What makes the party's ideology nationalist, 
however, is that Bavaria remains its central organising principle. The 
CSU rhetorically expresses love for the Bavarian Heimat and the need 
to preserve and defend it in much the same way as nationalists 
prioritise the nation. An examination of the difficulty of articulating the 
concept of Nation in Germany will clarify the CSU's reasons ... for 
privileging Heimat as a focus for political mobilisation.48 
45 Further, Franz Josef Strauf3 's reputation outside Bavaria is an indicator of his 
success in bringing Bavarians together. An uncommonly popular politician and 
prime minister in his homeland, he was regarded as dangerous and reactionary by 
many in the rest of Germany. 
46 "Next year we will celebrate 1500 years of Bavarian statehood [ ... ] We are one of 
the oldest states in Europe and we will self-confidently make our voice heard in 
Bonn and in Europe". ["Wir feiem im nachsten Jahr 1500 Jahre bayerische 
Staatlichkeit [ ... ] Wir sind einer der altesten Staaten in Europa, und wir werden 
selbstbewuf3t unsere Stimme erheben in Bonn und in Europa".] From a speech by 
Max Streibl on Ash Wednesday 1992, printed in the Bayernkurier, 141h March 1992. 
47 E. Gellner Nationalism Ch. 15. 
48 For a reading of the term Heimat from the perspective of cultural studies see D. 
Morley & K. Robins 'No place like Heimat: Images of Home(land) in European 
Culture' and J. Peck 'Rac(e)ing the Nation: Is there a German 'Home?" in G. Eley & 
R. Suny (eds.) Becoming National: A Reader. 
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Although the CSU is termed nationalist for the purposes of the 
present theoretical discussion, in tenns of the party's own ideology, 
Bavaria is not a nation and the CSU is not a nationalist party. When we 
consider the degree of disrepute into which the tenns Nation and 
Vaterland had fallen by 1945, it is evident that any attempt to 
rehabilitate or redefine them would have been counterproductive, at 
least in the short tenn. An attempt by German writers, academics and 
politicians to do just that in 1971 revealed to what extent pejorative 
connotations continued to cling to the concepts.49 According to 
Friedrich Roth; 
The disavowal of one's own national tradition, the delegitimisation of 
nationalism as a result of one's own history were also fundamental. It 
goes without saying that National Socialism, interpreted as a lesson on 
the inhuman results extreme nationalism can lead to, is being alluded 
to here. 50 
• 
Klaus Weigelt, editor of a book of texts arguing for the 
rehabilitation of the concept of patriotism in Gennany, refers to 
Vaterland and Nation as "sullied concepts."51 He proposes a return to 
pre-Nazi interpretations which differ sharply from connotations of 
superiority, hatred and conquest.52 Even in this academic context, 
however, the term Nationalismus is considered to be irrevocably 
associated with power and expansion. The gist of the argument is to 
compare and contrast it with a positive, healthy patriotism, which in 
turn is linked to the relatively unencumbered concept of Heimat. 
Patriotism grows from the smaller unit, from the family, the Heimat, 
the region [ ... ] Nationalism has a fixation for size, it wants the greater 
nation, the powerful state, a wide Lebensraum [ ... ] Patriotism has more 
to do with having one's heart at peace. 53 
49 The transcript of the discussion, in which well-known writers such as Heinrich 
Boil and Giinter Grass participated, is published in A. Mischerlich & K. Kalow (eds.) 
Hauptworte- Hauptsache. Heimat, Nation. 
5° F. Roth Die Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs p.2 I. 
51 K. Weigelt (ed.) Patriotismus in Europa p. 4. 
52 Cf. "Cosmopolitanism and patriotism are not opposites. He who is at home and 
rooted in his own land will understand and respect his neighbour's patriotism". R. 
von Weizsacker, cited inK. Waigelt (ed.) Patriotismus in Europa p. IO. 
53 Ibid. p. I 3 
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Triibners German dictionary, published during the Third Reich, 
clearly separates the definitions of Heimat and Vaterland as they were 
then understood; 
[Heimat] differs from the more recent word Vaterland to the extent that 
it has no political meaning [ ... ] Heimat can therefore be employed in 
relation to animals and even plants. 54 
A definition of Heimat, taken from a dictionary published in 1959, 
begins as follows; 
Heimat in its original, non-figurative sense is anywhere where people 
favour a small world, albeit one representing a complete way of life 
[Lebensganzheit], over all others and experience all other worlds as 
more or less foreign. 55 
The entry then goes on to mention Bavaria expressly, but only to 
exclude it from the definition of Heimat. Bavaria is described as a 
polity created through human agency, to which an apolitical concept 
such as Heimat cannot be linked. Instead, Heimat is associated with a 
more organic presence, a symbiosis of land and people independent of 
historical power-games. It can be concluded that the concept of Heimat 
was a politically unarticulated element in German both before and after 
the Second World War. By the 1950s, however, the CSU had already 
appropriated the term for its own ideological purposes. 
The Concept of Nation 
The word Nation did not disappear from German political 
culture following the Second World War, although a glance at titles of 
books written on the subject suffices to illustrate the difficult 
relationship of Germans to the concept.56 Both the CDU and CSU 
derived their understanding of the Nation from a state-nation modelled 
on Bismarck's Reich. They believed that cultural criteria were 
54 Cited in A. Mischerlich & K. Kalow (eds.) Hauptworte-Hauptsache. Heimat, 
Nation 
ss Staatslexikon der Gorres - Gesellschaft. Cited in A. Mischerlich & K. Kalow ( eds.) 
Hauptworte-Hauptsache. Heimat, Nation The current definition of Heimat to be 
found in the Duden dictionary is also apolitical. 
56 For instance; H-J. Maaz The Fallen People, A. Peisl & A. Mohler (eds.) The 
German Neurosis and B. Ortmeyer Arguments against the German National Anthem 
(my translations). 
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insufficient markers of nationhood and that a nation had to be 
encapsulated in a state. For this reason, the CSU could not and would 
not support any--recognition of Germany's division and took legal steps 
to ensure that the political realisation of a united nation remained 
possible. 57 In 1973 the party, then in opposition, took a stand to defend 
what it considered to be an attack on its articulation of the concept of 
Nation. As a consequence of German chancellor Willi Brandt's 
Ostpolitik, the government was in the process of negotiating bilateral 
treaties with Eastern Bloc countries, including the DDR. The CSU 
feared that recognition of East German sovereignty would seal the 
division of Germany and dash hopes of eventual reunification, or the 
restoration of the state to the German nation. The Bavarian 
government, on Franz Josef Straul3's insistence, took the case to the 
German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. 58 The Constitutional Court 
supported the CSU's interpretation in its declaration that deutsche 
Nation should be a synonym for deutsche Staatsvolk. According to the 
• 
court, to regard the German nation as merely a linguistic and cultural 
community would be detrimental to the constitutional goal of the 
political reunification of Germany. Consequently, Brandt's treaty was 
judged to be constitutional only if interpreted according to these 
principles. 
The belief in the need for state and nation to coincide also 
forms the official basis of the CSU's policy on immigration. At the 
same time, however, the recent debate in Germany surrounding the 
question of dual citizenship highlights the fact that the criterion of 
descent still constitutes a national marker as important as language, 
culture and subjective feelings of belonging.59 This interpretation of 
national membership is shared by the CSU, as is borne out by a 
57 "We will never accept the nonsensical theory of two German states". ["Wir werden 
nie der Unfug der Theorie von zwei deutschen Staaten annehmen".] From a speech 
by Franz Josef Strauf3 to the CSU Europa-Forum in Munich on 61h April I 979. 
58 At the time, the CSU was not supported by the CDU in this. However, the 
continuing existence of a single German citizenship came into its own with the fall of 
the Berlin Wall by allowing the rapid legal integration of East Germans into West 
Germany and thus precipitating German reunification in 1990. For a fuller account of 
the CDU/CSU and the SPD's diverging theoretical understandings of the German 
nation, see F. Roth Die Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs. 
59 Rogers Brubaker"' traces the development of the ethnic concept of citizenship in 
Germany, where CSU policy finds its roots, from the nineteenth century onwards. R. 
Brubaker Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. 
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comparison of its attitude towards the ethnic Germans who arrived en 
masse in Bavaria from Czechoslovakia at the end of the Second World 
War, and its policy on the acquisition of German citizenship by foreign 
immigrants. The former, as well as ethnic German immigrants who 
continue to come to Germany from Eastern Europe, are deemed to 
possess a right of residence by virtue of their descent. However, 
chancellor Gerhard Schroder's plan to introduce automatic dual 
citizenship for children born in Germany of foreign parents triggered a 
petition by the CDU/CSU against this measure in 1999.60 The party's 
justification for this stance is revealing. Dual citizenship for 
immigrants is deemed unacceptable as it can only encourage divided 
loyalties, suggesting that the CSU's understanding of national loyalty 
is of a deep-rooted, quasi-religious feeling of belonging, rather than the 
mere exercise of citizenship rights. 
One cannot see why somebody who happens to live here for eight 
years, somebody who doesn't even speak the German language 
properly, should immediately become German and concurrently retain 
his old citizenship as well [ ... ] Just as I cannot be Protestant and 
Catholic at once, neither can I as a rule have two loyalties 
concurrently.61 
According to the CSU, citizenship must be deserved, hurdles must be 
crossed and the candidate will be deemed worthy according to his or 
her readiness to leave past loyalties behind. Ghettoisation is presented 
as the only alternative to this form of assimilation. 
The CSU insists that foreigners should integrate fully into 
German society by recognisirtg its fundamental constitutional 
60 The petition was a success, gathering over five million signatures in the first few 
months of 1999. The law was eventually modified and children who acquire dual 
nationality thus are now required to opt for one or the other by their twenty-third 
birthday. Cf. S. Green Beyond Ethnoculturalism? German Citizenship in the New 
Millennium. 
61 ["Es ist daher nicht einzusehen, daf3 jemand, der hier zufallig acht Jahre lebt, daf3 
jemand, der nicht einmal die deutsche Sprache vemtinftig spricht, gleich Deutscher 
werden und zudem gleichzeitig seine alte Staatsbtirgerschaft behalten soli [ ... ] 
Genausowenig wie ich evangelisch und katholisch sein kann, genausowenig kann ich 
generell gleichzeitig doppelte LoyaliHiten haben".] From a speech by Stoiber on 17'h 
February 1999, Ash Wednesday of that year. For historical reasons, speeches made at 
the party rally held on this day traditionally use more direct and simple rhetoric than 
conventional political debate. They are thus a good gauge of the CSU's fundamental 
beliefs. 
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principles, mastering the language and actively participating In 
community activities.62 Thus, the party resists the idea of 
multiculturalism., expressed in their repeated denial that Germany is an 
Einwanderungsland, or country of immigration. 63 This term represents 
the antithesis of the relatively homogeneous nation-state which the 
CSU wishes to preserve, at least in its rhetoric. Germany actually has a 
high proportion of foreign resid~nts and its multicultural character, 
particularly in the big cities, is hard to ignore. The party's fundamental 
distaste for a multi cultural· Germany is· justified officially with 
reference to constitutional principles: which clearly make the link 
between preserving German . national:. ·.·identity · and limiting 
immigration.64 Edmund Stoiber has express.ed himself thus; 
Talk of a multicultural society tears up the._ very roots of our national 
and cultural identity, develop·ed ·over:·centuries.-65 ;. 
·' 
. . '' . 
Consequently, the CSU's u~derst~ding of.belo~ging to the German 
•• ' • • 1' ' 
nation is quite different :to; the' model: of; 'constitutional patriotism' 
developed by the left-wing Germ.an philosopher Jiirgen Habermas, for 
instance.66 However,. the debate surrounding this question has been 
62 "To be German means to identify with our historically developed society, our 
culture and system of values. This. cannot be achieved with divided loyalty to two 
states. And this cannot be achieved without identifying with history, culture and 
values. Our policy is as follows;· citizenship cannot be given away, citizenship must 
be internally acquired". ["Deutscher zu sein, das heillt, sich mit unserer geschichtlich 
gewachsenen Gesellschaft, unserer Kulttir und Wertordnung zu identifizieren. Dies 
kann nicht erreicht werden bei ·geteilten Loyalitiiten zu zwei Staaten. Und dies kann 
nicht erreicht werden ohne Identifikation mit Geschichte, Kultur und Werten. Unsere 
Position ist: Staatsangehorigkeit kann man' ··nicht. verschenken, Staatsangehorigkeit 
muB man innerlich erwerben".] From Stoiber's inaugural speech to the Bavarian 
parliament on 29'h October 1998. . . .. . . . . 
63 Multiculturalism has been defm~d as follows.;· ~'The foreigners retain their cultural 
and national identity[ ... ] There is only partial assimilation in the cognitive and social 
spheres as well as in social status; identifi~atory assimilation does not take place". G. 
Schwertfeder, cited in F. Roth Die Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs p.327. 
64 As a result of a "constitutional responsibility towards the German nation" Germany 
cannot "due to its history and the way it regards itself be or become a country of 
immigration". Extract from a 1982 resolution of the CSU/CDU parliamentary group, 
cited in F. Roth Die Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs p. 324. 
65 Printed in die Welt of 25th February 1989. Cited in F. Roth Die Idee der Nation im 
politischen Diskurs p. 330. · 
66 This model posits a high degree of democratic interaction and influence on social 
affairs by a diversity of actors who may onlyhave the basic 'rules of the game' in 
common. Unsurprisingly, this is considered too risky an approach by a conservative 
party intent on preserving society's traditions and identity from dilution through 
multiculturalism. Cf. J. Habermas 'The European Nation-State - Its Achievements 
and Its Limits' in G. Balakrishnan (ed.) Mapping the Nation. 
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deliberately non-emotive. It emphasises instead the danger of friction 
and racism caused by too much immigration. Even measured appeals 
to national patriotism, a legitimate tool of political rhetoric,. would 
have triggered accusations of racism and allusions to Germany's Nazi 
past.67 
The Concept of Heimat 
The tendency in CSU rhetoric to put Germany's existence as a 
state before that as a community is illustrated by the categorisation of 
the Nation and the Heimat. The relationship to Germany is presented 
as a pragmatic one. Contrary to love for the Heimat, the CSU attempts 
to link the German Vaterland to a sense of responsibility. Vaterland is 
often substituted for Nation as a somewhat less loaded term, in that it 
does not immediately conjure up associations with extreme right-wing 
nationalism. This sense of duty is conveyed using rational as opposed 
to emotional rhetoric. It corresponds to the party's understanding of its 
place in German politics; showing reliability in coalition and solidarity 
towards other Liinder, but single-mindedness in its defence of Bavarian 
interests.68 When the CSU refers to the German Vaterland, then, it is in 
a context denuded of emotional or rousing rhetoric. Edmund Stoiber 
continues to recognise Germany as his nation but no love, rhetorical or 
otherwise, is lost between him and it. Instead, these feelings are 
reserved for appeals to the Bavarian Heimat. 69 The mood in CSU 
rhetoric vis-a-vis the German construct is one of pragmatic acceptance, 
as long as the continued autonomy of the Bavarian state is guarante~d; 
67 Roth reports that a comment of Stoiber•s regarding multiculturalism made at a 
press conference in 1988 had to be withdrawn because the terms used - "durchmischt 
and durchraf3t" - smacked of vocabulary used during the Third Reich. F. Roth Die 
Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs p. 332. 
68 "The CSU must retain its unmistakeable features in the party structur~ of the 
German federal republic as a Bavarian regional party with Germany-wide 
responsibility and European objectives!" ["Die Christlich-Soziale Union muf3 im 
Parteiengeftige der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ihr unverwechselbares Gesicht als 
bayerische Landespartei mit bundesweiter Verantwortung und mit europaischer 
Zielsetzung behalten!"] From a speech by Franz Josef Strauf3 celebrating forty years 
of the CSU in Munich on 22"d November 1985. 
69 This has long been the case in CSU rhetoric. Treml quotes the CSU politician and 
then Bavarian prime minister William Hoegner as saying in 1945; "Our reason says 
Germany, but our heart belongs to Bavaria". In 1949, then prime minister Ehard 
rejected the German Basic Law for not being federal enough with the words "No to 
the Basic Law, Yes to Germany". M. Treml Geschichte des Modemen Bayern pp. 
392&419. 
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There are sixteen regional capital cities - but Berlin is certainly first 
among equals. Were I no longer to accept this, then I would no longer 
accept the nation. The nation will play an important role for an 
indefinite period in my opinion [ ... ] My nation is called Germany. I am 
not Basque, I am not Quebecois. Federalism is not separatism.70 
Further, Stoiber describes the relationship between the German Liinder 
as one of"noble competition". 71 This refers in particular to the question 
of redistribution of funds between the Liinder. In November 1999 the 
German Constitutional Court, in a case brought by Bavaria and two 
other 'paying' Liinder, declared the current system of solidarity 
payments to be unconstitutional. Although the existence of solidarity 
among the Liinder (particularly towards the new federal states in the 
East) is regularly affirmed, the Bavarian government continues to take 
a line which prioritises its own interests. 72 Thus, the recognition of 
responsibility towards the German Vaterland in CSU rhetoric conveys 
the impression•of a pragmatic, rational approach to German-wide 
affairs. 
Bavaria's constant experience of subordination to some higher 
power, whether it be Holy Roman Empire, Rhine Federation, German 
Empire or Federal Republic, has led to a political culture not overly 
fixated with the concept of undivided sovereignty. 73 Bavarian 
Eigenstaatlichkeit, or sovereignty, is an important marker of identity, 
but is understood to be limited to certain policy areas. Similarly, 
70 ["Es gibt sechszehn Landeshauptstadte - aber Berlin ist sicherlich Primus inter 
Pares. Wenn ich das nicht mehr akzeptieren wiirde, dann wiirde ich ja die Nation 
nicht mehr akzeptieren. Die Nation wird ftir mich auf unabsehbare Zeit eine wichtige 
Rolle spielen [ ... ] Meine Nation heif3t Deutschland. Ich bin kein Baske, ich bin kein 
Quebecois. Foderalismus ist kein Separatismus".] From an interview with Edmund 
Stoiber entitled 'Berlin mul3 bayerischer werden' in the Suddeutsche Zeitung, 131h 
November 1999. 
71 "Financial redistribution in its present form is materially unconstitutional [ ... ] My 
approach is that a higher degree of self-responsibility and noble competition between 
the Liinder strengthens all of Germany". ["Der Finanzausgleich in seiner heutigen 
Form ist materiell verfassungswidrig [ ... ] Mein Ansatz ist, dass ein hoheres Maf3 an 
Eigenverantwortung und ein edler Wettstreit der Uinder ganz Deutschland starkt".] 
Ibid. 
72 "The goal of our petition was not to opt out of solidarity [payments,] especially 
vis-a-vis the East German Liinder". ["Das Ziel unserer Klage war nicht der Ausstieg 
aus der Solidaritat, gerade auch gegeniiber den neuen Landem".] Ibid. 
73 "Federalism corr~sponds to Bavarians' understanding of themselves". 
["Foderalismus entspricht dem Selbstverstandnis der Bayem".] From a speech by 
Edmund Stoiber, published in the Bayernkurier, 4th July 1998. 
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Bavaria's identity as a Freistaat, (literally translated 'Free State' but in 
fact the German translation of 'Republic'), is understood to be a 
subordinate one. Consequently, nuanced appeals to a multiplicity of 
identities are not particularly new or difficult to grasp for Bavarians. 
However, although the CSU defines Germany as a nation, connotations 
of national pride, love and belonging are almost solely associated with 
Bavaria. 74 In party rhetoric, this is primarily expressed through 
references to the beauty of the Land and its economic success. 75 As 
such, patriotism is not expressed in terms of national solidarity, far less 
nationalism, but in terms of the concept of Heimat. 
Not only does the CSU want to come across as the best party to 
represent Bavarian interests in Germany and Europe, but it also wants 
to style itself as the only truly Bavarian party. To this end, it has 
created a rhetorical correspondence between the party and the Land, 
which is most effective in getting its ideological message across. For 
instance, Edmund Stoiber ended his speech to the CSU party 
conference in 1998 with the words "I wi 11 do everything in my power 
to ensure that Bavaria and the CSU continue to belong together". He 
used even more direct rhetoric at a party conference in 1995; "[T]hat is 
the CSU, and the CSU is Bavaria".76 Given all but continuous CSU 
rule in Bavaria since 1946, the almost universal association of the party 
with the Bavarian government is to be expected. This further facilitates 
the construction of an equivalence of party and Land in CSU rhetoric. 
The conceptual merging of the two is also promoted through the 
party's choice of symbols. For instance, the party logo consists of a 
74 Cf. "The historic self-understanding of Bavaria, which has always proudly 
recognised its place in European history". ["Das historische SelbstversUindnis 
Bayerns, das sich irnrner voller Stolz zu seinem Platz in der Geschichte Europas 
bekannt hat".] CSU European manifesto 1979. "Few regions in Europe can claim to 
possess something similar to Bavarian consciousness of its Heimat and state 
tradition". ["Dem bayerischen Heimat- und Staatsbewul3tsein haben nur wenige 
Regionen Europas Vergleichbares an die Seite zu stellen".] From a speech by 
Edmund Stoiber in Bad Kohlgrub on 5th July 1998. 
75"We love this uniquely beautiful Heimat with all our heart". ["Dieses einmalig 
schone Heimatland lieben wir mit alien Fasern unseres Herzes".] From a speech by 
Max Streibl in Garmisch-Patenkirchen on 11'h August 1991. 
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lion and a blue diamond. These symbols originate from the Bavarian 
coat of arms and the Bavarian flag respectively, but have now become 
so associated wflh the CSU that they are often reproduced without the 
party name. 
Lion and diamond belong the CSU like people to their country [ ... ] 
The lion, our heraldic animal, is an expression of our strength.77 
Moreover, the word 'we' is used interchangeably in CSU rhetoric to 
designate the party and the Bavarian people; 
The CSU has been in government in Bavaria for the last forty years 
and has helped to shape this land. It has shaped it together with you, 
ladies and gentlemen[ ... ] Why? Because we love our Heimat. 78 
Party, people and Land are collapsed into one through the ambiguous 
use of the pronoun. In this way, politically neutral territorial markers • 
are politicised in order to convey the impression that the CSU is the 
only truly Bavarian party and that it, quite literally, embodies Bavaria. 
CSU rhetoric articulates a stable and regular linguistic structure, 
clearly ranking the concepts of Heimat, Nation and Vaterland both 
territorially and according to their role in party ideology. Nonetheless, 
a degree of ambiguity remains in the CSU's concept of the Heimat. 
Therein lies the strength of its emotional appeal. To quote Montserrat 
Guibemau; 
It is important to emphasize that symbols are effective because they are 
imprecise. Symbols transform difference into the appearance of 
similarity, thus allowing people to invest the 'community' with 
ideological integrity. 79 
76 ["Ich werde alles tun, dal3 Bayem und CSU weiterhin zusammengehoren"; "[D]as 
ist die CSU, und die CSU ist Bayem".] 
77 ['"Lowe und Raute' gehoren zur CSU wie die Menschen zu ihrem Land[ ... ] Der 
Lowe, unser Wappentier, ist Ausdruck ftir unsere SHirke".] From a pamphlet ofCSU 
campaign materials prepared for the I 998 elections p. 4. 
78 [In Bayem ist vierzig Jahre lang die CSU mit an der Regierung und hat dieses 
Land mitgepragt. Mit Ihnen zusammen gepragt, meine Damen und Herren [ ... ] 
Warum? Weil wir .. unsere Heimat Iieben".] From a speech by Max Streibl on Ash 
Wednesday I 990, published in the Bayernkurier, I 01h March I 990. 
79 M. Guibemau Nationalism and Intellectuals in Nations without States: the 
Catalan Case p. I 003. 
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Party rhetoric invites the voter to ponder his or her own experience of 
Bavaria and realise the importance of preserving local tradition whilst 
· investing in progress. The appeal remains ambivalent; voters may feel 
that they are being addressed as Swabians, Franconians or Altbayer, or 
even in terms of the overriding Bavarian-wide identity constructed by 
the party;· 
The Bavarian party to represent Bavaria's interests is only the CSU [ ... ] 
In almost tWo. hundred years a living symbiosis has come about here 
between the regions·ofBavaria.80 
. :The: CSU's appeals '.~n the name of the Bavarian Heimat can thus be 
. understood on different levels. Heimat is generally understood as the 
smal.ler: entity, but~ varies: according.: to context. Just· as a native of 
,,;\' ' f •. I ' ' ' •' 
.' · Nuremberg'might'identify.him- or herself as a Franconian in Bavaria, a 
' . '• ' ' 
B~y~an in Germany and a German in Europe, the party acknowledges 
~ ' .. : . local: identities while: at the same time. affirming an undifferentiated . .. ·. . . . 
Bavarian : identity0S1 .. Overall, CSU rhetoric conveys a sense of 
.. , sup.e~mposed,'·. onion.;.skin-like identities surrounding the conceptual 
. core of the Bavarian Heimat. 
Conclusion · 
CSU rhetoric seeks to encourage voters to take the consonance 
of:He{mat a~d Bavana for granted. In turn, the party aims to mobilise 
this identity polit.ically in its calls for voters to support the CSU out of 
.. loye for t~e Bavarian Heimat; 
· . · · · Thanks. to a ·policy which has. not wavered over decades, we have put 
the conviction through to people from Aschaffenburg to Berchtesgaden 
and from' Hof to Lindau that Bavaria is their Heimat within the German 
Vaterland. 82 
80 ["Die bayerische Partei, die die Interessen Bayems vertritt, ist nur die CSU [ ... ] In 
den fast zweihundert Jahren ist hier aus diesen Teilen Bayems eine lebendige 
Symbiose geworden".] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber to the CSU party 
conference in Munich on 28'h August 1998. 
81 The existence of multiple identities within Bavaria was recognised by all ten party 
workers and politicians I interviewed in January and February 2000. 
82 ["Durch eine jahrzehntelange beharrliche Politik haben wir den Menschen von 
Aschaffenburg his Berchtesgaden, von Hofbis Lindau die Oberzeugung vermittelt, 
daf3 Bayem ihre Heimat im deutschen Vaterland ist".] From a speech by Franz Josef 
Strauf3 in Wiirzburg on P' December 1985. 
213 
The Heimat serves as a vehicle for the expression of the self-esteem 
and self-confidence of a community. Further, the malleability of the 
concept allows ambiguity to be exploited for nation-building purposes. 
The required 'imagined community' is infinitely easier to define 
positively in terms of Heimat than Nation, as both Bavaria's close 
associations with the rise of National Socialism and the fascist use of 
the word Heimat have proved less difficult to overcome than memories 
of Nazi crimes committed in the name of nationalism and for the glory 
of the German Nation. 83 In the German-speaking world, the concept of 
Nation cannot be purified totally of historical pollution. However, the 
CSU has found in Heimat a means of avoiding the pitfalls of playing 
with the past whilst retaining the emotional pull and rhetorical force of 
a concept emphasising belonging and solidarity. 
The CSU has changed the label describing the core of its 
nationalist ideofogy in order to make it less objectionable and above 
all, less contestable. Yet, regardless of whether one refers to Bavaria 
rhetorically as a nation or as the Heimat, the party's underlying 
ideology follows the basic nationalist principle of prioritising Bavarian 
identity and interests above all else. The party has gone about 
reconciling the dualism of nationalism and pro-Europeanism in an 
equally confident fashion. It has established its European credentials 
without being afraid to privilege the preservation of Bavarian 
sovereignty and criticise aspects of the integration process. This 
strategy exemplifies the combination of core and peripheral principles 
in CSU ideology. European integration can be reconciled with 
contemporary nationalism if interpreted in a way that subordinates it to 
the immutable core goal of national self-determination. The following 
chapter examines how the CSU and SNP have constructed the 
European Union in a way that complements their neo-nationalist 
ideologies. 
83 The NSDAP was founded and built up in Munich, where Hitler's unsuccessful 
putsch took place in 1923. Nuremberg during the Third Reich will forever be 
associated with the Nazi rallies which took place there. Bavaria was also promoted as 
a favourite holiday resort by the Nazis and Hitler himself owned a mountain-top 
retreat in Berchtesgaden, close to the border with Austria. 
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7 The European Dimension 
In order to illustrate the way in which the CSU and the SNP 
reconcile support for further European integration with their core 
nationalist principles, the present chapter focuses on their respective 
interpretations of the EU and its internal dynamics. It will be shown 
that the parties' generally pro-European stance is a peripheral 
component of their neo-nationalist ideologies. In much the same way 
as Europe 'rescued' the 'nation-state', the European construct rescues 
the principle of self-determination from anachronism by adapting it to 
fit in with contemporary politics. 1 As such, it is used strategically by 
the parties to further national autonomy, which clearly takes priority in 
their rhetoric. In this way, both parties have turned integration, which 
might have been construed as a threat to their core principles, into an 
opportunity. For this transformation to be successful, the complexity of 
the European Union must naturally be interpreted according to 
nationalist ideology. The first section of the chapter examines the 
parties' construction of the European integration process, and the way 
in which it is presented as not only compatible with but also conducive 
to self-determination. The second section examines in more detail the 
proposition that European policy is peripheral to CSU and SNP 
ideology. Building on the conclusions drawn, the focus of the final 
section will then shift towards how EU is used to further the core 
nationalist goal. 
A closer look at the SNP's interpretation of the EU will 
uncover the symbolic and instrum~ntal aspects of the party's European 
policy, as dictated by the demands of domestic politics. The CSU's 
extensive first-hand experience of European mechanisms as a party of 
government, on the other hand, points to a more pragmatic. policy 
regarding institutional change. The emphasis will be on the macro-
level analysis of institutions and the role of member states within the 
European Union, rather than on specific policy areas. Interviews with 
SNP and CSU parliamentarians and employees will be used to provide 
evidence of each party's overall vision of Europe. It will become clear 
that, despite contextual differences, a similar strategy can be discerned 
1 Cf. A. Milward The European Rescue of the Nation-State. 
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in the parties' approach to EU institutions and their dynamics. The 
tenn 'European Institutions' refers collectively to the European 
Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Council. 
Commissioners are nominated by member states but are presumed to 
act in the best interests of the EU. The Commission's role is to develop 
policy, propose legislation, issue secondary legislation, mediate with 
outside bodies and monitor compliance with European law. The 
Council of Ministers, on the other hand, is made up of a government 
minister from each of the member states and meets to take policy and 
legislative decisions. The role of the European Parliament, now 
directly elected by citizens of the member states, was substantially 
enhanced in the Treaty on European Union of 1992. In addition to its 
required approval of the EU budget and its importance in holding the 
Commission to account, the legislative procedure of eo-decision gives 
the parliament an important say in the shaping of EU law. ECJ judges 
are each nominated by a member state to apply and interpret European 
law. Finally, the European Council consists of heads of member states, 
who meet to agree on the broad lines of future integration. 2 
The complex reality of the European Union today has 
traditionally been viewed through two contrasting theoretical lenses. 
Indeed, the debate surrounding the process of European integration has 
long been characterised by an often intransigent stand-off between two 
main schools of thought, which have only recently begun to combine 
to form a clearer picture of the EU.3 The neo-functionalist school 
maintains that EU institutions play the more important role in 
controlling the union and its development, whereas 
intergovemmentalist theorists claim that member states remain 
'Masters of the Treaties' and their interpretation.4 European integration 
theories are explanatory of the integration process rather than 
interpretative of the status quo. However, in practice, a theoretical bias 
towards neo-functionalism or intergovemmentalism underpins 
2 See N. Nugent The Government and Politics of the European Union Part 2. 
3 Cf. W. Sandholtz & A. Stone Sweet (eds.) European Integration and Supranational 
Governance and W. Wallace The Dynamics of European Integration. 
4 Cf. G. Garrett & G. Tsebelis An institutional critique of intergovernmental ism and 
W. Wessels An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macropolitical View on Integration 
Processes. 
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accounts of European institutions and dynamics in the academic 
literature. 5 As is to be expected, party political visions of the EU are 
similarly embedded in a particular world-view. Moreover, neo-
nationalist parties construct the EU in a way which is not only 
compatible with their ideologies, but which also furthers their core 
goals. Nevertheless the roles, if not the relative clout, of the principal 
European actors are treaty-based and therefore clearly defined. These 
can be compared to the party political interpretations of integration 
devised by the CSU and the SNP. 
I Party Policy on Europe 
Scotland in Europe 
The SNP considers a confederal Europe to be the ideal end 
point of integration. By a confederation, it means an association of 
member states which pool sovereignty in certain areas but do not 
surrender overall control to a central, or federal, authority. 
Significantly, the SNP supports the retention of the power of veto over 
European legislation if a vital national interest is at stake. The image of 
a 'seat at the top table' is repeatedly used to convey the party's 
ambition for Scotland to be a full member state of the European Union. 
The SNP aspires to make Scotland what it calls a 'normal nation'; that 
is, one with no more or fewer of the trappings of statehood than other 
member states.6 Thus, the party continues to espouse the nineteenth-
century nationalist view that 'nation' should coincide with 'state', 
whilst pragmatically limiting its d~mand for sovereignty to the partial 
form which is the lot of contemporary states. The pooling of 
sovereignty which EU membership entails is not likened to its 
surrender, as a zero sum analysis would suggest. To quote John 
5 Cf. S. Schmidt Only an agenda-setter? and K. Alter Who are the 'Masters of the 
Treaty? It has been pointed out that the vocabulary employed to describe the EU is 
itself highly theoretically charged. The neofunctionalist resonance of terms such as 
I 'engrenage, I 'acquis communautaire and spill-over has now been overtaken by 
terms with an intergovernmentalist flavour, such as subsidiarity, proportionality, 
opting out and sustainable convergence. G. Marks et a/ Governance in the European 
Union p.133. 
6 Bruce Crawford observed; "There is also the issue of Scotland becoming a normal 
place in this world, having the simple dignity of being accorded the same status as 
the Danes, the Dutch or the Irish". 
217 
Swinney; "Independence is a relative concept in terms of the way in 
which other institutions are structured". Angus Robertson noted; "The 
idea that you po-gl [sovereignty] does not mean that you've lost it". By 
being placed within the EU, the goal of independence is relativised in 
order to counter the argument that it is a revolutionary, isolationist 
goa1.7 The party's expedient manipulation of concepts adapted to 
contemporary politics is underlined by the following comment from 
Neil MacCormick; 
Independence, freedom, sovereignty. All names, all labels. The SNP is 
part of a long, wide, movement for self-government, autonomy. Now 
that in my definition would mean autonomy in whatever overall 
context of governance is sensible, constructive, forward-looking and 
also expressive of solidarity. 
In the present-day context, the SNP has seen the strategic advantage of 
placing its core goal of independence within a European Union 
• construct. 
The European Union, as a treaty voluntarily entered into, is 
interpreted by the SNP as an enhancement, rather than as a limitation 
of sovereignty. The stock argument brought to counter claims that 
independence in Europe would merely substitute Brussels' influence 
for Westminster control, is to point out the difference between the two 
forms of Union. Kevin Pringle stated; 
The UK is a unitary state, whereas the European Union is a union of 
pooled and shared sovereignty, where the members decide issues on a 
common agreed basis and that's not the case as far as the UK is 
concerned [ ... ] So you're leaving a very unequal union to participate 
fully in an equal union.8 
The party emphasises that an independent Scotland within the 
European Union would be able to exert equal influence to other small 
member states, thereby underlining the alleged contrast to England and 
7 George Re id remarked; "I hear Jordi Pujol [leader of Catalonian CiU coalition] 
speaking the same language and I listen to A lex Salmond; I don't think the gap 
between them is that big". 
8 Only Gordon Wil;on hinted at a possible parallel; "One thing I do worry about is 
seeing replicated in Europe the problems which Scotland has had in being a minor 
part in an imperial England". 
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Scotland's skewed relationship within the UK.. 9 George Kerevan 
summed up the SNP's approach as follows; 
It is inconceivable to me in the twenty-first century that you would not 
co-operate, i.e .. share your sovereignty. But you have to have it in order 
to share it. 
The EU is therefore presented as a badge of equal status to existing 
'' ' sovereign st~tes. and an affirmation of independence of action in. 
opposition to the barrier represented by Westminster. 
Official party support for the integrative step of economic and· 
· . mo~etary: union .(EMU) does not extend to fiscal harmonisation. The 
SNP :recognises. that such a step would very much undermine its 
... :conception ~[,Scottish independence. John Swinney commented; 
,·l: 
· The·· min~te , you 1• go down the route of fiscal harmony - tax 
·. harmonisation ;~.:I: think you 're down the route towards a federal state 
.. ·· . because you 're effe~tively removing one of the last areas of discretion 
. · ' that an indiv.idual member state would actually have. 
: 1,, 
Dissenting. voices within the SNP point out that this partial approach 
may no't be economically viable, however. They suggest that the party 
'is,skating over complex debates for the sake of presenting a policy that 
is clearly different to the Labour and Conservative parties' cautious 
·stance ori EMU.'~0 In other less prominent areas of integration, such as 
the· Colnmon · For~ign and Security Policy, Swinney was less clear 
· about a possible.eri.d point. This lends substance to Neil MacCormick's 
o~inion th~t, the party contains "a variety of shades of opinion as to 
• ' J.' 
9 Mike Russell put it thus; "There's something very, very different in every sense 
between being a member of a confederal union and being a member of an 
incorporating union". Bruce Crawford developed the argument; "We need to release 
our full potential. We're not able to do that within a framework that doesn't suit us, 
which is geared much more to the south east of England[ ... ] Westminster is where 
the real barrier is". 
10 George Kerevan took the following view; "Speaking as an economist [ ... ] the 
single currency must mean a common monetary and fiscal policy and therefore, some 
kind of common government. ·Jt doesn't work otherwise [ ... ] All I 'm saying is I think 
there's room for that sort of debate beginning to flower in the SNP". This view 
recalls the reservations expressed by Isobel Lindsay on the party's adoption of the 
Independence in Europe policy. Cf. chapter five, section three. 
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how far the integration process should go". 11 However, as is evident 
from the positive tone of party rhetoric, MacCormick's 
characterisation ..of the SNP as "integration sceptic" in the sense that it 
would want to "take a critical look at each move towards further 
integration, step by step", has not been translated into the public face 
of the party. 12 Were the SNP indeed to adopt a more nuanced 
approach, its strategy would resemble that of the CSU more closely 
than its current tendency to present an overwhelmingly pro-European 
image. 13 In terms of a macro-level view of the European institutions, 
however, the parties share a broadly intergovernmentalist vision of 
Europe. 
Bavaria in Europe 
Since the beginning of Edmund Stoiber's prime ministership of 
Bavaria in 1993, the CSU's attitude towards the EU has been less one 
of enthusiasm lnd more one of realistic but critical acceptance. The 
party calls for a federal, decentralised Europe, in which decisions are 
taken as close to citizens as possible. Among other policies, the party 
supports political union, a further strengthening of the European 
parliament's role in decision-making, and eastern enlargement of the 
EU. 14 The CSU makes it clear that its blueprint for the Europe of the 
future is a Staatenverbund, not a Bundesstaat; in other words a 
11 Alasdair M organ, for one, was of the view that the party should slow down and 
take stock of the integration achieved so far. Mike Russell commented; "I think we 're 
all sadder and wiser and have seen some of the difficulties of it [integration]". 
12 Cf. chapter five, section two. Angus Robertson pointed out that a sceptical stance 
"doesn't necessarily have to be euro-sceptic in the brand that one sees in England, 
which is very emotional and irrational". However, other interviewees voiced 
individual concerns about integration, for a variety of idiosyncratic reasons. For 
instance, Gordon Wilson said; "I think there still are delusions of grandeur buried 
inside the European psyche and I fear that it might take on an imperial role if too 
much power is concentrated in the central institutions [ ... ] I do not want an integrated 
Union because Europe itself might become aggressive". 
13 The party's rhetoric and public image as a whole must be distinguished from the 
work of individual MEPs, which may or may not be critical of specific Commission 
initiatives. 
14 This last policy is not only argued to be beneficial to Bavaria economically, putting 
it once again at the centre of European trade flows, but also ties in with the CSU's 
spirited defence of the rights of exiled Sudetendeutschen. Cf. The CSU European 
Manifesto, 1989. The SNP also supports enlargement, although much less vocally 
than the CSU, and emphasises the economic benefits the larger market will bring to 
Scotland. See the SNP European Manifesto, 1999. 
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confederation rather than a federal state. Similarly to that of the SNP, 
this approach is clearly intergovernmentalist; "In a confederation, the 
parts decide what competencies the centre enjoys". 15 However, this 
does not stop the CSU stating its preferred guiding principles for 
integration to be 'Foderalismus und Subsidiaritiit'. These can be 
combined felicitously within Bavarian political culture, given that "the 
German version [of federalism] is a version involving the decentralised 
exercise of state power". 16 The concept of federalism has opposite 
meanings in English and German. These were succinctly summarised 
by one interviewee as denoting centripetal government in English and 
centrifugal government in German. 17 Federalism is thus a concept 
which does not 'travel' we11. 18 However, despite the misleading 
differences in terminology, it can be concluded that, like the SNP, the 
CSU envisages an EU in which the member states are stronger than the 
central authority . 
The CSU's 1999 European election campaign made clear which 
level of governance the party prefers. The slogan 'Bayem stark fur 
Europa' leaves the voter in no doubt that the impetus for integration 
should not lie at the European leve1. 19 Josef Lindner stated; 
We have to decide how this Europe should be structured and that is 
where Bavaria says subsidiarity and competition among regions, not 
centralism and levelling-down.20 
15 ["In einen Staatenverbund bestimmen die Teile dariiber, welche Zustandigkeiten 
die Zentrale hat."] Although a civil servant with the European ministry of the 
Bavarian government and not a CSU spokesman, Jorg Vogel's definition of the 
concept corresponds to its usage in CSU policy and Bavarian political culture more 
generally. 
16 ["Die deutsche Version ist eine Version der dezentralen Ausubung staatlicher 
Gewalt".] Gerd Muller 
17 ["die Wortbedeutung heif3t; das hat eine zentrifugale Wirkung, also weg vom 
Zentrum, moglichst hin zum nachgeordneten Ebenen und im Englischen hat es eine 
zentripetale Bedeutung; es geht ins Zentrum".] Jorg Vogel. Cf. note 15. 
18 Chapter three, section two discusses the notion of conceptual travelling. 
19 This sentiment was repeated in the personal campaign leaflets of candidates. For 
instance, Emilia Muller demanded that Bavarian economic and agricultural interests 
be taken into account, and Ingo Friedrich emphasised the need for powerful 
representation of Bavarian interests. 
20 ["Jetzt mussen wir uns entscheiden, welche Struktur dieses Europa haben soli und 
da sagt eben Bayern Subsidiaritat, Wettbewerb der Regionen und nicht Zentralismus 
und Gleichmacherei".] 
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In turn, socialism has long been linked to European bureaucracy in 
CSU rhetoric, and is often contrasted to the themes of regional 
diversity and healthy competition in CSU rhetoric. 21 As is evident from 
his rhetoric, Edmund Stoiber has never been one to underestimate the 
potential influence of the Bavarian government in European affairs. 
During the debate surrounding EMU, he gave the impression that his 
reluctance to support German. entry· might have a bearing on its 
eventual introduction. 22 Conv~rsel~;, Stoiber also emphasises the 
centrality of the European Union ·to domestic politics. He placed the 
' . 
Bavarian government's European ministry directly under his control in 
· 1998 and insisted : 'that'. Klaus· ·. K.inkel, Chancellor Kohl's · foreign 
minister, rethink his~ ministry's ~organisation! in order to give greater 
prominence to European. affairs.23 . ·Further, Stoiber has repeatedly 
quoted the statistic' .th~t: :fifty. perce.J1t( ofi laws: applied I in. Bavaria' 
originate in the EU I and was keen to drive this point home· during the 
1999 European election~ campaign. ~4 : The~ EU thus plays a relatively 
•. . ·., I • 
prominent role in, CSUI rhetoric; even df· Bavaria's . actual role in 
European decision-making is not· as important as the party would like 
to suggest. 
As a European region, Bavaria must focus on influencing 
European affairs through .the European parliament and the Committee 
of the Regions, as well as through issue~linked Liinder representation 
21 "The CSU does not want an· EU that is governed centrally and bureaucratically. We 
are against dreary socialist levelling-down".t'Die CSU will kein Europa, das 
zentralistisch und biirokratisch regiert wird .. Wir sind gegen ode sozialistische 
Gleichmacherei".] CSU European Manifesto,.1979:The CSU recently attempted to 
revive the spectre of socialism in the European context by presenting the 1999 
election as a choice betWeen a socialist 'and a conservative Europe. 
·. 
22 When asked the question.'are you still a Eu~o~sceptic?' Stoiber replied, "What 
does it mean to be a sceptic. in this case? I want an optimum guarantee of the 
permanence of the Euro".' ["Was heiBt hier Skeptiker? Ich will eine optimale 
Bestandsgarantie ftir den Euro".) Die Siiddeutsche Zeitung. 28th February 1998. 
23 Cf. Die Siiddeutsche Zeitung.13th May:1998,"where Kinkel is quoted as saying; 
"The CSU shouldn't be allowed to sacrifice our [Germany's] reputation and our 
responsibility in Europe on the altar of the Bavarian election". ["Die CSU darfunser 
Ansehen und unsere Verantwortung in Europa nicht auf dem bayerischen 
Wahlkampfaltar opfem".): · 
24 One of the election slogans sought to justify his ever-presence during the campaign 
and at the same time underline the vote's importance by saying that in Bavaria, 
European affairs w~re a leadership responsibility. ["In Bayem ist Europa 
Chefsache".] Stoiber also emphasised the importance of voting by appearing on 
individual candidate's flyers, accompanied by a signed endorsement. 
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on the Council of Ministers. Consequently, the CSU's blueprint for 
organising the tiers of European governance is somewhat more 
developed than that of the SNP, which does not extend far beyond a 
call for full Scottish member status. This is reflected in the primary 
role of subsidiarity in CSU European policy. Indeed, along with 
federalism, subsidiarity is the basic principle guiding the party's vision 
of future integration. This test of effectiveness, as laid down in Article 
3B of the Treaty on European Union, is designed to create a tiered 
structure of government, with European, state and sub-state levels each 
retaining responsibility for the tasks they are best qualified and 
equipped for. In the CSU's rhetorical translation of this test, European-
level control is presented negatively, as a final recourse when no 
alternative exists. This approach to European governance tallies with 
the party's core goal of preserving Bavarian autonomy. Furthermore, 
in order to avoid the European Commission's gradual encroachment on 
state or sub-state affairs, the CSU has based its demand that the EU's 
competencies be clearly defined on the principle of subsidiarity.25 The 
principle is thus evoked when the party expresses reservations 
regarding European initiatives which endanger Bavarian interests or, 
even more crucially, Bavarian autonomy. On the other hand, 
subsidiarity is also used by the party as evidence of its support for 
European integration. For instance, CSU rhetoric regularly refers to 
former prime minister Max Streibl's influence in drawing former 
Commission president Jacques Delors' attention to the subsidiarity 
principle, and the Bavarian government's role in lobbying to have it 
incorporated into the Maastricht treaty. 26 Party support for rthe 
subsidiarity principle and its interpretation of federalism show that the 
CSU shares the SNP's intergovernmentalist vision of the European 
Union. 
25 Gerd Muller stated; "In concrete terms, there must be a delimitation of 
competences at the next conference of member state governments". ["Konkret muB 
bei der nachsten Regierungskonferenz es zu einer Abgrenzung der Kompetenzen 
kommen".] 
26 This assertion is based on a meeting of Liinder representatives held in Munich in 
late 1990. They issued a joint declaration to the effect that federalism and subsidiarity 
should be guiding principles of future European integration. For the text of the 
declaration, see M. Treml Geschichte des Modemen Bayem p. 495. 
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11 Reconciling Autonomy with Integration 
The SNP- 'Hands across the Ocean?' 
SNP rhetoric reconciles the nationalist core with the pro-
European periphery of party ideology by elaborating a myth of Scottish 
identity. Complementing that of the compassionate Scot used to 
promote domestic integration, it amounts to asserting that Scots are 
inherently more European-minded than the English.27 Neil 
MacCormick was of the opinion that "it is easier for Scotland to see a 
context of identity-securing in the European framework than an 
identity threat [ ... ] whereas English identity was more in opposition to 
Europe".28 This idea contrasts sharply with Gordon Wilson's reading 
of the general mood in previous decades; 
In the 1960s and 1970s Scotland was still contaminated by British 
imperial attitud&s as a matter of public opinion [ ... ] and there were 
members who felt they didn't have anything in common with Europe. 
And there was hostility to the metric system. 
Interestingly, this statement also supports the myth of Scots' openness 
to Europe in that it attributes negative attitudes to 'imperial 
contamination'. The myth of "hands across the ocean" Scots, as Bruce 
Crawford put it, was corroborated by all the SNP members . 
interviewed, although many different justifications were proffered to 
explain this view.29 These ranged from the Scottish experience of 
emigration and immigration and resulting family ties in other parts of 
the world, through intellectual and trading exchanges, to a psycho-
27 Although some interviewees were careful to avoid drawing any normative 
conclusions from this assertion, the comparison with England was always explicit. 
For instance, George Kerevan commented; "I'm just trying to say structurally there 
are differences [ ... ] I think there were also elements of a European culture that 
lingered on in Scotland, which made it easier under the Thatcher years to adopt this 
kind of European identity". 
28 Bruce Crawford stated; "To suggest that in some way Scotland could become 
independent and be a Norway or another country of that ilk would I think go against 
the grain of what the Scottish people feel about themselves and what they feel about 
the rest of the world". 
29 The exception proving the rule was Isobel Lindsay who is, it will be remembered, 
opposed to the partY's European policy.However, she acknowledged the strategic 
strength of being "able to project this outward going image [ ... ] it made the SNP 
position much more attractive, I think". Cf. chapter five, section three. 
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historical account. 3° Kevin Pringle was more pragmatic and offered an 
explanation in terms of greater trade, tourism and inward investment 
flows between Scotland and Europe compared to the UK as a whole. 
The myth of the pro-European Scot is a self-justifying 
'invention of tradition' designed to undergird the SNP's current 
European policy.31 In contrast, the Scottish political climate during the 
1970s, shaped by the prevalence of the oil and fisheries questions, 
Norway's anti-EEC stance and the personal opinions of many office 
holders, favoured a cool if not a hostile party position on European 
integration. Gordon Wilson's appraisal of public opinion in those days 
clarifies the interest politics motivating the party's myth-making at the 
time; 
I think the view was [ ... ] very unappreciative of Europe generally [-... ] 
Don't forget, Europe was a long way away and anything it did seemed 
to disturb people and upset their ways of working, and none of the 
money that came from Europe had started to come through. 
Further, Gordon Wilson pointed out that these myths are not shared by 
the mass of the population, but are being attributed to Scots by the SNP 
leadership. For instance, in a prime example of a rhetorical elision 
between the SNP and the Scottish nation, Winnie Ewing has stated; 
"We in Scotland are not Euro-sceptics, we are UK-sceptics". 32 
Characterising the national psyche in such a way is central to the 
strategy of the SNP, although this sometimes leads to implausible 
interpretations of Scottish public opinion in party rhetoric. -For 
example, consider the following qtJote by Alex Salmond; 
Public opinion in Scotland is now running in favour of the Euro. The 
latest poll gave 40% to those in favour, and 40% to those against. A 
30 John Swinney remarked; "We've not been in control of our destiny [ ... ] So I think 
in a sense Scots are a bit more ready to see changing and evolving constitutional 
structures as something that's much more easy to handle [ ... ] People in England have 
been accustomed to being in the driving seat, to being in control and not feeling as 
though there was anybody limiting what they were able to do. That's a huge element 
of their psyche". 
31 On the use of Scottish stereotypes to further party political ends, see S. Reicher & 
N. Hopkins Self and Nation Ch. 5. 
32 From a speech by Winnie Ewing to SNP conference on 25th September 1998. 
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sustained information campaign would tip the balance decisively In 
favour of entry.33 
-
This assertion is somewhat bold, given the statistics on which it is 
based. However, it shows that regardless of poll results, the SNP is 
continuing to elaborate a historical myth of Scots as enthusiastic 
Europeans. As will be shown below, an equivalent myth is propounded 
by the CSU. By attributing constant and long-standing European 
credentials to their respective nations, the parties aim to show that 
European integration and national autonomy are compatible in terms of 
identity politics as well as in institutional terms. 
The SNP is less forthcoming than the CSU, however, on the 
question of a pan-European identity. In fact this theme is of little 
significance to the SNP, contrary to the CSU's emphasis on 'unity in 
diversity', which will be discussed further below. As was made clear 
during the SNP' s 1999 European election campaign, the dominant 
theme is one of interest politics.34 The party pays lip service to the idea 
of European cultural diversity, but does not elaborate on the question 
in a way comparable to the CSU. Although a sense of European unity 
is acknowledged, its content is restricted to shared civic values such as 
respect for human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles. 35 
There is hardly a mention of common cultural roots and religious 
rhetoric is quite foreign to the party.36 The SNP's 1999 European 
manifesto contains only a short paragraph on European cultural policy. 
This is limited to quoting the provision on cultural heritage contained 
in the Maastricht Treaty and pledging to back European cultural 
initiatives. To quote John Swinney, 
33 A lex Salmond, in an address to the London School of Economics on 25th February 
1999. Peter Murrell provides another example; "I think they (the Scots] are more 
open to Europe. The opinion poll now is suggesting that's not the case but I feel that 
does not accord with what I find talking to people". 
34 Cf. Chapter five, section two. 
35 Only George Reid elaborated, rather idiosyncratically, on the cultural aspect; "(The 
EU] is based on institutions, it's based on the v'alues of life. Food, music, literature, 
artistic values being part of life which you wouldn't find in North America; slight 
revulsion from conspicuous consumerism that marks American society, a belief in 
solidarity, communaute solidaire, which you would never hear Americans speaking 
about." .. 
36 Angus Robertson thought that a Muslim member state would be a positive 
inclusion in the EU. Doubts as to the desirability of Turkish membership were 
limited to its human rights record. 
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I don't think [a European state] is sustainable in a cultural sense 
because there is such a vested cultural pride and cultural enthusiasm in 
different parts of Europe. So I think, in a sense, what we are witnessing 
is a coming-together of shared interests. 
It is interesting to note that this response to the cultural question is 
expressed in terms of shared interests, and does not allude to the 
importance of preserving Scottish culture as integration progresses. 
Neither was this issue highlighted by any of the other interviewees 
close to the SNP. Given that party rhetoric depicts the Scottish nation 
less vividly than the CSU does the Heimat, it was to be expected that 
the idea of a European community would also be less developed. As a 
policy peripheral to the parties' core goals, it only reflects the ideology 
being articulated by them at the domestic level. 
The role of SNP MEPs within the party has been, by their own 
admission, singularly symbolic. This is typified by Winnie Ewing's 
unofficial title of 'Madame Ecosse'. In a conference address, she 
described her role as an MEP thus; "I tried to prepare a place for 
Scotland in the hearts and minds of our Euro-colleagues". 37 Winnie 
Ewing represented Scottish interests unstintingly during her twenty-
five years as an MEP, from 1974 to 1999, and her affectionate moniker 
recognises this. However, few of her or her colleagues' European 
activities are ever reported, fuelling the impression that Europe is a 
political outpost rather than a political arena with day-to-day relevance 
to Scots. In the first six months of the year 2000, the SNP issued ever 
five hundred press releases, but o~ly six of them dealt with European 
issues. The substance of SNP European policy also supports the 
impression that the party has done little to develop its view of the EU 
since the general, strategically-motivated endorsement embodied in the 
'Independence in Europe' slogan.38 Although the party claims its 
37 From an address by Winnie Ewing to the SNP party conference on 25th September 
1998. However, Isobel Lindsay remembers that Winnie Ewing was once firmly 
against EU membership; "She was very hostile but once she was elected she went 
native! So she was quite an influential voice in that sense". 
38 "I believe there is a solid strategic and tactical value for the SNP in making a 
candid statement of policy to the effect that our advocacy of independence is defmed 
within the permanent framework of the European Community". J. Sillars Scotland: 
The Case for Optimism p. 190. 
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MEPs made more speeches to the European parliament during its 1994 
to 1999 session than all other Scottish MEPs put together, progress 
regarding the policy proposals included in its European manifesto is 
not highlighted by the party itself, let alone the Scottish press. 39 
Detailed SNP policy. concentrates on Scotland-specific issues 
such as fishing and whisky· exports, a· tactic which is at once a strength 
and a disadvantage. Informed ·by. the fact that Scotland is currently 
. . . 
represented in Europe as .Pait of the UK, this policy focus is directed 
towards influencing· the . British position . where Scottish interests are 
particularly strong or, widely·· diverging from tho~e of the rest of the 
country.40 That the curre~t ·,system, should revolve around Whitehall 
. ·.. . 
severely limits the p~y's scope for developing a distinctively Scottish 
position in all fields i ofi Europ~~an I policy,. as! the SNP itself naturally' 
.. ·· .. ·. ·'. ;'.. . . ·i ' ' 
never tires of pointing out: ~:How·e.ver;. from tlie' point of view of party 
image, this approach. is soni~what :un~atisfactory. For the SNP to leave 
ti•. ' . ' . . . . . ·. . '. . . . : 
other policy areas ! to' .the·~ 'big'' .. players~: ·is :. both . an admission of 
. powerlessness and a ·lost opportunity. to become a vocal advocate for 
change. Furthermore, it· is .not· effective ·party communications which 
seem to be lacking ·in some policy ~areas., but the substance of policy 
itself. The following cominent ·by Neil·· MacCormick is indicative of 
this; 
One of the things I'd like to make. sure vve do in the next year or so is 
have a more serious debate . about our' stance on the' intergovernmental 
conference in Nice[~ .. ] Thafs.the trouble. We haven't had a debate on 
that question for quite a whit~~· .. ' . 
This does nothing to bolst~r~th~ SNP's·· credibility as a potential party 
of government, capable· of:making/.'Independence in Europe' a reality. 
. ,., . . 
In short, the party has not·so far! set' 'its· European policies to work for 
'Independence in Europe',. despite· the prominence of the European 
element in its flagship slogan. 
39 SNP European Manifesto, 1999 p. 2 ... 
40 Ian Hudghton fmds it very frustrating that authority over agriculture and fishing 
has now been devoived to the Scottish parliament, but that it still has to negotiate 
with ministries in Whitehall in order "to accommodate our view again within the UK 
position. And it doesn't always work".· · 
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The SNP interprets European integration as pragmatic co-
operation in certain areas, with member states remaining the primary 
motors of progress.41 However, the party neglects the theme of sub-
Scottish governance in the European context as it struggles to rid 
Scotland of the label 'region' and instead argue the case for equal 
member status. Correspondingly, the theme of subsidiarity is 
acknowledged but not developed. Unlike the CSU, the SNP has its 
sights set first and foremost on a 'seat at the top table' of the Council 
of Ministers, and subsidiarity is not a strategically useful principle in 
this context. Overall, the SNP's evocation of the European Union is 
aimed at the abstract, somewhat superficial level of the European 
debate in the UK, beyond which few Scottish voters or politicians care 
to probe. 
The SNP's support for continued use of the member state veto 
points to the primarily symbolic power of the European dimension in 
its rhetoric. It is aimed at reassuring voters that, were 'Independence in 
Europe' to be achieved, Scottish autonomy would not thereafter begin 
to flow inexorably towards some form of federal super-state.42 
However, Isobel Lindsay made the following cogent point; 
Now anyone who actually knew about the use of the veto by a single 
small nation [would know it was] not a viable mainstream answer to 
the question of accepting EU policies and their implementation. 
Much is made of the clout of small nations in an EU alleg~dly 
weighted in their favour. 43 However, evidence to justify this 
interpretation of EU structures is 'not offered. One must assume that the 
SNP is referring to the disproportionate amount of small member state 
41 Kevin Pringle stated; "The basic building blocks of the EU are the member states 
and that's the way it should stay". Neil MacCormick said; "We are reasonably 
satisfied with the broad look of the institutions as they are now". 
42 To quote Neil MacCormick; "The scope of the veto should be taken down to 
genuinely constitutional issues. So I would extend QMV [qualified majority voting] 
but not on constitutional issues". 
43 A section of the 1999 European manifesto entitled 'A Europe of small nations' 
claims that; "[S]maller nations like Scotland, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and 
Luxembourg - they all punch well above their weight within the institutions of the 
European Union. That is because there are measures in place to counterbalance the 
dominance of the larger nations". Kevin Pringle put it thus; "And of course, the 
structures and institutions of the EU are specifically weighted to give preference to 
the small countries". 
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votes in the Council of Ministers relative to population, or their power 
to invoke the veto. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the fact that 
large member states, with even more votes, are in a stronger position to 
have their way. Much like the rationale behind the 'Independence in 
Europe' policy, it seems that this strand in SNP rhetoric is designed to 
reassure voters that an independent Scotland would not be an 
insignificant member of the EU, rather than provide an accurate 
reflection of the dynamics of EU decision-making. 
SNP rhetoric is anachronistic in the importance it attaches to 
the veto and the influence of small member states.44 It thereby offers a 
somewhat distorted view of European decision-making which is 
compatible with its core ideological commitment to prioritising the 
nation. Further, the 1999 SNP European manifesto declares that an 
independent Scotland would have its own Commissioner, although the 
allocation of Covunissioners to countries is not an officially recognised 
practice. It states that independence would cause the number of 
Scottish members of the European parliament to double (to be on a par 
with comparably populated Denmark), and secure the much sought 
after seat on the Council of Ministers. 45 However, the current 
uncertainty as to the number of Commissioners after enlargement and 
the upper limit imposed on the number of European parliament 
members by the Treaty of Amsterdam cast doubt on these assertions. 
The party also claims to have won the argument as to whether Scotland 
would automatically become an EU member on secession or whether it 
would have to reapply as a newly sovereign state. Yet a lack of 
precedent and some scholarly opinion makes this a less clear-cut case 
than the party maintains.46 Parallel to its emphasis on the allegedly 
disproportionate powers of small nations in the EU, the party's rhetoric 
44 "The Luxembourg Compromise is now mainly symbolic for domestic 
consumption". G. Marks et al European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. 
Multi-level Governance p.363. Paradoxically, attempts to avoid invoking the 
Luxembourg compromise in the Council of Ministers laid the foundations for a 
consensual style of politics which still persists, despite contrary qualified majority 
voting provisions. ._ 
45 SNP European Manifesto, 1999 p. 3. 
46 See M. Happold Independence: in or out of Europe? An independent Scotland and 
the European Union. 
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on these matters is optimistic, if not misleading.47 That these claims 
should go largely uncontested is an indication of the uninformed nature 
of the European debate in Scotland and the UK more generally.· 
The fact that the SNP takes some liberties in its ideological 
construction of the EU testifies to the fact that its European policy is 
instrumental to the party's core neo-nationalist agenda. Aspects of 
European integration which are unhelpful or of little relevance to this 
core goal, such as the actual use of veto powers or the principle of 
subsidiarity, are played down. Furthermore, the SNP is not shy of 
making confident assertions as to the role and rights of a putatively 
independent Scotland within the EU, which would be the subject of 
considerable debate among experts and academics. Finally, the party 
employs a myth of Scottish openness towards all things European in 
order to suggest an inherent tendency for Scots to support European 
integration. This is perhaps the most explicit example in the evidence 
discussed of ideological manipulation designed to further a political 
project. It illustrates the party's attempt to harness the EU to its 
nationalist cause by politicising national identity. The SNP constructs a 
stereotype of the Scottish mentality to complement its interpretation of 
the EU, which in turn is favourable to the party's understanding of 
'Independence in Europe'. Such a strategy is indicative of a larger-
scale dynamic, which sees neo-nationalist parties interpreting 
European integration as a phenomenon compatible and not conflicting 
with the core of their ideologies. 
The CSU - 'Euro-sceptic?' 
The CSU goes about resolving the tension between its support 
for European integration and its love for the Heimat in an ·explicit 
manner. It derives its pro-European stance from the history of the party 
on the one hand and the history of Bavaria on the other. For instance, 
Theo W aigel, concurrently German finance minister and CSU party 
chairman from 1989 until 1998, felt that his support for EMU flowed 
from the policies of his predecessors in the party; 
47 Similarly, when the debate over the 'Independence in Europe' policy took place in 
the late 1980s, the leadership was fond of asserting that an independent Scotland 
could negotiate derogations from aspects of the Treaties it did not want to endorse. 
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I said back then, before 1997 or 1998, that I would immediately resign 
from my office as party chairman and finance minister, were a 
Bavarian cabinet to reject the Treaty of Maastricht, because I saw 
myself as following in the tradition of Dr. JosefMiiller, ofHans Ehard 
and ofFranz JosefStrauB.48 
The possibility he alludes to was a very real one during the debate 
concerning economic and monetary union, the timetable for which was 
contained in the Maastricht Treaty, as Edmund Stoiber was vocal in 
doubting the wisdom of German participation. Given that this 
opinionated stance was outwith his mandate and in opposition to Theo 
Waigel, it was widely interpreted as a piece of populist posturing by 
the Bavarian prime minister, .designed to win support at home.49 
Stoiber was positioning, himself as ·sympathetic . to the attachment of 
Bavarians to the Deutschmark. 50 He was also underlining the policy 
independence of his party - and by implication the Bavaria it represents ... 
- vis-a-vis the German federation, regardless. of the· fact that the 
minister representing the federation in this case was the CSU 
chairman! Theo Waigel made the following comment; 
Every level [of government] had to decide for itself, and it can 
sometimes have been the case that the Bavarian level emphasised other 
points than the federal level. And sometimes there were also 
conflicting goals.51 
Stoiber's eventual climbdown was interpreted as humiliating by 
the opposition - SPD placards showed W aigel and Stoiber boxing - but 
was spun as an exercise in political realism and praiseworthy caution 
48 ("lch ha be damals vor 1997, 1998 erkHirt, ich werde am selben Tag, wo ein 
bayerisches Kabinett den Vertrag von Maastricht ablehnt, von meinem Amt als 
Parteivorsitzender und als Finanzminister zuriicktreten, weil ich mich da in der 
Tradition von Dr. Josef Muller, von Hans Ehard, von Franz Josef Strauss, gesehen 
habe".] 
49 Cf. The Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 9th March 1998. 
so The Deutschmark is linked to the spectacular post war economic recovery of West 
Germany - the Wirtschaftswunder - and is considered an apolitical identifier. An 
exhibition on the history of the currency, mounted in Munich during the winter of 
1999, was so popular that it was extended. 
st ["Jede Ebene miiBte fiir sich entscheiden, und da hates schon mal sein konnen, daB 
die bayerische Ebene andere Akzente gesetzt hat als die Bundesebene. Und da gab es 
auch manchmal einen Zielkonflikt".] 
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by the party itself.52 The contrast with Stoiber's image as an 
enthusiastic and committed politician at the European level during the 
1999 European election campaign illustrates the instrumental nature of 
the CSU's European policy. Indeed, Julia Hartmann admitted that there 
were doubts among the planners of the campaign as to whether this 
image-change would be acceptable to voters.53 The party portrays its 
pragmatism and readiness to express opposition to certain aspects of 
integration as a virtue. This is reconciled rhetorically with its pro-
European stance as follows; 
The CSU pursues European politics with clear contours and a sense of 
realism, but also with a readiness to compromise which a community 
of twelve nations requires. 54 
The party will emphasise positive or negative aspects of integration as 
its commitment to Bavarian self-determination dictates, proof that the 
EU is used strategically to underpin the CSU's core goal of preserving 
Bavarian autonomy. 
The other main strand of the CSU' s rhetoric on the EU is its 
recasting of Bavaria's history in European terms. This is explicitly 
stated in a speech by former prime minister Max Streibl, in which he 
linked the party's duty to support European integration to well over a 
millennium of Bavarian history; 
Bavaria has served a great European purpose over the last one 
thousand four hundred years. We must make it clear that the CSU is a 
guarantor that the utmost will be done to maintain this continuity for 
the good of all our Bavarian Heimat [ ... ] It's about Europe, but it's 
also about our inherent interests, about our Bavarian interests. 55 
52 Several of those interviewed maintained that there had never actually been ·a 
difference of opinion between the CSU leaders. (Cf. the commitment to strict 
compliance with the convergence criteria included in the party's 1994 European 
manifesto). 
53 These proved to be unfounded, given the CSU's best-ever result at that election. 
54 ["Die CSU betreibt Europapolitik mit klaren Konturen und mit RealiHitssinn, aber 
auch mitjener KompromiBbereitschaft, die eine Gemeinschaft von zwOlfNationen 
voraussetzt".] CSU European Manifesto, 1989. 
55 ["Bayem hat iiber 1400 Jahre eine groBe europaische Aufgabe erftillt. Wir miissen 
klarmachen, die CSU ist der Garant dafiir, daB diese Kontinuitat mit aller Kraft 
fortgesetzt wird zum Wohle unserer gesamten bayerischen Heimat [ ... ] Es geht urn 
Europa, aber auch urn unsere ureigensten Interessen, urn unsere bayerischen 
Interessen".] From a speech in Regensburg on 171h February 1989. 
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This rhetoric links the myth of the Bavarian nation's longevity to the 
Land's European character and depicts current CSU policy as a 
continuation of"Bavaria's allegedly central role as a European player. 
The notion of inherent (ureigensten) interests conveys a sense that this 
continuity is long-standing and organic through the use of the 
superlative form and the prefix 'ur'. Alongside the lofty commitment 
to a "great European purpose", the importance of Bavarian interests is 
emphasised. Once again, the evocation of Europe is subordinated to the 
prioritisation of Bavaria. 
Although the party may stress continuity in some contexts, the 
CSU's remembered history is also the springboard for other, 
sometimes diverging, strategic goals. This is an illustration of the 
adaptability of the party's European message depending on the 
Bavarian interests at stake.56 For instance, Bavaria's long history of 
autonomy is calJed upon to justify the CSU's reticence to subscribe to 
certain aspects of European integration. Indeed, party opposition to 
specific European initiatives is ascribed rhetorically to the self-
confidence born of a solid, historically-grounded identity. 
Bavarian history is the history of integration [ ... ] Regarding the 
cultivation and preservation of a specific regional identity, Bavaria is 
one of the most advanced in Europe. 57 
Voters are thereby invited to draw the conclusion that Bavaria does not 
need EU legitimation in the same way as other German Liinder- which 
do not have the same historical continuity - and can therefore be more 
openly critical of the EU. The presumption here is that the 
'Bindestrich-Liinder' born of Allied occupation, to use Franz Josef 
Strauf3' s telling phrase, do not have the self-confidence to take a stand 
56 Jeffery and Collins make a similar point in relation to the CSU's policy on EU 
enlargement; "While at one level these recommendations for reform may be seen as 
positive contributions to the wider debate about enlargement [ ... ) they also 
concretely reflect at another Bavaria's 'Euro-sceptical' attitudes about the European 
integration process." C. Jeffery & S. Collins The German Lander and EU 
Enlargement: Between Apple Pie and Issue Linkage at p. 96. 
57["Die Bayerische .. Geschichte ist eine Geschichte der Integration ( ... ) Bayem ist, 
was Ausbildung und Pflege einer spezifischen regionalen Identitat betrifft, in Europa 
mit am weitesten fortgeschritten".) From a speech by Edmund Stoiber in Bad 
Kohlgrub on 5th July 1998. 
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against integrative steps. 58 However, this aspect of CSU rhetoric, 
employed only in opposition to specific EU policies, should not be 
equated with an ambivalent attitude to the EU per se. The CSU, unlike 
a large proportion of the British Conservative party, never criticises the 
EU project as a whole. Indeed, in the words ofTheo Waigel; ''There is 
no rational alternative to the process of European unification". 59 
The CSU and Edmund Stoiber in particular, are often portrayed 
by the media as being Euro-sceptic, although the claim is hotly 
disputed by party spokesmen.60 One must also be careful not to 
'stretch' the concept by equating it with the connotations it has in 
Britain.61 For one, Germany's Nazi past dictates that none but the most 
radical can deny the importance of the European project to Germany. 
Not only did it help to rehabilitate the country as a respected 
international player in the decades following the Second World War, 
but it also assuaged fears in Europe of an over-powerful reunited 
Germany following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. In Germany as a 
whole, pronounced anti-EU views are most often associated with 
extreme right-wing parties. Like all the mainstream parties in 
Germany, the CSU recognises the basic value and purpose of the EU 
as a Friedensgemeinschaft, or peace community, and regularly repeats 
its commitment to the European project. For a CSU politician to do 
otherwise would be to go against the grain of over fifty years of party 
policy and, importantly, risk betraying the memory of Franz Josef 
Strauf3. 62 However, the CSU claims to have gone a step further in the 
European debate than its opponents, whom it accuses of being unable 
58 Cf. Chapter four, note sixty-six. 
59 ["Zum europaischen Einigungsprozel3 gibt es keine verniinftige Alternative."] 
From the foreword to the CSU European Manifesto, 1989. 
60 Those interviewed preferred the term 'Euro-critical.' Alfons Zeller commented; "I 
always say that when someone questions something and observes it in a critical 
light, it's not negative. Having a critical attitude is a long way from being an 
opponent". ["Ich sage immer, wenn jemand hinterfragt, kritisch etwas beaugt und 
beleuchtet, dal3 es nicht negativ ist. Eine kritische Haltung heillt noch langst nicht ich 
bin ein Gegner".] 
61 Cf. Chapter three, section two for a discussion of conceptual stretching. 
62 "Beside Konrad Adenauer and other great European statesmen, Franz Josef Straul3 
drove forward reconciliation and co-operation in Europe. The CSU sees its European 
purpose as the continuation of his life's work". ["Franz Josef Straul3 hat an der Seite 
von Konrad Adenauer und anderen grof3en europaischen Staatsmannern die 
Aussohnung und Zusammenarbeit in Europa vorangetrieben. Ihr europaische 
Aufgabe sieht die CSU auch als Fortfiihrung seines Lebenswerkes".] CSU European 
Manifesto, 1989. 
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to distinguish between the principle and the practice of European 
politics. In contrast, the CSU presents its European outlook as 
nuanced, sophisticated and openly critical of specific policies which 
appear unnecessary or incoherent. Markus Ferber summed up the 
argument as follows; 
It's no longer about the fateful question, yes or no to Europe. It's about 
the fateful question, should Europe concern itself with something, yes 
or no.63 
Linked to this is the party's emphasis on its pragmatic, professional 
approach. The EU is treated without undue reverence by the party, as a 
political arena to be scrutinised and criticised in the same way as 
domestic affairs. 64 
The CSU regards Europe as a further badge of identity over and 
above its well-~trenched Bavarian identity. In a variation on a by-now 
familiar theme, former prime minister Streibl described the party's 
overall European policy aim as "to preserve our Heimat and to shape 
Europe".65 Although pro-European feeling ts regarded as 
complementary and not antagonistic to Bavarian identity, the party 
makes clear that the preservation of local identity should both guide 
and trump attempts. at further integration. Consequently, the 
importance of preserving and defending regional identity as the 
building blocks of further European integration is often aggressively 
emphasised; 
Diversity[ ... ] is Europe's wealth[ ... ] Bavarian sovereignty, which has 
developed in over a thousand years of history, must also have 
63 ["Da geht es nicht mehr urn die Schicksalsfrage ja oder nein zu Europa, sondern es 
geht urn die Schicksalsfrage, muf3 sich Europa darum kiimmern ja oder nein".] 
64 Markus Ferber noted; "When we say that we see things a little differently to the 
Commission, we 're immediately called anti-European. I think we are the ones who 
take the European question most seriously, because we deal with it so intensively". 
["W enn wir sag en, daf3 se hen wir ein billchen anders als die Kommission, dann 
werden wir sofort Europagegner genannt. Ich denke wir gehen am seriosesten mit 
dem Thema Europi urn, weil wir uns so sehr intensiv damit beschaftigen".] 
65 ["unsere Heimat bewahren, Europa gestalten."] From a speech in Regensburg on 





influence/ prestige [ Geltung] in a united Europe. It must be accepted 
that whatever Bavaria can do better is not a job for Brussels!66 
Such confrontational rhetoric could be likened to a Bavarian David 
squaring up to the European Goliath, since the influence of individual 
Liinder on European decision-making is actually exercised, as in 
Scotland, either through the German state apparatus or by means of 
lobbying in Brussels. 
Although Bavaria is well represented in both the Committee of 
the Regions and the European parliament, the former is a purely 
consultative body and the latter is a political party forum and not a 
regional one. In practice, the Bavarian government is very effective at 
ensuring that information flows between Munich and Brussels are as 
rapid as possible. 67 Furthermore, the CSU government was active in 
pushing through the constitutional amendment to Article 23 of the 
German Basic Law, forbidding the German federal government to cede 
Liinder competencies to the EU without the approval of the Bundesrat. 
It also lobbied for the Liinder to be represented in those Council of 
Minister meetings which concerned their competencies. These 
achievements are more indicative of the Bavarian government's clout 
within Germany than at the European level, where it is only directly 
represented in the Committee of the Regions. Notwithstanding, CSU 
rhetoric styles the party as being just as powerful as the biblical David, 
capable of bringing Bavarian demands onto the agenda by bypassing 
state mechanisms in its lobbying and influencing even Jacques Detors' 
vision of integration.68 
Another important aspect of CSU rhetoric on Europe is that of 
Einheit in Vielfalt or 'unity in diversity', an image which underlines 
66 ["Die Vielfalt [ ... ] ist Europas Reichtum [ ... ] Bayerische Eigenstaatlichkeit, 
gewachsen in einer iiber tausend-jahrigen Geschichte, muB auch in einem geeinten 
Europa Geltung haben. Es muB gelten: was Bayem besser kann, ist keine Aufgabe 
ftir Briissel! "] CSU European Manifesto, 1989. 
67 The access of the Bavarian government to European decision-making structures is 
generally recognised to be one of the best amongst the German Liinder. See C. 
Jeffery & S. Collins The German Liinder and EU Enlargement: Between Apple Pie 
and Issue Linkage at p. 89. 
68 The meeting of German Liinder presided over in Munich by Max Streibl in late 
1990 is claimed by the CSU to have given the impetus for the inclusion of the 
subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty. Cf. note 26. 
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that the party interprets European integration in a way compatible with 
the preservation of Bavarian particularity. The phrase is principally 
taken to mean tfie protection of existing national and regional cultures 
and is therefore usually used in conjunction with the concepts of 
subsidiarity and a Europe of the Regions. Strains of exclusionary 
rhetoric come to the fore, however, in the party's evocation of a shared 
western and Christian culture linking Europeans above and beyond 
their diversity. According to those interviewed, this construct stands 
for a community of values which includes democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and the welfare state. A historical argument extending 
this community to the cultural and metaphysical realms is developed in 
the following statement; 
Europe cannot be merely an economic· community of interests. Europe 
needs a spiritual bond 1 [~ ~·.] Europe· is: founded on the ancient 
philosophy of the Greeks and the statecraft of the Romans, on the great 
creative achieviTients of different peoples in. antiquity, the Middle 
Ages and modernity .. Christianity. has been a fundamental pillar of 
European culture and civilisation for two thousand years. 69 
The community of values construct is used to justify the CSU's 
opposition to Turkish membership of the EU.70 This line of argument 
runs parallel to CSU immigration policy, which posits a Western 
'leading culture' that immigrants (principally Turkish Muslims) are 
expected to accept, respe.ct and share to the extent of learning the 
language and assimilating German constitutional culture. The religious 
aspect of these policies·. was usually . flagged as noteworthy by 
interviewees, although its. controversial nature was acknowledged. 
Jorg Vogel gave his non-partisan view of the debate; 
69 ["Europa darf nicht nur eine wirtschaftliche Interessengemeinschaft se in. Europa 
braucht auch ein geistiges Band [ .· .. ] Europa griindet auf der antiken Philosophie der 
Griechen und der Staatskunst der Romer, auf den groBen schopferischen Leistungen 
der verschiedenen Volker in Altertum, Mittelalter und Neuzeit. Ein tragender Pfeiler 
der europaischen Kultur und Zivilisation ist seit 2000 Jahren das Christentum".] 
From a speech by then Bavarian government minister Mathilde Berghofer-Weichner 
in Kloster Polling on 11th January 1989. 
70 Gerd Miiller mentioned the important role of the family, the equality of women, 
tolerance and democratic values as characteristic of a western Christian culture. With 
reference to the possibility of Islamic EU member states, he continued; "These are 
basic values for me .. which are, of course, judged differently in the Islamic world, a 
fact which in itself would lead to fundamental problems". ["Das sind fiir mich 
grundlegende Werte, die natiirlich in der islamischen Welt anders gewertet werden, 
und dies wurde schon zu fundamentalen Problemen fiihren".] 
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At the moment it is very controversial, especially in the light of the 
Turkish question, to what extent religious considerations play a part in 
this European culture. 71 · 
Evidently, domestic immigration debates have influenced the CSU's 
construction of the EU as a western, Christian community of values, 
since the notions of shared values and 'unity in diversity' at the 
European level correspond to the party's interpretation of a German 
'leading culture'. 
The CSU asserts that its policies are infused with Christian 
morality. It defines this as a belief in human dignity, freedom and 
responsibility before God, principles which it also identifies as 
influencing the German basic law.72 The party remains officially ope!l 
to people with other Weltanschauungen, to the extent that these are 
• compatible with its own.73 However, the CSU's emphasis on the 
Bavarian Stiimme and their homogeneity, its strict policies on the 
integration of immigrants and its vocal opposition to multiculturalism, 
all suggest that this Christian outlook may be less than favourably 
disposed towards other religions.74 According to the CSU, Bavaria's 
alleged homogeneity must thus be protected on two fronts; against the 
faceless bureaucratic centralism of Europe on the one hand, and 
against internal dilution by large numbers of foreign immigrants on the 
other. A clear qualitative difference is made in CSU rhetoric between 
fellow members of the European Union and immigrants. For instance, 
the party states that; "A Europe 'without barriers' is an important step 
71 ["Es ist im Augenblick gerade vor dem Hintergrund der Tiirkei sehr umstritten in 
wie weit in diese Europaische Kultur auch religiose Erwagungen mit einflieJ3en".] 
72 T. Waigel ,Die geistigen Grundlagen der Christlich-Sozialen Union' in B. Haneke 
& R. Hopfinger (eds.) Gechichte einer Volkspartei- 50 Jahre CSU at p. 21. 
73 Ibid. p. 19. 
74 "Nobody has to be a Christian in Bavaria. But whoever lives in Bavaria as a 
follower of another religion or non-denominationally should kindly take note of one 
thing; namely that Christian roots in Bavaria reach back to Roman times and that 
Christian culture has shaped this Laizd and its people for almost two thousand years". 
["In Bayern muJ3 niemand Christ sein. Aber wer in Bayern als Andersglaubiger oder 
Konfessionsloser lebt, der moge bitte wohlwollend eines zur Kenntnis nehmen: Daf3 
namlich in Bayern die christlichen Wurzeln bis in die Romerzeit zuriickreichen und 
die christliche Kultur dieses Landes und seine Menschen seit bald zwei Tausend 
Jahren geformt hat".] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber in Bad Kohlgrub on 5th 
September 1998. 
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towards a Europe in which a new sense of community can develop".75 
This idealistic, quasi-functionalist vision of integration based on shared 
values is sharpl~ contrasted to the 'exploitation' of EU member states 
by economic refugees. The CSU believes Germany should not be 
allowed to become a land of immigration for economic asylum 
seekers, and expresses concern that too few barriers within Europe 
could aggravate the problem. 
Uncontrolled immigration can only be solved at the European level 
[ ... ] There must be an end to Germany being required to carry a 
heavier burden in this domain than all other European member states 
put together.76 
Although the CSU manipulates European policy to further its 
core goals, it supports the fundamental process of European 
integration. As a neo-nationalist party, it acknowledges the necessity of 
a European framework without ever losing sight of the nationalist 
• ideology motivating its pro-European stance. Indeed, the CSU's 
ultimate goal is to defend Bavarian autonomy against too great an 
encroachment of European regulations. However, a universally Euro-
sceptical strategy, similar to that of branches of the British 
Conservative Party, is not suited to the German political arena. Instead, 
the CSU condones the general German consensus in favour of the EU 
and points to the excellence of the party's pro-European credentials 
from its genesis onwards.77 Rhetorically, it underlines its well-
established Bavarian identity and from this, in turn, flows the assertion 
that there is no party better qualified to speak for and defend Bavaria. 
It alleges that no other party can combine the CSU's experience of 
European matters and its empathy with Bavaria and its people. The 
rhetorical link to its political project can be observed in the party's 
creation of a correspondence between the Land and 'its' party. The 
CSU's ideological myth-making depicts Bavaria as a united, long-
75 ["Ein Europa 'ohne Schlagbaume' ist ein wichtiger Schritt zu einem Europa, in 
dem sich ein neues Gemeinschaftsbewul3tsein entwickeln kann".] CSU European 
Manifesto, 1989. 
76 ["Die unkontrollierte Zuwanderung ist nur auf europaischer Ebene zu IOsen [ ... ] Es 
mul3 Schlul3 damit sein, dal3 Deutschland in diesem Bereich mehr Lasten zu tragen 
hat als alle anderen.EU-Mitglieder zusammen".) CSU European Manifesto, 1994. 
77 As early as 1946 one of the CSU's founding members, Josef Miiller, pointed to the 
need for monetary union to help prevent another European war. Cf. T. Schlemmer 




standing, Europe-oriented nation in an attempt to imbue the party with 
the same unique presence. 
Ill Nationalist Core and European Periphery 
The CSU and the SNP share a similar vtston of future 
integration, despite the fact that they use the terms federalism and 
confederalism respectively to describe it. As has already been noted, 
the German word F oderalismus does not have the same centralising 
connotations as the English-language concept, and the same tendency 
can be observed in each party's rhetoric. Neil Walker offers a legal 
definition of federalism which shows that the root of these diverging 
political interpretations lies in opposing views of which level of 
government will gain the upper hand in the distribution of authority; 
[L ]egal authority under a federal constitutional order is distributed in 
separate parcels between central (federal) legislatures and governments 
on the one hand and provincial (state) authorities on the other, and in 
such a manner that neither sphere of authority is (entirely) free to 
trespass upon, override or remove the competence of the other. 78 
The CSU stresses the sub-state aspect of federalism, combining its 
demand for more decentralised democracy with the concept of 
subsidiarity. The term Subsidiaritiit is used more widely in Bavarian 
political culture than the concept of subsidiarity in Scotland. The 
Conservative government's state-centric interpretation of subsidiarity 
during the debate surrounding the ratification of the Treaty:- on 
European Union is the only tim~ the concept has had a high public 
profile in the UK. Bavarians are more familiar with the term due to 
their experience of German federalism and of the Catholic teachings 
from which it originally derives.79 Nevertheless, the SNP has 
incorporated subsidiarity into its European manifesto. Although it is 
given low prominence, in keeping with its incomplete integration into 
Scottish political vocabulary, the emphasis on decentralisation is 
78 N. Walker Beyond the Unitary Conception of the United Kingdom Constitution p. 
390. 
79 For an account of the concept's origins and its German usage see H. Lecheler Das 
Subsidiaritiitsprinzip. 
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similar to the CSU's interpretation of the concept.80 Such a definition 
tallies well with neo-nationalist ideology. Despite exploiting the 
strategic potential of the European dimension differently depending on 
their domestic requirements, the parties share the same overall vision 
of an ideal European Union. That is, a confederal polity organised 
according to the principle of subsidiarity and functioning according to 
an intergovernmental dynamic. 
The SNP's detailed blueprint for future European integration 
remains somewhat vague, and interviewees were often unable or 
reluctant to elaborate on it. However, achieving Scottish equality with 
other small nations within the European Union was articulated as the 
ultimate goal. A primary concern to influence the form and quality of 
European institutions was not expressed. 81 Peter Murrell formulated 
the Scottish focus of the party's European policy as follows~ 
The thing the S~ has to do is perpetually push expectations forward. 
We do that by providing examples of what other member states have 
done and how they're in a better position than we currently are to do 
things[ ... ] It's about equality. 
The CSU, on the other hand, has translated its core goal of preserving 
and prioritising national autonomy into the language of EU politics; 
namely a demand for the Commission's competencies to be strictly 
defined. The party considers that the present state of affairs - in which 
the limits of EU jurisdiction remain vague and can thus be extended 
through Commission initiatives and favourable European Court of 
Justice rulings - poses a serious threat to Bavarian sovereignty. This, in 
turn, is linked to the party's avowed distaste of what it sees as a 
bloated European bureaucracy.82 In general, the SNP's European 
80 "In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity there ought to be extensive and 
effective decentralization of decision-making to local levels. Every political decision 
affecting individuals, localities and communities should be taken as close to home as 
is compatible with securing practical results". SNP European Manifesto, 1999 p. 11. 
81 Asked about the concept of European confederalism, Gordon Wilson commented 
sardonically "People don't really know what they mean when they talk about that". 
82 Gerd Muller commented; "When we hand over this bit of sovereignty in these 
areas of jurisdiction, it does not mean that we want to give away this competence to 
an anonymous EurQPean bureaucracy of civil servants". ["Wenn wir dieses Stiick 
SouveraniUit in der Gesetzgebung in diesen Bereichen abgeben heif3t es auch nicht, 




vision is substantially less developed than that of the CSU. This has the 
advantage of presenting a simple message and a united front with no 
apparent divisions for the opposition to exploit.83 It is important, 
however, not to ignore cracks in the rhetorical facade, for the first 
sustained and relatively sophisticated attack on the party's European 
policy will reveal how easily a construct without strong intellectual or 
party support can crumble. The question of EMU is a case in point.84 
In .contrast, the CSU's practical experience of lobbying in Brussels 
permeates its European policy. This contributes to the image it presents 
of itself·~ an experienced, reliable champion of Bavarian interests, 
which can be trusted to pick its way confidently and effectively 
through the complex world of European politics. The result of the 1999 
European election . in Bavaria points to the fact that this image has 
found 1 favour ·with the electorate, . as the CSU attracted over twelve 
· ,pe~cent more vote~ than its average results in Bavarian elections. 85 
.. As was discussed in chapter five, the prominent position the 
SNP gives to the European dimension in its 'Independence in Europe' 
policy is part of a long-term strategy. 86 Attitudes towards the EU in the 
United Kingdom are very different to the German general consensus in 
favour. In fact, the media and the Conservative Party are for the most 
part hostile, the Labour party is cautious on the increasingly prominent 
issue of EMU, and single-issue anti-European Union parties have had 
some electoral success. 87 In contrast, the SNP comes across as quite 
83 Isobel Lindsay suggests that at the 1988 SNP party conference, during which tne 
'Independence in Europe' policy was adopted, only minor amendments were 
accepted which "did not represent the ma'in thrust of the critical amendments because 
they [the leadership] wanted a polarisation of the debate into simply unconditional 
. acceptance or rejection"~ 
84 Gordon Wilson warned of the dangers inherent in the party's policy on EMU; 
"You should never ever go and support something whose terms are undefined. Do we 
join at the current level of the pound? That would be a disaster". 
85 Markus Ferber opined; "The great majority of Bavaria's population, independently 
of who they eventually vote for, say that if anyone can represent Bavarian interests in 
Europe, then it is the CSU". ["Und da sagt die groBe Mehrheit der Bevolkerung in 
Bayern, unabhangig davon, was sie am Ende wahlen, wenn jemand bayerische 
Interessen in Europa vertreten kann, dann ist es die CSU".] 
86 lan Hudghton said; "It's our duty as would-be leaders of our community to try and 
lead public opinion too on major issues rather than do a 'William Hague' and follow 
it [ ... ] I think it is incumbent on us to try and push public opinion forward in a 
reasonable and rational way". 
87 The SNP is well aware of these factors and their effect on party strategy. lan 
Hudghton remarked; "I think that the extent of euro-scepticism on the part of the 
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unreservedly pro-European; "Euro-enthusiasts in an increasingly euro-
sceptic world" as Mike Russell put it. As one of the SNP's most senior 
strategists, his appraisal of SNP European policy is worth quoting at 
length; 
I'm not sure we have a particularly well developed vision of Europe. I 
mean, I think that's one of the problems. I think we have a pretty well-
developed view of why we regard the European Union as a good thing 
and a good thing for us because the context in which we argue the case 
for independence is much easier to explain and understand[ ... ] It's the 
contextualising of the case for independence, the fact that Scotland 
could become independent and remain a member of the European 
Union and adjust its relationships with all the other members including 
England comparatively easily [ ... ] To some extent, therefore, the 
European Union is a convenience for us. 
The prominence of the European element in the SNP's flagship slogan 
is therefore potentially misleading. George Reid pointed out that "it 
was hardly a t>uming issue on the doorsteps" and the European 
campaign was a low-key affair for a party which prides itself on 
success at European elections. Had its European profile been really 
important to the party, it would undoubtedly have put more effort into 
having a third MP elected. 88 The 'Independence in Europe' policy is 
predicated more on the requirements of the party's nationalist ideology 
than on an interest in the form and substance of future European 
integration. 
Kevin Pringle also made it abundantly clear that the SNP's 
European policy is instrumental to its nationalist ideology; 
Europe comes in centre-stage for the SNP within the context of the 
independence campaign. It defines the nature of independence [ ... ] So 
people are still focusing and reacting towards the SNP on the basis of 
what we say about Scotland, not on what we say about Europe. 
media has been fed by our political opponents and has not been helpful". Alasdair 
M organ commented; "I think the relentless [media] campaign has obviously had an 
effect on Scotland as well although I suspect there's still a differential between the 
Scottish opinion and the English opinion". 
88 The lukewarm C'!_mmitment to the European election campaign can be compared 
with the importance attached to a bye-election held soon afterwards in the 
constituency of Ayr. About £24,000 was spent on campaigning for that single seat, 
compared to about £90,000 for the European election in Scotland as a whole. 
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This eminently pragmatic strategy skirts an apparent ideological 
contradiction between independence and integration in order to reap 
the benefits of placing Scottish self-determination within a European 
framework. Indeed, George Reid commented that "instead of any 
conflict, it would seem profoundly sensible to have this dualism". A 
thin ideology like nationalism admits of such a strategy. However, the 
SNP never loses sight of the Scottish interest and its core goal of 
independence. The words 'in Europe' are merely an instrumental 
addition to this core nationalist principle, designed to make the pursuit 
of independence more palatable to the Scottish voter. 
A parallel can be drawn between the SNP's focus on 
independence and the CSU's ongoing struggle to preserve a degree of 
sovereignty within a federal Germany. Bavaria's defence of its federal 
tradition is a familiar theme of CSU rhetoric. 89 Although the CSU 
• supports a federal European Union, its experience of German 
federalism provides it with an example not to be followed, rather than 
a model for European integration. 90 Indeed, experience of the 
centralising tendencies of the German federation can only have 
strengthened the party's resolve to safeguard regional autonomy within 
the European Union.91 However, in principle, a federal structure goes 
hand in hand with subsidiarity at the European level. The need for 
subsidiarity is also explained using the example of German 
federalism. 92 
89 "Especially in Europe, our federal tradition gives Bavarian politics its 
unmistakeable character and its outlook". ["Unsere fOderale Tradition gibt der 
bayerischen Politik gerade in Europa ihren unverwechselbaren Charakter und ihre 
Blickrichtung".] Theo Waigel, in a foreword to the CSU European Manifesto, 1989. 
90 JosefLindner stated; "In its current state German federalism is [ ... ]not a model 
for the EU". ["Der bundesrepublikanische Foderalismus ist in seinem gegenwartigen 
Stand[ ... ] kein Vorbild fiir die EU".] 
91 "We want to stop the creeping reduction in Liinder competences and by winning 
back legislative competences, right the shift in the balance of powers between the 
Bund and the Llinder".[ "Wir wollen die schleichende Auszehrung der 
Landerkompetenzen stoppen und durch die Riickgewinnung von Kompetenzen in der 
Gesetzgebung das verschobene Krafteverhaltnis zwischen Bund und Landem wieder 
ins Gleichgewicht bringen".] Edmund Stoiber, in a speech to the Bundesrat on 26th 
August 1994. 
92 ["Denn die einzelnen Llinder konnen Vieles effizienter, schneller, einfacher und 
besser regeln, als dies in dem oft miihsamen Abstimmungsprozef3 auf Bundesebene 
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Individual Liinder can resolve many things more efficiently, quickly 
and easily than is possible in the often laborious voting procedure at 
federal level. That is also precisely the meaning of the subsidiarity 
principle. 
In turn, European unity is presented as being in both German and 
Bavarian interests. Finally, the party implies that it alone, as the only 
party rooted in Bavaria and standing exclusively in Bavaria, is capable 
of understanding and representing Bavarian needs. Together with the 
idea of Biirgernahe, these basic elements of the CSU's European 
policy are mixed and matched in party rhetoric. 93 
The CSU emphasises that it is no longer a question of the need 
for European integration, but rather a matter of how best to fashion it. 
Consequently, the Bavarian government is quite prepared to cede a 
strictly limited amount of sovereignty in areas where progress demands 
it, such as tradellft.I1d environmental policy; 
European integration naturally leads to a loss of sovereignty in certain 
areas. One can accept a limited loss of competence in limited, specific 
jurisdictions because at the same time one can say that the profit in 
terms of shaping policy is thereby enhanced. 94 
However, integration is not to be seen as an end in itself, as the party's 
emphasis on subsidiarity makes clear. 95 The CSU argues that progress 
should be sectoral and subjected to the test of whether an issue really is 
moglich ist. Das istja auch der Sinn des SubsidiarWitsprinzips".] Edmund Stoiber in 
a speech to the Bundesrat on 261h August 1994. 
93 For instance, European parliamentary candidate Angelika Niebler's campaign flyer 
read; "I support a federal Europe, because only a Europe of that sort is close to its 
citizens". ["Ich setze mich ein [ ... ] fiir ein f6derales Europa, weil nur ein solche 
Europa biirgemah ist".] The party's 1979 manifesto contains the sentence; "For the 
CSU as a resolutely federalist party, a united Europe can only be a Europe of 
diversity". ["Fiir die CSU als eine iiberzeugt f6deralistische Partei kann ein geeintes 
Europa nur ein Europa der Vielfalt ( ... ] sein".] 
94 ["Die europaische Integration fiihrt natiirlich in bestimmten Bereichen zu einem 
Souveranitatsverlust. In diesen begrenzten Einzelzustandigkeiten akzeptiert man 
einen begrenzten Zustandigkeitsverlust weil man gleichzeitig sagt, daB der 
Politikgestaltungsgewinn dadurch grofier ist".] Jorg Vogel. 
95 Gerd Muller put it thus; "Integration for its own sake is not really an end in itself. 
Ifl can solve a pro~lem better in Munich, than that's where it should take place". 
("Integration nur urn der Integration Willen ist eigentlich kein Selbstzweck. Wenn 
ich in Miinchen ein Problem besser lOsen kann ( .. ] dann soll es in Mtinchen 
passieren".] 
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better dealt with at a higher level of governance. In turn, subsidiarity is 
given a human face by emphasising citizens' rights to have decisions 
taken as close to them as is feasible, in order to enhance the 
transparency of governance. One of the 1999 European campaign 
slogans 'Biirgerniihe statt [instead ofJ Biirokratie ', neatly sums up this 
argument. 
The CSU's theme of unity in diversity within a Europe of 
nations and regions seems a somewhat contradictory element in its 
rhetoric. The party is arguing for an interpretation of the EU which 
includes a moral identification with shared European values that goes 
beyond interest politics and economically-driven integration. At the 
same time, however, it upholds a vision of cultural diversity. The 
theme of unity in diversity thus tackles the question of multiple 
identities head on. By professing more than a purely rationally 
motivated loyalty to the European project, the CSU purports to 
supplement and enrich Bavarian identity rather than undermine it. It 
supports a three-tier system of government and celebrates each 
corresponding level of identity in its rhetoric. 96 The CSU European 
parliamentary candidate Bernd Posselt addressed this dialectic in his 
campaign flyer; 
I support a Europe which takes also the features of our unique Heimat 
into consideration, which does not only reach the heads, but also the 
hearts.97 
To the CSU, even a European Union which goes beyond 
economic and political co-operatibn into the realms of morality and 
identity-building is compatible with the party's core commitment to 
preserving Bavarian sovereignty, as long as it complements and does 
not threaten to overtake Bavarian identity. Not only is a limited loss of 
sovereignty deemed to enhance Bavarian influence in certain policy 
96 Josef Lindner said; "As a state- Bavaria sees itself as a state within the German 
federal republic - Bavaria does not want to lose its statehood [ ... ] That is the reason 
for Bavaria's commitment to strengthening the regions within the EU". ["Bayern will 
sozusagen als Staat - Bayern versteht sich als Staat innerhalb der Bundesrepublik -
seine Staatlichkeit nicht verlieren [ ... ] Deswegen auch der Einsatz Bayerns fiir die 
Stiirkung der Regionen innerhalb der EU".] 
97 ["lch bin fiir ein Europa [ ... ] das auch auf die Besonderheiten unserer einzigartigen 
Heimat Riicksicht nimmt [ ... ] das nicht nur die Kopfe, sondern auch die Herzen 
erreicht".] 
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areas, but parallel to this, party rhetoric includes a European 
component in its construction of Bavarian identity. Similarly, the 
SNP's elaboration of the myth that Scots are particularly open to 
European influence is designed to bolster the party's politically and 
economically motivated support for integration with an element of 
emotional identification. The CSU and the SNP both go about 
reconciling nationalist ideology with support for European integration 
using rhetoric which ranges from the pragmatic and interest-driven to 
the construction of national stereotypes. As a whole, both parties' 
European policy is designed to undergird a strong national identity 
rather than introduce any element of competition with the EU as an 
alternative 'nation-state' construct. Characterising independence as the 
core and integration as the periphery illustrates the relative importance 
of these elements to each party's neo-nationalist ideology. 
Conclusion 
• 
The focus of this chapter has been the SNP and the CSU's 
interpretations of European integration and their compatibility with 
each party's core principles. Neither the CSU nor the SNP believe that 
support for both national autonomy and European integration are 
ideologically incompatible. This is because both reject European 
institution-driven integration and instead support a confederation of 
member states. Their chosen interpretation of integration is thus not 
irreconcilable with national self-determination within the EU. 
Sovereignty and European integration would represent a contradiction 
if the goal were the creation of a European state and indeed, a 
centralised European state. But that is not our goal.98 
The CSU's vision of future integration is more structured than that of 
the SNP, and it has developed a blueprint for a strict division of 
competencies at different government levels. Although the CSU 
describes its policy as a federal solution, it understands this to mean 
98 ("Die Eigenstaatlichkeit und die europaische Integration waren dann ein 
Widerspruch, wenn das Ziel die Schaffung eines europaischen Staates ware und zwar 
eines europaischen Zentralstaates. Aber das ist nicht unser Ziel".] Although Jorg 
Vogel is referring here to the goal of the Bavarian government and not that of the 




decision-making at the most local level that is feasible, rather than a 
polity structured around a central European authority. The SNP's 
emphasis on the subsidiarity principle is less strong than in CSU 
rhetoric, given that it does not accept Scotland's current status as a 
region and aspires to participate in decision-making as a member state. 
It presents the EU as an alternative to Westminster government and 
describes it as a qualitatively different form of union from that of the 
United Kingdom. 
Both parties stress the importance of national interests in 
shaping their approach to the EU. However, the CSU supplements this 
rhetoric with, a . theme of Europe as a community of values. The 
historical importance of the European project to post-war Germany is 
· also a fac.tor i he~e.·. Theo Waigel, for instance, understands the EU as a 
. symbol of peace and an opportunity for Bavaria and Germany to regain 
· sovereignty and :respect. He therefore sees no contradiction between 
these goals and a strong Bavarian identity, given that the EEC provided 
the framework for a rearticulation of this identity after the Second 
. World War. Markus Ferber put this strand of CSU rhetoric succinctly 
when he said; "a peace community is more than a common market".99 
The SNP, however, does not go down this road in its rhetoric and 
emphasises instead that Scotland can benefit economically from the 
EU,' which it characterises as a community of shared interests. Overall, 
however, the· parties. share broadly similar constructions of the 
institutions and 'dynamics involved in European integration. Both see 
the European Union as a vehicle for furthering core ideological g~als. 
The incorporation of the European dimension into their ideologies is 
thus neo-nationalist insofar· as it updates nationalist principles to 
correspond to contemporary politics. 




8 Discourse Theory and Neo-Nationalism 
This chapter sets out to analyse the ideologies of the SNP and 
the CSU using an explicit discourse theoretical framework. In 
exploring the ideological tension between nationalism and European 
integration, the last three chapters have focused on the rhetorical 
manifestation of neo-nationalism in specific cases of political party 
propaganda. In the present chapter, attention shifts away from the 
parties' pro-European periphery to their construction of the nationalist 
core. Further evidence of party rhetoric will be brought to illustrate the 
more general dynamics shaping party ideology and strategy, which will 
be described using Laclau and Mouffe's terminology. Tapping away at 
the public face of a party in this way is rather like cracking open an 
egg; the outer shell of rhetoric reveals the substance of strategy, which 
surrounds the ideological centre. In terms of discourse theory, the core 
of an ideology, which has repeatedly been the subject of discussion 
since Michael Freeden's distinction between core and peripheral 
ideological principles was introduced in chapter one, can be equated to 
a nodal point of discourse. In turn, this nodal point corresponds to the 
nation in nationalist ideology. Indeed, the concept of the nation is a 
privileged point of partial fixation of discursive elements, given that it 
informs the organisation of nationalist ideology, the prioritisation of its 
principles and the shaping of its strategy. 
It will be remembered that, according to discourse theory, 
ideology is a form of discourse geared towards decontesting concepts 
in order to create the illusion that social structures are unified and thus 
'real'. 1 The system of interrelated differences constructed by ideology 
is presented as fixed and immutable in order to hide its contingency 
and vulnerability to being superseded by a competing hegemonic 
project.2 Nationalist ideologies differ, however, depending both on 
how parties interpret the nation and how they combine emotional and 
rational appeals strategically in order to attract support. Parties wi 11 go 
1 "Instances of assertions such as 'this is what liberty means', and 'that is what justice 
means' are attempts to limit the essential contestability of political terms". A. Norval 
The Things we do with Words: Contemporary Approaches to theAnalysis of 
Ideology p. 323. 
2 "National identity is always a project, the success of which depends upon being 
seen as an essence". S. Reicher & N. Hopkins Self and Nation p. 222. 
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about articulating concepts in different ways according to the context 
in which they evolve. One instance is the nature of the antagonism 
created by ideological friction between different world-views. It will 
be shown that discourse theory provides an illuminating framework 
within which to present empirical data. 3 
The first section of the chapter will apply Laclau and Mouffe's 
conception of the nodal point to the. SNP' s construction of the Scottish 
nation and the CSU' s interpretation of the Bavarian Heimat. Section 
two will look at the· parties' ques't for conceptual· hegemony. The 
dominant role enjoyed· by. the CSU's, articulation of. the Heimat in 
Bavaria will be contrasted . to the · SNP' s · attempt to gain wider 
acceptance for its construction of Scottish national identity. The final 
section will return ,to 1the d)'namics :ofr antagon.ism :in discourse theory. 
Conflicting .articulations of concepts' and. the' I identity ·crises to which 
they give rise wjll be discussed in terms of the presence of the 'Other' 
in party rhetoric. Once again; party literature and interviews conducted 
with party workers and parliamentarians will form the basis of the 
discussion. Interview data is .an important source ·of evidence of the 
neo-nationalist ideologies being propagated and provides illuminating 
insights into the thinking behind party strategy. Investigating how the 
SNP and CSU seek to · link a politically neutral sense of national 
belonging to support for; their political programmes is particularly 
interesting in an age when: the multiple identities of voters must be 
considered. It will , become, clear;. for instance, . that the immediate 
'Other' can be incorporated ·or.repudiated in a neo-nationalist world-
view. A discussion in terms of discourse theory will serve to clarify the 
way in which concepts, are: manipulated in the parties' bid for 
ideological hegemony. The ultimate :'unfixity' of identity construction 
·can effectively be approached: from· a post-modem perspective, one 
which recognises the contingency of discourse and the instability of 
meantng. 
3 Chapter two, section two offers a more detailed discussion of discourse theory and 
its applicability to studies of neo-nationalist ideology. 
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I The Articulation of the National Nodal Point 
The Scottish nation as a nodal point 
The attempt to mobilise national loyalty for the SNP's ends can 
be traced through all of its campaigns, but is most obvious in the 1999 
Scottish election slogan; 'The SNP - Scotland's Party'. The party's 
creation of this link between party and nation associates support for the 
SNP with a feeling of Scottish belonging, thereby politicising national 
identity. In Laclau and Mouffe's terminology, this national identifier 
corresponds to a nodal point, as all principles of SNP ideology are 
organised around the prioritisation of the Scottish nation, first and 
foremost. This is expressed in the following appraisal of self-
determination, which was quoted with approval at the SNP's 1998 
annual conference; 
Self-determination is not some single-issue campaign. Everything that 
matters politically is contained within it.4 
Party ideology is thus structured around the nodal point of the nation 
and the pursuit of self-determination, just as the CSU makes the 
concept of Heimat central to its own political programme. However, as 
examples of SNP rhetoric illustrate, the imagery used by the party to 
convey its message is somewhat more inclusive than that employed by 
the Bavarian party, pointing to a very different articulation of the 
national identifier in each case. 
An SNP leaflet aimed at 'New Scots' (defined as "people from 
any nation who have come to live in Scotland, and who see their future 
in Scotland") uses upbeat and aspirational rhetoric to clarify their role 
in an independent Scotland. Explicitly targetted as potential SNP 
supporters, they are urged to "play a part in building a New Scotland". 
Instead of offering a vision of a nation steeped in tradition, the leaflet 
ends with the words; "It's where we are all going to that's important". 
The imagery used thus recalls that of the 'American dream' 
4 Ian Bell, quoted by Margaret Ewing MP in a speech to SNP Conference on 24th 
September 1998. 
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underpinning United States nationhood, according to which all citizens 
share a future if not a past. More generally, Salmond has stated; 
The achievement of independence relies on the people of Scotland -
and by that I mean all those who live in Scotland - to embrace a new 
future and to work for it.5 
This vague but forward-looking vision contrasts with the CSU's more 
vivid rendering of the Bavarian Heimat 's unique character and the 
need for traditional markers of identity to be cherished. Although the 
CSU pays equal attention to the theme of progress, this aspect of its 
rhetoric remains embedded within the concept of Heimat, which is 
defined using markedly ethnic criteria. 6 The SNP also constructs a 
national Scottish stereotype in order to mobilise an a priori neutral 
sense of Scottish identity for its political project. 
For the SNP these policies have to be founded in the Scottish 
mainstream, in the reawakening of the themes of enterprise, 
compassion and democracy which are the three pillars of Scottish 
identity and Scotland's sense of selfworth.7 
However, this message is conveyed using inclusive, 'catch-all' 
rhetoric, such as the myth of Scots having an inherent tendency to 
support social justice. 8 Although the CSU and the SNP both have the 
nation as the nodal point of their ideologies, it is constructed very 
differently. The SNP uses a different "narrative strategy" to the CSU in 
its rhetoric.9 
Those reading the SNP's 1997 general election manifesto were 
asked to believe that, after independence, "Scotland will become a 
s From a speech to the London School of Economics on 24th February 1999. 
6 For a discussion of the traditional and progressive components in the apolitical 
meaning of the Heimat concept, see chapter six, part three. 
7 A lex Salmond, from a speech to the London School of Economics on 24th February 
1999. 
8 "The social conscience, the community spirit, the idea of the common weal has 
never been lost in Scotland. And Scotland's party will use these principles in our 
actions". Margaret Ewing MP, in a speech to SNP special conference, 13th March 
1999. See chapter five, section one for a fuller discussion of this myth in the context 
of the 'Penny for Scotland' campaign. 
9 H. Bhabha 'DissemiNation' in H. Bhabha (ed.) Narrating the Nation p.292. 
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wealthier, freer nation". 10 This is a prime example of a truth assertion 
that is justifiable within the system of differences constructed by 
nationalist ideology, but is contested by every other major party 
ideology in Scotland. The SNP goes about structuring its ideology 
around the nodal point of the nation by asserting a relationship 
between Scottish independence, wealth and freedom. In keeping with 
their articulation within a system of differences, these identities are 
defined in contrast to others. The following statement is an example of 
the rhetoric used by the party; 
Scotland today is being held back by the Union with England. An 
independent Scotland will be a magnet for investment and our 'Bill of 
Rights' will protect every citizen from government interference-
something that Britain does not do-and establish social justice in our 
land. 11 
The initial speculative statement is justified so as to appeal to as wide 
an audience as possible. First of all, the Union is blamed, a reminder 
of the SNP's core ideological commitment to independence. Further, 
the phrase "something that Britain does not do" invites the 
juxtaposition with "something that Scotland does". However, it is 
actually contrasted with an SNP policy, thereby subtly eliding 
Scotland and the SNP. This correspondence is further reinforced by 
the ambivalent use of the first person plural; "our Bill of Rights" refers 
to that drawn up by the SNP, but "our land" is evidently meant to 
mean that of the Scottish people. As was demonstrated in chapter five, 
SNP ideology is thus attributed to Scotland as a whole. The party 
attempts to delimit and define the. Scottish nation by characterising it 
as hemmed in by the Union, as in opposition to the UK government 
and as having a different mentality to the rest of Britain. In the system 
of differences the SNP constructs, voters are encouraged to identify 
with the nodal point of the Scottish nation as an alternative to the UK. 
The piece of SNP rhetoric reproduced above contains 
something that almost every potential voter can identify with 
positively. Portraying Scotland as a magnet for investment should 
reassure businessmen. The promise of social justice should appeal to 
10 SNP General Election Manifesto, 1997 p.5. 
11 Ibid. p.5. 
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those on the left of the political spectrum, while more conservative 
readers will be satisfied with the promise of freedom from government 
interference. Crucially, the national nodal point is not evoked 
rhetorically using ethnic markers of belonging. In this way, the core 
commitment to independence is supplemented by a 'catch-all' strategy; 
no stone that might hide a potential voter is left unturned. Such an 
approach is also symptomatic of an age in which multiple identities are 
the norm. In the space of a single sentence, voters are variously 
appealed to as Scots, as non-Britons, as entrepreneurs and as lovers of 
both social justice and individual freedom. This is indicative of the 
flexibility that the thinness of nationalist ideology allows, and also 
illustrates that ideological constructions of identities are unstable and 
adaptable. It is important to note, however, that a British identity is not 
deemed compatible with the SNP's interpretation of self-
determination. Whereas the CSU pursues national autonomy within a 
larger polity and accordingly incorporates a German element in its 
• 
articulation of Bavarian identity, the SNP constructs a dual Scottish 
and European identity instead. 
The party's definition of the nation and its v1s1on of an 
independent Scotland are mutually dependent. John Swinney 
commented; 
Of course we are proud about what we are but not in a conservative 
sense of wanting to maintain something against changes. We actually 
want to do something better. 
The party's criteria of belonging are not based on ethnicity, but rather 
on voluntaristic participation 1n a multicultural society. 12 
Consequently, the net for membership of the Scottish nation is thrown 
wide to include anyone resident. 13 The party also points to affiliated 
organisations such as Asian Scots for Independence and New Scots for 
Independence, which are used to deflect accusations of racism and 
anti-Englishness respectively. Kevin Pringle pointed out that; 
12 Kevin Pringle commented; "We stand for the whole nation, nobody's excluded 
[ ... ]Everybody's in, basically, and we can all look forward together". 
13 "The right of Scottish citizenship will belong to all those resident in Scotland on 
the date of Independence and to those who were born in Scotland but are resident 
elsewhere". SNP Citizens not Subjects. 
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We're all Scots and some of the most passionate Scots are those who 
are recent incomers into the country, many of whom are active in the 
SNP whether they're from the rest of the UK or the. Indian 
subcontinent. 
This recognition of Scottish multiculturalism confirms that the SNP's 
national nodal point is constructed differently to that of the CSU, 
whose Heimat concept is articulated in opposition to multiculturalism. 
Unlike the Heimat concept, which is primarily targetted towards 
members of the Bavarian Stiimme, the SNP's depiction of Scottish 
belonging has few connotations of birth or tradition, since it is 
presented in terms of voluntaristic attachment rather than as a historical 
artefact. Neil MacCormick made the following comment; 
The growing concept of Scots has I think always been essentially a 
civic concept; you work within and pay your allegiance to these 
institutions, this place, then you belong. There's also of course the 
ancestral element but in that sense it's true that the Fortes [Scottish 
entrepreneurs of Italian extraction] are as ancestrally Scottish as the 
Mackays in America [ ... ] The exciting thing about multicultural 
cultures is that they have a place for all of them. 
An examination of the CSU's articulation of the nation will compare 
and contrast it with the Scottish case. 
The Bavarian Heimat as a nodal point 
,. 
The central role of the Heimat in CSU rhetoric corresponds to 
its articulation as a nodal point ofnationalist ideology. Indeed, from it 
emanates the ideological justification for many party policies. 
Environmental policy and city planning are presented in terms of 
protecting the Heimat. The CSU's position on Europe is argued to be 
in the best interests of the Heimat. Crucially, emphasis on the fact that 
the party stands only in Bavaria suggests that it best understands the 
Bavarian mentality, even to the point of embodying the Heimatland. 
The concept of Heimat is central in articulating the identity of the party 
as Bavarian. As an ideological nodal point, it provides the springboard 
from which to create a rhetorical correspondence between party, 
people and Land. By asserting such a close relationship between party 
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and Land, the CSU is attempting to make a highly ideological 
conceptual link appear 'common sense' - namely that between a 
politically neutr'ftl Bavarian identity and a vote for the party. 14 This 
corresponds to an "attempt to establish a definitive suture and to deny 
the radically open character of the social". 15 A recent example of party 
literature provides a graphic representation of the way the CSU depicts 
the Heimat as rooted in the permanence of the Bavarian landscape. 
The CSU' s manifesto for the 1998 Bavarian elections contained 
statements of party policy. in .. areas such as. education, unemployment, 
security and industry. Other, than: the campaign slogan, no general 
principles emphasising. the. CSU's. commitment to Bavaria were 
included. Instead, subtle .visual imagery was opted for. The entire 
manifesto was ·printed, on.~p~per. 'depicting· a bucolic scene in pastel 
colours, thus rendenng. in·· P.i~torial '.'rorm the beauty of the Bavarian 
landscape and, by extension; .of the Heimat it symbolises. In this way . ' '.'·· ' ' 
the national theme. was; .literally,· always·. in the background of the 
manifesto, without. being, explicitly formulated. As an inchoate 
message appealing to aesthetic sensibilities, it was designed to be 
attractive to potential voters .in much the same way as the concept of 
Heimat is repeatedly used in. party rhetoric to evoke a positive sense of 
Bavarian belonging. Such an image aims for conceptual hegemony at a 
level more subliminal··· than: general statements of principle. 
Furthermore, it shows the party decontesting a concept with no a priori 
,,1 . • ' 
political content to its ow~ :!advantage. The highly politically ·charged 
concept of the Nation, on the other hand; is used to designate the wider 
German context. It has been tre~te.d rhetorically with greater reserve, 
despite strong undercurre~ts .of~· party.: loyalty to a traditional, ethnic 
understanding of the natio~}.6 (By reinventing Heimat and Nation in a 
way acceptable to Bavari~n;·~~d· German. sensibilities, the CSU adapts 
its articulation of the nati6nal ~odal point to Bavarian society. An 
14 In advertising circles Bavaria, its government and the CSU are referred to as 'the 
Holy Trinity'. Team 70, an advertising company which worked on CSU campaigns 
for over twenty-five years, was particularly,successful at expressing this ideological 
sleight of hand visually. Cf. the CSU posters reprinted in B. Haneke & R. Hop finger 
( eds.) Gechichte einer Volkspartei - 50 Jahre CSU pp. 769-816. 
15 E. Laclau & C.lvfouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p. 187. 
16 See chapter six, section three for a discussion of the concept of Nation in CSU 
rhetoric. 
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important element of party strategy is to portray the CSU itself as a 
component of the Heimat construct. 
In chapter six, it was discussed to what extent the party equates 
itself rhetorically with the national nodal point. This refers to much 
more than the fact that it is unique in standing exclusively in Bavaria. 
The CSU' s influence in the economic development of the Land since 
the Second World War, its half-century of agenda-setting in 
government and its protection of Bavarian tradition are all highlighted. 
The contribution of the CSU's non-confessional stance to overcoming 
the religious cleavages which characterised Bavarian politics is also 
underlined. Further, the party's articulation of Bavarian identity is 
presented as all-encompassing enough to be attractive to all the 
Bavarian Stiimme, including the ethnic German exiles from Eastern 
Europe. For instance, emphasis on the party's federal role is likely to 
appeal to Franconians, who have a historically greater affinity with the 
German state than the south. Finally, charismatic figures such as Franz 
Josef Strauf3 and Edmund Stoiber are styled as representative of a 
world-view attractive to many Bavarian voters. 17 By extension, the 
CSU seeks to embody a collective Bavarian identity (gesamtbayerische 
Identitiit). The successful integration of these sources of dissent and 
difference into its ideology cements the party's link to the idealised 
Heimat depicted in its rhetoric. 
Charles Westen summed up the CSU' s Bavarian identity as 
follows; 
[It consists] in its strong rootedness, together with the people in this 
Land, in the landscape, also in the Bavarian culture which has evolved 
and the self-confidence that goes along with that. [Also] one and a half 
17 Siegfried Muller commented; "Franz JosefStrau.f3 was the one who, let's say, 
embodied Bavaria politically. Edinund Stoiber has achieved recognition among the 
entire Bavaria population as the representative of Bavaria and he is greatly endorsed 
as a person, even substantially more than his party is". ["Franz JosefStrau.f3 [war] 
derjenige der, sagen wir, Bayem politisch verkorpert hat [Edmund Stoiber] ist es 
gelungen in der gesamten bayerischen Bevolkerung als Repdisentant Bayems 
anerkannt zu werden und er hat eine ungeheuer Zustimmung zu seiner Person, auch 
wesentlich hoher noch als zur Partei".] 
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thousand years of independence as opposed to Baden-Wiirttemberg, a 
product of the post-war period. 18 
-
As such, the CSU itself seeks to be a symbol with an integrative 
function, which it portrays rhetorically as a complicity between party 
and Land so complete as to be symbiotic. Its resistance to accepting the 
multiculturalism of Bavarian society only consolidates the 
homogeneous picture it paints of the Heimat. The CSU's appeal to 
ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe as the fourth Bavarian Stamm, in 
contrast to its refusal to describe Germany or Bavaria as an 
Einwanderungsland, supports the view that the party's Heimat 
construct has an important ethnic component. 19 The CSU has done 
something to offset this aspect of its rhetoric by appropriating a myth 
depicting Bavarians as a hospitable and open people, using the slogan, 
'live and let live' .20 However, this rhetorical strand is used primarily in 
connection with the party's conception of liberalism and social justice, 
and is by no means as strongly emphasised as the Heimat construct.21 
CSU rhetoric applies the principle of unity in limited diversity 
to the national, state and European political arenas with the same 
ideological aim; the preservation of Bavarian autonomy and the 
defence of its interests both within Europe and the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The party's attempt to provide a general national identifier 
18 ["[Es besteht] aus der starken Verwurzelung mit den Menschen in diesem Land, 
aus der Landschaft, auch aus der gewachsenen Kultur Bayems und das 
Selbstbewu13tsein, das damit einhergeht. [Auch] anderthalb Tausend Jahre 
Eigenstaatlichkeit im Unterschied zu Bad en-Wiirttemberg, ein Produkt der 
Nachkriegszeit".] 
19 In the late 1990s, the CSU politician Peter Gauweiler repeatedly called for the 
principle that Bavaria is not a land of immigration to be enshrined in the Bavarian 
constitution. Jeffrey Peck notes that if Heimat can be defined in contrast to all that is 
foreign or distant, "then those outsiders desiring Germany as a Heimat can never 
hope to achieve this status." J. Peck 'Rac(e)ing the Nation: Is there a German 
'Home?" in G. Eley & R. Suny (eds.) Becoming National: A Reader at p. 483. 
20 Jorg Vogel, a source outwith the CSU, noted the existence of this myth in Bavarian 
political culture; "In general it is the case that the Bavarians are assumed to be a 
liberal people. There is, after all, the Bavarian motto 'live and let live"'. ["Das ist 
insgesamt so, dal3 den Bayem nahegelegt wird, dal3 sie ein liberates Yolk sind. Es 
gibtja das bayerische Motto 'leben und leben lassen"'.] 
21 A CSU campaign flyer produced for the Bavarian election of 1998 included the 
sentence; "Our basic principles are liberalitas bavariae, or live and let live, but 
solidarity with those who need our support". ["Unsere Grundsatze lauten; liberalitas 
bavariae, also leberi und le ben lassen, aber Solidaritat mit denjenigen, die unsere 
Unterstiitzung brauchen".] Note how the phrase 'leben und leben lassen' is also 
given in its Latin form so as to lend a veneer of age-old tradition to the myth. 
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at the domestic level is the rhetorical translation of this core 
ideological goal. 22 Its strategy of rhetorically relating the elements of 
people, party and land revolves around the nodal point of the Heimat. 
The myth of Bavaria's historical rootedness and unity serves to 
perpetuate the illusion that the CSU's interpretation of the Land as 
Heimat is not a contingent ideological construct. This prioritisation and 
politicisation of the national nodal point much resembles the strategy 
employed by the SNP with reference to the Scottish nation. 
The SNP and the CSU articulate their nationalist ideologies 
around the nodal point of the nation and the Heimat respectively. In 
each case, the ideological role of these concepts is the same, although 
the meaning attributed to them in party rhetoric is quite different. Both 
concepts have an organising, referential function within an ideological 
system of differences. In turn, the construction of national stereotypes 
derived from them is highly strategic. By being as inclusive as possible 
in its rhetoric, the SNP is making a bid for conceptual hegemony in a 
way adapted to political culture in Scotland. The articulation of 
'Britain' as the undesirable 'Other' is intended to promote negative 
feelings towards the status quo and encourage identification with 
Scottish independence as an alternative. Moreover, rhetorical devices 
are used to blur the distinction between Scotland and the SNP, in order 
to make this conceptual linkage appear uncontested common sense. 
The CSU uses the same rhetorical techniques, but is less inclusive in 
its appeals to the Bavarian Heimat. On the other hand, its articulation 
of the concept contains a German element. The flexibility of H.eo-
nationalist parties in the constructi9n of national identities is indicative 
of the many interpretations of self-determination by contemporary 
nationalist parties. It shows that independence is rarely constructed as 
an absolute in neo-nationalist ideology, but is combined with other 
levels of governance instead. Based on Maarten Hajer's definition of 
hegemony, discussed in chapter two, the following section will 
22 "In this way it is only consistent that the CSU should continue its attempts to 
represent peculiarly Ltinder interests as a regional party, to cultivate a style typical of 
the Land and at the same time as a federal force, to influence political decision-
making which affects national (sic.) and international politics". G. Hirscher Die CSU 
nach den Wahlen 1998 p. 440 (my translation). 
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compare the parties' relative success at persuading central actors to 
accept the rhetorical power of the national nodal point. 23 
11 Conceptual Hegemony 
The SNP 
The fact that the SNP stands only in Scotland makes it a 
Scottish party, but the intuitively plausible extension of its identity to 
'Scotland's party' is in fact highly ideologically charged. Peter Murrell 
points to the SNP's advantage in trying to mobilise Scottish identity, 
although he somewhat overstates its strength by suggesting that the 
correspondence between party and nation is taken for granted by the 
Scottish public.24 In fact, spirited contestation of this linkage means 
that it has by no means become hegemonic in Scottish political 
discourse.25 To return to Hajer's definition of the condition of 
discourse struct~ration, central actors have not been persuaded by, or 
forced to accept, the rhetorical power of new discourse. In the run-up 
to the Scottish parliament election, the tendency "to think that, because 
it is Scotland, you should vote SNP" was hotly disputed by the SNP' s 
political opponents.26 Donald Dewar, then leader of the Scottish 
Labour party, expressed himself thus; 
I object to the arrogance of saying they [the SNP] are Scotland's party 
and the very clear implication of much of their propaganda that those 
that don't accept their political ideology are somehow betraying 
Scotland or are not true Scots. I think I am every bit as legitimate an 
23 Maarten Hajer defines discourse structuration as the condition whereby "central 
actors are persuaded by, or forced to accept, the rhetorical power of a new 
discourse". City Politics: Hegemonic Projects and Discourse p. 47. Cf. chapter two, 
section three for a discussion of Hajer and Hall's respective applications of the 
concept of hegemony to empirical studies. 
24 Peter Murrell commented; "The SNP has that credibility anyway. If you asked the 
question, do you think the SNP puts Scottish interests first, then the obvious answer 
would be yes[ ... ] It's taken for granted, really, by the Scottish public". 
25 Maarten Hajer defines a hegemonic project "as a political project which constitutes 
a general political-strategic programme at a specific political institutional level." City 
Politics: Hegemonic Projects and Discourse p. 32. 
26 This was a response by a member of a focus group conducted by The Scotsman on 
the subject of attituaes to Scottish political parties, the results of which were 
published in the newspaper on 4th May 1999. This view was not shared by all other 
focus group members, one of whom even expressed fear of the SNP. 
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interpreter of Scottish optntons as Mr Salmond or any of his 
colleagues?7 
This illustrates that the party has not achieved the discourse 
structuration which Hajer points to as a condition of conceptual 
hegemony?8 Thus, the SNP's bid for hegemony is still a project, 
geared towards making its ideological interpretation of the Scottish 
nation not only acceptable but also dominant within Scottish political 
culture. Despite the SNP's attempts to profile its neo-nationalist 
. ide?logy in overwhelmingly positive terms, this construction has been 
effectively contested by opposition parties, who use the rhetoric of 
divorce, isolationism·· and separatism to undermine the party's 
independence project This demonstrates what Laclau and Mouffe term 
an . antagonism; ideological friction which a hegemonic articulation 
, atte~pts to ·~ve~c.ome by establishing a relatively stable, uncontested 
. · syste~, of me~i~g. 29 'Some of the most contested areas in Scottish 
•: . political, discourse and the SNP's contribution to these debates are 
dis.cussed below. 
The nationalist label can be something of a handicap to the 
SNP, as its eagerness to differentiate itself from other parties as non-
British can easily: be spun by opponents as evidence of anti-English 
rhetoric. Neil MacCormick commented that; 
The. trouble is: we. always have to say that we're more 'X' than 
somebody else and it is. usually more 'X' than the English. 
Therefore, the party is keen to ptlsh its project for Scotland to the fore 
tn ·.order. to· detract· attention from comparisons with its southern 
27 Quoted in The Scotsman, 4th April 1999. During the same campaign, prime 
minister Tony Blair gave his own interpretation of the image the SNP were trying to 
convey;" 'We are called the Scottish Nationalists therefore we are for Scotland' [ ... ] 
But the people who are most patriotic are the people who have the best policies for 
Scotland. I think all the way through what the SNP want to do is avoid the difficult 
piercing questions and say 'we are more Scottish than you"'. Quoted in The 
Scotsman, 9th April 1999. · 
28 "Depending on the way in which a national identity is defmed, it can be used to 
mobilize the population to any end, not only those which envisage a separate national 
state". S. Reicher & N. Hopkins Self and Nation p. 217. 
29 E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Ch. 3. 
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neighbour.3° For instance, parallels with other small nations are 
pointed to in preference to contrasts with England. Further, by 
profiling itself as a purely political movement, the SNP has always 
sought to distance itself from literary, romantic or cultural nationalism. 
Undoubtedly, the party fears that too much of an emphasis on tradition 
will lay it open to accusations of exclusive nationalism, parochialism, 
out-datedness and so on. 31 Those SNP members interviewed 
recognised that the negative connotations of nationalism could not be 
ignored and, as John Swinney put it, that the party had to "attempt to 
find ways to make [its] message more acceptable". 32 One instance of 
this is the party's current worry that it articulates its message too 
aggressively and thereby alienates female voters in particular.33 In 
constructing a system of differential identities around the nodal point 
of the nation, the party has been unable to surmount opposition to its 
rhetorical presentation of nationalism and have it generally accepted in 
the Scottish political arena . 
• 
As a means of distancing the party both from the negative 
campaigning of the opposition and the negative connotations of 
nationalism, the general consensus among those interviewed was that 
the rhetoric used by the SNP should be 'aspirational'. This has become 
a central component in the party's characterisation of itself as positive 
and forward-looking. 34 It is expressed in party rhetoric as a 
30 "So let us lay it on the line. This party doesn't blame the English or anyone else for 
the state of Scotland. At each and every election we have the ability to vote ourselves 
into independence". Alex Salmond, in an address to SNP conference on 25th 
September 1998. 
31 Mike Russell commented; "I used to be astonished by Michael Forsyth [former 
Conservative secretary of state for Scotland] getting away with the rhetoric he had 
because we would never have got away with it". Peter Murrell noted; "We're very 
careful about how to promote ourselves, that we don't let [our opponents] pigeon-
hole us". 
32 Alasdair Morgan was of the opinion that the party would be better off without the 
word 'national' in its name. Neil MacCormick was careful to point out that the SNP 
was a 'national' as opposed to a 'nationalist' party, presumably in order to distance 
the party from the fascist connotations of nationalism. 
33 John Swinney associated "the disparity between male and female support for the 
SNP" with "the very hard edge with which we articulate our message sometimes". 
34 The aspirational element is illustrated in this example of rather high-flown rhetoric; 
"Our vision is, to touch that Scottish horizon of national freedom[ ... ] Let us inspire 
the people - all the people - with our vision and with our sense of excitement and 
infinite possibility. Let us help all of Scotland to touch, to grasp, to reach that 




combination of emotional and rational arguments for Scottish 
independence, perhaps best summed up in Alex Salmond' s evocation 
of an independent Scotland as 'a rich country' and 'a rich society'. 35 
All the party representatives interviewed were quite sanguine about the 
need for emotional appeals in politics. Kevin Pringle stated; 
I think you always have to pursue a kind of heart and head campaign 
and I think, though the logical arguments for independence must 
always be put, there's always a case, of course, for mobilising people's 
attachment and sense of loyalty to Scotland. 
This appraisal of SNP strategy is an illustration of Andreas Geier's 
point that "it is precisely the combination of the most diverging levels 
of identification and loyalty that guarantees the permanence of the 
national hegemonic project".36 Despite the fact that its rhetoric rests on 
a coherent and - above all - costed ideology, the SNP nevertheless 
demands a leap of faith from its voters. George Kerevan summed up 
the required blend of emotion and rationality which characterises the 
party; 
The rhetoric of nationalism now is very much a kind of modernist, 
economic balance-sheet. It always amuses me because it is a highly 
emotional party. The party is still charged with this 'we-are-Scottish-
thing' and is genuinely desperate not to be anti-English. 37 
Although the rhetorical presentation of the SNP's message may 
have been made 'softer' and more nuanced, its core ideological goal 
has not changed. When asked to state the central message of the pa.rty, 
Bruce Crawford replied; 
Well, we are Scotland's party. I mean, we may talk about the economy 
and social justice, but I mean primarily we are there to stand up for 
Scotland. 
35 Alex Salmond in a speech to an SNP special conference in Aberdeen on 13th March 
1999. Cf. "While Scotland is a rich country we are not yet a rich society nor will we 
be until we fundamentally change some of our priorities". A lex Salmond, in a debate 
with Donald Dewar on 4th February 1999, published in the Scotsman on 5th February 
1999. 
36 A. Geier Hegemonie der Nation p. 191. 
37 Kerevan went on to point out that many senior economists are quite open to the 
prospect of independence but would never consider joining the SNP, concluding; 
"You can't not have some emotional commitment to independence if you 're going to 
join". 
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However, the SNP's articulation of the national nodal point has not 
gained as wide an acceptance in Scottish political culture as the CSU' s 
construction of the Heimat, which has achieved conceptual hegemony 
in Bavaria. As has been shown, the crucial conceptual linkage the SNP 
seeks to create between people and party is very much contested by its 
political opponents. Its rhetorical construction of a symbiotic bond 
between the two in the phrase 'Scotland's party' has not become 
dominant in the same way as the CSU is accepted as the archetypal 
Bavarian party. 
The CSU 
The CSU's hegemonic project is exemplified in this quote, 
taken from the CSU' s 1994 manifesto for the Bavarian parliament 
elections; 
• 
The Republic of Bavaria - that is not just a label, that was and is a 
political manifesto.38 
This is an explicit expression of the party's wish to mould Bavaria into 
a reflection of its ideology. The CSU uses a typical nationalist 
technique in that it 'forgets' historical episodes unhelpful to its cause, 
such as the revolutionary origins of Bavaria's Freistaat status, as 
proclaimed during a short-lived Bavarian soviet republic following the 
First World War. Instead, the party attaches a new meaning to a 
symbol of national sovereignty by linking the label to its own political 
project, leaving behind any connotations of a Communist one! In terms 
of discourse theory, this can be characterised as the CSU's 
rearticulation of the concept of Bavaria into a nodal moment of its 
ideology.39 What concerns us here is the success of the CSU's bid for 
discursive hegemony over the concept of Bavaria as Heimat. 
38 ["Freistaat Bayern- das ist nicht nur ein Etikett, das war und ist politisches 
Programrn".] 
39 It will be remembered that Laclau and Mouffe define moments as differential 
positions articulated within a discourse, and elements as differences yet to be 
discursively articulated. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p. I 05 
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The CSU has rearticulated concepts such as Nation and Heimat 
from the discursive formation of Nazism to moments of post-war 
discourse. However, the difficult relationship of Germans. to the 
concept of Nation was discussed in chapter six. Attempts to 
rehabilitate it continue, most recently in the debate surrounding a 
'leading' German culture (Leitkultur) which, according to CDU 
politicians at least, demands a re-evaluation of the word Vaterland.40 
Most interesting for our purposes is that, within these high-profile 
party political debates, the concept of Heimat remains uncontested.41 A 
book of discussion papers published in 1984 by the Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, entitled 'Heimat und Nation', set out to contribute to the 
debate on German identity in the context of the division of Germany 
and the process of European integration. Notwithstanding the book's 
.title, the concept of Heimat was defined apolitically and thereafter 
mentioned only fleetingly, signalling its neglect as a tool of political 
debate.42 In this context, the CSU's political articulation of the concept 
in Bavaria is quite remarkable.43 Consider, for instance, Jeffrey Peck's 
view that; 
40 See the BBC news online article, German CDU says immigrants must 'conform', 
6th November 2000, at 
http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/hi/englishlworld/europe/newsid 1010000/101 0281.stm, 
consulted on 8th April2001. The question of national pride continues to be a vexed 
one. The German environment minister Jiirgen Trittin caused a great deal of 
controversy in March 2001 by likening a CDU politician's expression of pride in his 
nationality to a remark one might expect from a skinhead. See President not 'proud' 
to be German, 20th March 200 1 at 
http:/ /news. bbc.co. uk/hi/englishlworldlmonitoring/media reports/newsid 1229000/1 
229754.stm, consulted on 8th April 2001. 
41 In academic circles, the concept of Heimat is discussed primarily within the 
discipline of cultural studies. See, for instance, Morley and Robins' discussion of the 
Heimatfilm genre and E. Reitz's acclaimed documentary entitled Heimat. D. Morley 
& K. Robins 'No place like Heimat: Images ofHome(land) in European Culture' in 
G. Eley & R. Suny (eds.) Becoming National: A Reader. C. Grafvon Krochow in 
Heimat. Erfahrungen mit einem deutschen Thema, discusses the concept in terms of 
the ethnic German A ussiedler exiled from Eastern Europe following the Second 
World War. Although this event has political ramifications to this day, both studies 
define the concept of Heimat in apolitical terms as a homeland, a territory and 
memory of origin, replete with identity-building connotations of childhood, 
belonging and security. 
42 "People in the federal republic of Germany identify the concept of Heimat either 
primarily with a place of personal security or with where their first social orientation 
in life took place". 'Introduction' to K. Weigelt (ed.) Heirnat und Nation p. 15. The 
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung is a trust affiliated to the CDU. 
43 J. Peck 'Rac(e)ing the Nation: Is there a German 'Home?" in G. Eley & R. Suny 
(eds.) Becoming National: A Reader at p. 489. 
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[W]holeness, totality and harmony is very much a romantic, utopian 
notion not realizable in the political entities people use as reference 
points for defining themselves [ ... ] Heimat, the territorial vision of 
such an ideology., also remains unattainable. 
The CSU finds itself in the situation of having successfully 
decontested the concept of the Heimat to its advantage. Opposition 
parties have been unable to forge their own peculiarly Bavarian 
identity attractive to voters. An illustration of this is the SPD's failed 
attempt to present itself as 'the other Bavaria' (das andere Bayern) in a 
1970s campaign. The slogan does not attempt to subvert or even 
challenge the CSU's ideological interpretation of Bavaria as Heimat. 
Indeed, its proposed alternative is explicitly derived from the CSU's 
world-view and thus confirms that central actors have been forced to 
accept the rhetorical power of CSU discourse.44 
The SPD can dream on about the 'other Bavaria'. It knows nothing of 
the real Bavarict-45 
The failure of SPD campaigns to mobilise alternative national myths 
was more than a temporary setback for the opposition in Bavaria. 
Rather, it was proof that the CSU's ideological penetration of the 
political arena is practically complete, given that even its strongest 
political opponents cannot successfully contest its concepts. Alf 
Mintzel points out the tendency for even SPD voters to identify with 
certain symbols of Bavarian identity, such as traditionalism and 
conservatism, which do not seem to tally with their party political 
orientation.46 The CSU thus fulfils Hajer's condition of discourse 
44 Another example of an SPD slogan which backfired is commented by Max Streibl 
as follows; "The SPD has chosen 'Let's preserve Bavaria' as its campaign slogan. 
What can this mean, then? It can only mean that Bavaria should remain the way it is. 
And let me add; the way it has become under the CSU! Is there really any better way 
to acknowledge our politics?" ["Die SPD hat das Wahlkampfmotto gewahlt 'Bayem 
bewahren.' Ja was kann das denn wohl heil3en? Das kann doch wohl nichts anderes 
heil3en, als dal3 Bayem so bleiben soli, wie es ist. Und ich fiige hinzu: wie es unter 
der CSU geworden ist! Gibt es eigentlich eine bessere Bestatigung ftir unsere 
Politik?"] From a speech published in the Bayernkurier on 21 51 July 1990, in the run-
up to regional elections. 
45 ["Die SPD mag weiter von dem 'anderen Bayem' traumen. Vom wirklichen 
Bayem weil3 sie nichts".] (emphasis in original transcript.) From a speech by 
Edmund Stoiber in Munich on 21 51 October 1995. 
46 A. Mintzel Die CSU - Hegemonie in Bayem Ch. 5. To quote Claus Mueller~ "The 
manipulation of language was stronger than their convictions". C. Mueller The 
Politics of Communication p. 58. 
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structuration. The SPD, to quote Stuart Hall, had to "perform with the 
established terms of the problematic in play".47 
That the party is clear on the rhetorical strategy required to 
propagate its ideology is illustrated in the following quote from Franz 
Josef StrauB; 
The danger is the gradual transformation of our society, from the 
violation of language and the distortion of concepts through the 
· narrowing of·consciousness to the transformation of reality. We, the 
csu,1 must take up the fight for language again and win the battle over 
. concepts ifwe want to change political reality.48 
This, statement is· quite consonant with discourse theory, which 
.. port.~ays ideolog.ical.competition in terms of a "battle over concepts". 
·. ·.· Sbi~B Tecognises that the "fight fo~ language" leads to the power to 
· ,' ·~ change political reality, or in Hajer's terms, to achieve the condition of 
·. · . disc.ourse institutionalisation.~9 Ultimately, Strauf3 aspires to achieve a 
hegemonic· · articulation by redefining the meaning of concepts to 
.correspond to. a. new ·."political reality". He was speaking in 1979, 
1,: 
· when Germany was governed by a socialist-liberal coalition and the 
CSU/CDU was in opposition at the federal level. However, at Land 
level; the CSU has achieved just such a hegemonic articulation. Within 
. Ba~aria, . it has constructed a sophisticated system of discursive 
· differences around .the Heimat, in which different levels of identity are 
related both to party affinities and national symbols. 
· . ; The phrase "Bavaria is our Heimat, Germany is our Vaterland 
· · and. ~urope is'· our~· future" is often repeated by party members to 
47 S. Hall 'The Rediscovery of 'Ideology" in J. Rivkin & M. Ryan (eds.) Literary 
Theory: An Anthology p. 1061 
48 ("Die Gefahr ist die schrittweise Vedinderung unserer Gesellschaft, durch die 
Vergewaltigung der Sprache und der Verfalschung der Begriffe iiber die Verengung 
des Bewu.l3tseins bis zur Vedinderung der Wirklichkeit. Wir, die Christlich-Sozialen, 
miissen wieder den K.ampf urn die Sprache aufnehmen, und die Schlacht urn die 
Begriffe gewinnen, wenn wir die politische Wirklichkeit andem wollen".] From a 
speech printed in the Bayernkurier on 14th April1979. 
49 "[T]he actual policy process is conducted according to the ideas of a given 
discourse (condition of discourse institutionalisation)". M. Hajer City Politics: 
Hegemonic Projects and Discourse p.48. 
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explain the party's differentiated understanding of Bavarian identity.50 
When taken in conjunction with another favourite slogan linking the 
concepts of Heimat to love, duty to Germany and responsibility to 
Europe, the levels of affinity become clear. Yet another variant is 'Wir 
wollen gute Europiier werden, Deutsche sein und Bayern bleiben ', 
translated as 'We want to become good Europeans, be Germans and 
remain Bavarians'. The verb bleiben has connotations of rootedness 
and longevity which sein does not convey.51 These multiple identities 
correspond to the CSU's dual role in German politics, which has 
involved carving out a niche at the federal level as the CDU' s 
indispensable acolyte, whilst retaining a uniquely Bavarian character. 
As the only important German regional party and as a coalition partner 
of its sister party, the CSU finds itself in the peculiar situation of 
having to make its presence felt in two political arenas. The rhetorical 
separation of the Bavarian Heimat from the German Vaterland helps 
to prevent confusion and illustrates the different levels of identity 
• 
being articulated by the party. In particular, any emotional affinity to 
the German nation is underplayed in CSU rhetoric. Emotional appeals 
are reserved for the Bavarian Heimat instead, in relation to which 
pride and love can be freely expressed without fear of soliciting 
unwanted comparisons with Nazi rhetoric. Articulating the Land's 
identity in such a way also strengthens a Bavarian-wide feeling of 
solidarity by underlining where primary loyalties lie; the CSU has 
always presented itself as a champion of Bavarian interests in 
Germany. 
Although the concept of the Nation is important to CSU 
ideology, it plays a relatively minor role in mobilising the Bavarian 
electorate behind the CSU's hegemonic project. Instead, the party 
constructs the Bavarian Heimat as a national nodal point and the 
primary focus of loyalty. The CSU's achievement of conceptual 
hegemony in Bavaria has not been emulated by the SNP, whose 
construction of the nation does not fulfil Hajer's condition of discourse 
so ["Bayem ist unsere Heimat, Deutschland ist unser Vaterland und Europa ist unsere 
Zukunft".] Although this phrase was coined by none other than Franz JosefStrau13, it 
is interesting to note that Ingo Friedrich described it as a Bavarian saying; ["Es gibt 
ein Spruch hi er in Bayem ... "] 
st From a speech by Max Streibl delivered on Ash Wednesday 1992, printed in the 
Bayernkurier on 14th March 1992. 
270 
• 
structuration within the Scottish political arena. The relationship 
between conceptual hegemony and the relative electoral dominance of 
the parties would be the subject of another study. What has been 
examined here is the effectiveness with which the concepts at each 
party's disposal have been appropriated and articulated in the service 
of their neo-nationalist ideologies. Building on the preceding 
discussion, the next section examines the interaction of the 
antagonistic practices inherent in these parties' ideologies with their 
discursive environments. 
Ill Antagonism in Nationalist Ideology 
Nationalist ideology is by its very nature deeply antagonistic 
towards the status quo, as it aspires to rearticulate the common sense 
understanding of a national construct, and thus revolutionise the 
discourse of a given historical bloc.52 In a "world-system of nation-
states", minority nationalist movements will inevitably cause friction 
with the relatively unified social and political space which they seek to 
transcend. 53 According to Laclau and Mouffe, identity crises. are the 
product of antagonistic ideologies struggling to rearticulate the 
meaning of contested concepts. In the context of nationalist ideology, 
the crisis revolves around the vexed question of national identity. 
Within a system of differences, the antagonism with the national 
'Other' is constitutive of identity and must therefore be resolved. By 
seeking to reconcile potentially antagonistic identities, parties respond 
to other ideologies competing to achieve conceptual hegemony. ~The 
European dimension of this proc.ess has been highlighted in previous 
chapters. In what follows, the state identities peripheral to the nodal 
national point - namely British and German identity - will be 
discussed. 
The neo-nationalist tendency to incorporate multiple levels of 
identity into their ideologies is a sign of flexibility in engaging with 
constructs in opposition to theirs. 54 For instance, the CSU's ideological 
52 For a theoretical discussion of the concepts of antagonism and historical bloc in 
Laclau and Mouffe 's thought, see chapter two, section two. 
53 C. Calhoun Nationalism Ch. 6. 
54 Elsewhere, I have characterised neo-nationalist ideology in terms of a choice 
between the exit and voice options, as theorised in Albert Hirschman 's typology. 
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combination of Bavarian and German identities is the rhetorical 
translation of its pursuit of Bavarian autonomy within the German 
federal structure. All other mainstream German parties support 
federalism and, by extension, a degree of Liinder autonomy. However, 
their interpretation of Bavaria's ·role within the federation is very 
different and there is necessarily friction with other ideological 
constructions of this differential identity. The SNP, on the other hand, 
presents the ideal Scottish! nation ; as independent of the United 
Kingdom construct, and thus plays down the Scottish experience of 
British identity. The following discussion will examine its rhetoric in 
more detai I. 
. The SNP 
'',,' I 
According to Alex · s·almond; ·.the : Scots . have had to contend 
with an inferiority complex. since the Act ofUnion in 1707; .. . ·,. ' ' . .· . . 
It is hard to under-estimate · the ' importance of self-confidence. For 
much of the last three hundred years Scotland has been told that it is 
· too small, too distant, too poor; or too stupid to govern itself. 55 
The perceived effect of' such claims on the Scottish electorate IS 
intimately linked to the party's attempts to encourage self-confidence. 
Despite the use of the passive,- Sahnond's reference to the time of the 
Act: of Union makes ·it· cl~ar that ·England is both the subject of 
· comparison and the source of criticism. In terms of discourse theory, 
SNP rhetoric aims . to · overcome an alleged · antagonism between 
Scottish and British identity. The question of the economic viability of 
an independent Scotland,:· for instari.c~,. highlights the unavoidable 
· presence of the English 'Other' ·in BNP rhetoric. The SNP is intent on 
demonstrating that Scotland 'is able to m'anage its own affairs without 
the help or support of its English neighbour. Unsurprisingly, this 
Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States. 
Cf. C. Sutherland Regional Nationalism in a Global Context; Exit, Voice and Loyalty 
from a National Perspective. 
ss From an address by Alex Salmond to the London School of Economics on 24th 
February 1999. A c.omment by Winnie Ewing is also worth noting; "Now that people 
have opened their eyes to Scotland's future, they do not let the old myths cloud their 
vision. They no longer believe Scotland is a poor country". From a speech to SNP 
conference on 25th September 1998. · 
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assertion is contested by the party's political opponents who claim that 
Scotland's relatively high level of social spending in the UK is 
subsidised by English tax-payers' money.56 The SNP's 'Penny for 
Scotland' campaign is an illustration of how the SNP seeks to resolve 
such an ideological antagonism by recourse to its articulation of the 
Scottish nation.57 Its ultimate aim is not to reconcile British and 
Scottish identity, a dualism that is the accepted norm for many Scots. 58 
Instead, slogans such as 'Scotland's party' show that the SNP's 
ideological response to these antagonistic identities is simply to focus 
on one and discard the other. The party translates its wish to end the 
Union into an exclusive rhetorical appeal to the Scottish identifier. In 
turn, it confronts unionist parties who combine Scottish and British 
identities with the claim that it is somehow 'more Scottish' than them. 
In much the same way as the CSU sums up its v1s1on for 
Bavaria as a combination of tradition and progress, SNP rhetoric 
centres on; 
The themes of enterprise, compassion and democracy which are the 
three pillars of Scottish identity and Scotland's sense of self worth. 59 
The link made in this p1ece of rhetoric between the SNP's 
interpretation of Scottish identity and its strategy of boosting voters' 
self-confidence could hardly be more explicit. Salmond elaborated on 
these pillars of identity during his address to the party conference in 
1998; 
Enterprise because no one in 'this world owes us a living [ ... ] 
Compassion because Scotland will flourish not only because its 
56 Cf. J. Mitchell The Myth of Dependency. 
57 For a more detailed discussion of the SNP's 'Penny for Scotland' campaign, see 
chapter five, section one. 
58 In an article on national identity published in The Scotsman on 16th April 1999, 
Tom Little commented; "Scots are, on the whole, perfectly comfortable with 
something which others might see ~s a dilemma. For most of us, there is nothing 
incompatible with being both Scottish and British". This appraisal is borne out in 
statistical surveys. The 'Moreno question,' which asks respondents if they feel 
Scottish, more Scottish than British, equally Scottish and British, more British than 
Scottish or British, invariably has a majority opting for one of the central three 
categories. Cf. A. Brown et a/ The Scottish Electorate p. 62. 
59 From an address by A lex Salmond to the London School of Economics on 24th 
February 1999. 
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economy will do well, but also because we shall be a just nation. [ ... ] 
Democracy because self-government for Scotland is not an event but a 
process. It is a process in which every institution is empowered by the 
d . . 1-le 60 emocrahc 1nte et. 
In this exposition of the benefits of choosing the Scottish national 
construct over the British one, the 'Other' is implicit in the statement 
that no one owes Scotland a living. In turn, the theme of Scottish 
responsibility for its own destiny recalls aspects of the economic 
debate on independence, as a counterweight to the emotive tone of the 
piece. The economic argument is then intertwined with the Scots' 
alleged predisposition towards social justice, thus tempering an 
evocation of material interests with moral considerations. These 
strands of argument are all employed by the SNP to tackle the Scottish 
constitutional question, and they all tend towards the same conclusion; 
the alleged superiority of an ideology prioritising the Scottish nation as 
opposed to the United Kingdom . 
• 
In the following remark, Alex Salmond sums up the rhetorical 
link between party and nation which is so central to any nationalist 
project. The phrase "secure identity" underlines how the SNP aims to 
present its ideological construct as fixed and 'true'; 
And so we have a secure identity as Scotland's Party based on our 
ideals of enterprise, compassion and democracy. However we also 
have something that is now very, very rare in politics. We have a 
vision of a new Scotland that transcends our experience.61 
The 'unknown' of independence is being spun here as inspiring, 
unique and exciting, in marked contrast to the images of darkness and 
insecurity favoured by the opposition.62 The general positivity of party 
rhetoric marks a move away from the more negative tone which was 
characteristic of past SNP campaigns. For instance, the party suffered 
negative fallout from the slogan 'It's Scotland's Oil' in the 1970s, 
60 Alex Salmond, in a speech to SNP conference in Inverness on 25th September 
1998. 
61 Ibid. 
62 "Even the same phrases and sayings can be used to mean fundamentally different 
things, to suggest fundamentally opposed notions of social relations as central to the 
national identity, and to mobilise support for fundamentally incompatible political 
parties and projects". S. Reicher & N. Hopkins Self and Nation p. 130. 
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which came to be associated with Scottish selfishness and money-
grabbing vis-a-vis England.63 The SNP is now eager to appear more 
upbeat, partly to distance itself from the backbiting associated with 
Westminster politics, and partly to foster a sense of optimism and 
confidence which it feels could persuade 'canny' Scots to support the 
party.64 This is succinctly expressed in the encouragingly titled 1997 
general election manifesto; 'YES WE CAN win the best for Scotland'. 
It is also evident in the confidence with which the party asserts that a 
vote for the SNP would bring about the full realisation of Scottish 
nationhood. Through such assertions, the SNP wishes to establish its 
interpretation of the independence project as more plausible than those 
of the political opposition. In terms of discourse theory, the contested 
meaning of 'independence' is symptomatic of ideological antagonism. 
One way the SNP goes about undermining other parties' rhetoric is to 
label it 'scaremongering'. Peter Murrell pinpointed the task at hand for 
nee-nationalists; 
We just have to find a mechanism to communicate the message beyond 
the scaremongering, because that's all it is. There's nothing wrong 
with the [SNP's] core vision. 
Indeed, the "core vision" has played a leading role in recent party 
campaigns. 
The slogan 'Scotland's Party' permeated the 1999 Scottish 
election campaign. Although it focuses on the fact that the SNP, by 
standing only in Scotland, has neither had to adapt nor adopt policies 
originating in England, the suggestion of a special spiritual relationship 
between the party and the Scottish people can also be inferred.65 John 
Swinney commented; 
What 'Scotland's Party' set out to do was align us with the common 
interest of people within Scotland. 
63 SeeR. Levy Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads p. 40 
64 On conflicting party political interpretations of the myth of Scots as canny, or 
cautious, seeS. Reicher & N. Hopkins Self and Nation Ch. 3. 
65 Alex Salmond made this clear in his address to the party conference on 25th 
September 1998. "First to our identity as Scotland's Party. Every other party to a 
greater or lesser extent still takes its orders from London". Kevin Pringle stated; 
"Basically, we are Scotland's party because we are the only party that is actually 
based in Scotland". 
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The party officially claims that Scottishness is not exclusive to the 
SNP. However, -the implications of the slogan are clearly otherwise. 66 
By asserting a direct link between the SNP and Scotland, the party 
implies that its political opponents are somehow less Scottish. Mike 
Russell, who coined the phrase, commented; 
What it's designed to say is that we're the people who identify most 
closely with Scotland and Scotland should identify most closely with 
us. That's what it means [ ... ] Whereas if you're Tories or Labour or 
Liberals your loyalty's going to be partially elsewhere at Westminster. 
We belong to you. I think that's what it says. 
Despite the fact that 'Scotland's Party' creates a distinction between 
parties and not nations, at least one party worker was unhappy with the 
message.67 
• In setting out to transcend British identity rather than reconcile it with 
Scottish identity, the SNP's brand of neo-nationalism lays itself open 
to attack. The party has great difficulty in shaking off its obvious 
'Other', particularly the equation of its desire to end the Union with a 
dislike for the English. An ideology that has no place for British 
identity is construed by its opponents to be hostile to that identity and, 
by extension, to those who adopt it. One of the SNP's responses to the 
charge of exclusivity, or 'narrow nationalism' has been to define 
Scottish identity very widely.68 
When Alex Salmond asked whether Labour's understanding of 
Scottishness might contain a whiff of ethnic nationalism, he 
emphasised the SNP's predominantly civic interpretation of the nation 
at the same time; 
66 This was recognised by Neil MacCormick but not by Kevin Pringle, who 
propounds the official party line; "We'd always argue that we don't have a monopoly 
on Scottishness and we'd never claim to do so. It's perfectly possible and valid to be 
Scottish and be a Labour voter". 
67 Peter Murrell quoted a focus group member who interpreted the slogan to mean 
that the SNP exist to put Scotland first. He then commented; "That's what we are 
trying to communicate but I'm not sure those two words communicate that message 
effectively[ ... ] It d.oesn't in itself explain what we are trying to say and we shouldn't 
expect voters to finish it for us". 
68 Alasdair Morgan referred to "narrow nationalism, though they [the SNP's 
opponents] never defme what wide nationalism would be!" 
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Donald [Dewar] was very keen to stress where he was born. He 
doesn't seem to understand that in the new Scotland it doesn't matter 
where you were born or where you are from. Our journey in Scotland 
is not about our past - its about the future~ It's about where we _are 
going to that matters - and going together. When you are confident 
about your nationhood you don't have to prove how Scottish you are. 
And when you are confident about your party you don't have to prove 
how Scottish it is. 69 
By suggesting that Dewar has simply not understood the 'truth' about 
Scotland, Salmond wishes to equate his own ideological view with 
common sense. The implication is that the SNP's Scottishness is 
inherent and self-evident, unlike that of the opposition, which has to 
prove its national credentials. The SNP is thereby trying to 
demonstrate that Labour has not successfully . incorporated Scottish 
identity into its ideology. SNP rhetoric portrays Labour not only as. 
• having difficulty in reconciling Scottish and British identities, but also 
in articulating Scottish identity. In contrast, the SNP is depicted as 
having resolved these antagonisms by articulating a unique but 
inclusive nodal national identifier. 
Distinguishing parties and issues using national markers is a 
unilateral SNP initiative, best conveyed in the 'Penny for Scotland' 
rhetoric. It is a potent one, however, and the Labour party has taken up 
the challenge by attempting to portray itself as more Scottish than the 
SNP .7° Further, the Conservatives in Scotland have suffered badly 
from being seen to be an English party out of touch with Scottish 
needs, an image the SNP has exploited and sought to reinforce in its 
69 From an address to SNP conference on 25th September 1998. Elsewhere, in an 
analysis of a piece of Donald Dewar's rhetoric, I examine its ethnic nationalist 
content at greater length. C. Sutherland Nationalist Ideology from a Rhetorical 
Perspective. Paper presented to the History of Concepts Group Annual Conference, 
28th-30th June 2001, Tampere, Finland. 
7° Kevin Pringle opined; "There's no doubt the Labour party was very aware [the 
"Scotland's Party" slogan] worked as well because it was something they were very 
sensitive about, a thing they were always very keen to attack because they were only 
too aware of how important that message was". The Labour politician George 
Robertson is quoted as saying; "The Scottish Labour Party; the real national party of 
Scotland". S. Reicher & N. Hopkins Identity, Mobilisation and Nation: A Psychology 
of Mass Action p. 159. 
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campaigning. 71 SNP rhetoric thus sets up a seeming I y necessary 
conflict of British and Scottish interests and, by extension, of 
identities.72 Thi~is summed up in the party's pejorative labelling of all 
othe~ parties standin~· in ~c.otland ~ 'London parties' .73 Despite the 
dual British and Scottish identitie·s of many Scots, the party depicts 
anything British as being not (read· anti-) Scottish. A dual identity is 
. . '' \ . . .. ·' . . . 
thus portrayed as an advantage when· it c?mes to the Scottish/European 
. . 
combination, but the British/Scottish variant cannot be countenanced 
by the SNP.74 The party ~e]~ts the. Scotti~h tradition of Unionist 
nationalism completely?~.·,:F<>{in~t~~e, the party officially distanced 
itself from the view exp·~~.~sed.-~ubli.cl},. by th~· MSP ~drew ·welsh that 
... British identity could :pht~>~ .·P.art·i_i~. t4e. makeup of an independent 
: : I 1' I~ ~ ,·: I ; \ I l 00 0 .' ' \,\ • ,I } I 'I ': I 1 I /,: ·, / . •, \ .' ' 
Scotland.76 It has been shown that the· debate surrounding the concept 
,· .. ,·.,' l ..... · .. •, •.' . 
·.:. of~he Scottish n~tiorVi:~,~~-~~?-~~~d o~:.fd,~~~~gi:ta~,.~~~i~~ beca~se o~the .. 
. conflicting political proj~ts._it _expresses: The SNP has chosen to solve .. 
' • ',' ·,, -:~:•1\,\,',·.'.).:•' '~".~·.,/':; '.~· ... «., ·. • ; • I • 
· ·. the antagonism_:.between_l.~co.~i~h; an~; ~riti~h .l~vel~. of identity by. 
• ' ·.' lj '. ' ; ~·~: :,•,~·.-:·, •;,\•.' ·::: ol .~·'·; ·,·~· .' .. ; '•;. ,·,; ·~·': o! ·:,: .· t ' • • ,' ' 
··focusing its rhetoric· exclusive!}' on Scotland in order· to further its core 
goal of national self-det~~i~ati~n·. As .. ~iil . be di~cussed below, the 
CSU approaches th~/~fu~~iri~m.·;· b~_~e-eri.\ Gennan and Bavarian 
. \ • .r , 
identities in quite a different way .. :. .. .. 
.. ·• ·, . 
. ·, . 
. ·. ·;_ ... , .. 
. . . . 
'I,. ·•''•'! ·.\ . 
' I ," o '·, ~ .' :' j I _. • 
! .. 
. , .; • I.. . ·. '• 
, ' .. ,_. ··:.·: 
.,1' . : • ,· .... • • 
71 Alasdair Morgan commented~ ,.,Th~~e ~as {~egati~~·s~and i~·the sense that . 
particularly the Conservatives. we~e seen to be and were certainly being portrayed by 
· us as being very anti-Scottish [!::]But I think'themore positive side of it was to try 
. ; .· ·to tap into any feeling of Scottish identity [.:.] It was to. try to tap into almost a more 
· · emotional appeal". . . · · · .r.·. ·.,>,. ; . : ,:, : · · ': · :·:;: .t· ·.. · ·. ~· .. :, ·.:· · . . .·· 
72 Gordon Wilson interpreted the 'Scotland's Party' ~logan thus; "I think it's set out 
as a contrast to the other parties which were England's parties" and Peter Murrell 
said "it's Scotland's party because they're not'~.· .: · · · 
73 An SNP flyer produced for the t'999 Scottish electi~n campaign made the contrast 
clear in its slogan; "Scotland's Party or London Labour". 
74 As was discussed in chapter seven, a dual Scottish-European identity is positively 
interpreted by the party, and is explicitly contraSted with English attitudes. George 
Reid highlighted which dual identity the party preferred; "It's significantly easier 
because of the three hundred years of ScotS dual identitY for Scots to move to a 
Scots-European position than for people in England". . · · . 
15 G. Morton Unionist-nationalism: the historical construction of Scottish national 
identity, 1830-1860. . . . . 
76 The prominent S~ politician Roseann~ Cunningham delivered a lecture series in 
which she asserted that Britain had not existed as· a nation since the end of World 
War 11, and that it was time to move on and adopt new identities. See 'Being British 
is a Thing of the Past' in The Scotsman of 13th February 1999. 
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The CSU 
In the late 1970s, then chancellor Willy Brandt used the phrase 
"the clocks work differently in Bavaria" (in Bayern gehen die Uhren 
anders ), to indicate that the Land was widely perceived as being 
different to the rest of Germany. This judgement, somewhat 
condescendingly delivered by an SPD politician, was hotly debated in 
academic, political and media circles alike. 77 It expresses the 
stereotypical German view of Bavarians, summed up in Josef 
Lindner's sarcastic comment as "a sort of exotic mountain people, to 
put it quite starkly, [ ... ] who still want to feed their cows on the 
mountain pastures of their province."78 However, Brandt's phrase was 
soon taken up by Franz Josef StrauB and turned into a positive 
expression of pride in Bavaria's particularity.79 An important 
component of CSU strategy has been to overcome the · alleged 
superiority complex of Northern Germans vis-a-vis Bavaria by 
presenting Bavarian identity as something overwhelmingly positive. In 
terms of discourse theory, this corresponds to tackling the identity 
crisis symptomatic of ideological antagonism. 
The party's attempt to foster a self-confident image for Bavaria 
is evident in the link it makes between Bavaria and beauty. This, in 
turn, can be subdivided into three elements; the prettiness of the 
countryside, the moral probity of the people and the Land's economic 
prosperity. As was pointed out in section one of this chapter, the idea 
of 'das schone Bayern' is illustrated throughout the CSU's hrtest 
manifesto. The title of Riehl-Heyse's book, which translates as "the 
party which invented beautiful Bavaria", in itself underlines that the 
CSU created the rhetorical construct. 80 The evocation in party rhetoric 
77 For a commentary and bibliography of the academic debate, see AlfMintzel 
'Bayern und die CSU' in B. Haneke & R. Hopfinger (eds.) Gechichte einer 
Volkspartei - 50 Jahre CSU at p. 198 
78 ["eine Art exotisches Bergvolk, urn es mal ganz krass darzustellen [ ... ] die wollen 
dann in ihrer Provinz auf den Almen noch ihre Kiihe fiittern".] 
79 "It is often said, that in Bavaria the clocks work differently. That is true- and in 
our opinion they work correctly!" ["Es heiBt dann oft, in Bayern gingen die Uhren 
anders. Das stimmt - und nach unserer Meinung gehen sie richtig!"] Franz Josef 
StrauB, in a speech to the CSU party conference in Munich on 22"d November 1985. 
80 H. Riehl- Heyse CSU- Die Partei, die das schone Bayern erfunden hat. The slogan 
used in the poster campaign for the 1998 Bavarian election - "schon, in Bayern zu 
leben"- was a variation on the same theme. 
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of fertile fields, majestic mountains, pure waters (and even beer) has a 
symbolic function. 81 Tellingly, the party regularly exploits the linkage 
of the words 'culture' and 'countryside' in the composite German noun 
Kulturlandschaft, which means land cultivated by man, but can also be 
used in the figurative sense of cultural landscape. 82 This conveys the 
image that the purity of Bavarian pastures is mirrored in the values and 
the rootedness (Bodenstiindigkeit) of its citizens. The Land is 
represented by the CSU as, quite literally, a moral high ground. In turn, 
the party employs this rhetoric without appearing anachronistic by 
supplementing it with industrialisation and modernisation policies. 
Alfons Zeller recognised the strategic challenge of combining 
the themes of tradition and progress when he said; 
That is always something difficult for the CSU. To preserve Bavarian 
identity on the one hand and on the other not to be labelled as 
hillbillies. 83 ~ 
The CSU wishes to affirm the particularity and value of its national 
construct vis-a-vis the rest of Germany. Its emphasis on Bavaria's 
achievements, embodied in slogans such as "Bavaria's out in front" 
(Bayern vorn ), expresses the party's attempt to overcome the 
articulation of Bavaria as inferior. Literally, the CSU aims to leave 
behind the 'Other' implicit in this slogan. A leaflet produced for the 
German federal election of 1999 confirmed that this strategy is 
expressed most explicitly when Bavaria's important standing in the 
German political arena is being underlined. Using superlatives 
throughout, a total of eleven policy areas were listed in which Bavaria 
was 'out in front' compared to the rest of Germany, including levels of 
81 JosefLindner put the sentiment thus; "As a Bavarian I naturally like the mountains 
and the lakes and Bavarian beer and Bavarian bread and have an emotional bond 
there, so to speak". ["Ich natiirlich als Bayer mag die Berge und die Seen und das 
bayerische Bier und die bayerische Brezn und da sozusagen eine emotionale Bindung 
babe".] 
82 See, for instance, __ the text reproduced in chapter six, section two. 
83 ["Das ist immer ein schwerer Gang der CSU. Auf der einen Seite bayerische 
Identitat zu wahren und umgekehrt nicht als hinterwaldlerisch abgestempelt zu 
werden".] 
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long-term unemployment, foreign investment, debt stock and research 
and development. 84 
The evocation of economic prosperity 1n CSU rhetoric is 
particularly important to its confidence-building strategy. Frequent 
references to Bavaria's rapid post-war development from a relatively 
backward agrarian Land to one of the richest in Germany are designed 
to inspire pride within Bavaria and respect outside it. In this case, the 
'Other' against which identity is being measured is not Germany or the 
EU, but other Liinder. As has been noted, one of the CSU's favourite 
ways of projecting a positive image of Bavaria is by listing the areas in 
which it has a top ranking within Germany. For instance, recent party 
rhetoric makes unfavourable comparisons to the Land of Lower 
Saxony, where Gerhard Schroder was prime minister before becoming 
German chancellor. This line of argument fulfils a variety of functions. 
Not only does Edmund Stoiber use statistics in order to allege the 
ineptitude of Schroder, his government and the SPD's ideology in 
general, but he also aims to illustrate the Land of Bavaria's superiority 
in various policy areas. 85 The statistics selected by the CSU do more 
than recall Bavaria's economic turnaround, they also suggest that 
Bavaria has a certain moral advantage over other Liinder; 
One has the feeling that many things here in Bavaria are still in good 
order, at the state level, in the municipalities, in families. 86 
CSU rhetoric invites one to infer from good exam results, for exam,Ple, 
not only that the Bavarian school system is more effective but also that 
Bavarian schoolchildren are more intelligent. In a similar vein, 
Edmund Stoiber regularly quotes Straul3's saying that Bavaria's most 
84 ["Bayem hat bundesweit den niedrigsten Anteil an Langzeitarbeitslosen [ ... ] 
Bayem ist der gefragteste Standort fur ausHindische Investoren. Bayem hat die 
geringste Pro-KopfVerschuldung aller Uinder. Bayem gehort zu den 
forschungsintensivsten Standorten der Welt''.] 
85 "In Bavaria there is no open drug scene or lawless areas as in the 'days of chaos' in 
the Lower Saxony of SPD chancellor candidate Schroder". ["In Bayem gibt es keine 
offene Drogenszene oder rechtsfreie Raume wie bei 'Chaostagen' im Niedersachsen 
des SPD-Kanzlerkandidaten Schroder".] From an address by Edmund Stoiber 
published in the Bayernkurier on 29th September 1998. 
86 ["Man spiirt, daB hier in Bayern viele Dinge noch in Ordnung sind, im Staat, in den 
Gemeinden, in den Familien".] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber in Bad Kohlgrub 
on 5th July 1998. 
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prectous raw material is Geist, or intellect.87 Further, Stoiber's 
emphasis on certain crime statistics, which are low compared to the 
rest of Germariy, insinuates that the Land remains more morally 
upright than its neighbours. 88 At the very least, the figures contain a 
'feel good' factor in the form of reassurance that nothing is rotten in 
the state of Bavaria. Gerd Muller summed up this sentiment; 
It gives us a measure of self-confidence, an incentive, when we 
observe the economic statistics. Then we are proud in Bavaria to have 
the lowest unemployment, the lowest crime levels. That gives us a 
good measure of self-confidence, also within the German state. 89 
The CSU atms to resolve the ideological antagonism between the 
Bavarian and German national constructs by focusing on the Bavarian 
Heimat as a positive concept that voters will want to invest in 
emotionally and politically. Linking Bavaria with beauty, wealth and 
morality highligpts the common endeavour of party and people in the 
creation and preservation of the nation. At the same time, it presents 
the political solution for a similarly prosperous future as self-evident; a 
vote for the CSU. 
In the same way as the SNP links party political rivalry to 
territorial identifiers such as London, England or the UK, it has been 
shown that the CSU links the SPD variously to German centralism or 
to other Liinder. However, the 'Other' in CSU rhetoric is represented 
not only by the SPD, but also by the CDU. In turn, the contrast 
87 ["Wir pflegen den 'RohstoffGeist'".) Edmund Stoiber, in his inaugural speech to 
the Bavarian parliament on 12th October 1999. 
88 Siegfried Miiller, a senior speechwriter for CSU politicians, explained the imagery 
used; "Appeals are sometimes made on the basis that Bavaria is, let's say, in a moral 
sense even more steadfast, more stable than in some other regions [ ... ] It is said that a 
certain system of values is perhaps more strongly present in Bavaria [ ... ] People are 
respectable, moral and so on. One seeks to emphasise, then, that things are allegedly 
better here in Bavaria than elsewhere". ["Es wird manchmal auch appeliert daran, 
dal3 Bayem, sagen wir, in moralischer Hinsicht noch gefestigter, stabiler ist als 
manche andere Regionen [ ... )Man sagt, eine gewisse Wertorientierung ist in Bayem 
vielleicht sHirker vorhanden [ ... ) Die Leute sind anstandig, moralisch und so weiter. 
Das versucht man also etwas herauszustellen, dal3 das in Bayem angeblich besser ist 
als anderswo".] 
89 ["Es gibt uns ein Stiick Selbstbewu13tsein, Anspom, wenn wir die wirtschaftlichen 
Kenndaten betrachten, dann sind wir stolz in Bayem, die niedrigsten Arbeitslosigkeit 
zu haben, die niedrigste Kriminalitat zu haben. Das gibt uns eins Stiick weit 
Selbstbewu13tsein, auch innerhalb der Staatlichkeit Deutschlands".) 
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between parties is often used as shorthand for pointing out the 
differences between Bavaria and the rest of Germany. For instance, the 
CSU's emphasis on Bavaria's national autonomy and particularity -
politically, socially and geographically - is reflected in its 
characterisation of itself as the 'the party which articulates clearly' 
(Partei der deutlichen Aussprache). This is an attempt by the party to 
distance itself from the CDU, which it criticises for being indecisive 
and lacking in focus. 9° Charles W esten commented; 
One needn't take coalition partners into consideration here [in Bavaria] 
and we can support 'pure doctrine', so to speak.91 
This rhetoric is also a general attack on German-wide parties standing 
in Bavaria, which are portrayed as less able to articulate a specifically 
Bavarian programme.92 In contrast, the CSU professes to speak its 
mind and thus formulate what the Bavarian electorate 'really thinks' . 
The importance accorded by the CSU to retaining crucifixes in school 
classrooms and its strict stance on abortion not only appeal to 
conservative sensibilities but also serve to demarcate Bavaria as a Land 
with a primarily Catholic population and a strong Catholic tradition, as 
opposed to the predominantly Lutheran religious influence in the rest 
of Germany.93 Moreover, the CSU's policy position is often to the 
right of the CDU on the political spectrum. Franz Josef StrauB' dictum 
- that there should be no party to the right of the CSU - continues to be 
followed by the party.94 This strategy is evident in its hard line on law 
90 Siegfried Muller stated; "That is a core principle of the CSU's self-understanding. 
Where the CDU remains a little uncertain, the CSU expresses itself clearly and 
plainly". ["Das ist ein Kemsatz des Selbstverstandnisses der CSU. Wo die CDU doch 
ein Stiick unbestimmt bleibt, da aul3ert die CSU ganz klar und eindeutig."] Siegfried 
Muller 
91 ["Hier muss man keine Riicksicht auf Koalitionspartner nehmen und kann 
sozusagen 'die reine Lehre' vertreten".] 
92 Markus Ferber commented; "Of course people realise that a party like the SPD, 
which has a national [sic.] structure, always has to make compromises between 
individual regions or individual Liinder and individual strands in the party". ["Die 
Menschen merken natiirlich schon, daB eine Partei wie die SPD, die eine nationale 
Struktur ja hat, immer ein Kompromil3 schon mal schliel3en mul3 zwischen einzelnen 
Regionen oder einzelnen BundesHindem und einzelnen Parteistromungen".] 
93 On the abortion issue, see Edmund Stoiber's inaugural speech to the Bavarian 
parliament on 29th October 1998. On the question of crucifixes in state schools, see 
A. Mintzel CSU. 
94 "Franz Josef Straul3 was right to warn that no democratic party should be allowed 
to emerge to the right of the CSU". ["Franz Josef Straul3 hat zu Recht davor gewamt, 
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and order and immigration policy, to the extent that far-right parties 
felt it unnecessary to stand in the last Bavarian election.95 Alfons Zeller 
commented on Edmund Stoiber's critical stance towards the current 
level of immigration to Germany as follows; 
',· 
,· .: .. : .. · 
Stoiber disapproved of thi~ politically quite heavily and he is thereby 
the one who, in quotatioii ·marks, is still keeping our Bavaria clean. 
Stoiber played that politicaJly very. well, I'm saying quite deliberately 
that he played it politically.!. He. ~c~ieved :gi-eat popularity because of 
· · that. 96 · , · · : ~ ' · ·. •: · :,: · : · , 
'., 
.. ' , . : . • : : :, ; \ ·~ ·,I, . . . . '. · .• : ~ _.: 
:.:Despite Zeller's use of,'s~ar~~q~~tes~-/_ihd:'riotion .. of keeping Bavaria·· 
.. clean is clearly raci~t. .H<;>~e~er, i~. is. not indicative of CSU rhetoric as 
' ' ', . ~ . :: ~ 1 ' :' I ( • I • l . I '. ; . . . '· ~ . ' p ,• ' ; I I 
. a whole, which is careful t() avoid _such polemical images. The fact that 
strategic thinking lies !pehi#d ;st6ib~~~ s ·rhetoric. is conveyed in Zeller' s · 
p~ase "he p~~ye.d it p6i~t.id~Ily~~~·.; .. <r:.;~r\::/<,·:,< .. ·'.:.\ ·.:; · . 
.... ·.• ". :i <m;t, :, ·.·'·:~:· .-r~,~ .. · ... ·.; .. ·•. • · . 
These · aspects\.oJ( GSU l rhetofic·: 'all\ ·contribute to delimiting 
• • • : I t ' I : ~, ' : • . : . ' . ,' \ ' ' , ' ·. ,' ~ t I 
Bavaria as. an· altematiy~: national;·:· construct'· .to Germany. By 
· representing the Hei~at ~;~:~tied .~dentitY,: 'the ~SU is rearticulating 
the parameters of nati-~nali~t di~course around Bavaria as a nodal point. 
At the same time, the artic~latio~ of Get;ID.~Y as Nation illustrates that 
the CSU is firmly co~itted · t~ ·German·. federalism. It will be 
remembered that CSl(' le~ers'i_;s~ch, ·. ~s. Edmund Stoiber fully 
·.acknowledge their Geiman.:l~entitY:'~4.'~ttach a great deal of weight to 
' : ; • ' ' , • ' , ~ ', ~~ '· : • ' , • I ' • • 1 I o ;, : ~ ~ ' 0 
1 
' 1 ' ' 
. : the party's institutional ~ti'itl.'role, (~nsti~utionelle Doppelrolle). Indeed, 
. · at a time when Germany>vas stilffdivided ·into East and West, Franz 
·. Josef StrauB stated that h~· ~~uld ·defe~d .h.is conviction that Germany 
< . . ' ' ...... ; .;':;'::·:;·:<< .·:~· ::··.\\?·.,·::·;::> ·.· ·.:,. ; ' . : .. -: '' . . . . 
. daB rechts von der CSU keine demokratisch~ Paitei entstehen darf'.] From a speech 
by Edmund Stoiber in Munich· on· 11th October.l995.' . . 
95" . ' ~:..· . ' ': .. ;, . . . .': '· \ .'. ·. . . '.' 
The far-right DVU- the German People's Union- is not bothering to field any 
candidates in the Bavarian election. Its spokesman Bemhard Droese explains why: 
'Here in Bavaria, there's little to. gain for the right. The.CSU have used all our 
policies in their manifesto and ~e.'re_quite'happy_witbthat, 'we can't see any point in 
fielding our own candidates'". Aliti~Forei!iner Campaigning in Bavaria, 13th 
September 1998. . . . . .· · .. 
http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/hilenglish/special ~ report/1998/09/98/gennan elections/news id 
169000/169484.stm#top, cons~lted on 8~ April2001~:. ·. 
96 ["Das hat Stoiber_ganz mas~iv politis~h ~bgel~hnt und ~mit [ist er der,] der unser 
Bayem noch, in Anfiihrungszeichen, sauber halt [ .· .. ] Das hat Stoiber sehr gut 
politisch gespielt, ich sage ganz bewuBt politisch gespielt. Damit hat er eine gro6e 
Popularitiit bekommen".] · · 
· .. ,•' 
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was one nation, even if it meant 'being the last Prussian'. This is a 
strong formulation for a Bavarian such as he, and shows the depth of 
his commitment to the CSU's vision of German nationhood.97 The 
CSU thus delimits the Bavarian discursive space as the Heimat within 
the larger German construct of Nation, emphasising Bavarian 
particularity and sovereignty without arguing for independence from 
the federation. This constitutes the party's ideological resolution of the 
antagonistic tension between Bavarian and German identities. The 
SNP, in contrast, proposes a radical alternative to the United Kingdom, 
namely its dissolution and the creation of a Scottish state. Both parties, 
however, seek to resolve the antagonistic tension between state and 
sub-state levels of identity by adapting their core commitment to 
national self-determination to the contemporary political arena. 
Conclusion 
Discourse theory has been applied to CSU and SNP ideology in 
order to situate the variants of neo-nationalism propounded by the 
parties within an explicit theoretical framework. This theory views 
society as a contingent construct in which relationships between 
concepts are formed, propagated and maintained by means of 
institutions, language, customs and practices. Taken together to mean 
discourse, they form the supporting framework which serves 
temporarily to fix social identities, thereby providing an illusion of 
certainty and stability. Political parties play an important role in 
interpreting, channelling and adapting discourse to further their own 
ideological projects. Following the Second World War, the CSU was 
sensitive to the particularly loaded significance of certain German 
concepts. Intent on operating a hegen1onic rearticulation in Bavaria, its 
focus on Heimat as a nodal point of its rhetoric enabled it to in~ulge in 
emotional appeals to Bavarian solidarity, whilst avoiding National 
97 "[Straul3] was miles away from any form of separatism, but instead was proud to 
call himself a 'German patriot'. This attitude culminated in his statement that 
Bavarians would have to be the last Prussians if need be, if the unity of Germany 
demanded it". ["[Straul3] war meilenweit von jedem Separatismus entfemt, sondem 
bezeichnete sich stolz als 'deutscher Patriot'. Diese Haltung gipfelte in seinem 
Ausspruch, dal3 notfalls die Bayem die letzten Preul3en sein mul3ten, wenn die 
Einheit Deutschlands es erforderte".] Edmund Stoiber, in a speech commemorating 
ten years ofFranz JosefStraul3's death in Munich on 3rd October 1998. 
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Socialist connotations.98 This is equivalent to applying typical nation-
building methods which, in turn, became self-perpetuating as the 
equation of party, Land and people became more thoroughly 
entrenched through the party's economic and electoral success. 
The SNP's ideology, on the other hand, can be described as 
antagonistic to the current dominant discourse, which continues to 
centre on the United Kingdom construct as the focus of 'national' 
politics. Yet institutionally as well as rhetorically, the advent of the 
Scottish parliament has begun to undermine the common sense notion 
of the UK. as a nodal point of political discourse. Ultimately, the SNP's 
aim is to make its interpretation of Scottish nationhood the crucial 
identifier of a new political arena, and achieve conceptual hegemony 
by successfully articulating an alternative to the existing 'nation-state' 
construct. However, although the SNP's claim to be the only 'truly' 
Scottish party is intuitively strong, it continues to be vigorously and 
• effectively contested in the rhetoric of the political opposition. In its 
own rhetoric, the evocation of a shared history and a sense of 
belonging is treated gingerly by a party careful to avoid accusations of 
making exclusionary, ethnic appeals. The CSU, on the other hand, has 
neatly sidestepped the negative connotations of the word Nation and 
enjoys conceptual hegemony within Bavaria. The chapter has shown 
that discourse theory provides us with a fruitful and illuminating 
framework for studying neo-nationalist ideologies. The dynamics of 
nodal articulation, conceptual hegemony and antagonistic practices 
structure investigation into and comparison of nationalist variants, 
whilst retaining the richness of data which allows them to be 
appreciated in their specificity. 
98 
Siegfried Muller noted; "In general there is hardly a federal politician who will talk 
about Germany in the same way as Bavarian politicians talk about Bavaria [ ... ] That 
is simply a problem that arose as a consequence of National Socialism". ["Es wird 
insgesamt so gut wie keinen Bundespolitiker geben, der in dieser Weise sich iiber 
Deutschland auBer( so wie meinetwegen bayerische Politiker sich iiber Bayem 
auBem ( ... ] Das ist einfach das Problem, daB sich in der Folge des 
Nationalsozialismus ergeben hat".] 
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Conclusion 
~~In politics, each opposing party or political force tries to win general 
acceptance for its own discourse type [. . .] The stake is more than 
~mere words '; it is controlling the contours of the political world. " 1 
A study of nationalist ideology from a post-modern perspective 
presupposes "the impossible unity of the nation as a symbolic force". 2 
It approaches the nation as a discursively constructed space, thereby 
questioning the very possibility of an unmediated reality. Such a study 
does not look for truth but seeks to understand the nature of 
ideological constructs instead. In other words, discourse theory 
structures an investigation into how the nation is 'narrated'. 3 Each 
nationalist variant can be characterised as a specific articulation of 
concepts around the nodal point of the nation, corresponding. to 
nationalism's ideological core. In turn, to describe an ideology in 
terms of core and peripheral principles is to engage in dissecting the 
structure of meaning it represents. Discourse theory frames and 
enriches this analysis of the particular by revealing the contingency 
and hence the adaptability of neo-nationalism. In tracing the dynamics 
of conflicting ideologies, it pushes us to question "the world-system of 
nation-states" and to reassess the coherence of discursive constructs 
that appear to be common sense. 4 A world in flux leaves everything 
open to debate. Indeed, asserting the all-pervasiveness of ideology 
underlines the need to deconstruct those Weltanschauungen which 
offer to make sense of our world. An insight into the mechanism of 
meaning creation can only enhance our understanding of the way in 
which nationalist ideology functions. Consequently; 
To understand nationalism, we have to understand the practical uses of 
the category 'nation', the ways it can come to structure perception, to 
inform thought and experience, to organize discourse and political 
action.5 
1 N. Fairclough Language and Power p. 90. 
2 H. Bhabha 'Introduction' to H. Bhabha (ed.) Narrating the Nation p. 1. 
3 Cf. H. Bhabha (ed.) Narrating the Nation. 
4 C. Calhoun Nationalism Ch. 6. 
5 R. Brubaker Nationalism Reframed p. 7. 
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Discourse theory provides us with just such a means of understanding 
nationalism. Within its framework, the ramifications of nationalism as 
an ideology ano1:he way in which it structures perception can be fully 
explored. 
In repudiating the possibility of fixed identity, a post-modem 
perspective requires instead that each variant of nationalist ideology be 
studied in its specificity. Discourse theory provides an interpretative 
theoretical framework which can be applied to empirical analyses of 
neo-nationalist movements. It theorises diversity as the articulation of 
elements into moments of a unique discourse. Moreover, theories of 
discourse and ideology complement each other in identifying the 
nation as the nodal point of nationalism, thereby locating the object of 
study among myriad political movements. Despite the flexibility of 
neo-nationalism, this immutable core continues to identify it as simply 
a contempora~ form of nationalism. However, to quote Craig 
Calhoun; 
As a discursive formation, nationalism shapes the form of 
representation, not its precise contents or level of inclusion. 6 
The relationship of nationalist ideology's changing periphery to its 
core can be understood as the intertwining of concepts into an 
internally coherent, if ultimately unstable world-view. In turn, the 
friction between ideologies competing to achieve conceptual 
hegemony becomes manifest through contested concepts. 
Laclau and Mouffe' s notion of antagonism conceptualises the 
debate over meaning in the political arena. A study of nationalist 
ideology based on discourse theory thus translates into a 
methodological concern with rhetoric. To return to Brubaker's quote 
above, the empirical study of nationalist ideology examines "the 
practical uses of the category 'nation'". In order to understand how 
ideologies achieve conceptual hegemony and the illusion of truth, it 
analyses how rhetoric is used to articulate concepts in as persuasive 
and convincing a manner as possible. Rhetoric thereby becomes an 
'artefact' of ideology. An account of the way in which concepts 
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".The birth of nationalist movements indicates the formulation of ideologies, for an 
ideology links action and fundamental belief'. M. Flynn Ideology, Mobilization and 
· the Nation p. 34.-
8 K. Webb The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland p. 108. 
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translated into 'emotional-economic' rhetoric, which mixes emotive 
and rational appeals in order to further core nationalist goals. If 
nationalism is-- viewed as a thin ideology capable of being 
supplemented with a variety of strategies, then it is not incompatible 
with support for European integration. The case studies examined and 
confirmed this proposition. According to Neil MacCormick, a 
"balancing of values" is possible. George Reid commented; 
I don't see any tension between identity and the political as long as 
you don't ask nineteenth century questions where identity, state and 
citizenship must all be inside the same box. 
Another achievement of the case studies was to explore neo-
nationalism's construction of "identity, state and citizenship" in terms 
of discourse theory. With reference to a wide range of primary 
sources, two neo-nationalist ideologies were shown to be antagonistic 
to a hegemonic ~nation-state' construct. Their relative effectiveness in 
bringing about a 'crisis of the hyphen' by redefining the nation as the 
nodal point of an alternative discursive formation was discussed. 
This study has examined two neo-nationalist parties' 
construction of national identity and their support for European 
integration, in order to illustrate the unique combination of ideological 
coherence and political expediency represented by their policies. The 
SNP is an example of a neo-nationalist party in that it pursues its core, 
immutable goal of prioritising the nation by promoting Scottish 
autonomy within a larger European framework. Detailed textual 
analysis was used to show this strategy at work. The party couches its 
chosen interpretation of the nation in aspirational rhetoric in order to 
channel identification with a national construct into votes. By styling 
itself as 'Scotland's Party', it aims to embody the nation and thereby 
politicise an inchoate sense of loyalty to Scotland. However, the SNP 
has not been as effective at translating this strategy into votes as the 
CSU. In the words of the current SNP leader Johp Swinney himself; 
"the CSU has managed, of all the German Liinder, to establish that 
identity linkage". 
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The CSU has sought to defend Bavarian autonomy by 
profiling itself as an archetypally Bavarian party with an important 
role to play in both the German and European political arenas. It is 
neo-nationalist in that its policies and rhetorical appeals revolve 
around a national nodal point articulated in terms of the Heimat. Both 
parties pursue the same core goal of prioritising their respective 
nations, even if the rhetoric each uses differs greatly. The national 
constructs they have developed can usefully be characterised in terms 
of discourse theory, which underlines both the centrality of contextual 
factors and the importance of the ideological manipulation of concepts 
to a party's role in a given political arena. Both parties seek to 'de-
contest' their interpretations of the nation and achieve conceptual 
hegemony by establishing their ideology as equivalent to common 
sense in Bavaria or Scotland. Bavarian political debate is indeed 
infused with the CSU's articulation of concepts, whereas the SNP still 
• finds itself propagating a discourse antagonistic to the status quo. 
To use Edmund Stoiber's own term, the CSU aims to be a 
'trademark' of Bavaria with its own integrative function.9 The party is 
concerned to preserve internal unity and combat the impression that 
Altbayern and its capital, Munich, are more than first among equals 
within Bavaria. Consequently, the concept of Heimat is articulated 
vaguely enough to mean the local, regional or national levels within 
Bavaria. However, the SNP's rhetorical construction of the nation is 
somewhat more inclusive than that of the CSU, which targets those 
who can link a feeling of belonging to the Bavarian landscape and its 
culture to their family or childhood roots. Rhetorically, the CSU 
presents Bavarian history as an important source of identity, the 
strength of which is styled as proportional to the length of time Bavaria 
has been a recognised entity. In turn, it is keen to reconcile a .united, 
apparently homogeneous Bavarian identity with both German and 
European identity. The party integrates the European dimension into its 
9 "It is not the case in any other Land of the German federal republic, that a party is 
also the trademark of the Land. Bavaria without the CSU would be like Bavaria 
without the Zugspitze [Germany's highest mountain] without the Chiemsee 
[Bavaria's largest lake ... ]". ["Das gibt es ftir kein anderes Land in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, daf3 eine Partei auch ein Markenzeichen eines Landes 
ist. Bayem ohne CSU, das ware wie Bayem ohne Zugspitze, ohne Chiemsee [ ... ]".] 
From a speech by Edmund Stoiber to the CSU party conference in Munich on 28th 
August 1998. 
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ideological construction of the Heimat by presenting it as another long-
standing, and therefore complementary, level of Bavarian identity. It is 
thus rendered co-mpatible with csu ideology, but remains subordinate 
to the party's core goal of preserving national autonomy. The party's 
effective incorporation of issues such as European integration into its 
ideology, without losing sight of its commitment to the Heimat, 
suggests that the end of its conceptual hegemony in Bavaria is not in 
sight. 
The SNP's 'Independence in Europe' policy plays an important 
symbolic role in the party's ideology. It provides a backdrop to the 
party's strategy of winning both the hearts and minds of voters by 
wooing them with a combination of concrete economic policies and 
arguments which link a vote for the SNP to an exercise in self-
assertiveness after centuries of 'remote control'. The economic aspect 
of the strategy ierves not only to enhance party credibility but also to 
'sell' the alleged benefits of independence to the individual. In turn, 
the more personal appeals to Scottish identity and self-worth are 
designed to tackle the party's own perception of Scots as too cautious 
or lacking in self-confidence to vote SNP. Central themes of the 
party's neo-nationalist ideology resurface in the European context. 
This points to the party's strategy of using the European Union to 
support, rather than undermine, its core aim of independence. It 
thereby confirms a central conclusion of the empirical study, namely 
that neo-nationalist parties adapt their strategy to contemporary 
circumstances in order to achieve a core ideological goal. The SNP's 
'Independence in Europe' slogan illustrates that nationalist party 
rhetoric can be adaptable without losing its nationalist character for all 
that. Indeed, it is a succinct expression of the ideological core 
('Independence') and its relationship ('within') to the strategic 
periphery ('Europe'). The phenomenon of European integration is not 
necessarily incompatible with a neo-nationalist party's understanding 
of self-determination. 
Analysing contemporary nationalist ideology using the 
conceptual tooLs of discourse theory helps us better to relate the 
strategies employed by neo-nationalists to their core principles. The 
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theoretical framework elaborated in this study is analytically 
replicable, providing scope for its conclusions to be tested in other 
cases. For instance, the terminology of discourse theory comes into its 
own in characterising the fortunes of parties such as the Volksu!tie 
(VU) and the Parti Quebecois (PQ). Both parties began to make their 
mark in the 1960s and represented a direct threat to the majority 
parties in Flanders and Quebec respectively. They were similar in 
emphasising their territorial identities through the constitutional issue, 
although their articulations of self-determination differed. 10 An 
analysis using discourse theory would illuminate how each 
respectively engaged with Belgium's move towards federalism and the 
question of Quebecois sovereignty. During the 1970s the VU, its core 
goals eo-opted or undermined by participating in government 
coalitions, initially distanced itself from its progressive policies and 
then stayed out of government in order to regain a clear ideological 
profile. 11 However, its attempts to contrast its policies with those of 
the breakaway Vlaams Blok sent it back into the ideological terrain of 
other political opponents, leading to further strategic confusion. Two 
'Others' effectively articulated progressive and right-wing alternatives 
to the VU's core goal of strong Flemish autonomy within a federal 
Belgium. This fatally undermined VU strategy and prevented it from 
linking its interpretation of Flemish identity to its construction of 
federalism. 12 
Founded in 1968, the Parti Quebecois enjoyed a rapid rise in 
popularity in Quebec. In marked contrast to a Quebecois identity that 
had long been articulated in linguistic and religious terms by those in 
power, the PQ offered a definition of national belonging based more 
on domicile and identification with institutions. 13 Although self-
10 "Support for federalism was the centre-piece of the VU programme, expressed 
through its definition of volksnationalisme and rejection of the 'nationalism of the 
state"'. P. Lynch Minority Nationalism and European Integration p. 113. 
11 The VU participated in the Belgian government coalition formed in 1987, but 
subsequently resigned (thereby bringing down the government,) a sign that it was not 
prepared to be identified too closely with a government and thereby endanger its 
ideological profile. 
12 "As a party founded to turn Belgium into a federal state, the process of 
federalization has brought the party to a position of programmatic fulfilment". P. 
Lynch Minority Nationalism and European Integration p. 109. 
13 However, the French language continued to be a central element ofPQ policy, as it 
was inherently linked to the occupational divisions in Quebec and therefore to the 
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determination remained the core of PQ ideology, it propounded 
different interpretations of the concept in two failed referenda on the 
question. The antagonistic 'Other' has made itself felt in Quebec 
politics in the past, particularly in the guise of former Canadian prime 
minister Pierre Trudeau's strongly articulated federal alternative to 
Quebecois sovereignty. However, the PQ's ideology has been 
instrumental in replacing Canada with Quebec as the primary focus of 
citizens' identity there. Its articulation of the nation as the nodal point 
of Quebecois political discourse is generally accepted as common 
sense, even if the party's electoral strategy is yet to bring about self-
determination; 
[N]ationalism in its various forms has become a hegemonic set of 
ideas in Quebec. That is not to say that all Quebecois are separatist, far 
from it; but that issues are debated largely within the context of 
Quebec and appraised by their impact on Quebec. All parties are thus 
forced to play on the nationalist field. 14 
• 
Keating's appraisal illustrates how political discourse in Quebec is 
now constructed in national terms. The concept of Quebec has been 
decontested in the nationalists' favour; ideological antagonism has 
been resolved to give the nationalist interpretation conceptual 
hegemony within the territory. 
The achievement of conceptual hegemony is an important sign 
of the rhetorical force of an ideology. It is pursued by neo-nationalists 
in order to further their core goal of self-determination. Indeed, this is 
the unifying characteristic of all contemporary nationalisms, no matter 
how diverse the "narrative strategies" surrounding the core principle 
n1ight be. 15 Both the SNP and the CSU build their ideologies around 
the national nodal point. They aim to construct a rhetorical edifice so 
strong as to make the link between party, people and nation appear 
self-evident. Support for European integration is an element 
underpinning their quest for national autonomy, and future research 
might examine the relationship of self-determination to other 
party's modernising policies. Surveys also show that, despite official PQ ideology, 
98% of those supporting independence are francophone. M. Keating Nations against 
the State p. 100. 
14 Ibid. p. 93. 
15 H. Bhabha 'DissemiNation' in H. Bhabha (ed.) Narrating the Nation p. 292. 
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List of Interviewees 
The following list states interviewees' current and, where relevant, 
previous employment, their relationship to either the SNP or the CSU, 
and the date on which they were interviewed. 1 
Scotland 
John Swinney MSP: Leader of the SNP since September 2000. 
Previously vice-chairman of the party. MP from 1997 to 2001. 
Interviewed on 6th June 2000. 
Gordon Wilson: Solicitor. Leader of the SNP from 1980 to 1990. · 
Interviewed on 6th July 2000. 
Mike Russell MSP: Senior party strategist and manager of the 1999 
SNP Scottish election campaign. Interviewed on 13th July 2000 . 
George Reid MSP: Deputy presiding officer of the Scottish 
parliament. MP from 1974 to 1979. Interviewed on ih June 2000. 
Bruce Crawford MSP: SNP group leader in the Scottish parliament. 
Previously a member of the Scottish parliament's European committee. 
Interviewed on 22"d May 2000. 
Alasdair Morgan MSP: MP from 1987 to 2001. Interviewed on 8th 
June 2000. 
Neil MacCormick QC, MEP: Constitutional lawyer and academic. 
Elected to the European parliament in 1999. SNP spokesman for 
constitutional affairs. Interviewed on 13th May 2000. = 
Ian Hudghton MEP: Leader of the SNP's list of candidates for the 
1999 European election. Interviewed on 8th July 2000. 
Kevin Pringle: SNP Communications Manager. Interviewed on i" 
July 2000. 
Angus Robertson: SNP Policy Adviser, responsible for international 
liaison. Interviewed on 2nd June 2000. 
1 The abbreviations used are: MP; Member of the United Kingdom Parliament, 
MSP; Member of the Scottish Parliament, MdL; Member of the Bavarian Parliament, 
M dB; Member of the German Parliament, MEP; Member of the European 
Parliament. 
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Peter Murrell: SNP pennanent staff member, responsible for the 
party's 1999 European election campaign. Interviewed on 13th June 
2000. , ~ ·: ' 
George Kerevan: E~onomic~ lec~er and journalist. SNP member. 
Interviewed on 6th June 2009_ .. ~ · . ·:·<.'i::.'::.,. .. 
I_.·). 
• .·•·:.,; • r • ,: • 
Isobel Lindsay: Sociology, lecturer.··.· SNP party member and office 
holder until 1989, when she left the party in protest at its refusal to join · 
the Constitutional Conventio·n::Inter-Viewed on lOth July 2000. · · 
Bavaria . ·. ~ ~. ._.; ... •• \:/ ·: ; .• :•: :::::·· .. : ~.: ' : '' ~ ··. \ . 
·....... . .· ..... '.;·.~.\·:··.~::··;·!~:~·~·. :· 
Theo Waigel. MdB: .C.hah~i~ari .. ~/the: CSU from 1988-1999. Ge~an 
·minister of finance~·fi.om\:I989)to\.i998!'>Iiiten'iewed ·on·· 13th March. 
2000. .· , ; ' • : ; ; .~.:·. :.:~~~·i:\::::;:·,:;/::.:;;/: ' : :,.: ; ' I ' .. • • . . , 
Th~~as Gopp~l:· Ci'e~~f~i.\s~~r~t~'/d(;·th~·~.·cs(J:: Interviewed ·on 2nd i 
. . March 2000.· ... ~.: .·i;/i !: . ;i:}t::;:···: , ~;tK/.t:.·gr~, .. ; :· .. ..  · . . 
Gerd MUller MdB: ·M.emb'er· :of the. German.' parliamentary' committee 
for European affairs .. ·l~te~i~~ed\)1{-i~~·F~bruary 2000. ·· · 
• .... : ~: :' .. ,· .: /: ... _';.·.~ ••• ••• .. ; < ; ....... ·,:: ·.~· :: ;. '' ' ..... ·., ... : ·: : ••• ••• ' . . • • ' • 
Alfons Zeller· Mdt: :.'Chairman 1.;(}ft', the'· Bavarian·. parliamentary :·. 
committee for European.\·arl<i! 'federal \)Affairs. Interviewed on 18th · 
January 2000. · .r: ··· · .. ·.:··.· . .";· .. ~\;,. · :; · 
.• .. 
,_ . ; 
· · · Markus Ferber MEP:: Chaifrri~· o(CSU. members of the European 
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Bavarian government. Interviewed on 25t January 2000. 
Markus Schiek: Creative director with the CONTOP advertising 
agency. Director of the CSU's Bavarian and European election 
advertising campaigns. Interviewed on 14th February 2000. 
299 
Appendix 11: 
German originals of texts reproduced in chapter six 
A us Lie be zu Bay ern und seinen Menscben 1 
,Fur Bayem. Mit Herz und Verstand." Das ist nicht nur das Motto, 
unter dem wir fUr die Landtagswahl urn das vertrauen der Burgerinnen 
und Burger und urn eine klare Mehrheit kampfen. Dieses Motto 
beschreibt zugleich, aus welchem Geist CSU und Staatsregierung fUr 
Bayem arbeiten: Es ist die Liebe zu Bayem, zu seiner grof3en 
Geschichte, seiner reichen Kultur, seiner landschaftlichen Schonheit, 
seiner lebendigen Vielfalt aus Tradition und Fortschritt. Aus innerster 
Uberzeugung arbeiten wir fur dieses einzigartige Land, fur seine 
Menschen aus den Regionen Altbayem, Franken und Schwaben, die 
auch zur Heimat der Vertriebenen geworden sind. Weil uns dieses 
Land in seiner unverwechselbaren EigensUindigkeit am Herzen liegt, 
tun wir alles, urn das Erbe unserer vielHiltigen Traditionen, die 
Schonheit der Natur und das menschliche Gesicht des Freistaates zu 
bewahren. 
Wir wissen aber auch, daf3 sich Bayem heute in einer Welt, in der die 
nationalen Grenzen ihre Bedeutung verlieren, den Herausforderungen 
und dem Wettbewerb stellen muf3. Darum setzen wir uns weiter dafur 
ein, daf3 der Fortschritt ,bayerisch spricht". 
Mit aller Kraft kampfen w1r dafur, daf3 Bayem mit se1ner 
geschichtlich gewachsenen kulturellen Identitat als Land der Tradition 
und des Fortschritts auf Erfolgskurs bleibt und seine Stellung in 
Deutschland und einem zusammenwachsenden Europa behauptet. Wir 
vertreten die bayerischen Interessen gegen politische Gegner wie die 
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• 
SPD, die Bayem mehr als Dependance des Bundes denn als 
eigensUindiges Land betrachtet. Sie hat allein deshalb keine 
Alternative zu bieten, weil ihr von Kompetenz his 
Durchsetzungvermogen jede Fahigkeit abgeht, ein Anwalt Bayems 
auf national er und intemationaler Ebene zu sein. 
Bayem muB in guten und bewahrten Handen bleiben. Unser Einsatz in 
Bayem und unser Erfolg wird zugleich ein Signal in der 
bundespolitischen Auseinandersetzung urn den ktinftigen Kurs in 
Deutschland sein. Vertrauen verdient nicht der Veranstalter einer 
inhaltsarmen Politshow, Vertrauen verdient, wer Leistung 
vorzuweisen hat! 
Bayem hat sich den Herausforderungen unserer Zeit mit Erfolg 
gestellt. Bayem hat im bundesweiten Vergleich seit Jahren die beste 
Arbeitsmarktbilanz. Bayem verfiigt tiber eine 
Infrastruktur, hochqualifizierte Arbeitskrafte, 
ausgezeichnete 
wirtschaftliche 
Wachstumsdynamik, ein vorbildliches soziales Niveau und eine hohe 
Lebensqualitat. Diese Erfolge sind zu allererst Verdienst von FleiB 
und Zielstrebigkeit unserer Blirgerinnen und BUrger. Sie sind aber 
auch die Frlichte e1ner zukunftsorientierten, konsequenten 
Regierungspolitik, die den Weg gebahnt hat fur den Wandel vom 
Agrarland zum modemsten lndustriestaat, mit dem Herzstlick seiher 
mittelstandischen Wirtschaft. Wir haben wirtschaftlichen und sozialen 
Fortschritt geschaffen und zugleich fur den Erhalt der historischen, 
regionalen Identitat und der Pragung durch eine bauerliche 
Landwirtschaft gesorgt, die die Seele unseres Landes bleiben muB [ ... ] 
Deshalb gilt auch fur die vor uns liegenden Jahre: Es gibt keine 
Alternative zu unserer Politik - ,Flir Bayem. Mit Herz und Verstand". 
1 Transcript of a speech by Edmund Stoiber, published in the Bayernkurier of 29111 
August, 1998. 
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Zehn CSU- Punkte fiir Europa2 
FUr den 13. Juni gilt: Die CSU ist die Kraft, die bewegt. 
Wir sind der Anwalt der bayerischen Interessen 
Wir stehen fiir eine glaubwUrdige Europapolitik, die die 
bayerischen Interessen erfolgreich zur Geltung bringt. Bayem 
braucht in Europa eine kraftvolle und erfahrene Vertretung. 
Wie in der Vergangenheit werden wir auch in Zukunft die 
HUter der Interessen Bayems und seiner BUrgerinnen und 
BUrger in Europa sein. 
Wir stehen fiir ein Europa der Nationen und Regionen 
Wie brauchen ein Europa, in dem Bayem und Deutschland 
ihrer Rolle gerecht werden konnen. Die Regionen und Nationen 
stiften Identitat und Solidaritat ihrer BUrgerinnen und BUrger. 
Sie sind auch in Zukunft als Trager der europaischen 
Integration unverzichtbar. 
Wir kampfen fiir ein sauberes Europa 
Wir werden nach dem RUcktritt der gesamten EU-Kommission 
streng darauf achten, daB unter dem neuen 
Kommissionsprasidenten · Prodi nur die qualifiziersten 
Personlichkeiten benannt werden. Wir setzen auf ,Qualitat statt 
Quote". Dazu gehort auch et ne Entschlackung und 
Umstrukturierung der EU-Kommission. Die BUrgerinnen und 
BUrger haben ein Recht darauf, daB ihr Steuermittel korrekt 
verwendet werden. 
Wir sind die kompetenste Partei in Europafragen 
2 Published in the Bayernkurier of 5th June, 1999. 
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. .,::·:. Keine · andere Partei Bayems hat auf den Feldem der 
·:·:' ... · .. <,.·:::.~ ... Europapolitik eine vergleichbar hohe Kompetenz wie die CSU 
./.:·
1
: <·: .. :·/ .. :·erworben. Umfragen belegen, daB die Biirger der CSU mit 
\ .~ ·' ~~ .1. ' • . .- :' ' '. . • . . 
.. ,.·· :::. . . . 
· ·::··'.·: .. :.~f:.> groB~m Abstand am metsten zutrauen, die schwierigen . •. ·: ... :.:,,,· .. ···:: '• ·. . 
'.,.. . . ... :.: europaischen Probleme zu losen . 
.. . . \ : ':b.~:: .•..•.. ·.;:,, .·. . 
' ··.;,: .. :.'::'i: ... :·,.:iJ'(~~~:;:wir:~olten d~r Landwirtschaft eine faire Chance geben 
.· ... ':··~~{·i,.:.::'·\:: .. ·. ,::,\'.•·:: ··.··,; ' ; . . 
.:·: ;··,.':.:.':\.\~~Die. bauerlichen Einkommen miissen gesichert bleiben. Wir 
. '. ::j·.·:::.:::)i.:) :. '.: ·,:.: '.. . . . . ' . 
·. ~ · ·. ·. :·.:_:~';':.;~::/;.!·~·;.~~.~:.8~11~~. di~· i ~ )~ayem. 1typische Agrarstruktur mit bauerlichen 
....... 1 I~J·:~~.\:~···,:::,)(:·,',~·'',· .. :-·.~ ~~::/.~t'·l,,l, .. ,·,,·, .'~>.~.''~. '.',' . 
· ... . : . · ·;·.i:;;t:;:~'~\(/:}·.Famili~nbetrieben ~· erhalten, die hochwertige Lebensmittel 
I , •'o ',1' •',, .. /,1',';'J, ,'·') ' ''I ' 
. ·~ ." . '; ·.·. . ,: !I;' • • .. ·:· .• :~.~~·.; ;.::/;.~.:~~{~ eizeugen 'u~d· unsere' einzigartige Kulturlandschaft pflegen. 
. . . :i . . · ·:~~;:.~ : .. :\/: i;!~.j;;~\();;:,:- ,:q./;\'!~:y,; : Y' ·, <· · :. ·. · .· • .· . · · 
· .. · . ·. · ' .. : .. ~\ .. :·.::·.>::;·.:·;'\:x:~:·~'/!!·. Der; rot-gr'ii'neii ·Chaos-Politik in Boon zeigen wir die rote 
:. :·.~,.:. · .. .. :~'?:·. <.·:,:.\,! .. \.\'·_.::~,~._;·//' :·]~ !~.~:\;' I·.;':,·:.>: ... ~.. ··. 
· ..... ,.·, ·, · · .. ,,·.\.''. .-:'o·~ 1 '''}'1·· ·Karte .: . .r.'::J,· ·.I. · <· · 
::.;.·I.·.~·.· .. :,· . .:.:·:;·,..~::-. :>)~r;::··~.il/M~}.:.; ... · .. -~ .. :: ;;.~,:~· .. :{ ::\ .... : .: ·.~.:~, ...... · ·,· · ... : .. . . · 
. · ·. :: ·.:-;··· :~~·;·:::::·, .· ·'!. ··'<:·: .. ~\-;:{':~;~).~~~~b~.Bwj~~~kanzl~r( Schroder ·hatte als .Motto ausgegeben: ,Nicht 
) :·~ . ::. ,' ..... :.~:;;\· ' .... : .. ;· ....... ·. : ·,." . . . 
: ·.: •
1 
· · :· • , • · • ~.~(::·:·.~/.fi!~(. allesl'anderes;,· ·aber ,· vieles besser". Wir wissen jetzt: Die 







·!··.:\: >:; '·' :.:~;\·{~i/.: ... W1.Bundesregierung macht :·alles. schlechter. Anstatt notwendige 
I ;)•,: f ,.';; ·, \\ .· ;· ~~ ;' I •' I ·, I I 1 , ' ' •.' I 
........ ,'~ ·,·, ·\·.::;: · Reforirien 'anzupacken, dreht sie alte zuriick- und sie verkauft 
· ~.,.:: .. ,.·.·.'·)·~.\\.:\.die deutschen. ~teress6n in Europa. Diese Absteigermannschaft 
. ,,. 1 .. . ··::,~:/.'.•::~.: .• ~.~_(~. • .~.·;:· 1 ;, ,tr·,_;-,., ·. . · 
. ·' ·: .·:':::-;·: :.:·:~\.;{~·.:,·~erdient am .13.· Juni nur eines: Die rote Karte. 
1 1 10 
' • • i, .,' .' ; t: ,' 
1 
'i •,~! ,. ; : • 0 ~.· ',·, .... :.:,:~.· ~.~ ,; ,:: ·.·~ '·.·;·:·:,_rl~.''!,.~':.' ~~:·.:",: :.' ·~· ',• ,·· /', ·.' .. : ·•· , I. 0 ' · , I I 
.. .. . :\r;.:··;.~:):~.v?~\r,.:·:· ......... : ..... . . . . . 
.'';; · .... '. ~.: '·.:~::;::.··:··'·\.·r';·;~:;{· Qie ~.steryyei~e~ung brauc~t Weitsicht und Augenma8 · 
. ':· . .... ·.· .... _, :~.:~J~.;~ ... ~~··i!.~~~·~ Die O~t~~eiterun~{liegt · irit politischen und wirtschaftlichen 
; ,, ,,.,··.,t •.'1• :.l' .' , I 0·•' / , 
.. · .. ·· .· · .. ;; .:~:'.;/:~ .. :·:~·>~·~~~t~r~~~.~·.~~ye~s; peutsc~lands und Europas. Zur Vermeidung 
..... : ... · ·.::' ,:~.·:::::;·~ii·i;~/;'{·;~;/~·ll .. -:··. \,'~·. ';, :·:::: ,· ... ·':' ,1'' • 
.... ·,; •• j, :.!t' .. :-.~::,·1 ,·.'.1J.':;,.,\:'On~l ... 1 • ,Problet,nen,, . insbesondere .In den bayenschen 
. ., ·.·, ' ...... !!.'1.'·.\~.';:~\·~·,_:';'·.,: .. :·~~-!\'~··:;,~·~:.,·.··, ... '·. '·, 
., .. ·. ,,..·.-·;;::··\'(' .. ··:/,Gre·~regionen;'. in~·:. der Landwirtschaft und auf dem 
''• ol1 ,•.// '' ' '• '''I.· •' 
_'·/·: ·:~:";.;fi::Arb~its~cll-kt sind pbeq~angsfristen erforderlich. 
• I : \ 
1
' ' • ~ ; : ·, ; • • :1. I ' •. ' ' •,' • 0 • ' • '., 0 , ' , , 
·. · .. ,...-.~;·~·\:' Die·~·christlich~abendUindischen Werte mfissen Leitkultur 
· ~ ', :· .. ··. bteiben i;. ··. ·. 
0
j ' ~ : ,·· i ·' . •
1 
• .' :' • '. I ',. I , ' \ • 
1 
.\ ' 
·. ;: ... ·.· ,\ .~::.:Wir,:\ve~den··~~D.sigegen die Illusion etner multikulturellen 
. ·: .i . : ·' . . . . . . . 
· ...... ·.·-: :Gesell~chaft.: Wegen mangelnder Integration und Homogenitat 
...... ·.:: ·. gefahid.et ~ie die Stabilitat und den inneren Fried en in Europa. 
· ... ·· 
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Die christlich-abendHindische Kultur muB die Leitkultur tn 
Europa bleiben. 
Wir sind Garanten fiir eine Politik aus einem Gu8 
Der Erfolg unserer modemen Politik in Bayem und im Bund 
gibt uns Recht. Unser Politikkonzept, das aus Sachverstand, 
Biirgemahe und der Verbindung von Tradition und Modeme 
besteht, ist ein durchgangiges Modell nicht nur fiir Bayem, 
sondem fiir ganz Europa. 
Das Europaische Parlament mu8 zu einem Gegengewicht in 
Europa werden 
Angesichts der sozialistischen Mehrheit in der Regierungen der 
Mitgliedstaaten brauchen wir im europaischen Parlament, das 
sich zu einem gleichberechtigten Mitgesetzgeber entwickelt 
hat, einen biirgerlichen, einen christdemokratischen Gegenpol. 
Das geht nur m it einer stark en CSU. 
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